TradeMark East Africa (TMEA)

Formative Evaluation of the Capacity Bilding programmes on Regional Integration for the Ministries of East African Community Affairs

Final Report

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Contents

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List of acronyms

ASI	Adam Smith International
CB	Capacity Building
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CET	Common External Tariff
CMP	Common Market Protocol
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EAC	East African Community
EAMS	East African Monitoring System
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
Finaid	Financial Aid
FRA	Fiduciary Risk Analysis
GoU	Government of Uganda
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
KCP	Kenya Country Programme
LGA	Local Government Association
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MEAC	Ministry of East African Cooperation (Tanzania) and Ministry of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism (Kenya)
MEACA	Ministry of East African Community Affairs (Uganda)
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Rwanda)
MINICOM	Ministry of Trade and Industry (Rwanda)
MINEAC	Ministry of East African Community (Rwanda)
MPACEA	Ministry responsible for East African Community Affairs (Burundi)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NOC	National Oversight Committee
NTB	Non-Tariff Barrier
PAR	Project Appraisal Report
PRU	Policy Research Unit

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PSF	Private Sector Federation
PSFU	Private Sector Foundation of Uganda
PSO	Private Sector Organisation
SCT	Single Customs Territory
SME	Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises
TA	Technical Assistance
TL	Team Leader
TMEA	TradeMark East Africa
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSU	Technical Support Unit
UMA	Uganda Manufacturers Association

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The formative evaluation was commissioned by TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) to measure the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the capacity building programmes to the Ministries of EAC on regional integration. Specifically, the evaluation establishes what progress has been made towards improvement of the capacity of EAC coordinating ministries to deliver on their core mandates in order to enhance regional integration. The evaluation provides evidence of project performance over implementation during TMEA's current strategy towards the planned results across the various outcome areas. The evaluation also highlights lessons learnt and challenges faced during implementation from 2011 to date.

2. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) is an East African not-for profit company Limited by Guarantee established in 2010 to support the growth of trade - both regional and international - in East Africa. TMEA has been established with the support of the EAC Member States and a number of co-operating partners engaged in the EAC regional integration agenda. The aim is to grow prosperity in East Africa through trade.

3. TMEA's current strategy is scheduled to run until December 2016, with a new phase being designed for 2017-21. TMEA's budget to-date amounts to £330 million ($540 million), of which about 38% is under Strategic Objective 2 in the area of enhanced trade environment. A significant proportion of this is aligned to improving regional and national coordination through developing the capacities of the EAC organs and institutions and the Ministries of EAC in each Partner State. The capacity building programmes for Ministries of EAC fall under this component.

4. The evaluation is based on a mixed methods approach in order to strengthen the reliability of data and validity of findings, as well as to broaden and deepen the understanding of how outputs, outcomes and to the extent possible, impacts are (and are not) achieved, especially in challenging contexts. This is particularly relevant for TMEA, as data access and quality remain major challenges in the region and there is a desire to continue and improve support to national capacity for implementing regional integration measures in the future. Learning is therefore at the core of the applied formative evaluation strategy. The team undertook significant desk review, rolled out an e-survey and conducted field missions in the five East African capitals as well as Arusha to undertake focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders.

5. The report is structured to first provide some overarching conclusions, followed by findings, conclusions and recommendations specific for each of the countries. The final section provides overarching recommendation for TMEA to consider when developing the new corporate strategy for 2017-21.

Findings and recommendations

6. The key findings and recommendations for the overall programme going forward into TMEA's new Phase 2 for 2017-21 are summarised in table 1 overleaf.

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Table 1: Overall programme assessment against evaluation criteria

#	Criteria	Assessment 1 to 5	Confidence level	Conclusions / recommendations
1	Relevance	3	Medium	**Conclusions:** Overall, most of the country-level capacity building activities were in line with government priorities and commitment to EAC integration. Some project activities started as early as 2009 under fast-track arrangements and well before the first TMEA Theory of Change was developed possibly contributing to some sequencing issues in terms of strategic alignment. **Recommendation:** Keep flexibility in the programme to respond to country specific needs. The Ministries responsible for EAC integration are an important counterpart for TMEA and play a key role in the implementation in the EAC integration agenda. At the same time, after the first phase of TMEA support, the capacity gap between the ministries across the five EAC member states has widened in many areas. Taking this into account, TMEA should continue to consider the national context and reflect on the support that is offered, and provide support within the TMEA boundaries appropriate to each country rather than a "one size fits all" approach. This may entail building new alliances at higher levels of the public sector (e.g. Tanzania) or, where partners are ready to 'graduate' (e.g. Rwanda) potentially moving away from broad based capacity building and towards more issue-based approaches.
2	Efficiency	2	Medium	**Conclusions:** Results for direct outputs and lower level results were identified in all countries. For instance, Tanzania drafted and submitted the Common and Market Integration Strategy (CMIS) to cabinet and made a significant contribution to the drafting of the National Integration Policy Framework. Some countries exhibited good Value for Money (Uganda and Rwanda), while others had mixed or unclear results (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania). Some countries demonstrated useful strategies to address VfM challenges such as limiting technical assistance and enforcing strict travel strategies and policies. Most countries had delays related to TMEA approvals, and some for procurement procedures, though there was an indication that this has significantly improved over time. **Recommendation:** Develop clear Theories of Change at national level with related monitoring and evaluation frameworks to allow for more responsive management of future programming. In the design of its new strategy for 2017-21, TMEA should build on the positive programming experience from the current Phase 1 programmes, especially those which used participatory processes to ensure relevance and national and regional buy-in, to identify strategic challenges and develop a high-level strategic framework. Subsequently TMEA should ensure that national level programmes are aimed to achieve those results. Thorough application of the Theory of Change (or other similar) approach at intervention or national level, currently used largely only at the TMEA corporate level, would strengthen the development of programme and project results chains. It would also strengthen the linkage between all the programmes and projects funded by TMEA. Finally, TMEA should support the counterpart Ministries to develop strong monitoring and evaluation plans that include measurable outputs and outcomes for the programme and have properly resourced and clearly assigned responsibilities for data collection.

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3	Effectiveness	2	Medium	**Conclusions:** While outcome-level results have been more prominent and robust in Rwanda and Uganda, each of the CB programmes has been able to deliver, at least to an extent. Key outcome level results verified by the evaluation include, for example:
				- In Rwanda: EAC commitments were mainstreamed across the four key pillars of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II), as well as the outcomes, interventions and M&E indicators of sector plans attached to specific MDAs - In Uganda: the adoption of the EAC integration mainstreaming indicators developed by MEACA by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. - In Kenya: Improved coordination between MEAC and the MDAs - the MDAs noted that MEAC communicates scheduled EAC meetings and where the joint Kenya position papers are required, MEAC draws up positions that are informed by contributions from the implementing MDAs. - In Burundi: More than 1700 officials, including top management, benefited from six-month language courses with 92% reporting that English had improved their work performance, including their ability to contribute to regional meetings.
				Key enabling and constraining factors influencing the effectiveness of the programmes include the level of management as well as the political and economic context.
				Recommendations: Build in and ensure knowledge transfer. TMEA should consider specifying in a consultant's terms of reference the mandate for their engagement and work with a local MEAC staff member, and develop clear, measurable learning objectives that guide the mentoring and skills transfer. Further, achievement of these learning objectives should be monitored over the life of the contract.
4	Impact	2	Low	**Conclusions:** While the team has been able to identify results on institutional, organisational and individual level, including but not limited to the setting up of organisational units, drafting of strategies and other important policy documents and trainings delieved, in most cases it has been too early to measure the broader impact resulting from the CB programme.
				At the same time, positive indications of impact in most countries have been identified, although being able to attribute this to TMEA, and the CB programme especially, remains a challenge. This has been exasperated by the short time since implementation, which in some cases is still ongoing, combined with the weak design and administration of the respective monitoring framework's for the programmes.
5	Sustainability	2	Medium	**Conclusions:** A challenge for many countries is being able to produce quality deliverables without technical assistance (TA) support. This is directly related to the finding in most countries around the concern that TA transfer of skills and knowledge is limited. Some countries had this challenge exacerbated with high turnover of newly trained staff while others showed a different challenge where the CB programme was perceived to be "extra work."
				Most countries demonstrated that some parts of their CB programme were likely to continue even without TMEA support. Examples of CB programme benefits that are likely to continue after the programme has ended include, where effective, knowledge and skills that have been acquired through the capacity building exercise being cascaded to other officers through on-the-

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job training, mentoring and coaching and for some countries, the ability to continue strategic planning activities.

7. Table 2 (below) summarises the Evaluation Team's findings and the assessment of the country CB programmes based on the evaluation questions.

Table 2: Country programme assessment against evaluation criteria

#	Criteria	Country project	Assessment 1 to 5	Confidence level	Comments
1	Relevance	Burundi	3	Medium	The programme overall is seen as relevant to the aims
		Kenya	3	Medium	The programme seems to have been technically sound and generally in line with the country needs. Mixed results as to whether the targeted population was reached to a satisfactory extend
		Rwanda	4	Medium	Gender equality and human rights were address to a varying extent, generally there is room for improvement
		Tanzania	2	Medium	Mixed results as to whether programme has been adjusted throughout implementation to align it emerging priorities
		Uganda	4	Medium	
2	Efficiency	Burundi	2	Low	Programme has overspent
					Problems with TA
					Most of the programme deliverables are completed. However, due to the political crisis that erupted in April 2015, these key deliverables have not been approved by the government.
					The National Strategy and action plan was the most critical document for the success of future mainstreaming of EAC integration, requiring operationalisation into the individual plans and budgets of relevant ministries.
					The EAMS Burundi was developed and operationalised. However, there is a need to finalise the lab to collect the data, conduct training and reinforce ownership
		Kenya	2		50% of planned activities have been completed, 3 at planning stage, 12 have just started.
					Reasonable allocation of funds to consultants. Communication - 50% of budget, TMEA suggests that this scope was expanded with

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				Low	due approval, however, no data was identified to explain this reallocation Other outputs seem to have underspent, financials not linking expenditure to outputs or activities - cannot do a VfM analysis. Actions taken by TMEA to minimise costs Programme has been develop in response to changing environment, Output 5 was dropped completely Cannot assess results due to lack of empirical data, anecdotal indication of positive results Attribution problem of results to CB programme
		Rwanda	4	High	The CB programme has delivered value for money Some concerns about the costs of international TA, but the programme has made attempts to achieve costs savings through phasing out TA positions and introducing the graduate fellowship programme Structures and procedures in place and functional for efficient project management The remaining concern relates to communication with the EAC Secretariat
		Tanzania	2	Medium	Delayed start of CB programme - led to underspending Reliance on direct hiring of local consultants Outcomes and outputs monitored through the TMEA-designed M&E plan. Evolving toward results-oriented monitoring MEAC highly dependent on the CB programme funding Programme management structures in place and functioning
		Uganda	4	High	Most outputs met Efforts taken to ensure due diligence and transparency. Unused amounts carried forward from the previous year and topped up by TMEA to meet anticipated expenditure, budget fully spent by end of the programme Several activities specifically designed to ensure VfM Coherent programme management oversight and reporting system was developed, with four-year work plan. A single consortium managing the programme Delays could be transparently understood or addressed by the steering committee and/or TOC GoU resource constraint at the early stages of the programme led to some key MEACA technical staff posts not being filled
3	Effectiveness	Burundi	2	Low	Everything came to a halt in April 2015 Communications strategy developed but results cannot be attributed to CB programme. English language component carried out, seems successful. Important document, such as National Strategy Plan developed but not approved by Government. Capacity needs assessment was also not carried out. Problems with significant turnover and poor performance of previous technical assistance. The CB programme supported MPACEA with infrastructure and equipment. Three training sessions were held in cooperation with other programmes.

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		Red	Programme reinforced monitoring capacity increasing frequency of reporting again shorter-term deliverables. Problems with EAMS due to internet connectivity, quarterly labs are held instead
Kenya	2	Low	At least one intervention undertaken in collaboration with the EAC secretariat

Hard to assess effectiveness due to lack of concrete data and clear indicators. Not clear who the targeted population was

No clear theory of change

Policy Unit exists and is furnished, Research Assistants are in place and are producing research papers. Staff received induction training and attended team building training.

Some indication of improved coordination between MEAC and MDAs but only anecdotal |
| Rwanda | 4 | High | The programme has achieved the outcomes sought and targets set. Rwanda provides regional best practice on the mainstreaming of regional integration into policies, plans and budgets of MDAs

TA has supported development of several studies. Data suggests that research from papers feed in to MINEACs decision making process Significant, long-term TA has benefitted

TA has helped mainstream regional integration in the EDPRS II and plans and budgets of relevant MDAs.

Communication with EAC remains a challenge

Lack of baselines makes attribution and causality difficult to measure |
| Tanzania | 2 | Medium | Delayed start, but largely been implemented as designed

CB has not yet achieved intended outcomes or engaged with MDAs, main achievement was the identification of regional integration focal points.

Too early to expect achievement of indicators and short-term and intermediate outcome levels.

Cannot track implementation of EAC commitments and mainstreaming of EAC outcomes due to no sensitisation, no production of progress reports, no launching on EAMS TZ.

Planned Public Awareness study had been designed but not implemented.

National Integration Policy drafted but government shifted responsibility to the MFA, CMIS finalised but with cabinet for approval, impact studies planned but not commissioned.

Capacity development plan designed and implemented and focuses on training.

MEAC operation and management staff have been trained.

Infrastructure investments have been made, especially in IT. Communications strategy developed, with simplified version of the CMP.

Sensitisation of business people on EAC integration issues.

Risk of insufficient political will to support regional integration at highest level, constraining MEACs ability to coordinate and mainstream EAC commitments to plans and budgets of MDAs. |

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			Yellow	Results chain not revised since original design. MEAC focused more on intra-governmental coordination than broader engagement of private sector and stakeholders despite public awareness raising efforts.
	Uganda	4	High	Largely implemented according to plan, where delays occurred these could be transparently understood or addressed by the steering committee and/or TOC. Steering committee chaired by MEACA director and all departments' heads and staff approved work plans. Permanent Secretary chaired MEACA's Tripartite Oversight Committee and members included the TMEA country director and Imani top management Coherent programme management oversight and reporting system Some initial resource constraints In January 2015 - 80% of training courses had been implemented, 92% technical courses and 82% general courses, but only 40% of general management courses. Practically all MEACA staff had participated in one or more trainings, along with 18 MDAs. Detailed M&E system developed with Imani Long-term experts embedded in MEACA with counterpart staff To track progress of implementation of EAC integration commitments, the TSU worked closely with MEACA to develop EAMS Uganda Intermediate objective "improved strategic leadership and coordination of EAC integration across government by MEACA" was achieved Rigorous monitoring and management structure meant that corrective measures could usually be taken effectively The establishment of the national Technical Working Group on EAC implementation having the coordinating role of MEACA was fully recognised by all MDAs.
4	Burundi	3	Low	Programme closely cooperates with other donors such as AfDB, and builds on the EU's initial efforts and is being implemented in close coordination with the AfDB. AfDB projects and the CB programme have many synergies which can increase impact on trade flows. Political stability in the country remains a concerns.
Impact	Kenya	1	Low	Awareness raising: not clear that messages were received or impacted behaviour. No data to confirm impact identified at stakeholder level. MDAs have been sensitised but no data to measure impact. Parallel EAC integration activities are run with the same MDAs - attribution problem. The policy unit was set up. A strategic plan is in place but internal MEAC challenges have delayed roll-out. Unlikely that goals will be achieved during the life of the plan.
	Rwanda	3	High	Despite significant achievements in the improvement of the Rwandan business environment and conformity with EAC commitments, the impact upon its economy will still depend upon its neighbours doing the same. With the immediate pressures of delivery culture in the Rwandan public service, opportunities to reflect, learn and improve means to address these more strategic challenges may not be exploited.

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				High dependence upon TA has potentially negative consequences for MINEAC staff morale and ultimately, the sustainability of the programme.
	Tanzania	1	Low	After 1.5 years, when legal harmonisation and implementation of EAC measures remain a major challenge, it is too early to try to trace the impact upon trade flows or the general business environment in the region.
	Uganda	4	Medium	Too early to measure impact Public and community have increased awareness of the EAC integration programme and coordinating role of MEACE, CB supports seems to have contributed MEACA is growing in strength and influence, MDAs have accepted their leadership and GoU has recognised their strategic role, likely linked to the CB programme The Communication strategy has been good TMEA has given post-programme allocation to employ a communications expert and funding of activities Capacity building on three levels: institutional, organisational and individual
5 Sustainability	Burundi	2	Low	Plans made to develop and exit strategy, but stalled due to political crisis. Main challenge to sustainability. Most deliverables marked as completed but not approved. Continuity of Sector Working Group, transfer of know-how, high turnover of staff, work ethic, methods of work to the MPACEA are big challenges. Unlikely that English training will continue. Programme likely to continue as policy work, M&E (EAMS), reform of the MPACEA structure and human resources.
	Kenya	2	Medium	Benefits that might continue after programme: knowledge and skills are being passed on through on-the-job training, mentoring and coaching and Research Officers' seem to be mainstreaming research in activities; future strategic planning activities can be executed internally, Integration Officers can be used to build the capacity of MDAs. Challenges remain from shifting geographical focus away from regional trade blocs. TMEA seems to see MEAC sustainability proposals as too ambitious. Inadequate staff numbers. Lack of capacity to coordinated the strategic planning process within limited time frames. No mentioning of gender or human rights. However, MEAC remained conscious of the gender mainstreaming agenda despite it not being embedded in the project plan.
	Rwanda	3	High	Sustainability is main concern High reliance on TA, lack of time to transfer skills to staff, a skills gap exists between expectations, ability of MINEAC staff and MINEACs absorption capacity remain challenges. High turnover is large problem.

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				Introduction of Graduate Fellowship programme to address the sustainability challenge but absorption of fellows by not secure.
	Tanzania	1	Medium	Main challenge is general lack of commitment of Tanzania to regional integration, further compounded by high dependence upon external funding. Lack of commitment to regional integration across the government and political buy-in has not significantly changed during the lifetime of the programme. Sustainability of EAMS is questionable due to issues in obtaining reports from other MDAs and technological challenges relating to Internet connection. EAMS sustained largely with support from the long-term M&E TA. Electronic data management solutions have been discouraged as a standard dimension of the M&E framework of MDAs.
	Uganda	3	Medium	Acceptance can only be sustained if it can still generate relevant research based policy initiatives After the MTR, the TL was replaced by Imani with mentoring from TSI Must sustain momentum of successful communications strategy thorough continued engagement with community IT equipment must be updated Information centre must be digitalised Turnover of staff an issue Two paces of EAC integration an issue ("coalition of the willing" vs the slower TZ and BU) Quality of advice must be high *Donors and funding partners must remain convinced that MEACA still has an important coordinating role to play

8. The Evaluation Team used the five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability to assess the overall programme. Each of these criteria was given a score between 1 and 5, where 1 represents "poor" performance and 5 is "excellent" (as shown in the table below), for each national CB programme's performance.

9. The column "Rating criteria" shows how the score was derived in those cases where sub-questions existed, based on equal weighting for each sub-question in the criterion. The evaluation questions, sub-questions and evaluation criteria are presented in Annex 7.

Assessment (1 to 5)	Rating criteria
Excellent (5)	>4.49 – 5
Very good (4)	3.49 - <4.48
Good (3)	2.49 - <3.48
Fair (2)	1.49 - <2.48
Poor (1)	0 - <1.48

10. In addition to the assessment, the Evaluation Team used a traffic light system to indicate the confidence levels of the findings. As opposed to assessing the performance of the programmes as above, the confidence levels indicate the availability of data upon which the findings were based.

Confidence level	Criteria	Colour

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High	All the evidence needed to support the evaluation team's assessment was available	
Medium	Most of the evidence needed to support the evaluation team's assessment was available	
Low	Partial evidence needed to support the evaluation team's assessment was available	

11. Table 3 below summarises the individual country level findings and links these up with country level recommendations.

Table 3: Summary of country level findings and recommendations

Finding	Recommendation
Burundi	
1. Most of the programme deliverables, such as the National Integration Strategy and MPACEA Strategic Plan are completed. However, due to the political crisis that erupted in April 2015, these key deliverables have not been approved by the government. The National Strategy and action plan was the most critical document for the success of future mainstreaming of EAC integration, requiring operationalisation into the individual plans and budgets of relevant ministries.	1. The CB programme should complete remaining deliverables and facilitate the approvals by government when the political environment is conducive to these activities.
Kenya	
1. The programme has multiple design challenges that include: 1) no clear, explicit theory of change; 2) no identified baseline studies; 3) often no identification of stakeholder groups beyond broad categories; and 4) no indicators or set targets to measure change. This challenges the programme to make informed management decisions regarding programmes and activities or understand if they are moving towards, or away from, their intended results.	1. A clear Theory of Change should be developed that illustrates how TMEA aims to bring about change. This can then be used to develop a strong monitoring and evaluation plan that includes measurable outputs and outcomes. For example, MEAC should clearly identify its specific target groups, assess their needs, and then develop a focused and targeted campaign with clear measurable results.
2. The interdependency between the MDAs that impact regional trade in Kenya calls for a comprehensive programme that addresses the EAC integration agenda. TMEA recognises this interdependency, hence its decision to run parallel capacity building programmes with relevant MDAs and private sector organisations that are engaged in, or are beneficiaries of EAC integration. However, this support is not provided within the ambit of a comprehensive strategy to address all MDAs. This has resulted in strained relationships. A comprehensive strategy and programme would help to ensure that sufficient mechanisms for the coordination of the Kenya programme across all MDAs and the private sector players are put in place.	2. TMEA should develop a comprehensive strategy that captures all of the TMEA Kenya programmes under a single approach. This would help to ensure that sufficient mechanisms for the coordination of all interventions undertaken across all MDAs and the private sector players participating in the TMEA Kenya programme are put in place. The Kenya programme should then engage with these organisations and together address the critical capacity gaps facing them.
3. TMEA contracted two consultancy firms and seven independent consultants to implement	3. We recommend that TMEA considers specifying in a consultant's Terms of Reference

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the Kenya programme. Independent consultants were contracted against specific project proposals based on specific needs. However there was no provision to review how the different pieces of work fit together (e.g. ensured no overlap) to support one comprehensive programme. Further, consultants were not always paired with MEAC staff. This did not build the knowledge within MEAC, which impacts on potential sustainability

the mandate that they engage and work with a local MEAC staff member, and develop clear, measurable learning objectives that guide the mentoring and skills transfer. Further, achievement of these learning objectives should be monitored over the life of the contract.

4. There were significant changes to the EAC coordination environment. One example is the implementation of a new MEAC organisation structure that saw both trade and tourism brought under the same wing with EAC regional integration. A second example is the introduction of the "Northern Corridor" group. These changes called for TMEA to re-examine its approach to supporting the regional integration agenda of the newly restructured Ministry as well as the Ministry of Tourism, in order to ensure on-going effectiveness. Such action would have enabled TMEA to realign its interviews in line with the new structures to eliminate overlaps and enhance efficiency. It is true that the overlaps are caused by the Government, not TMEA, but it is in interest of TMEA to support the development of streamlined implementation frameworks to ensure effectiveness.

4. We recommend that TMEA consider this context and reflect on the support that is offered to the various departments within the newly restructured MEAC and to the Ministry of Tourism in respect to the Northern Corridor. Part of this reflection should consider how to streamline the various programme activities.

Rwanda

1. Rwanda has been successfully mainstreaming EAC commitments across government, with concrete progress on the implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol and other commitments. At the same time, the EAC regional integration agenda does not remain static; it is highly political and continuously evolving. Inevitably, other MDAs have other, potentially competing priorities. On the working level, MINEAC has been successful at networking and mainstreaming, but these results may not be sustainable without ministries' full political commitment. Much depends upon the political stewardship of the new Minister and her ability to convene support. In order to ensure continued relevance of support, there is a need to proactively plan for the future direction of integration, as well as both the national and regional political context. While the commitment of various MDAs cannot be taken for granted, there are sufficient mechanisms in place to spearhead integration, also into new areas, such as free movement of capital and services with MINEAC leadership. EAMS is functioning and data entry is expected to be fully automated this year. Concerns however remain about data quality.

1. MINEAC should continue to play a central catalyst and coordination role on the mainstreaming of EAC commitments across the government. There is a need to exercise caution in absorbing the mandate of other MDAs and adopting a greater implementation role. Achievement, such as the progress on NTBs, is an effective example of mainstreaming that can be replicated on other issues, without over-stepping the MINEAC mandate. MINEAC should utilise the experience to disseminate learning across government on both the mechanism for coordinating regional integration issues, as well as the concrete benefits obtained by private sector. Procedures for the verification of the reliability and quality of data input into EAMS should be established and shared across the region. Generally, baseline data should be gathered/established, whether for assessing EAC Commitments or awareness raising. With a view to the particular challenges faced in other EAC Partner States, the Rwandan is an exemplar, and its best-practice should be disseminated across the region.

2. There were several key findings regarding the need to strengthen and sustain MINEAC staff including the challenge of knowledge transfer, the sustainability of TA, and the ability to continue to produce quality products without technical assistance.	2. Concrete deliverables for knowledge transfer should be attached to all appropriate TA's ToRs, with a clear work plan that details how that knowledge will be transferred.
3. EAC decisions are not always clear, which allows broad interpretation of Partner State commitments. Generally, there are some challenges with communication from the regional to the national level (e.g. analysis and feedback on EAMS data).	3. EAC decisions should be carefully transcribed, with a clear description of Partner State commitments. The EAC Secretariat should work more closely with MINEAC during the design phase of studies and interventions. The EAC Secretariat should improve communication and provide more relevant feedback to MINEAC. Likewise, MINEAC is encouraged to proactively influence the design of studies and interventions and seek analysis and feedback on generated data (e.g. EAMS data submissions) through EAC processes (e.g. technical meetings).
Tanzania	
1. Trade integration in the EAC did not factor significantly in the Government's vision or their overall development plans. The lack of progress made on the implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol exemplifies the lack of political commitment to the EAC integration agenda. MEAC's ability to coordinate and mainstream EAC commitments into the plans and budgets of other MDAs was significantly constrained, with progress limited to the identification of regional integration focal points. EAMS Tanzania is not yet launched, with MEAC having concerns about MDAs willingness to provide regular updates. The parallel effort to define so-called "EAC Outcomes" was introduced to improve engagement, but may divert attention from actual EAC commitments.	1. After the elections, we recommend that a political economic analysis be conducted to assess potential champions of regional integration and how to improve the business environment in the new administration. This can be used to inform how to shape more powerful mechanisms for the stewardship of EAC integration during a potential Phase II of support. MEAC will need to demonstrate its continued added value for spearheading integration in the dynamics of the tripartite negotiations and the "variable geometry" in East Africa. This will have benefits across the TMEA portfolio in Tanzania. There is also a need to think beyond the traditional approach to inter-ministerial coordination (e.g. identification of MDA focal points), which could also be included as a part of the political economic analysis. Due to the challenges experienced and foreseen for the roll-out of EAMS Tanzania, reliance upon the EAC Common Market Score Card may prove the best way to assess progress on EAC commitments for the moment. The EAC Outcomes are very general development objectives with little to no relationship with the more concrete commitments that Tanzania has entered into through EAC Council Decisions. We strongly suggest that the focus should remain on the latter, rather than introducing another layer of more general objectives that may distract attention away from the concrete legal and policy reforms required to implement the EAC agenda.
2. MEAC has focused more on intra-governmental coordination, rather than broader engagement of private sector and stakeholders, despite its public awareness raising efforts. Civil society reported that the awareness raising	2. We recommend a mechanism for regularly sharing information and soliciting input at the working level from a broader group of stakeholders, which would likely increase the relevance and potential impact of MEAC efforts.

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efforts need to be further informed and influenced by existing grass-roots networks.	A more formalised mechanism for CSO/PSO (civil/private sector organisation) consultation, such as opening up existing quarterly meetings, identifying concrete CSO/PSO activities and making specific MEAC budget allocations for civil society engagement would help to improve collaboration. Guidance can be sought from the EAC PSO/CSO Dialogue Mechanism. The Public Awareness Survey should be launched and identify the most effective means for transmitting information to the public (e.g. TV, radio, billboards, pamphlets, other).
3. The results chain, developed by TMEA headquarters with external support, has not been revised since the original design. In its current form, it is not well adapted to the current Tanzanian context, and not useful for the management of the programme.	3. For this results chain to be useful, it requires review and revision, with a stronger emphasis upon knowledge uptake and coalition building, and should factor in the constraints and realities of the external environment. We recommend developing a clear theory of change and related results chain that has concrete, achievable, and measureable outputs.
Uganda	
1. Many of MEACA's CB needs identified in the planning phase of the CB programme have been met during the implementation of this programme.	1. Any successor programme for MEACA could include: 1) limited replacement of obsolete IT equipment limited support for EAMS in addition to the Government of Uganda's (GoU) budget support for this; 2) Funding for short-term studies on Uganda's further integration with its EAC Partners and where internal capacity does not exist, continued funding for the staff research grants initiated during the CB programme; and 3) Assistance to develop an in-house staff training programme for new staff.
2. Changes in Uganda's trading environment and in technology mean that the physical hard-copy based information centre funded under the CB programme is no longer fit for purpose.	2. Any successor support programme for MEACA could include resources to create a digital 'virtual information centre' delivered to public sector and private users' mobile and other devices via the MEACA web page or a dedicated app.
3. MEACA needs to demonstrate to both the GoU and potential donors that its capacity built under the CB programme still enables it to: (1) play a significant coordinating role in Uganda's further integration with the EAC, and (2) in the GoU's regional integration sensitisation campaign with the wider Ugandan community.	3. If MEACA is to continue with its crucial EAC integration sensitisation activities, any proposed successor support programme should include a sub-component to boost the effectiveness of sensitisation activities. This could include: (1) continuing with the sensitisation activities currently funded by TMEA as part of their post-CB project communications support, (2) rolling out the digital version of their information centre as proposed in recommendation 2, and (3) boosting their presence in social media in order to ensure that they are able to reach this increasingly important segment of the Ugandan community.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) is an East African not-for profit company Limited by Guarantee established in 2010 to support the growth of trade - both regional and international - in East Africa. TMEA has been established with the support of the EAC Member States and a number of co-operating partners to facilitate the EAC regional integration agenda. The aim is to grow prosperity in East Africa through trade.

2. TMEA works closely with East African Community (EAC) institutions, national governments, the private sector and civil society organisations to increase trade by unlocking economic potential through: (1) Increased physical access to markets; (2) Enhanced trade environment; and (3) Improved business competitiveness

3. TMEA's programme is currently scheduled to run until December 2016, with a new phase being designed for 2017-21. TMEA's budget to-date amounts to £330 million ($540 million), of which about 38% is in the area of enhanced trade environment. A significant proportion of this is aligned to improving regional and national coordination through developing the capacities of the EAC organs and institutions and the Ministries of EAC in each Partner State.

4. Article 8 (3a) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community states that *"Each Partner State shall designate a Ministry with which the Secretary General may communicate in connection with any matter arising out of the implementation or the application of this Treaty, and shall notify the Secretary General of that designation".* As a result, although the set-up date differs, all Partner States have set up Ministries with the mandate to coordinate implementation of its obligations under the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.

5. Capacity building through technical assistance and training, as well as raising public and institutional awareness of the EAC's regional integration programmes and other related support is currently being provided by TMEA to: Burundi's Ministry to the Presidency for East African Affairs (MPACEA); Kenya's Ministry of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism (MEAACT); Rwanda's Ministry of the East African Community (MINEAC); Tanzania's Ministry of East African Cooperation (MEAC); and Uganda's Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA).

6. While each of the country programmes were tailored to the national conditions, a key underlying assumption across all interventions was that if the Ministry responsible for EAC integration improves its strategic leadership and coordination capacity, and if key stakeholders improve their knowledge on regional integration, then the CB programme will support the development of a comprehensive framework for regional integration. For the outcome to actualise, ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) need to implement EAC commitments, as captured by the East African Monitoring System (EAMS).

7. The CB programme fits within the broader context of TMEA's Theory of Change under Strategic Objective 2 on Enhanced Trade Environment. It is noteworthy, however, that some of the CB interventions at country level were actually implemented as 'fast-track projects' in 2009-10 through consultancy contracts directly funded first by DFID and then by TMEA. This meant that elements of the programme were already being implemented in the absence of an overarching corporate Theory of Change for TMEA, providing some challenges to the sequencing of the strategy development process.

8. As part of the fast track projects (implemented between 2009 and 2012), institutional reviews and capacity assessments were done for all of the coordinating Ministries in the five Member States. These assessments, and the experience gained from the wider fast track projects, informed the design for the capacity support that has been provided to these Ministries since 2012.

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9. While TMEA's corporate level Theory of Change provided a useful frame of reference overall, many of the challenges identified in the evaluation at the country level were underpinned weak or non-existent Theories of Change at the programme level. While each programme does have a linear results chain with defined outputs and outcomes, a more clearly defined manifestation of how the interventions are to deliver change was sometimes absent. Where these did exist, such documents weren't necessarily being used to inform programme management decisions, with Uganda and to some extent Rwanda demonstrating active use. While the East African Monitoring System (EAMS) has varying usefulness and success, what was often missing for many TMEA programmes was basic project level management data, such as baselines, clear target audiences, and a clear understanding for how which activities were expected to bring about what immediate change and how that led to, or would lead to, the overall expected TMEA goal.

10. This document is the report of the formative evaluation of the TMEA capacity building programmes on regional integration for the Ministries responsible for East African Community Affairs in the five EAC Member States. The first section provides an overview of the conclusions across the five countries. The following sections outline the broad findings and conclusions for each of the five countries as well as the key recommendations at country level - more detailed reports are available in the supporting annexes. The final section is dedicated for the overarching recommendations.

1.1 Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

1.1.1 Relevance

11. Across the five countries, most of the country-level CB activities were in line with the government's priorities and commitment to EAC regional integration. Tanzania was the one exception due to challenges arising from its membership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the EAC, and a perceived reticence of the Tanzanian government toward EAC integration.

12. Overall, the programmes were focused on building the capacity of the Ministries in line with their individual mandates over a period of five years. During this period the operating environment, as defined by the priorities assigned to regional integration as well as the opportunities and threats presented by it - both nationally and regionally - continued to evolve. During its first five-year operating cycle, TMEA has established itself as an organisation that is able to act responsively and adapt quickly to a changing environment. In some ways, while the CB programmes were initially in place to develop institutions, the biggest successes were in areas that had clear links to core issues to be addressed (e.g. language capacity in Burundi, or NTBs in Rwanda and Uganda). Arguably the long-term commitment provided a good platform for working on core issues.

13. Most interventions had holistic and well thought-out approaches engaging to varying degrees with government, the private sector and civil society, which enabled different focuses and approaches to achieving the overall TMEA goal. Indeed, taking into account the low level of capacity of the Ministries at the outset of the programme and the relative lack of urgency related to EAC integration agenda within other MDAs, in many countries the CB programme has significantly contributed towards EAC regional integration becoming a higher priority on the agenda - and the respective Ministries becoming more respected among other MDAs. This can be deduced, for example, from the increase in participation and level of engagement at TMEA's National Oversight Committee (NOC) meetings, which are chaired by the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of EAC.

14. The benefits from active participation in the NOCs has been clear. In Tanzania, for example, the NOC process has been reinvigorated by a new PS who came from the Ministry of Trade. There was a general sense among interviewees that personality and drive mattered and the agenda was moving along better than before, though still at a slow pace in comparison to

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the other countries. The National Oversight Committee (NOC) is meeting quarterly to review progress, as planned. According to interviews and an annual progree report shared with the evaluator, the Quarterly NOC meetings and related performance assessment matrix have created friendly competition among partners. The Permanent Secretary provided charismatic leadership to these meetings. Generally, interview data suggests that MEAC reporting had evolved into a more results-oriented mode and progress review meetings, in addition to the regular management meetings on Mondays, had grown more common; also at departmental level.

15. The design process, including through the fast track support, appeared to provide solid guidance for programmes (such as Kenya and Uganda) with regards to planning relevant interventions. However, in most countries, due to a general lack of data (no baseline and the inability to conduct extensive qualitative field work to construct retrospective baselines) the relevance of the programmes' implementation and results are not as clear. In some countries, such as Kenya, it was not always clear how all the activities led to, or aimed to lead to, the overall TMEA goal while in other countries, such as Uganda, this was more clearly established.

16. Taking into account the increase of priority assigned to regional integration in the Northern Corridor countries, and the two different speeds assigned for integration between the groups of Rwanda-Uganda-Kenya and Burundi-Tanzania, it is clear that the landscape has changed significantly from 2010 to 2016. The next phase of TMEA will need to be able to respond to these changes, but also to be flexible enough to adapt should new circumstances arise resulting in a different shift in the integration process. By setting up the CB programmes, TMEA responded to the needs identified in the contemporary problem analysis, and this was the logical thing to do at the time, given the circumstances as they were understood. At least each of the countries had all set up their MEACs, and these needed support at the time as the best option available to progress the CMP.

17. The programmes presented various levels of addressing gender mainstreaming from conducting assessments (Burundi) to engaging with gender in various activities (Uganda). In most countries data indicated that there is a need to specifically engage with how to focus and bring about change with marginalised groups and women specifically. However here Uganda provided the most evidence of gender focused activities, and provided the only concrete examples of emphasising the human rights that the EAC Treaty guaranteed (such as the free movement of people throughout the Community, the right to seek work and the right to set up business or trade in the other Partner States).

1.1.2 Effectiveness

18. Strong management influenced results. In Uganda, at the start of the programme, a coherent and robust programme management oversight and reporting system was implemented. This included a four-year work plan, and annual work plans (approved by the programme steering committee) with annual log frames and budgets, and influenced their clear results. While Burundi made some recent progress in the completion of its deliverables (e.g. English language training) the lack of an overall strategic framework severely impacted programme results. The political and economic context also influenced the effectiveness of programmes.

19. Results for direct outputs and lower level results were identified in all countries. For instance, Tanzania drafted and submitted the Common and Market Integration Strategy (CMIS) to cabinet and made a significant contribution to the drafting of the National Integration Policy Framework. Kenya has a Policy Unit and Research Assistants producing research papers in Kenya, where there are indications of improved coordination between MEAC and the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).

20. Lack of data for outcome or higher-level results often thwarted the team in drawing concrete findings for outcome or higher-level results. For instance, while in Burundi one study shows that approximately 60% of the population is aware of the EAC, the data does not indicate

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that this is a result of, or that the MPACEA communication component contributed to, this finding. In Kenya, measuring the change in MEAC's strategic leadership or effectively coordinating EAC integration activities is hampered by the evaluation's lack of concrete data. In Rwanda, general awareness of the EAC is at 92% of the population, while awareness of MINEAC is only 44%. Given the lack of a baseline, it is not clear if this has increased since the CB programme funding started, or the extent of the increase from the start of sensitisation activities in 2010.

21. Rwanda provides regional best practice on the mainstreaming of regional integration into the policies, plans and budgets of MDAs. In Rwanda, the MINEAC has benefited from significant, long-term TA including a Regional Integration Advisor, Communication Adviser, Legal Adviser, Lead Economist, and M&E Adviser. Strong M&E allowed Rwanda to demonstrate higher levels results, where data show that the CB programme has been successful in promoting the mainstreaming of EAC commitments across the government, especially on the promotion of the free movement of goods.

22. TMEA invested significant resources through the MEAC CB programmes to support regional coordination in the EAC. While TMEA has provided support to other parts of the EAC Secretariat, there was no exact counterpart to the MEAC programme, raising questions about whether there was a gap in the strategic approach. However, it would appear that a key contributor to why the reporting by the different Partner States on progress made with implementing the Common Market Protocol was so patchy was that the Member states only reported on progress in areas that they were individually interested in making progress. In other areas the partner concerned usually stalled with responses to the effect that this item is under discussion, or review. In other words, the Secretariat (which only has the mandate to report on progress, not punish the partner states for not making progress) could only hope that by publicising the progress made by some Partners in a specific area would encourage those falling behind to catch up. The Secretariat had no mandate to do more than this.

23. The view from Rwanda was somewhat different, where MINEAC felt that quite frequently there were capacity challenges at the EAC Secretariat. For example, it was reported that at times, the transcription of Council decisions was not done in such a way that there waws a clear indication of what was required of Partner States. Also, MINEAC felt that they were not sufficiently consulted, for example, on the preparation of ToRs for various studies. MINEAC felt that it would also be useful to get more feedback on the EAMS (and other data) provided to the Secretariat.

24. In summary, for national approaches to be able to deliver as effectively as possible, there may be a need to review the rules and procedures of how the EAC Secretariat operates with the MEACs. This could be coupled with technical support to ensure that the formal and informal lines of communictation between the Secretariat and Partner States are well defined and used unequivocally.

1.1.3 Efficiency

25. Some countries exhibited good Value for Money (Uganda and Rwanda), while others had mixed or unclear results (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania). Some countries demonstrated useful strategies to address VfM challenges such as limiting technical assistance and enforcing strict travel strategies and policies. Uganda was direct with their approach, with a number of the activities undertaken under the Finaid component specifically designed to ensure Value for Money. Others took a programmatic approach to challenges, such as Burundi which had overwhelming challenges with technical assistance and addressed this by reinforcing its monitoring and increasing the frequency of reporting against shorter-term deliverables. Most communications and outreach activities seem to have been conducted without defining target audiences or applying tools for analysing impact, which is a concern considering the sometimes significant budget allocation for these components (e.g. in Kenya over 50% of expended funds).

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26. Most countries had delays related to TMEA approvals, and some for procurement procedures, though there was an indication that this has significantly improved over time.

1.2 Impact

27. While the team has been able to identify results on institutional, organisational and individual level, including but not limited to the setting up of organisational units, drafting of strategies and other important policy documents and trainings delieevred, in most cases it has either been too early to measure the broader impact resulting from the CB programme.

28. At the same time, positive indications of impact in most countries have been identified, although being able to attribute this to TMEA, and the CB programme especially, remains a challenge. This has been exasperated by the short time since implementation, which in some cases is still ongoing, combined with the weak design and administration of the respective monitoring framework's for the programmes.

1.3 Sustainability and scaling up

29. A challenge for many countries is being able to produce quality deliverables without technical assistance (TA) support. This is directly related to the finding in most countries around the concern that TA transfer of skills and knowledge is limited. Some countries had this challenge exacerbated with high turnover of newly trained staff while others showed a different challenge where the CB programme was perceived to be "extra work."

30. Most countries demonstrated that some parts of their CB programme were likely to continue even without TMEA support. For instance, Burundi would likely continue as policy work, M&E (e.g. the EAMS), reform of the MPACEA structure and human resources, since they formed part of the core work of the Ministry. While MEAC in Tanzania remained highly dependent upon the CB programme funding - actual expenditure of the CB programme being more than half of the ministry's operational budget, efforts have been made to institutionalise the support through the establishment of the MEAC M&E Committee and M&E Focal Points at other MDAs.

31. Examples of CB programme benefits that are likely to continue after the programme has ended include, where effective, knowledge and skills that have been acquired through the capacity building exercise being cascaded to other officers through on-the-job training, mentoring and coaching and for some countries, the ability to continue strategic planning activities.

32. A challenge to long-term sustainability is the shifting focus away from regional blocks. Interview data indicates that the new Cape to Cairo agenda[1] that is being spearheaded by the African Union means that the drive towards a deep rooted African Union may soon overshadow the EAC integration agenda.

33. The dynamics of the EAC integration process suggest that the leaders of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have been frustrated with the pace of integration in recent years and have responded by utilizing the Northern Corridor or the "coalition of the willing" to implement agreed policies faster than the other two EAC members have been willing to move.

2. BURUNDI

34. Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country. It is heavily dependent upon the agricultural sector with most people engaging in subsistence farming. The country is still suffering the devastating effects of the civil war that prevailed from 1993 to 2005 with the economy contracting from 1991 to 2005, when GDP per capita declined in real terms by more than a

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[1] Also known as the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)

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third (36%). Burundi has again been rocked by violence since President Pierre Nkurunziza announced his plan to run for a third term, for which he was re-elected in July 2015. Dozens of people have since been killed, including a recent spate of killings of senior government officials, and thousands have fled the country.[2]

35. Burundi has been a member of the EAC since July 2007.

36. Given the lack of a clearly defined results chain for the Burundi Capacity Building (CB) programme, the evaluation drew on the Project Appraisal Report (PAR) with which to understand the CB programme's logic. The Burundi CB programme logic appeared to be similar to the other CB programme's in the region: if the Ministry responsible for East African Community Affairs (MPACEA) improves its strategic leadership and coordination of regional integration in Burundi, this will then lead to the overall outcome that Partner States substantially increase the implementation of a comprehensive framework for regional integration. The original design also notes a specific result relating to the removal of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). Indicators measure the development of a regional integration plan, strengthened procurement and financial management systems, and increased public awareness.

37. The CB programme was delivered mainly through technical assistance and had three main components: 1) Capacity Building for MPACEA for coordinating the EAC; 2) Institutional and Human Resources Development; 3) and Monitoring and Evaluation. There were also infrastructure investments, and a small awareness raising pilot campaign. The CB programme had a USD 4,137 million budget, with a substantial proportion being dedicated to the English Language Component (cumulative component expenditures amounted to USD 1,705,747).

2.1 Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

2.1.1 Relevance

38. The CB programme is in line with the Burundi government's priorities and supports key outcomes of the MPACEA Strategic Plan such as mainstreaming regional integration across MDAs, MPACEA capacity development and broader awareness-raising. Further, the CB programme engaged private sector and civil society in the design of key strategic documents and other CB programme activities. While TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) conducted a gender mainstreaming assessment across the country portfolio, it was not clear how they have promoted gender sensitivity or reached out to marginalised groups. The CB programme addressed, to some extent, the English language barrier that MPACEA and others faced through the English language component, for example facilitating those that participated in this component to better participate in regional meetings. Finally, an added very relevant potential benefit of EAC membership is that it has the ability to promote peace and stability in the country.

2.1.2 Effectiveness

39. With various technical assistance (TA) challenges addressed, the CB programme made some recent progress in the completion of its deliverables. However in April 2015 the political crisis halted all activities resulting in the government not approving documents, such as the National Integration Strategy and MPACEA Strategic Plan and related action plans. Given that progress on mainstreaming EAC commitments across various MDAs requires an overall strategic framework, this challenge severely impacted programme results.

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[2] Appalling Human Rights Abuses in Burundi, Deutsche Welle, 18 September, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/appalling-human-rights-abuses-in-burundi/a-18722879

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40. A notable achievement was that MPACEA completed the English language training and communication component. More than 1,700 officials, including top management, benefited from six-month language courses with 92% reporting that English had improved their work performance, including their ability to contribute to regional meetings. However MPACEA's pilot communication efforts were too limited to have any identifiable results. While one study shows that approximately 60% of the population is aware of the EAC, these data do not indicate that this is a result of, or that the MPACEA communication component contributed to, this finding.

2.1.3 Efficiency

41. The CB programme had overwhelming challenges with technical assistance. Interview data stated that, for example, the initial Human Resources advisor had limited French and was unable to provide contracted deliverables. Another example provided was the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) advisor introducing expensive information and communication technology (ICT) solutions that did not solve MPACEA's M&E challenges. Other data further indicate that the current TA team has spent significant amounts of time reorganising the programme's structure; restructuring has taken place three times since the programme's initiation.

42. Interview data suggest that while there had been programme delays related to TMEA approvals, this has significantly improved. Further, as an indication of good, responsive management by TMEA, once problems were with TA were identified, the CB programme moved to quickly address these by reinforcing its monitoring and increasing the frequency of reporting against shorter-term deliverables. For example, interview data stated that in 2015 new milestone-based contracts were introduced and the Terms of References (ToRs) included short-term deliverables and weekly/monthly monitoring and reporting.

43. Against a total budget of USD 4.137 million (excluding the communications component of USD 216,000), by the end of the fiscal year 2014/15, approximately USD 4.167 million had been spent. The evaluator was not able to confirm if this was an over-spend, or related to the communications component expenditure being recorded as a part of the expenditure. The CB programme made significant outlays for basic ministry infrastructure, which addressed the Ministry's structural constraints. The English Language Component absorbed a significant part of the budget, with cumulative expenditures for the entire program amounting to USD 1,705,747. There is a fixed budget for travel expenses and an agreement with MPACEA that this budget is only used in the second half of the financial year that aims to control travel expenditure of Ministry staff.

2.2 Impact

44. The potential impact of the CB programme has been enhanced by close coordination and synergies with other donors, particularly the African Development Bank (AfDB). The CB programme is building on the EU's initial efforts and is being implemented in close coordination with the AfDB. Limited interview data note that the AfDB projects and the CB programme have many synergies, which could ultimately increase the impact of trade flows, providing the political stability in the country allows this.

2.3 Sustainability and scaling up

45. As the CB programme was winding down in 2015, there were plans to develop an exit strategy. However, due to the political crisis the plan was never completed. The lack of this plan constitutes the main challenge to the CB programme's sustainability. While most programme deliverables are reported as completed, they are also reported as not yet approved. A critical example of this is the National Integration Strategy and MPACEA Strategic Plan and action plans.

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46. The latest quarterly report (January – March 2015) highlighted continuity and sustainability as key challenges for the CB programme. Interview data suggest that the TA team is very conscious of this. Interview data indicated two specific challenges: (1) the need to ensure transfer of knowledge and skills to the MPACEA officials and (2) concerns over the continuity of the Sector Working Group.[3]

47. According to some interviews, MPACEA staff are hesitant to do "extra" work and the CB programme was perceived to be on top of regular duties. For this reason, a few interviewees suggested that long-term TA was more sustainable. However, high turnover affected the sustainability of TA, as those with better capacity tended to move to positions outside the Ministry. Further, interviewees stated that the CB programme was only "scratching the surface" with regards to knowledge transfer, which influences sustainability. Nevertheless, according to some interviews, the CB programme would likely continue even without TMEA support, such as policy work, M&E (e.g. the East Africa Monitoring System, EAMS), reform of the MPACEA structure and human resources, since they formed part of the core work of MPACEA. Interview data however noted that the concern was about sustaining the quality of this work, which they thought would be lacking without external TA.

48. Finally, when the CB programme ends the English training will likely not continue as it required substantial financial investment. However, it had a "in-built" sustainability mechanism though the training of trainer component and this may be further reinforced by the government or another donor.

2.4 Recommendations

49. **Key Finding 1:** Most of the programme deliverables, such as the National Integration Strategy and MPACEA Strategic Plan are completed. However, due to the political crisis that erupted in April 2015, these key deliverables have not been approved by the government. The National Strategy and action plan was the most critical document for the success of future mainstreaming of EAC integration, requiring operationalisation into the individual plans and budgets of relevant ministries.

50. **Recommendation:** The CB programme should complete remaining deliverables and facilitate the approvals by government when the political environment is conducive to these activities.

3. KENYA

51. TMEA Kenya provides support to various Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and the private sector and civil society. Their aim is to support Kenya to drive the EAC agenda and unlock the region's economic potential[4]. In March 2011, TMEA Kenya provided support to the State Department of East African Affairs, a department within the Ministry of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism and previously known as the Ministry of East African Community (MEAC). With a budget of USD 5,566,000, TMEA Kenya aimed to achieve six capacity building outputs recommended by the MEAC ASI (Adam Smith International) Fast Track Report[5]. Two changes included the Coordination and Leadership Programme being extended from 2014 to 2016 and eliminating Output Number 5. The six originally planned outputs were:

- Output 1: Communication & awareness campaign implemented

- Output 2: Staff development programme designed and developed

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[3] Quarterly report, 9
[4] Project Appraisal Report, *Institutional Support to the Ministry of East African Community (MEAC)*,TMEA
[5] 2010

- Output 3: Policy Coordination Unit operational

- Output 4: Common Market Protocol (CMP) implementation plan developed & executed

- Output 5: Financial management & procurement systems operational, enabling MEAC to pass a fiduciary risk analysis (FRA) assessment; and

- Output 6: Monitoring systems fully operational.

52. The results chain for the MEAC Kenya Programme suggests that TMEA's capacity building support to MEAC and focal persons within MDAs was intended to enhance MEAC's ability to coordinate and lead the implementation of the EAC regional integration agenda in Kenya.

3.1 Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

3.1.1 Relevance

53. TMEA contracted two consultancy firms and seven independent consultants to implement the Kenya programme. Interview data indicates that the firm contracted to undertake the communication/awareness work was contracted at the start of the programme. The costs related to the two ODI Fellows originally contracted under the Fast Track phase were taken over by Kenya Country Programme (KCP). Over time, TMEA contracted independent consultants through specific project proposals based on identified needs. Interview data indicates that TMEA assessed all requests to ensure that they supported its overall programme objectives and met specific identified needs, thereby ensuring their relevance. However there was no provision to review how the different pieces of work fit together (e.g. ensured no overlap) or supported one comprehensive programme.

54. The evaluation compared the MEAC Coordination and Leadership Work Plan (2011) and the Fast Track report (2010) to better understand the programme's relevance. This comparison showed that MEAC's work plans addressed all but one Fast Track recommendations (Output 5). These data show the relevance of the CB programme's initial design.

55. The relevance of the programmes implementation and results are not as clear. For example, the review indicates that there was no empirical study used to focus the communication strategy, or what specific messages to relay to which groups. Interview data suggests that implementers made assumptions about which groups to focus on based on intuitive understanding of the roles of opinion leaders. It was expected that the targeted groups would benefit from the communication and result in actions that would contribute to EAC integration. The social media platform project that targeted university students was not informed by an understanding (e.g. Theory of Change) of how improved knowledge and awareness of the EAC would impact students' behaviour. Further, there were no data that showed students' understanding before implementation (i.e. lack of a baseline) or data that measured the results.

3.1.2 Effectiveness

56. There are clear signs of effectiveness for activities undertaken to strengthen MEAC. For example, a Policy Unit now exists and Research Assistants are in place and producing research papers. Further, MEAC staff received induction training and attended team building training alongside MDA focal point staff.

57. Interview data from key MEAC staff and MDAs note that there is now improved coordination between MEAC and the MDAs. When asked to provide examples, the MDAs noted that MEAC communicates scheduled EAC meetings and where the joint Kenya position papers are required, MEAC draws up positions that are informed by contributions from the

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implementing MDAs. Measuring the change in MEAC's strategic leadership or effectively coordinating EAC integration activities is hampered by the evaluation's lack of concrete data. MEAC presented data that demonstrated improvements in its performance contracting rating over a three-year period and attributed this change to the TMEA CB programme. However, the evaluation team did not collect data that confirmed this direct attribution. At the same time, the interdependency between the MDAs that impact regional trade in Kenya requires a comprehensive programme that addresses the EAC integration agenda. Programme documents and interview data indicate that that the current CB programme does not provide a comprehensive strategy to address all MDAs that TMEA supports, and additional interview data suggest that this has resulted in strained relationships.

58. While interview data suggests that most activities to strengthen MEAC contributed to the achievement of the targeted outcomes, an empirical assessment of effectiveness at the outcome level is constrained by lack of data. For example, for most TMEA and MEAC activities that sought to bring about change external to MEAC, it is not clear who the targeted population were and therefore if they were reached. While a list of beneficiaries was provided to the evaluators, the evaluators were unable to compare this list to a specific target group and determine the extent to which there is a match. Thus, with no specific identified target groups, few activities with scoping exercises or baseline studies, and a lack of clear indicators to measure anticipated change, there is a lack of empirical data on which to assess much of this programme's effectiveness. TMEA noted that the lack of baselines was a result of the need for TMEA to proceed with implementation of planned interventions in a timely manner.

3.1.3 Efficiency

59. The Project Appraisal Report provided a budget of USD 5,566,000 to be split between the six outputs. Ultimately Output 5 was removed from the work plan. It is not clear if the USD 955,000 originally allocated to this activity was removed from the budget reducing the allocation to USD 4,611,000. TMEA financial records for the MEAC Kenya programme show that 72% of these funds (USD 3,299,932) has been expended on the project. This is in light of the fact that while 31 activities that were planned for the five-year period, only 16 have been completed, three are at the planning stage, and the remaining 12 have just been started.[6] Of the funds spent, 61% were for consultants and workshop participants' expenses, and travel expenditure limited to approximately 8%. Output 1, Communication and Awareness, which was originally allocated approximately 20% of the total budget, has absorbed 50% of the entire expended funds.

60. While MEAC and MDA interview data show that MEAC's coordination ability has improved, the lack of empirical data does not permit an assessment of the remainder TMEA results. For instance, while the Policy Research Unit (PRU) produces policy papers, it is not clear who reads them or the extent to which these policy papers inform the integration agenda. Therefore the evaluation cannot confirm nor disconfirm if the TMEA programme achieved results as expected in light of resources spent and assess if this programme provided value for money.

3.2 Impact

61. The team did not identify any clear impact-level results. While the interview data suggest that the communication and awareness activities have increased awareness of target populations of cross border trade opportunities there are no data to confirm this perception. Key MDAs have been sensitised on regional integration issues but there are no data to show if such activities have had the expected impact. The fact that TMEA is running parallel EAC integration activities with the same MDAs, means that even in the future when such data may be available, it will be very difficult to draw a line between changes brought about by

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[6] Kenya programme work plan status, TMEA, 12 February 2015

the CB building support offered to such MDAs through the MEAC project and the support received from TMEA directly.

62. At the organisational level, a strategic plan for 2013 – 2017 is in place, although internal MEAC challenges, specifically related to funding, have delayed implementation. The concern, however, is that with the planning period now at half way stage, it is unlikely that the strategic goals specified in the planning document will be achieved during the life of the plan.

63. With seven Research Officers trained and placed in technical departments, research assistants engaged at the Policy Research Unit, and integration officers inducted in EAC integration related matters, there is potential for future impact.

64. TMEA chose to provide disparate support to MDAs that are key actors in the EAC integration agenda, rather than design an integrated Kenya programme has also resulted in overlapping activities across the various MDA. This approach poses challenges to attributing outcomes and impact of the various components of the overall Kenya programme to any specific intervention.

3.3 Sustainability and scaling up

65. There are three examples of potential CB programme benefits that are likely to continue after the programme has ended. MEAC interview data suggests that:

- Knowledge and skills that have been acquired through the capacity building exercise are being cascaded to other officers through on-the-job training, mentoring and coaching. The placement of research officers in each directorate appears to be mainstreaming research in all activities.

- Future strategic planning activities can be executed internally through management team meetings, without inputs from TMEA.

- Integration Officers can be used to build the capacity of MDAs going forward, eliminating the need for support from TMEA.

66. A challenge to long-term sustainability is the shifting focus away from regional blocks. Interview data indicates that the new Cape to Cairo agenda[7] that is being spearheaded by the African Union means that the drive towards a deep rooted African Union may soon overshadow the EAC integration agenda. A second identified challenge is that consultants were not always paired with MEAC staff, which then did not build MEAC staff's knowledge, which impacts on potential sustainability.

3.3 Recommendations

67. **Key Finding 1**: The programme has multiple design challenges that include: 1) no clear, explicit theory of change; 2) no identified baseline studies; 3) often no identification of stakeholder groups beyond broad categories; and 4) no indicators or set targets to measure change. This challenges the programme to make informed management decisions regarding programmes and activities or understand if they are moving towards, or away from, their intended results.

68. **Key Recommendation**: A clear Theory of Change should be developed that illustrates how TMEA aims to bring about change. This can then be used to develop a strong monitoring and evaluation plan that includes measurable outputs and outcomes. For example, MEAC should clearly identify its specific target groups, assess their needs, and then develop a focused and targeted campaign with clear measurable results.

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[7] Also known as the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)

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69. **Key Finding 2**: The interdependency between the MDAs that impact regional trade in Kenya calls for a comprehensive programme that addresses the EAC integration agenda. TMEA recognises this interdependency, hence its decision to run parallel capacity building programmes with relevant MDAs and private sector organisations that are engaged in, or are beneficiaries of EAC integration. However, this support is not provided within the ambit of a comprehensive strategy to address all MDAs. This has resulted in strained relationships. A comprehensive strategy and programme would help to ensure that sufficient mechanisms for the coordination of the Kenya programme across all MDAs and the private sector players are put in place.

70. **Key Recommendation**: TMEA should develop a comprehensive strategy that captures all of the TMEA Kenya programmes under a single approach. This would help to ensure that sufficient mechanisms for the coordination of all interventions undertaken across all MDAs and the private sector players participating in the TMEA Kenya programme are put in place. The Kenya programme should then engage with these organisations and together address the critical capacity gaps facing them.

71. **Key Finding 3:** TMEA contracted two consultancy firms and seven independent consultants to implement the Kenya programme. Independent consultants were contracted against specific project proposals based on specific needs. However there was no provision to review how the different pieces of work fit together (e.g. ensured no overlap) to support one comprehensive programme. Further, consultants were not always paired with MEAC staff. This did not build the knowledge within MEAC, which impacts on potential sustainability

72. **Key Recommendation**: We recommend that TMEA considers specifying in a consultant's Terms of Reference the mandate that they engage and work with a local MEAC staff member, and develop clear, measurable learning objectives that guide the mentoring and skills transfer. Further, achievement of these learning objectives should be monitored over the life of the contract.

73. **Key Finding 4**: There were significant changes to the EAC coordination environment. One example is the implementation of a new MEAC organisation structure that saw both trade and tourism brought under the same wing with EAC regional integration. A second example is the introduction of the "Northern Corridor" group. These changes called for TMEA to re-examine its approach to supporting the regional integration agenda of the newly restructured Ministry as well as the Ministry of Tourism, in order to ensure on-going effectiveness. Such action would have enabled TMEA to realign its interviews in line with the new structures to eliminate overlaps and enhance efficiency. It is true that the overlaps are caused by the Government, not TMEA, but it is in interest of TMEA to support the development of streamlined implementation frameworks to ensure effectiveness.

74. **Key Recommendation**: We recommend that TMEA consider this context and reflect on the support that is offered to the various departments within the newly restructured MEAC and to the Ministry of Tourism in respect to the Northern Corridor. Part of this reflection should consider how to streamline the various programme activities.

4. RWANDA

75. In March 2008 the Rwandan government established the Ministry of East African Community (MINEAC) to fulfil the joint commitment of the East African Community Partner States to establish national ministries with primary responsibility for EAC matters. It serves as an operational link between the Government of Rwanda and other national stakeholders, and the EAC organs and institutions with the main aim of coordinating EAC activities at national level. MINEAC fulfils an important role as challenges often arise from a combination of the EAC Secretariat not engaging Partner States in planning and insufficient communication about what actions are required on national level following regional decisions.

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76. The Ministry's mission is to lead the widening and deepening of the EAC integration process, thus promoting the development goals of Rwanda and the region. MINEAC's core functions are to: 1) promote Rwanda's interests; 2) facilitate and coordinate the development and harmonisation/approximation of domestic and regional legal and policy instruments, as well as programmes; 3) sensitise national stakeholders on regional integration; 4) enhance capacity to strengthen regional cooperation and partnerships; 5) monitor and evaluate the impact of legal & policy instruments and programmes; and 6) support investment promotion in the region and beyond.

77. The CB programme aims to support MINEAC in its role. Specifically, the CB programme logic suggests how results will achieve intended goals. A key assumption is that if the MINEAC improves its strategic leadership and coordination capacity and if key stakeholders improve their knowledge on regional integration, then the CB programme will achieve its outcome of implementing a comprehensive framework for regional integration. To accomplish this, ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) need to implement EAC commitments.[8] The CB programme has four key activities. These include: 1) mainstreaming EAC issues into key strategic plans (including EDPRS II); 2) developing policies, strategies and research papers that support trade integration; 3) support MINEAC's M&E (particularly EAMS) and 4) the design and implementation of a communications strategy.

78. The MINEAC CB Programme (2011-2014) had an overall budget of USD 5.5 million which was recently amended to USD 6.271 million. TMEA delivered the CB programme partly through direct financial aid to MINEAC, and partly through TA.

4.1 Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

Relevance

79. The CB programme was in line with Rwanda's commitment to EAC integration. Regional and international economic integration is one of the six pillars of the Vision 2020 and is critical for opening up the region, minimising barriers to trade and promoting foreign investment.[9] Rwanda has embraced the private sector and specifically regional integration by developing its Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II), with regional integration as one of the crosscutting issues.[10] Interview data suggest that MINEAC has played a pivotal role in mainstreaming regional integration into the EDPRS II and subsequently into the plans and budgets across key MDAs and at the district level. On the working level, MINEAC has been successful at networking and mainstreaming, but these results may not be sustainable without ministries' full political commitment.

80. Increasingly, the CB programme has supported MINEAC to reach more broadly to private sector and civil society through various awareness raising events and communications products. A number of interviewees confirmed that private sector breakfast meetings, where the MEAC Minister is always present, provide a particularly effective space for interactive dialogues among private companies and associations. Interview data further suggest that, as a result of MINEAC's sensitisation efforts, the private sector is more interested to learn about specific regional market opportunities and challenges; linked also by interviewees to the Communication Strategy and more targeted awareness raising (e.g. on export procedure reforms). At the same time, most interview data indicated that there is a need to improve engagement with marginalised groups and women specifically.

Effectiveness

81. The CB programme has been successful in promoting the mainstreaming of EAC commitments across the government, especially on the promotion of the free movement of

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[8] Results Chain
[9] Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015, MINEAC, 2010, p. 7
[10] Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II)

goods. While formally all of the EAC Partner States have adjusted their tariff schedules in line with EAC commitments, only Rwanda has not "replaced" tariffs with charges of equivalent effect, including additional taxes and charges[11]. Overall, Rwanda has the highest score in the region (91.4%) on the elimination of tariffs in intra-regional trade. Rwanda also has the lowest ratio of percentage of total NTBs reported over percentage of total EAC imports (0.50). Further progress has been made since the publication of the Score Card (2014), with the number of restrictions reduced to Capital (4), Services (9) and Goods (3), though these results still require verification.[12]

82. Rwanda provides regional best practice on the mainstreaming of regional integration into the policies, plans and budgets of MDAs. EAC commitments were mainstreamed across the four key pillars of the EDPRS II, as well as the outcomes, interventions and M&E indicators of sector plans attached to specific MDAs. Critical factors included capacity building of MDAs, districts, and MINEAC, as well as networking across government. MINEAC also required, and had, a powerful government ally, the President's Office and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN).[13] Because MDAs have other, potentially competing priorities an important strategy is for MINEAC to network, which depends heavily upon personal relationships, the energy of a few individuals and face-to-face meetings.

83. Centralised planning at the beginning of the cycle has significantly facilitated the mainstreaming work. MINEAC presents priorities for the year, engages and harmonises these priorities with respective MDAs, ensures that the priorities are attached to specific budget lines, and has regular follow-up. The strong Rwandan accountability and delivery culture appears to have played a role in the MINEAC's success.

84. Data from the MINEAC annual work plan demonstrates that MINEAC's activity implementation capacity has significantly improved. In 2013/14 87% of the work plan was achieved and 13% partially achieved.[14] This was in comparison with an 8% completion rate in 2010/11.[15] Concrete deliverables have included the Development of the National Strategy on Regional Integration and its implementation plan, the communication strategy, MINEAC strategic plan 2012-2018 and various pieces of research. Interview data suggests that the research from these papers feeds into MINEAC's decision-making process and has helped to foster an evidence-based management culture.

85. The M&E component and dedicated TA supported the monitoring of mainstreaming efforts. EAMS Rwanda has been designed and rolled-out across MDAs. The backlog of decisions has been resolved and EAMS Rwanda is now fully automated, allowing updating and full interoperability with EAMS Central. According to the EAMS Briefing Note[16], MINEAC sector experts were trained and have access to EAMS Rwanda. These sector experts are expected to work with MDA counterparts to regularly update EAMS. MDAs have been trained on the utilisation of EAMS to enable them to update the status of implementation on a regular basis. [17] MDAs will input data for directly into the web-based platform this year (2014/15) for the first time. Some of the Council Decisions are not yet in the system and the EAC Secretariat is also still developing indicators for the 4th EAC Development Strategy. Interview data raised

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[11] (EAC Common Market Score Card, 2014)

[12] The latest update was calculated and provided by the M&E Advisor to MINEAC. It is based on data gathered from stakeholders, but has not yet been verified by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) team of the World Bank. Some difference of interpretation may still arise. Several of the restrictions were not actively removed (i.e. laws amended) but rather the stakeholders in the workshop felt they were not restrictions because already existing laws were in place to address them. Items like these will need to be discussed with the IFC going forward and skews the picture in terms of progress made.

[13] Mainstreaming Regional Integration in Rwanda: The Case Study, TMEA, 2013, in Case Studies for Effective Technical Assistance: How can TMEA Improve Support to EAC Partner States?, TMEA, 2013

[14] PowerPoint, National Oversight Committee, August 2014

[15] There were some differences in these figures in different sources (Annual Progress Report, NOC presentation), with performance ranging from 83% fully or partially completed to 87% fully completed and 13% partially completed in 2013/14.

[16] 2015

[17] Brief on Effective Operationalization of the East African Monitorng System (EAMS), MINEAC, 2015

two concerns; the EAMS quality assurance and that data entered by the EAC Partner States is not verified independently.

86. MINEAC has benefited from significant, long-term TA including a Regional Integration Advisor, Communication Adviser, Legal Adviser, Lead Economist, and M&E Adviser. They provide up to 90% of the initial intellectual input on background research, planning, and assessment, with MINEAC staff focusing mainly on the implementation of related supporting duties. According to interviews, there is a strong preference for on-the-job mentoring and support, rather than formal training sessions.

87. TA supported the design and implementation of a Communication Strategy, with activities ranging from television and radio programmes, to media events, social media presence, various communications materials and stakeholder meetings (e.g. road shows). According to the latest public perception survey, general awareness of the EAC is at 92% of the population, while awareness of MINEAC is only 44%. These data show that 44% of the respondents reported to know about EAC Integration through radio campaigns, while 18% had read billboards.[18] Given the lack of a baseline, it is not clear if this has increased since the CB programme funding started, or the extent of the increase from the start of sensitisation activities in 2010. Private sector feedback was also positive. According to one interviewee, "today, individuals, also companies, are keen to learn. They have been exposed not only to information, but actual opportunities that relate to their particular interests."

88. Due to the dependence of the Rwandan economy on its neighbours for market access, the impact of the CB programme is highly dependent upon externalities, even beyond Rwandan borders in EAC Partner States.

Efficiency

89. Considering the significant achievements outlined above, and the funding spent, the CB programme has delivered value for money. Of the total budget of USD 6,271,000, USD 5,081,406.37 was spent by the end of 2014/15. Of this amount, 3,283,299 (65%) was spent on consultants' fees.[19] Total Financial Aid constituted only 1,317,613 (26%). The proportion of spending on consultancy fees was high and reflected the programme's predominant delivery modality, technical assistance. The Fresh Graduate's Fellowship programme (detailed in paragraph 62) was an attempt to promote sustainability and build capacity at lower cost; the total expenditure for this component being only USD 241,250. Attempts were made to reduce TA costs and phase out some of the TA support.

90. While programme activities were largely completed on time, there have been some delays relating to procurement issues. The CB programme is well integrated into regional decision making structures and processes, as well as the Rwandan government's planning and implementation processes. For example, CB programme reporting is extracted from MINEAC's own system and reporting requirements. Data suggest that communication and in particular feedback from the EAC Secretariat could be improved. For example, EAC decisions are not always clear, and the EAC Secretariat does not always engage Partner States in planning. Another example identified through interview data is that the EAC Secretariat does not always engage Partner States in the preparation of ToRs for studies at an early stage, despite the formal approval processes of the EAC, and the use of EAMS data is not always optimal. In general, there are some reported challenges with communication from the regional to the national level.

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[18] Global Analysis Report on Rapid Assessment Pilot Survey on Impact of EAC Regional Integration and Communication Activities from 3rd – 6th March 2014, MINEAC, 2014
[19] Considering that only the budget lines for consultancy fees were calculated, this percentage is likely to be still higher, as the nature of the other expenses related largely to technical assistance support costs.

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4.2 Impact

91. There review revealed a tension between MINEAC's immediate, activity-oriented demands of daily work and the broader, higher visibility impacts expected by the programme.

92. The ultimate impact of the CB programme will be highly dependent upon external factors outside of the sphere of influence of MINEAC or TMEA. Despite significant achievements in the improvement of the Rwandan business environment and conformity with EAC commitments, the impact upon its economy will still depend upon its neighbours doing the same. High dependence upon TA has potentially also negative consequences for MINEAC staff morale and ultimately, the sustainability of the programme.

4.3 Sustainability and scaling up

93. One of TMEA and MINEAC's main concerns with the CB programme is with regards to TA. One concern relates to sustainability of quality outputs. According to interviews, TAs prepare the majority of first drafts (80-90%) of all key documents. A challenge for MINEAC is to produce quality deliverables for evidence-based policy making without TA support as interview data suggest that MINEAC has a skills gap. For example, there is an expectation that MINEAC staff can implement sophisticated econometric analysis, a skill that does not currently exist within current staff. At the same time, there is a growing awareness that MINEAC staff may need less focus on technical skills, and more focus on process skills, such as report writing, Excel, developing and delivering presentations, and project management skills.

94. A second concern related to TA is the transfer of knowledge to MINEAC staff. TA consultants struggle with the lack of time to transfer skills to them. The knowledge transfer challenge is exacerbated by MINEAC's high staff turnover. At the highest level, the programme has experienced the changeover of two Ministers and four Permanent Secretaries, with many more staff rotations. Most interviewees state that the main reason for high turnover is better financial incentives outside of the public sector.

95. The CB programme introduced the Graduate Fellowship programme to address one of the key sustainability challenges. The programme sponsors recent graduates to work at MINEAC and pairs them with TA consultants. However three challenges exist; (1) the lack of a guaranteed future position at MINEAC, (2) graduates not being perceived as MINEAC staff and (3) the programme exists outside of the regular MINEAC structures and will likely end with the conclusion of TMEA funding.

4.4 Recommendations

96. **Key Finding 1:** Rwanda has been successfully mainstreaming EAC commitments across government, with concrete progress on the implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol and other commitments. At the same time, the EAC regional integration agenda does not remain static; it is highly political and continuously evolving. Inevitably, other MDAs have other, potentially competing priorities. On the working level, MINEAC has been successful at networking and mainstreaming, but these results may not be sustainable without ministries' full political commitment. Much depends upon the political stewardship of the new Minister and her ability to convene support. In order to ensure continued relevance of support, there is a need to proactively plan for the future direction of integration, as well as both the national and regional political context. While the commitment of various MDAs cannot be taken for granted, there are sufficient mechanisms in place to spearhead integration, also into new areas, such as free movement of capital and services with MINEAC leadership. EAMS is functioning and data entry is expected to be fully automated this year. Concerns however remain about data quality.

97. **Recommendation:** MINEAC should continue to play a central catalyst and coordination role on the mainstreaming of EAC commitments across the government. There is a need to exercise caution in absorbing the mandate of other MDAs and adopting a greater implementation role. Achievement, such as the progress on NTBs, is an effective example of mainstreaming that can be replicated on other issues, without over-stepping the MINEAC mandate. MINEAC should utilise the experience to disseminate learning across government on both the mechanism for coordinating regional integration issues, as well as the concrete benefits obtained by private sector. Procedures for the verification of the reliability and quality of data input into EAMS should be established and shared across the region. Generally, baseline data should be gathered/established, whether for assessing EAC Commitments or awareness raising. With a view to the particular challenges faced in other EAC Partner States, the Rwandan is an exemplar, and its best-practice should be disseminated across the region.

98. **Key Finding 2:** There were several key findings regarding the need to strengthen and sustain MINEAC staff including the challenge of knowledge transfer, the sustainability of TA, and the ability to continue to produce quality products without technical assistance.

99. **Recommendation:** Concrete deliverables for knowledge transfer should be attached to all appropriate TA's ToRs, with a clear work plan that details how that knowledge will be transferred.

100. **Key Finding 4:** EAC decisions are not always clear, which allows broad interpretation of Partner State commitments. Generally, there are some challenges with communication from the regional to the national level (e.g. analysis and feedback on EAMS data).

101. **Recommendation:** EAC decisions should be carefully transcribed, with a clear description of Partner State commitments. The EAC Secretariat should work more closely with MINEAC during the design phase of studies and interventions. The EAC Secretariat should improve communication and provide more relevant feedback to MINEAC. Likewise, MINEAC is encouraged to proactively influence the design of studies and interventions and seek analysis and feedback on generated data (e.g. EAMS data submissions) through EAC processes (e.g. technical meetings).

5. TANZANIA

102. While Tanzanian exports exhibit a growth trend, in relation, exports to the EAC have grown only modestly. The percentage of EAC exports from world exports has a declining trend-line, having reduced from 12% in 2007 to 10% in 2013. On the overall business environment, the general sense is that Tanzania has also not been faring very well, with the World Bank Doing Business Index often cited as evidence of decline. However from 2014 to 2015 the Distance to the Frontier Score improved. When comparing the logistics performance of Tanzania to the rest of East Africa[20] there is a notable decrease in performance since 2012.

103. The Ministry of East African Cooperation (MEAC) has several functions, which include to: (1) oversee, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the East African Community Treaty and Protocols, (2) lead the Tanzanian delegation on negotiations with EAC Partner States, (3) mobilise commitment to EAC peace and security issues, (4) analyse and respond to enquires related to trade, investment and productive sectors from stakeholders and the public, and (5) facilitate and coordinate the implementation of the Judiciary orders, among others.

104. Interview data suggest that the MEAC has limited technical capacity, despite its 103 staff, and limited financial resources to fulfil its mandate. The MEAC Strategic Plan also notes that

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20 Comparison done using the World Bank Logistics Performance Index

there is a "low level of importance and adherence attached to EAC integration matters in national agenda."

105. MEAC's programme logic appeared to be that, if the MEAC rolled out a national strategy and developed policy, implemented a long term capacity development plan, produced and disseminated regular regional integration monitoring reports, and was equipped and resourced, this would improve MEAC's strategic leadership and coordination of EAC integration. Combined this would then lead to an increase in the implementation of a comprehensive framework for regional integration in Tanzania.

106. To increase the implementation of EAC commitments across MDAs, the CB programme aimed to mainstream EAC integration issues into laws, policies, strategies, plans and budgets. Activities included the drafting of the National Integration Policy Common and Market Integration Strategy (CMIS), MEAC's Capacity Development Plan, various studies, identification of regional focal points in MDAs and support to M&E, namely through the EAMS.

107. Finally, the CB programme aimed to enhance awareness and knowledge on EAC integration through developing and implementing a communications strategy. This comprised of the design and dissemination of various communication products and conducting awareness raising via various media and stakeholder forums.

108. MEAC implements the CB programme drawing on long and short-term technical assistance. Subsequent to passing the Fiduciary Risk Assessment in 2013 (FRA), funds were channelled directly to the Ministry.

5.1 Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

Relevance

109. The integration challenges of Tanzania are various, due to its membership in both Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the EAC, the on-going tripartite negotiations, as well as the increasingly variable speeds of integration in the EAC. The general reticence of the Tanzanian government toward regional integration also challenged the CB programme. EAC integration does not factor dominantly in any key government strategy documents, with only some infrastructure interventions being included in the latest strategic Big Fast Results Initiative that commenced in 2013/14.[21] However, there is almost 1:1 correspondence between the main objectives (C, D, E) of the MEAC Strategic Plan and the intermediate outcomes of the CB programme.

110. MEAC is a relatively young and weak ministry, with the agenda taken over by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. According to various interviews, through the identification of regional integration focal points in the Departments for Policy and Planning (DPP) at key MDAs, MEAC has attempted to establish a coordination and communication channel. According to MEAC, the only way to ensure mainstreaming and effective implementation is through the formal planning and budgeting process; hence the focus on the DPP. However, coordination across MDAs in Tanzania is an intransigent challenge also beyond the regional integration agenda. With the cabinet reshuffle in January 2015 resulting in a change in the Minister responsible for MEAC, as well as the Permanent Secretary, presenting an opportunity for change.

111. The MEAC focus has mainly been on the intra-governmental coordination function. MEAC introduced broader target groups into the design of the programme and directly addressed them through the public awareness component. Despite this, MEAC does not fully engage civil society and the private sector. Most notably, according to civil society representatives,

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[21] Big Results Now, the United Republic of Tanzania Prime Minister's Office, 2015, Retrieved from: http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/quick-menu/brn/

the Minister cancelled a keynote speech at a December 2014 meeting in Arusha with 24 hours' notice and provided no replacement. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) indicated that MEAC does not systematically invite them to meetings and some interview data suggested that MEAC may not be consulting a legitimate cross-section of private sector and civil society. MEAC recognises particular challenges in reaching women and more marginalised groups.

Effectiveness

112. Data suggests that the CB programme has not yet achieved its intended outcomes or successfully engaged with other MDAs. This applies particularly to the implementation of EAC commitments and mainstreaming of EAC obligations. The identified and combined risk of insufficient political will to support regional integration (at the highest level) and the difficulties encountered in influencing and coordinating other MDAs has significantly protracted the timeline, with achievements only expected well into the future.

113. Some progress has been made on the National Integration Policy Framework, which is in draft form, though responsibility has been shifted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to develop a more comprehensive regional integration strategy. The Common and Market Integration Strategy (CMIS) had also been finalised, and is with cabinet for approval. While MEAC has also introduced a new means of mainstreaming through so-called EAC outcomes, the objectives and indicators remain general development objectives, rather than relating to specific EAC commitments (e.g. compare Common Market Score Card and draft Outcomes). Also, the MEAC outcome mainstreaming strategy has not yet been connected with the strategic planning cycle of MDAs; a major obstacle to successful MDA uptake of the objectives.

114. EAMS Tanzania has been designed but not rolled out across the MDAs. Due to the significant challenges with obtaining data from the other MDAs through routine data collection efforts (e.g. for annual reporting), this challenge will probably not be overcome by the introduction of automated reporting via EAMS.

115. The CB programme has been more successful in its awareness-raising and communications efforts, with evidence of concrete changes for beneficiaries, such as women traders. However, measurable results across the broader population will not be known until the EAC perception survey is implemented.

Efficiency

116. Despite the programme being designed in 2011, active implementation has only been on-going for the past 1.5 years (6 quarters). Programme start-up was delayed due to the need to finalise the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), conduct the FRA, which deferred first disbursement. Spending picked up in 2013/14 and almost tripled in 2014/15. Nevertheless, the CB programme spending was well below target. Out of the total budget of USD 2.758 million, only USD 1.803 million (65%) has been spent, with approximately one-year left of the programme.[22] The MEAC grant component (USD 1,115,608) constituted 62% of the total expenditure. The significant under-spend in comparison with original budget projections was due to the delayed start of the CB programme and translates into the lack of results.

117. At the same time, MEAC is highly dependent upon the CB programme funding, with actual expenditure of the CB programme being more than half of the operational budget of the ministry. For example, of the total MEAC budget received of approximately USD 7.9 million for 2013/14, once the Tanzanian contribution to the EAC was removed (approximately USD 5 million) along with personal emoluments, the available budget for implementing actual MEAC activities was approximately USD 1.6 million.

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[22] MEAC Capacity Building Programme Financial Summary

5.2 Impact

118. After 1.5 years, when legal harmonisation and implementation of EAC measures remains a major challenge, it is simply too early to even try to trace the impact on trade flows or the general business environment in the country.

5.3 Sustainability and scaling up

119. Several respondents noted that the main challenge to the overall programme's sustainability relates to Tanzania's general lack of commitment to regional integration, which is further compounded by MEAC's high dependence on external funding. Interview data suggest that this lack of commitment to regional integration across the government and political buy-in had not significantly changed during programme's lifetime and remains the main challenge for achieving related results, especially across other MDAs.

120. The sustainability of EAMS is questionable due to issues in obtaining reports from other MDAs and technological challenges relating to access of a reliable and fast Internet connection. The strengthening of M&E capacity and establishment of M&E Focal Points across government MDAs has been a part of the Public Sector Reform Programme since 2000, but coordination and information across MDAs remains extremely challenging. Further, EAMS is sustained largely with support from the long-term M&E TA financed by the CB programme. Finally, evaluation data strongly suggest that electronic data management solutions have been explicitly discouraged as a standard dimension of MDAs' M&E frameworks as a part of the above-mentioned reform process.

5.4 Recommendations

121. **Key Finding 1:** Trade integration in the EAC did not factor significantly in the Government's vision or their overall development plans. The lack of progress made on the implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol exemplifies the lack of political commitment to the EAC integration agenda. MEAC's ability to coordinate and mainstream EAC commitments into the plans and budgets of other MDAs was significantly constrained, with progress limited to the identification of regional integration focal points. EAMS Tanzania is not yet launched, with MEAC having concerns about MDAs willingness to provide regular updates. The parallel effort to define so-called "EAC Outcomes" was introduced to improve engagement, but may divert attention from actual EAC commitments.

122. **Recommendation:** After the elections, we recommend that a political economic analysis be conducted to assess potential champions of regional integration and how to improve the business environment in the new administration. This can be used to inform how to shape more powerful mechanisms for the stewardship of EAC integration during a potential Phase II of support. MEAC will need to demonstrate its continued added value for spearheading integration in the dynamics of the tripartite negotiations and the "variable geometry" in East Africa. This will have benefits across the TMEA portfolio in Tanzania. There is also a need to think beyond the traditional approach to inter-ministerial coordination (e.g. identification of MDA focal points), which could also be included as a part of the political economic analysis. Due to the challenges experienced and foreseen for the roll-out of EAMS Tanzania, reliance upon the EAC Common Market Score Card may prove the best way to assess progress on EAC commitments for the moment. The EAC Outcomes are very general development objectives with little to no relationship with the more concrete commitments that Tanzania has entered into through EAC Council Decisions. We strongly suggest that the focus should remain on the latter, rather than introducing another layer of more general objectives that may distract attention away from the concrete legal and policy reforms required to implement the EAC agenda.

123. **Key Finding 2:** MEAC has focused more on intra-governmental coordination, rather than broader engagement of private sector and stakeholders, despite its public awareness raising

efforts. Civil society reported that the awareness raising efforts need to be further informed and influenced by existing grass-roots networks.

124. **Recommendation:** We recommend a mechanism for regularly sharing information and soliciting input at the working level from a broader group of stakeholders, which would likely increase the relevance and potential impact of MEAC efforts. A more formalised mechanism for CSO/PSO (civil/private sector organisation) consultation, such as opening up existing quarterly meetings, identifying concrete CSO/PSO activities and making specific MEAC budget allocations for civil society engagement would help to improve collaboration. Guidance can be sought from the EAC PSO/CSO Dialogue Mechanism. The Public Awareness Survey should be launched and identify the most effective means for transmitting information to the public (e.g. TV, radio, billboards, pamphlets, other).

125. **Key Finding 3:** The results chain, developed by TMEA headquarters with external support, has not been revised since the original design. In its current form, it is not well adapted to the current Tanzanian context, and not useful for the management of the programme.

126. **Recommendation:** For this results chain to be useful, it requires review and revision, with a stronger emphasis upon knowledge uptake and coalition building, and should factor in the constraints and realities of the external environment. We recommend developing a clear theory of change and related results chain that has concrete, achievable, and measureable outputs.

6.   UGANDA

127. TMEA provided USD 5.3 million for a CB programme that supported Uganda's Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA). This included USD 890,000 of financial aid (Finaid) for MEACA. Finaid funded: 1) the implementation of the national East African Community (EAC) integration policy; 2) research; 3) the Common Market Protocol (CMP) implementation action plan; 4) MEACA visibility and EAC awareness campaigns; 5) MEACA Strategic Plan updates; 6) MEACA training; 7) EAMS; 8) the MEACA Resource Centre; 9) material support for MEACA; 10) implementation of the M&E system; and 11) law and policy reform.

128. Imani Development implemented the four-year CB programme between August 2011 and June 2015. Imani's implementation team consisted of a combination of long-term technical assistance and short-term specialists. The Uganda CB programme did not have an explicit theory of change, but it did have a programme results chain finalised in 2013. The overall objective of the CB programme was: "Uganda substantially increases its effective implementation of the comprehensive programme for EAC integration". In addition to this overall objective, the CB programme also had an intermediate outcome of "improved strategic leadership and coordination of EAC integration across government by MEACA". It also had two short-term outcomes: 1) enhanced awareness of EAC integration of EAC integration by MDAs, PSOs, CSOs, CBOs, educational institutions, local governments, legislators, media, professional bodies, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the Ugandan public; and 2) increased implementation of EAC priority laws, decisions and programmes by selected MDAs.

6.1 Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

Relevance

129. The four-year CB programme is relevant to the Ugandan context. First, the four-year CB programme objective is in line with Uganda's 2010 to 2015 National Development Plan[23] objectives and its Vision 2040[24]. Second, the design of the programme was based on identified needs and was developed after wide consultation. Third, the implementing partner, Imani Development, worked in partnership with MEACA to identify the specific CB activities to be carried out to support their overall Strategic Plan (2012-17).

130. There were a number of activities undertaken during the implementation of the CB programme that were in line with the gaps identified by Adam Smith International (ASI) in the pre-programme Fast Track Project[25], the initial work done by Imani Development in the inception phase of the CB programme and the MEACA Strategic Plan.

131. While the vast majority of the activities undertaken during the implementation of the CB programme focused on MEACA, capacity building also took place with other key stakeholders. Examples include EAMS training for other MDA officials, Private Sector Foundation of Uganda (PSFU) and the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) private sector research on CET, and EAC awareness campaigns that covered almost 50% of Uganda's Districts. Though TMEA initially allocated resources for developing the capacity of other MDAs, this was not realised due to resource constraints[26].

132. We identified several examples of how this programme promoted gender equality and to some extent human rights. For example, the programme's cross border trade initiatives were chosen due to the importance of this for women SME traders[27]. The programme also supported the provision of Swahili lessons for Ugandan cross-border (mainly women) traders. While Swahili is not very common in Uganda it is the most effective lingua-franca in both Kenya and Tanzania, and thus supports trading. The Busia border post regional information centre mainly serviced women traders. The EAC sensitization programme was a major initiative focused primarily on women traders in rural areas of Uganda. By the end of the programme MEACA was able to provide gender-disaggregated data on its outreach/capacity building/sensitisation activities. This programme also emphasised the human rights that the EAC Treaty guaranteed (such as the free movement of people throughout the Community, the right to seek work and the right to set up business or trade in the other Partner States). Finally, the programme adjusted to emerging priorities and needs during programme implementation.

Effectiveness

133. There are two important examples of MEACA's effectiveness, as demonstrated through successfully asserting its strategic leadership of the integration process.

- The adoption of the EAC integration mainstreaming indicators developed by MEACA by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, and its 2013/14 directive that MDAs must ensure that they have allocated adequate resources in their budget estimates for mainstreaming the EAC integration agenda. By mid-2015 13 MDAs had included mainstreaming EAC integration in their Ministerial Policy Statements; and

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[23] Which emphasizes enhancing the competitiveness of Uganda's goods and services in the EAC, identifying opportunities and addressing the supply side constraints, and boosting the Ugandan population's awareness of the EAC integration agenda.

[24] Which articulates Uganda's aspiration to be a modern and prosperous country which is a major player in a strong EAC, COMESA and the global market.

[25] Between January 2010 to March 2011

[26] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015

[27] This was illustrated in the case study on Annie's Metalworks provided in Imani's end of project report. This is a case study on a small-scale woman-owned company manufacturing metal furniture and house gates which has been able to break into the Rwandan and Kenyan markets with the assistance of MEACA. See Imani 2015.

- The establishment of the Technical Working Group on EAC Implementation in the Office of the Prime Minister in 2013. In the work of this TWG the coordinating role of MEACA was fully recognised by all of the other MDAs involved.

134. An internal review of MEACA's staff training plan[28] conducted during December 2014 and January 2015 concluded that 80% of the group training courses, 92% of the technical courses, 82% of the general and 40% of the general management courses were undertaken. Most MEACA staff, had participated in one or more of these courses, and staff from 18 MDAs had also been trained[29].

135. In order to monitor and track the progress of Uganda's implementation of its EAC integration commitments the TSU worked closely with MEACA to develop EAMS Uganda as a fully web based database that was compatible with EAMS central hosted by the EAC Secretariat in Arusha. This system was finalised in mid-2013 and training sessions were conducted for the MEACA staff, and the staff of other MDAs, that were tasked with updating and operating the system.

Efficiency

136. Over the implementation period of the programme MEACA used the USD 890,000 Finaid component to fund: the implementation of the national EAC integration policy (14%); research (5%); the Common Market Implementation Plan action plan (18%); MEACA visibility (29%); MEACA Strategic Plan updates (2%); MEACA training (7%); EAMS and Resource Centre (9%); material support for MEACA (9%); implementation of M&E system (6%); and law and policy reform (1%)[30]. TMEA ensured that equipment funded under the material support component was provided timeously. MEACA chaired the procurement process and supervised its implementation, thus ensuring ownership and transparency.

137. A number of the activities undertaken under the Finaid component were specifically designed to ensure value for money. In order to ensure due diligence and transparency with respect to the disbursement of the Finaid funds Imani Development's partner Aclaim Africa Ltd, an independent Ugandan financial management company, managed the Finaid funds. Interview data show that TMEA (Uganda)'s management team and MEACA senior management were satisfied with this arrangement and the professionalism with which it was carried out.

138. At the start of the programme, a coherent and robust programme management oversight and reporting system was implemented. This included a four-year work plan, and annual work plans (approved by the programme steering committee) with annual log frames and budgets. A detailed M&E system was developed and implemented, with monthly and quarterly progress reports provided to the programme steering committee and TMEA. The Tripartite Oversight Committee (chaired by the MEACA Permanent Secretary, with representatives from TMEA and Imani Development's management) provided strategy and policy guidance.

139. Interview data indicate that the MEACA senior management perceived that having a single consortium managing the whole programme was an efficient way of ensuring that the programme was well implemented and managed at the technical support and fiduciary levels. While the senior TMEA (Uganda) staff largely concurred with this assessment, they also indicated their concern that initially the Technical Support Unit (TSU) did not have enough regional and wider experience due to the high percentage of local experts in the team. They noted that while the replacement of the team leader (TL) after the programme's mid-term review (MTR) did go some way towards addressing this, it would have been more beneficial

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[28] 2011-2015
[29] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015, p 19
[30] Compiled from financial reports by the project fund manager (Acclaim Africa Ltd)

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if the new TL, with his extensive external experience, could have been based full-time in Uganda.

6.2 Impact

140. As the programme only ended in Jne 2015, it is too early to identify systematic impact level results. At the same time, some positive signs are emerging. Programme reports and interviews suggest that the public sector and the wider community in Uganda have increased their awareness of the EAC integration programme, and the coordinating role of MEACA in this process. Interviews with TMEA Uganda management suggest that the CB support programme's co-ordination, sensitization and publicity activities contributed to this perceived change. The MEACA Communications Strategy, developed through the support of the CB programme, emphasised the use of radio as a major means of information dissemination. The Strategy also used a number of other forms of communication and the so-called 'cluster approach'. Both of these communications strategies have continued to be used by MEACA in their on-going post-programme EAC sensitisation activities.

141. Other data also show some indication of MEACA's growing strength and potential influence that is likely linked to the CB programme. Finally, the GoU recognised MEACA's strategic role in 2013 when it was one of the few MDAs that did not experience a cut in its allocation in the 2013 National Budget

6.3 Sustainability and scaling up

142. The data suggest that the TMEA funded CB programme for MEACA has built its capacity during the CB programme's implementation at three levels: institutional, organisational and individual. However:

- At the institutional level MEACA will only sustain the acceptance by the other MDAs and non-state stakeholders of its continuing mandate to co-ordinate Uganda's implementation of its EAC integration commitments if it can show that it can still generate relevant research based policy initiatives.

- At the organisational level, the IT equipment and the resource centre provided by the CB programme is already beginning to show its age.

- At the individual level, the CB programme built the capacity of MEACA staff members through the development and implementation of a coherent staff training programme and through mentoring for MEACA counterparts. A number of staff members trained under the CB programme have already left MEACA to take up other opportunities.

143. A further issue to be considered is the sustainability of MEACA as an institution. This arises from the dynamics of the EAC integration process in that the leaders of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have been frustrated with the pace of integration in recent years and have responded by utilizing the Northern Corridor or the "coalition of the willing" to implement agreed policies faster than the other two EAC members have been willing to move. MEACA will need to ensure its continuation as the coordinator of Uganda's further integration within EAC by showing the other MDAs and the wider Ugandan community that it is still relevant within this 'two speed' integration process.

6.4 Recommendations

144. **Key Finding 1:** Many of MEACA's CB needs identified in the planning phase of the CB programme have been met during the implementation of this programme.

145. **Key Recommendation**: Any successor programme for MEACA could include: 1) limited replacement of obsolete IT equipment limited support for EAMS in addition to the Government of Uganda's (GoU) budget support for this; 2) Funding for short-term studies

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on Uganda's further integration with its EAC Partners and where internal capacity does not exist, continued funding for the staff research grants initiated during the CB programme; and 3) Assistance to develop an in-house staff training programme for new staff.

146. **Key Finding 2**: Changes in Uganda's trading environment and in technology mean that the physical hard-copy based information centre funded under the CB programme is no longer fit for purpose.

147. **Key Recommendation**: Any successor support programme for MEACA could include resources to create a digital 'virtual information centre' delivered to public sector and private users' mobile and other devices via the MEACA web page or a dedicated app.

148. **Key Finding 3:** MEACA needs to demonstrate to both the GoU and potential donors that its capacity built under the CB programme still enables it to: (1) play a significant coordinating role in Uganda's further integration with the EAC, and (2) in the GoU's regional integration sensitisation campaign with the wider Ugandan community.

149. **Key Recommendation**: If MEACA is to continue with its crucial EAC integration sensitisation activities, any proposed successor support programme should include a sub-component to boost the effectiveness of sensitisation activities. This could include: (1) continuing with the sensitisation activities currently funded by TMEA as part of their post-CB project communications support, (2) rolling out the digital version of their information centre as proposed in recommendation 2, and (3) boosting their presence in social media in order to ensure that they are able to reach this increasingly important segment of the Ugandan community.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

150. The key recommendations for the overall programme going forward into TMEA's new Phase 2 for 2017-21 are:

151. **Develop clear Theories of Change at national level with related monitoring and evaluation frameworks to allow for more responsive management of future programming**. In the design of its new strategy for 2017-21, TMEA should build on the positive programming experience from the current Phase 1 programmes, especially those which used participatory processes to ensure relevance and national and regional buy-in, to identify strategic challenges and develop a high-level strategic framework. Subsequently TMEA should ensure that national level programmes are aimed to achieve those results. Thorough application of the Theory of Change (or other similar) approach at intervention or national level, currently used largely only at the TMEA corporate level, would strengthen the development of programme and project results chains. It would also strengthen the linkage between all the programmes and projects funded by TMEA. Finally, TMEA should support the counterpart Ministries to develop strong monitoring and evaluation plans that include measurable outputs and outcomes for the programme and have properly resourced and clearly assigned responsibilities for data collection.

152. **Build in and ensure knowledge transfer**. TMEA should consider specifying in a consultant's terms of reference the mandate for their engagement and work with a local MEAC staff member, and develop clear, measurable learning objectives that guide the mentoring and skills transfer. Further, achievement of these learning objectives should be monitored over the life of the contract.

153. **Keep flexibility in the programme to respond to country specific needs.** The Ministries responsible for EAC integration are an important counterpart for TMEA and play a key role in the implementation in the EAC integration agenda. At the same time, after the first phase of TMEA support, the capacity gap between the ministries across the five EAC member states has widened in many areas. Taking this into account, TMEA should continue to consider the national context and reflect on the support that is offered, and provide support

within the TMEA boundaries appropriate to each country rather than a "one size fits all" approach. This may entail building new alliances at higher levels of the public sector (e.g. Tanzania) or, where partners are ready to 'graduate' (e.g. Rwanda) potentially moving away from broad based capacity building and towards more issue-based approaches.

ANNEX 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EVALUATION

PROJECT TITLE: CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION

TYPE OF EVALUATION: FORMATIVE EVALUATION

Background

TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) programmes aims to improve trade competitiveness in East Africa by reducing transport time/costs and improving the trade environment. It targets an increase in trade of 10% (above trend) by 2016, contributing to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. TMEA was officially launched in February 2011 as a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement a programme to promote trade growth in East Africa. TMEA is currently funded by the UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and USA. TMEA's secured budget to date totals about £330 million ($540m). The programme is currently scheduled until December 2017 with the possibility of a new programming phase beyond that.

Approximately, 38% of TMEA's budget is in the area of Enhanced Trade Environment with the most being aligned to improving regional and national coordination through developing the capacities of the EAC organs and institutions and Ministries of EAC in each Partner State. The Treaty for Establishment of the East African Community was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered into force on 7 July 2000 following its ratification by the original three Partner States – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007 and became full Members of the Community with effect from 1 July 2007.

The five Partner States of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi), have made significant progress on regional integration in recent years. The East African Community (EAC) launched a Customs Union (CU) in 2005, a Common Market in 2010.The EAC has already signed the EAMU protocol and a roadmap towards its implementation is underway. TMEA believes that trade policies and their implementation can contribute to enhancing the environment for trade within East Africa. In particular, the implementation of the East African Community regional trade agreements will contribute to increasing the region's competitiveness by increasing the size of the market and making the region more open. The implementation of regional trade agreements is also expected to contribute to reducing trade costs if harmonised policies, legislation and procedures are used throughout East Africa. Full implementation of the Customs Union is a critical step to enhancing the trade environment. Without full implementation of the Customs Union, the implementation of the Common Market Protocol and subsequent protocols, yet to be negotiated, will be unable to take effect.

Fast track projects supported by TMEA were implemented between 2009 and 2012 which undertook institutional reviews and capacity assessments of all coordinating Ministries of EAC.These assessments laid the foundation for the additional project support that is currently undertaken for the coordinating Ministries.

TMEA supports the Burundi's Ministry to Presidency for East African Affairs (MPACEA), to carry out its mandate of negotiating, coordinating, monitoring and implementing the government's commitments under the EAC Treaty, its Protocols and Annexes. Specifically, support is targeted towards a) Strengthening capacity for economic analysis, negotiation and implementation of EAC Regional integration policies b) Harmonisation of Legal frameworks and c) Enhancing capacity and participation of business and civil society in regional integration among others. Key planned outcomes from the project include a strengthened leadership role of MPACEA, enhanced awareness on regional integration by stakeholders and increased implementation of EAC decisions, policies and laws by targeted MDAs.

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TMEA supports Rwanda's Ministry of East African Community **(**MINEAC) to develop its core capacity through the provision of technical assistance (TA) in areas such as strategic planning, economic analysis, and monitoring and evaluation. Assistance also includes a comprehensive staff training programme, delivering both rapid induction training and long-term professional education. TMEA also supports MINEAC to roll out a comprehensive communication strategy to raise public awareness on the impact of regional integration.

TMEA supports Kenya to provide institutional support to the s State Department of EAC under the Ministry of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism to strengthen its institutional development and capacity for EAC-related policy analysis and co-ordination. Specifically support is provided to a) Enhance communication and awareness on the EAC agenda b) Support implementation of the Common Market Implementation Plan and c) Develop and roll out the Decision and Process Monitoring System (EDPMS) fir tracking implementation of EAC decisions among others. Key planned outcomes for the project include a strengthened leadership role for the Ministry of East African Affairs to support the Regional Integration agenda and enhanced awareness on EAC regional integration among stakeholders among others.

TMEA supports Uganda to increase the capacity of the Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA) to coordinate and monitor regional integration. Project interventions address critical areas of institutional weakness including the low awareness of the Uganda public about the EAC integration agenda, absence of a national policy on EAC integration, mainstreaming of EAC integration in Uganda's development agenda, persistence of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in intra-EAC trade; delays in operationalizing the Common Market Implementation Plan (CMIP), limited human and financial resources, and institutional bottlenecks among other challenges.Key planned outcomes for the project include a strengthened leadership role for MEACA, increased implementation of EAC decisions, policies and laws by targeted MDAs and enhanced awareness on the EAC integration agenda by stakeholders.

TMEA supports Tanzania to increase the capacity of the Ministry of East Africa Cooperation (MEAC) to improve strategic leadership and coordination of the EAC integration process, increase the implementation of EAC commitments by MDAs and to enhance awareness and knowledge on EAC integration. Project interventions address critical areas including poor implementation of EAC decisions and commitments; poor follow-up on implementation; inadequate involvement of other stakeholders (e.g. business and civil society); inadequate integration of EAC commitments across Government of Tanzania (GoT) policies, strategies, plans, and budgets; inadequate awareness in the wider public domain on EAC and the integration process; inadequate knowledge of potential market opportunities in the EAC; and lack of information on implementation and progress. TMEA support to MEAC is also focused on improving monitoring, evaluation and reporting capacity of the Ministry on EAC Integration. As part of this, web-based M&E database (EAMS Tanzania) is being developed to facilitate tracking of implementation of EAC decisions and directives.

Purpose

TMEA aims to conduct a formative evaluation to measure the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the capacity building programmes on regional integration. Specifically, the evaluation will establish whether progress has been made towards improvement of the capacity of EAC coordinating ministries to deliver on their core mandates in order to enhance regional integration. The evaluation will provide evidence of projects performance over years of implementation towards the planned results in the various outcome areas. The evaluation will also highlight the lessons learnt and challenges faced during implementation from 2011 to date. Findings and recommendations will be used to improve the implementation and management of current projects as well as the design of future projects.

Recipient

The primary audience for the evaluation is TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), the joint evaluation group, the Ministries of East African Affairs, relevant MDAs in the TMEA supported countries, their key stakeholders as well as development partners. The findings will be used by TMEA and the PIC

to inform the on-going implementation of TMEA's strategy and in particular, those sub-strategies that concern reducing trade costs.

Evaluation scope and objectives

The formative[31] evaluation will address the following 5 key questions:

a) Effectiveness

Effectiveness refers to the extent to which a development intervention has achieved its objectives, taking their relative importance into account.

For each particular project, the following key questions will be answered:

- To what extent were the objectives achieved / are likely to be achieved?

- To what extent can identified changes in the project be attributed to the intervention? What would have occurred without the intervention?

- What has worked well for the capacity building interventions? Have the Bilateral engagements made any impacts?

- Where any new interventions put in place to facilitate achievement of project objectives?

- If gender[32] mainstreaming targets were set at project inception, did the program achieve the targets, if not what were the challenges?

b) Impact

Impact refers to the totality of the effects of a development intervention, positive and negative, intended and unintended. The impacts are the tangible long-term outcomes to which the project contributed.

The evaluation will answer the following key questions:

- What is the current and likely impact (intended and unintended, positive and negative) of the intervention? How has the intervention affected the well-being of different groups of stakeholders?
- To what extent can the identified changes/impact be attributed to the intervention?
- MEACs have traditionally had a precarious relationship with other MDAs especially Trade, Foreign Affairs. With the emerging COW/ trilateral initiative, the role of MEACs and indeed the EAC Secretariat has faced some challenges- in some cases being usurped or side-lined by other key agencies e.g. Foreign Affairs which have taken the lead. What has been the effect of the capacity building intervention on the working of the Ministries, are they taking the lead in EAC integration issues as had been assumed at project start?What is the evidence that they are doing so?

c) Relevance

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[31] A summative evaluation will be undertaken for MEAC Uganda as the project has recently come to an end.

[32] Efforts to mainstream gender across TMEA have been relatively recent. For this reasons most of the projects did not have a policy to measure and monitor the different impact on men and women at project inception. The main purpose of including gender in the evaluation is to map out the existing gender practice, draw on the lessons learnt and assess the challenges faced to inform the design of the TMEA gender policy and incorporate gender issues into the TMEA phase II programme.

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Relevance is the extent to which a development intervention conforms to the needs and priorities of the target groups, the policies of recipient countries and donors and TMEA's strategy.

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

- To what extent is the intervention aligned with ministries priorities and needs? Is the intervention well in tune with the trade policies and administrative systems of the partner country government and EAC policies and systems?

d) Sustainability

Sustainability is the continuation or longevity of benefits from a development intervention after the cessation of development assistance.

The Evaluators will answer the following questions:

- What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?
- What is the evidence of systems and tools developed as part of improving the capacity of Ministries? Is there evidence of efforts geared towards mainstreaming project innovations into government policies, practices and in planning and budgeting process?
- What are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?

e) Efficiency

Efficiency is the extent to which the costs of a development intervention can be justified by its results, taking alternatives into account.

The evaluators will answer the following key question:

- To what extent and how has the intervention been effective and achieved good Value for Money (VfM)?

Further sub–questions to assist in the interpretation of the 5 key evaluation questions above are hereby attached as Annex 1.

Methodology

The consultant will use scientific and technical methods of collection and organising data. The consultant will treat the evaluation questions as a hypothesis and use scientific methods to verify them. The consultant also use mixed methods to appropriately assess the processes and impacts of interventions. Methods should be tailored to the problem at hand and the resources available. Methods used may include: analysis of desk Survey (Secondary data), informal and formal stakeholder interviews, focus groups, and data triangulation. The consultant will make use of a robust approach and methodology in addressing the question of attribution. The consultant shall also consider approaches to use in gathering views from citizens as part of gauging public awareness on EAC integration issues and opportunities. Use of citizens' representative bodies PSOS and CSOs will be required.

Data Collection: The consultant should also aim to collect only information that will be of use and that will achieve high response rates. The consultant must employ multiple mechanisms to ensure data quality and appropriate levels of validation, The evaluation consultant should propose an assessment methodology to rank performance of each of the projects under evaluation after addressing the key evaluation questions at hand.

Desk Survey: The desk review will entail a detailed review of relevant project documents that will be availed by TMEA and the project partners. These will include the EAC Treaty, the 4th EAC Development Strategy, project design reports, Project Appraisal Reports (PAR), project work plans, monitoring plans (including results chains), risk plans, quarterly ,mid-term review reports where applicable,annual progress reports and TMEA Theory of Change/Strategy. The evaluators

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will also undertake a review of relevant secondary data including relevant policies and technical documents relating to the assignment.

Interviews and focus group discussions: The evaluators will have the options of conducting structured and semi structured interviews as well as focus group discussions and Key informant interviews for information gathering. Due attention will be paid to language to ensure effective communication. Key informant interviews will be conducted involving TMEA programme staff and directors, project staff and partners from the Ministries coordinating East African Affairs in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, the EAC Secretariat and relevant MDAs supporting the integration process and EAC Policy makers. There will be merit in bringing together representatives from the MEACs for a joint FGD.

Throughout the evaluation, lessons learnt should be identified and evidence/ content analysis should be captured in form of comprehensive case studies (minimum of at least 5 case studies).

Information from different sources, e.g. existing documentation and interviews, focus group discussions will be triangulated.

The evaluation team will also develop an assessment tool, outlining project management criteria and standards which will be presented to TMEA for feedback and discussed with the Joint Evaluation Group (JEG) for adoption. The purpose of the assessment tool is to develop a common understanding of the standards applied for the formative evaluation.

Expected deliverables

The Capacity Building Programme on Regional integration consultancy team is expected to provide the TMEA with the following deliverables:

1. A detailed inception report with a work plan and draft data collection tools two weeks after signing the contract. The detailed inception report should comprehensively demonstrate the technical approach (and data collection tools) that will be effectively and efficiently address the evaluation questions within the consultancy timeframe.
2. A 1st draft evaluation report presented to TMEA and the Joint Evaluation Group for review and input.
3. A 2nd draft evaluation report that will be presented to the Joint Evaluation Group, TMEA Senior Management and Leadership Teams and relevant country and regional programme staff and Directors for review and validation.
4. A final draft evaluation report that will be presented to the TMEA Programme Investment Committee (PIC) for adoption. The final report will be a written report (Ms Word) with an executive summary and a Power point presentation on key findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The evaluation report shall be written in English, be of no more than 20 pages (excluding annexes), use numbered paragraphs and should be structured into 3 sections; the first part will be devoted to the evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the project; the second part will provide an analysis of sustainability and the scaling up of the project approach; and the third part will focus on recommendations for future directions to be included into the Phase 2 of the project strategy/PAR. Annexes will provide detailed information collected during field visits (focus discussion reports, summaries of interview sheets, summaries of responses to questionnaires). During the interviews and trips, the Evaluators will take photos at project sites and record and take some photos during some of the interviews of the stakeholders which will be submitted along with the reports at the end of the evaluation. For these multimedia products, email and phone contacts will be provided.

Commencement date and period of execution

The formative evaluation will be executed within a period of 6 weeks from signing the contract. A detailed work plan with clear and measureable deliverables and timelines should be included in the technical proposal for this consultancy and the awarded consultant(s) will develop and finalise the proposed work plan and budget (as part of the inception report) within 1 week of starting the assignment.

Schedule of deliverables

Article I. Date	Article II. Deliverables
Article III. 1st July 2015	Article IV. Contract signed
Article V. 7 working days after signing the contract	Article VI. Inception report
Article VII. 21 working days after receipt of TMEA comments on the inception report	Article VIII. First draft project evaluation report
Article IX. 7 working days after receipt of TMEA comments on the 1st draft evaluation report	Article X. Second draft project evaluation report
Article XI. 7 working days after receipt of TMEA comments on the 2nd draft evaluation report	Article XII. Final draft project evaluation report

Budget for evaluation

The budget for this evaluation will not exceed USD 100,000.

Qualifications

To ensure the independence of the evaluation and the credibility of the findings, the evaluation will be conducted by a team of external consultants identified through a transparent selection process. The team will include members with an appropriate balance of expertise in evaluation methodologies, relevant technical expertise and practical experience. The team should include an experienced East African for local and regional context. The Evaluation team leader is expected to be evaluation professional with substantial successful experience leading and managing evaluation assignments, particularly relating to trade facilitation in developing countries and have in-depth knowledge of the latest evaluation methodologies. The team leader should have at least 10 years experience.

The team should have at least two members with strong knowledge of the EAC Regional integration agenda to be able to fully contextualize the capacity building programme under Evaluation. The team should also present good qualitative and quantitative skills. The team should have fluency in English, French and ideally have a Kinyarwanda and Swahili speaker.

The Evaluation team should combine the following expertise and experience:

- Experience of designing and undertaking evaluations of multi-component development programmes, using mixed methods approaches that meet recognised standards for credibility and rigor;

- Education qualification of at least a Master's Degree(Team Leader) and Bachelor's Degree(Team members) in Development Studies, Economics or relevant Social Sciences;

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- Demonstrated experience of using evaluations as a tool for lesson-learning both during programme implementation and beyond;

- Strong stakeholders management skills and ability to work flexibly with donors, partner countries, private sector entities; demonstrated ability to manage and sensitive relationships tactfully and productively;

- Strong understanding of the strengths and limitations of different designs and how to interpret and present findings accurately to both researchers and non-researchers;

- Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of various quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies for demonstrating impact;

- In-depth knowledge of trade issues, particularly in East Africa, and experience of working on evaluations of trade policies and programmes;

- Understanding of social inclusion and gender issues in programming in East Africa;

- Strong communication skills - being strategic as well as able to communicate complex studies and findings in an accessible way for non-technical people;

- Selected company should have quality assurance processes in place.

Implementation arrangements

The Evaluator will be responsible for all logistic arrangements required to conduct the evaluation work. TMEA will facilitate convening of meetings and site visits where necessary. All relevant expenses should be covered by the evaluation contract budget.

The evaluation consultant will report to TMEA Results Director, who will manage day to day contractual and organisational issues with the evaluation team, monitor implementation progress, and provide progress updates to the Joint Evaluation Group (JEG)[33]. The evaluation consultant will work closely with the TMEA enhanced trade environment regional and national teams, Strategic Objective Team Leader, and relevant partner staff.

Governance and quality assurance may be further strengthened by 2 to 3 peer reviewers. The role of the peer reviewers is to review the scientific and technical quality of the independent evaluation; to ensure that the design and implementation of the evaluation is robust and credible, and will stand up to external scrutiny. Peer reviewers inputs will be coordinated by the Results Director.

The evaluation report will be presented to the JEG and subsequently to the TMEA programme Investment Committee (PIC) for review, quality assurance, acceptance and final sign off.

Indicative sub-questions for key questions in section 4

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[33] The JEG is an advisory sub-committee of the PIC, TMEA's oversight body. Joint Evaluation Group (JEG) is in place to steer and advise the monitoring and evaluation of the TMEA programme at key strategic points. It provides strategic direction on the independent evaluation, and has a strong coordination and facilitation role across the evaluative exercises and to ensure lessons learnt are taken forward.

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Effectiveness

- What were the systems in place for tracking the effectiveness of progress towards stated desired short and mid-term outcomes? Were these systems used to make decisions to change activities accordingly?
- How well did the implementation approach respond to the changing demands of the situation?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

Impact

- What do beneficiaries (men and women) and other stakeholders affected by the intervention perceive to be the effects of the intervention on themselves? What real difference has the intervention made to the beneficiaries?
- What are the changes that have occurred during the life span of the intervention or the period covered by the evaluation be identified and measured?
- To what extent can identified changes be attributed to the intervention? What would have occurred without the intervention?

Relevance

- Have the interventions been developed with the inclusion and participation of project partners?
- Were the interventions carried out adequate solutions to the capacity building programmes on regional integration developed? What else could have been done?
- Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
- Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended impacts and effects?
- To what extent are the objectives still valid?

Sustainability

- What were the major factors, which have influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme or project? To what extent, were these issues known before the end of the project or programme (for ended projects) and what was done to mitigate them?
- Do partners have the financial capacity to maintain the benefits from the interventions when TMEA support has been withdrawn?
- Do the projects have a clear and comprehensive exit strategy that was regularly monitored? What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact?
- How can the programming approach for the Capacity Building programme be improved?

Efficiency

- Has the evaluated intervention been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency?
- Were activities cost-efficient?
- Were outputs and outcomes achieved on time?
- In which activities/component does the project achieve higher VFM and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VFM?
- Could more of the same result have been produced with the same resources?
- Could an altogether different type of intervention have solved the same problem but at a lower cost?
- To what extent was risk management integrated in the programme? How often were risks identified, analysed and incorporated in programme design? How were the envisaged risks and assumptions as laid out at project design addressed?
- How efficient and effective were the management and administration systems and procedures including programme results framework and reporting?

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- What is the estimated equivalent money value of the benefits and costs to fund the project?

Coherence

- Was the programme governance model comprehensive, clear and appropriate for the effective management and delivery of the programme and related projects? To what extent did all actors pull in the same direction?
- Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities? What is the effect of constraining factors?
- What have been the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date?
- To what extent has the mix of interventions within TMEA or by different partners contributed to optimise the impact of the support?
- To what extent were the projects linked to other projects within the TMEA Programme framework?

ANNEX 2 - METHODOLOGY

Methods

1. We employed mixed methods approach in order to strengthen the reliability of data and validity of findings, as well as to broaden and deepen the understanding of how outputs, outcomes and to the extent possible, impacts are (and are not) achieved, especially in challenging contexts. This is particularly relevant for TMEA, as data access and quality remain major challenges in the region and there is a desire to continue and improve support to national capacity for implementing regional integration measures in the future. Learning is therefore at the core of the formative evaluation strategy.

2. Data collection tools included:

   - Desk review

   - E-survey (quantitative data)

   - Focus group discussions

   - Semi-structured interviews

Sampling

3. This section provides a brief overview of the sampling strategy, data collection tools and data analysis plans. There is no such thing as a perfect evaluation design – there is however such a thing as a credible and useful evaluation. We need to make appropriate and informed method choices that will lead to a credible, and useful, impact evaluation.

4. **Country and Institutional Selection.** The TOR provided the countries for the research and the selected institutions.

5. **Qualitative sampling.** For Focus Group interviews and semi structured interviews, we identified key informants in each country through country teams. Based on this, we snowballed a sample (i.e. ask key informants who else the evaluation team should talk with). We selected organisations that provided different insights than those directly involved with the programme, such as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may have a competing mandate over the regional integration agenda. For most countries, on most questions, we reached data saturation, which is when new categories and themes stop emerging.

6. **E-survey sampling.** We are reliant on the TMEA database, and active email addresses, to send out the e-Survey. Due to poor TMEA and MEAC monitoring data, we were unable to establish a population from which to draw a random and stratified sample.

Data collection tools

7. **Desk Review.** TMEA identified and provided key documents. This included ToCs, logical framework matrixes for the country programmes, the baseline capacity assessments and public awareness surveys, previously conducted reviews and evaluations (e.g. MTR in Uganda), EAMS reports, Common Market Score card reports and results-oriented monitoring reports based on the indicators in the LFMs.

8. **E-survey.** The evaluation team developed a quantitative survey based on the evaluation questions. Relevant questions were developed and the tool was administered via e-mail. The survey was sent to 233 respondents but the survey data obtained have no significant value (n=39).

9. **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).** FGDs were organized with key stakeholder groups. The initial idea of gathering ministry representatives in a FGD in Arusha was not possible due to EAC meeting schedules. However, a similar session was held at national level with

regional integration focal points from different MDAs. This will require support from the TMEA Country Team. Another session could be held with civil society, including representatives from private sector. Ideally, each FGD will include between 5-7 participants and will meet for 1-2 hours. The emphasis will be upon gathering data on what worked and what did not work for increasingly national capacity to coordinate and implement regional integration issues, and how it could be improved in the future. Ultimately, the Review Team met with 87 stakeholders in total (Burundi – 10; Kenya – 21; Rwanda – 16; Tanzania – 10 and; Uganda -30).

10. **Semi-structured Interviews.** One-on-one interviews with key informants were held with people in the supported ministries, and with other organisations.

Data Analysis

11. The evaluation team analysed qualitative data through a 1) content analysis, which reduce larged amounts of unstructured textual content into manageable data relevant to the (evaluation) research questions; and 2) thematic coding which identified passages of text that are linked by a common theme or idea allowing the indexation of text into categories, as appropriate. When results were found, we attempted to identity rival explanations.

12. The ToR requested five cases, and with guidance from TMEA, it was agreed that these would identify particularly good examples of lessons learnt. The case narratives (case studies imply a more in-depth study), is the more appropriate term given their potential depth, and are 1-3 pages in length. Data were collected and analysed to provide a holistic story. The case narratives were determined as the research was implemented and not every country has a case narrative, per agreement with TMEA.

13. There were several data limitations. First, we were heavily reliant on secondary data of which we had little control over its accessibility or quality. For example, while we used secondary data, we were unable to verify the validity or credibility of the source data. Second, response rates to e-surveys were very low. Third, the time period to collect data is relatively short.

14. Given these considerations, we employed data triangulation. Triangulation facilitates validation of data through cross verification from more than two sources. It tests the consistency of findings obtained through different instruments and increases the chance to control, or at least assess, some of the threats or multiple causes influencing our results.:We checked the consistency of our findings by using at least two different data sources (data triangulation) and researcher triangulation.

Evaluation work plan

Below we highlight the key steps in the evaluation work plan.

15. **Organise logistics.**

16. **Review programme documents.** While this initial step should have taken place prior to entering the field, due to time constraints we implemented this review throughout the data collection period. A literature review was implemented prior to the start of the field work and continued throughout the duration of the evaluation. Documents were collected from TMEA, TMEA partners, and other identified sources.

17. **Develop the evaluation framework.** Evaluation questions were refined and organised according to the OECD DAC criteria.

18. **Review of TMEA Theory of Change.** This proved challenging given the lack of theories of change at the programme level. The evaluation team did engage with, and interrogate, the TMEA Theory of Change. A ToC, or programme theory, describes how the intended results will be achieved – how programme activities are understood to contribute to a series of intermediate outcomes that will lead to the final intended impacts. Using TMEA's ToC, the

focus was be on validating critical assumptions and on testing the causal logic in ToC pathways (i.e. has x led to y). The initial desk review will seek to identify existing ToCs (how change is expected to be brought about) and theories of action (TOA), which defines what activities aim to bring about that change. The fieldwork tested the current ToC and ToA (often using the Results Chain in place of a formal ToC). This iterative process was implemented throughout the evaluation period.

19. **Develop evaluation data collection tools and conduct data collection.** Primary data collection was focused by the team's data needs, based on the data gaps identified by secondary data review. Given the time frame, the review of secondary data happened concurrently with gathering primary data, thus creating a somewhat fluid and iterative process.

20. **Analyse data.** Secondary data: (a) informed what questions need to be addressed with primary data gathering and the focusing of that (sampling), and at the same time, (b) provide data for answering the evaluation questions. Primary data collection filled data gaps and provided deeper insight and contextual understanding. All data were analysed against the evaluation questions. Further, five country reports, provided in Annex 2, provided all data collected during field visits, which have been analysed and summarised for TMEA.

21. **Answering Descriptive Questions.** Using all data sets, the evaluation team aimed to answer descriptive questions– what has implementation been like (what activities have been undertaken and what has been the quality of implementation?), what changes have occurred (and for whom?), and what has been the context in which the TMEA programme has been implemented?

22. **Identify five cases.** During the field work, the evaluation team identified five case narratives. These case narratives highlight a best practice or lesson learnt for informing management decisions with regards to the CB programme.

23. **Summarising evidence into an overall judgement.** Finally, evaluations synthesize information and provide an overall evaluative judgement.

24. **Write report**. We have written and provided a draft report to TMEA based on the approved outline, for comments. We look forward to receiving one comprehensive and non-conflicting set of comments, which we will address to the best of our ability, and write the final report.

25. **Dissemination.** Once the report is approved, the evaluation team will provide critical findings and recommendations to key stakeholders.

Data collection tools

Focus Group Discussion Guide

Focus Group Leader:

Place of Focus Group:

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Time started and ended:

Introducing the Focus Group

- Welcome the group and introduce yourself. Explain the Focus Group's purpose, which is to gather a more in-depth understanding about TMEA and the MEAC.

- Explain that the participation is voluntary and not paid. Clarify that the information gathered will be anonymous, though their names will appear at the back of the report as having been interviewed.

- Explain that the Focus Group will last approximately 1 hour. Inform the group that we are aiming to gather information, and not achieve consensus. Ask the group if there are any questions before we get started, and address those questions.

- Ask the group to introduce themselves. Have them provide their name, organization, function, and relationship with the MEAC programme.

- Ask if there are any questions before the Focus Group begins.

Rapport Building Stage

- Facilitator asks questions that are easy for participants to answer to start the talking and sharing. This should take about 5-10 minutes.

In-depth discussion - FGD Questions

- What has been achieved/not achieved by the MEAC Capacity Development Programme? Why was this possible/was not possible?

- How could the MEAC Capacity Development Programme be improved?

Probes that may be used to encourage additional discussion may include

- *Importance of regional integration in national development strategies/plans?*

- *Relationship of Ministry of Integration to other ministries*

- *Evidence of mainstreaming of regional integration into policies/strategies and actions of other MDAs and agencies. What has been key to success? Why has mainstreaming failed?*

- *Relevance of TMEA support to identified capacity needs of the Ministry of Integration? (original needs assessment)*

- *Level of awareness about regional integration in other MDAs?*

- *Perception of quality of technical assistance (e.g. long term vs short term, international vs national)*

- *Perceived relevance of training provided to daily tasks*

Closure

Facilitator summarizes the impressions or conclusions from the discussion, and participants clarify and confirm the information. Facilitator answers any remaining questions from participants. Facilitator thanks the participants and indicates next steps.

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General Evaluation Qualitative Guide

Note that only questions relevant to the respondent will be used.

Country			
Interviewer		**Time started**	
Interviewee		**Time ended**	
Organisation		**Informed consent-verbal**	
Date of interview		**Location of interview/Type of interview (phone, Skype, in person, group)**	

- **(Establish rapport)[shake hands]** My name is _____ and I work with the Saana. Thank you for making the time to meet with me.
- **(State purpose)** I am here today to ask some questions about TMEA/MEAC, specifically about (*insert activity* –).
- (**Motivation**) I hope to use this information to help inform TMEA and the wider development community about the capacity building programme
- (**Time line**) We have [45 minutes - 1 hour] for our time together. Are you available to respond to some questions during this time?
- (**Consent**) You do not need to participate in this interview. Not participating will in no way influence your relationship with TMEA/MEAC. You may stop the interview at any time and you may refuse to answer any questions. Your answers are confidential and I will not use your name in the report or identify you in any way. However, your name will be included in the list of people that we have interviewed.
- (**Transition**) Do you have any questions for me before we start?

Description
1. Please tell me about your relationship with TMEA/MEAC/CB programme
2. Based on your experience, what can you tell me about the CB programme?

Relevance
1. Please tell me about:

- Was the CB programme relevant to the context and to the needs of the Ministry? (Problem and gaps identified and addressed)
- Was there a clear rationale provided for the selected programme activities? (activities addressed gaps/problems)
- Was the TMEA intervention design in line with the Ministry's Human resource development plan?

2. To what extent did capacity building meet relevant country needs?
3. Was the targeted population covered (reached?)
4. Were the TMEA policies and programmes supportive of gender equality and other human rights?

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- Was the TMEA programme designed to provide equal participation and benefits for women and men, or other groups, as appropriate?
- Did the TMEA programme help to promote (other marginalised groups?)

5. Was the TMEA CB programme adjusted throughout its implementation to align it with emerging priorities/needs and to ensure support for best practice?

- Was the TMEA CB programme planned and implemented in a manner sensitive to the country's political and cultural sensitivities?

Efficiency

1. Did the implementation of the TMEA programme make effective use of time and resources to achieve the results?
2. Was the TMEA programme designed and/or amended throughout the implementation period for optimal value for money?
3. How exactly has the programme expenditure been tracked by TMEA since the launch of the project to present? Have expenditures been tracked against project outputs/outcomes? If so, please share these tracking reports from both TMEA and MEAC.
4. Can you provide us the latest details on allocations for the different components of the programme as compared with the initially agreed upon budget? How were these agreed with stakeholders?
5. What mechanisms/systems does TMEA have in place to ensure expenditure is appropriately used? What risk management mechanisms are in place? When were these instituted?

Effectiveness

1. Was the TMEA programme implemented according to plan? If not, why not and what was done about it?

- To what extent did contextual factors facilitate or hinder programme implementation?
- How was the implementation tracked? (monitoring framework or system

2. Was the necessary support for implementation provided?

- To what extent did the Secretariat in Arusha support the country recipients?
- What support was provided for programme implementation, by whom and to what effect?
- How were bottlenecks in implementation identified? How were they resolved?

3. Was timely corrective action taken where needed?
4. What were the risks to achieving the TMEA objectives, such as weak institutional frameworks, or relatedly, constrained absorption capacity? Were the risks managed appropriately?
5. Has Secretariat responsive to the needs of countries and beneficiaries?
6. Did TMEA facilitate trade changes in the targeted population?

Impact

1. What has been the effect of CB within a Ministry? At the institutional, organisational, individual and stakeholder level?
2. Were there any unintended changes?
3. Who or what else may have contributed to these results?

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4. What role has the local and national context played in either supporting or hindering change?

Sustainability

1. To what extent can the benefits of the TMEA CB programme continue after donor funding has ceased?
2. Are there any areas of the TMEA CB results that are clearly not sustainable? What lessons can be learnt from these?

ANNEX 3 – COUNTRY REPORTS AND PRESENTATION OF DATA

1. The country reports in Annex 2 represent data collected during field visits, from focus group discussions and interviews. These data have been analysed and summarised for ease of reading.

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List of acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
CB	Capacity Building
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DTF	Distance to the Frontier
EAC	East African Community
EAMS	East African Monitoring System
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECGLC	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MPACEA	Ministère à la Présidence chargé des Affaires de la Communauté Est Africaine
NOC	National Oversight Committee
NTBs	Non-Tariff Barriers
OBR	Office Burundais de Recettes
PAR	Project Appraisal Report
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTT	Project Tracking Team
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SCT	Single Customs Territory
TA	Technical Assistance
TAF	Trade Advocacy Fund
ToR	Terms of Reference
WTO	World Trade Organization

Context

1. Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. The economy is heavily dependent upon the agricultural sector with most people engaging in subsistence farming. Today Burundi still suffers the devastating effects of the civil war that prevailed from 1993 to 2005 and saw GDP per capita declined in real terms by more than a third (36%),[34]

2. Burundi has again been rocked by violence since President Pierre Nkurunziza announced his plan to run for a third term, which resulted in his re-election. Dozens of people have since been killed, including a recent spate of killings of government senior officials and thousands have fled the country.[35]

3. Exports from Burundi averaged 18690.84 million Burundian Francs (BIF) from 2000 until 2015, reaching an all-time high of 75218.70 million BIF in December of 2008 and a record low of 3619.90 million BIF in June of 2010.[36] Figure 2 below summarises growing export sectors in relation to demand from the global market.

**Figure 1: Burundian growing export sectors in relation to global demand**

Source: International Trade Centre Trade Map

4. Burundi's largest exports are gold, coffee, tea and soap. The main export markets are the United Arab Emirates, Democratic Republic of Congo, Switzerland, Kenya, and Germany, as summarised in Figure 2 below.

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[34] Strategic Plan, MPACEA, p. 19
[35] Appalling Human Rights Abuses in Burundi, Deutsche Welle, 18 September, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/appalling-human-rights-abuses-in-burundi/a-18722879
[36] Trading Economics, Burundi, 2015, retrieved from: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/burundi/exports

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Figure 2: Main export markets for Burundian commodities

List of importing markets for a product exported by Burundi
Product: TOTAL All products

Source: International Trade Centre Trade Map

5.   According to the Doing Business Index the business environment has slightly improved in Burundi with the Distance to the Frontier Score increasing from 49,94% in 2014 to 51,07% in 2015. The Logistics Performance Index also demonstrates substantial improvement. See Figure 3 for further details.

**Figure 3: Composite LPI Score in East Africa 2007-2014**

Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index

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
6. Burundi has been a member of the EAC since July 2007 and applied the provisions of the EAC Customs Union Protocol on July 1, 2009 and the Common Market Protocol on July 1, 2010. It is also a member of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC), the Nile Basin Initiative, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Further, Burundi participates in the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite negotiations. [37]

7. Some of the regional integration challenges faced by Burundi include:

    • Untapped natural resources;

    • Growth rate of a population highly dependent on food crop production;

    • Underdevelopment of the private sector;

    • Weak economic infrastructures (transportation and electricity);

    • Business environment requiring substantial change to attract foreign investment; and

    • Non-tariff barriers still to be addressed, particularly in regard to rules of origin and mutual recognition of regional standards. [38]

8. The Ministère à la Présidence chargé des Affaires de la Communauté Est Africaine's (MPACEA) main mission is to coordinate the implementation of, and compliance with, commitments toward the East African Community (EAC). MPACEA also aims to ensure the representation and effective participation, as well as promote the interests, of Burundi in all activities related to the EAC. Further, MPACEA has the mandate to act as spokesperson of the EAC in government and to coordinate and monitor activities of other MDAs with regard to issues pertaining to the EAC. Finally, the Ministry is mandated to design and raise funds for related programmes and projects.[39]

9. Figure 5 (next page) summarises the latest MPACEA organogram. The Ministry's structure has been under discussion with support from the CB programme and MPACEA is now considering alternative structures.

10. The MPACEA Strategic Plan included a SWOT analysis that identified five Ministry weaknesses. These weaknesses included a lack of: 1) technical familiarity with regional integration issues; 2) English language capabilities; 3) effective monitoring and evaluation; 4) poor staff motivation; and 5) a lack of funding infrastructure for communication technology.

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[37] Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (PRSP II), 93
[38] Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (PRSP II), 93
[39] MPEACA website, retrieved from: http://www.eac.bi

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Figure 4: MPACEA organogram

Source: MPACEA

Intervention

11. Given the lack of an identified a results chain for the Burundi Capacity Building (CB) programme the evaluation drew on the Project Appraisal Report (PAR) with which to understand the CB programme's logic. The Burundi CB programme logic appeared to be similar to the other CB programme's in the region. The logic is that if MPACEA improves its strategic leadership and coordination of regional integration in Burundi, this will then lead to the overall outcome that Partner States substantially increase the implementation of a comprehensive framework for regional integration. The original design also notes a specific result relating to the removal of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). Indicators measure the development of a regional integration plan, strengthened procurement and financial management systems, and increased public awareness.

12. TMEA delivered the CB programme via technical assistance to the Ministry, including mentoring and formal training sessions. There was also significant procurement of equipment, such as a generator, vehicles, and computers.

Key Findings

Relevance

13. *This section explores the extent and how well the intervention suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.*

14. Regional integration is an important part of the Burundi Vision 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (PRSP II). It is one of the key means to transform Burundi's economy to produce sustainable, job-creating growth according to the PRSP II. "Through its membership in the EAC, Burundi hopes to find a definitive solution to its geographic isolation. The membership also represents the surest means to establish the political stability and

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security conditions required for sustainable economic and social development"[40]. Interview data suggests that the EAC is a clear priority for the government despite Burundi being a member of different economic regional groupings.

15. Placing MPACEA in the President's Office reinforced its power to some degree, but the Ministry continues to have several challenges with regards to its ability to effect change. First, the country is a relatively recent member of the EAC and second, the Ministry is relatively young. Interview data suggest a third and related challenge; ministries exist that are more powerful than MPACEA such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, and the Office Burundais de Recettes (OBR), which tends to operate independently from MPACEA.

16. The opportunity to introduce significant organisational restructuring came with the Burundi chairmanship of the EAC[41]. Data suggested that MPACEA has and should retain a coordination rather than developing a technical mandate. For example, the technical dimensions of trade negotiations should remain within the remit of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

17. The objectives and design of the CB programme were in line with the MPACEA strategy, contributing particularly to Strategic Outcome 1: The synergy between regional and national institutions has improved, along with the institutional capacity of MPACEA and its stakeholders; and Strategic Outcome 2: Strategic partners and stakeholders are sensitised and involved in regional integration. The CB programme was less relevant for outcomes 4, 5, and 6 relating to fundraising, peace and security and infrastructure, respectively.

18. Interview data support these findings, noting that that the CB programme contributed to institutional capacity strengthening, the development of instruments and tools, improving legislation and regulation, as well as awareness-raising. Further, these data indicated that TMEA provides significant management support to MPACEA.

19. MPACEA engaged several key stakeholders among private sector organisations (e.g. the Chamber of Commerce and the Confederation of Industries) in the validation of key documents, such as the national regional integration strategy and action plan. The private sector also benefited from MPACEA's CB programme that focused on English language training. Limited data suggest a need for more engagement with the private sector. Finally, some respondents noted that engagement with civil society has been restricted as civil society organization (CSOs) tend to be quite politicised.

20. The TMEA Burundi Office initiated a gender mainstreaming assessment in 2013, both at TMEA Office and with key partners. The assessment reviewed five themes: internal capacity, health & safety, information, inclusivity, and capacity building and accountability. The results of this assessment were not reviewed. One interviewee recollected a recent example of implicit gender discrimination. He stated:

    With the Single Customs Territory (SCT) goods are cleared only once, at arrival. Therefore, OBR also posted customs officials at the Dar es Salaam and Mombasa ports. Apparently female customs officials were hesitant to request for these postings, while the Director General assumed women would not want to go on a foreign posting.

21. Thus while MPACEA is aware of the greater need for gender sensitivity and mainstreaming, the evaluation data did not identify specific activities in the CB programme that specifically address this or reaching out to marginalised populations.

22. In sum, The CB programme is in line with the Burundi government's priorities and supports key outcomes of the MPACEA Strategic Plan such as mainstreaming regional integration across MDAs, capacity development of MPACEA and broader awareness-raising. Further

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[40] Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (PRSP II), pg. 94.
[41] The evaluaiton data did not disconfirm nor confirm that Burundi acted as chair of the EAC Summit, or when.

the CB programme engaged private sector and civil society in the design of key strategic documents and other CB programme activities. While TMEA conducted a gender mainstreaming assessment across the country portfolio, it not yet clear how they have promoted gender sensitivity or reached out to marginalised groups. The CB programme addressed, to some extent, the English language barrier that MPACEA and others faced through the English language component, for example facilitating their ability to participation in regional meetings. Finally an added benefit of EAC membership is that it has the potential to promote peace and stability in the country.

Efficiency

23. *This section explores the extent to which the intervention used the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results [considering sound management and value for money].*

24. Out of a total budget of USD 4,137 million (excluding the communications component of USD 216,000), by the end of the fiscal year 2014/15, approximately 4.167 million had been spent, entailing an almost 10% overspend. Consultancy fees constituted 63% of all expenses.

25. The CB programme made significant outlays for basic ministry infrastructure, such as electricity, furniture, information, communication and technology (ICT) and vehicles. For example, over USD 70,000 was spent on the purchase of vehicles and USD 46,000 on the purchase of a generator for the Ministry.

26. The English Language Component absorbed a significant part of the budget, with cumulative expenditures for the entire program amounted to USD 1,705,747. However, considering the particular language challenges of Burundi, this allocation appeared appropriate.

27. There is a fixed budget for travel expenses and an agreement with MPACEA that this budget is only used in the second half of the financial year that aims to control travel expenditure of Ministry staff.

28. The CB programme had overwhelming challenges with technical assistance. Interview data stated that, for example, the initial Human Resources advisor had limited French and was unable to provide contracted deliverables. Another example provided was the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) advisor introducing expensive ICT solutions that did not solve MPACEA's M&E challenges. Other data further indicate that the current TA team has spent significant amounts of time reorganising the programme's structure; restructuring has taken place three times since the programme's initiation.

29. Due to the problems faced with TA, the CB programme reinforced its monitoring capacities, increasing the frequency of reporting against shorter-term deliverables. For example, interview data stated that in 2015 new milestone-based contracts were introduced and the Terms of References (ToRs) included short-term deliverables and weekly/monthly monitoring and reporting.

30. Another recent change included integrating local consultants into the TA team. Interview data were mixed with regards to which were more appropriate or useful. Most people interviewed noted the need for international and local support on an extended and short-term basis.

31. Burundi has constituted a Regional Integration Coordination Platform. The Platform involves the Office of the President, Inter-ministerial Council for Regional Integration, the executive secretariat responsible for coordination of regional integration, and the technical committee for regional integration and subcommittees. The technical committee is organised according to the four major axis of the National Strategy for Regional Integration, with specific

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subcommittees for each axis.[42] The different levels of the platform meet on an established schedule throughout the year.

32. National Oversight Committee (NOC) guides the CB programme, and is chaired by the MPACEA Permanent Secretary, where most MPACEA stakeholders are represented. The CB programme has a Project Tracking Team (PTT), also chaired by the Permanent Secretary. According to the latest progress report, by January 2015, the PTT had met (only) twice.[43] There is also an official focal point/project lead to facilitate regular communication and coordination between MPACEA and TMEA. Finally, data suggest that the EAC Secretariat has been most involved with MPACEA with regards to M&E and EAMS.

Effectiveness

33. *This section examines the extent to which the activity attains its objectives by considering its ability to reach intended beneficiaries; achieve trade and social gains; and avoid unintended results.*

34. The legal transposition and implementation of Common Market Protocols at national level is not yet achieved. Burundi, together with Tanzania, provide the toughest barriers to move capital across borders in the region, namely due to capital controls. On the Free Movement of Services, Burundi fares better, with only nine non-conforming measures. Burundi also does well on the removal of NTBs, with six resolved and only one newly identified and unresolved NTB in place[44]. The EAMS Case Study indicates that out of 276 decisions made, 56 % are either fully implemented or are being implemented. The fully implemented decisions are concentrated in five ministries. The not yet implemented decisions are likewise concentrated in five ministries, which are: the Ministry of Public Works (24) Ministry of ICT (20) Ministry of Finances (17), Ministry of Environment (14) Ministry of Public Security (12)[45].

35. Interview data suggest that the most critical instrument for mainstreaming regional integration is the National Integration Strategy and Action Plan. This strategy is MPACEA's most critical tool that can be used to mobilise MDAs to implement regional integration. While MPACEA developed these documents, they were not approved prior to the April 2015 violence, which brought a halt to most activities.

36. In addition, MPEACE prepared an implementation guideline of all regional commitments shared with all MDAs and stakeholders. This implementation guideline has several elements. It encompasses the regional commitments/decisions/directives managed through EAMS Burundi, it defines steps needed to implement each individual decision by relevant MDAs under the coordination of the MPACEA/MDA responsible for the sector concerned. Finally, the reporting cycle, and the needed interactions between MPACEA and other MDAs are also covered in the implementation guideline.

37. One of MPACEA's main challenges is the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities between MDAs and issues with MDA focal points. For example, at times there was confusion over "who is coordinating versus who is implementing." Further, MDA staff tend to have competing priorities and high turnover. However some data reflected that the relationship between MPACEA and MDAs has improved in the last few months, siting examples such as MDAs' improved response to meeting and workshop invitations and the rapid operationalisation of EAMS.

38. Interview data suggest that most capacity-building targets had been achieved, with most outputs in the process of being either finalised or approved. Of the nine initially planned reports, three draft trade policy papers have been produced. Once approved, this would

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[42] Quarterly Report 1, 2014.
[43] Quarterly Report 1, 2015
[44] National Monitoring Committee Report from Rwanda
[45] EAMS Case Study: Burundi

constitute the basis for the first ever Burundi Trade Policy. Commenting on this achievement, a few interviewees noted that this technical work should not be done by MPACEA, rather is should be done by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

39. While the CB programme supported the development of the MPACEA draft Strategic Plan, work plans were in the process of being developed and the plan was not approved when programme activities were halted in April 2015. This work plan would have facilitated the development of departmental and individual work plans. According to the latest quarterly report, these work plans are critical for the MPACEA to operationalise its strategy.

40. A capacity need assessment of MPACEA was originally planned, but could not be carried out. Interviewees stated that institutional and human resources development were among the core challenges of MPACEA. While interview data highlight the lack of M&E capacity as a major challenge for MPACEA, EAMS Burundi has been designed and populated with data. Most recently, automatic report generation was added, including a data dashboard. Unique in the region, EAMS will not be rolled-out to MDAs, due to concerns about capacity, including Internet connectivity. MPACEA is holding quarterly "labs" where MDA staff key in the data onto 6-7 computer terminals at the Ministry during 3-4 sessions. According to interviews, regular reporting creates peer pressure among MDAs to perform. To date, one EAMS report has been generated and signed off by the Minister. The main challenge for the implementation of EAMS Burundi has been that EAC commitments are not yet mainstreamed into work plans, staff does not have access to computers and Internet, and the relationship between MPACEA and the MDAs is not clearly defined and understood.[46]

41. Three trainings sessions have been held in cooperation with other programmes. This included a general regional integration training, a training on Economic Partnership Agreement with the University of Sussex and a 5-day Training Session on TradeSift (Systematic Integrated Framework for Trade Policy Analysis). Internal training has also been provided to MPACEA staff, notably on EAMS, but also on the preparation of policy papers.[47] There is also an annual retreat for MPACEA staff. Interview data indicates that while the quality of the content of the trainings has been high, the capacity of MPACEA to organise the sessions has been more limited, with late invitations and at times, poor attendance. The CB programme provided MPACEA with infrastructure and equipment, including a power generator, vehicles and laptops (5). The ministry was also fitted with video conferencing equipment via support from the EAC Secretariat. MPACEA does not operate on a single network server and there are still problems with Internet connectivity.

42. The programme had a significant English language training component, with activities supporting English as a second language training, train-the-trainers, the setting up of an English Lab at MPACEA and furnishing books to self-access libraries across the country. The total number of registered participants was 1,717, of which 38% were women, 75% of the total completed the six-month course and of that 75%, 78% received passing marks. A survey found that 92% of participants reported that having English improved their work performance to a significant degree. Specifically, students reported that their English language ability improved their ability to contribute to regional meetings. In the teacher-training component, 100% of the trained teachers reported that their training ability had improved with the course. The training of teachers had a broader impact through secondary schools, universities and other institutes. Participants reported that the English Lab and self-access libraries were only partially successful, with the lab also having some technical challenges[48].

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[46] Quarterly Report January – March 2014 Annex 24
[47] Quarterly Report 1, 2015
[48] Enhancing English Language Skills and Training/ Set-up English Language Centers   in Burundi: End of Project Report, Williams Academy, 2014

43. The CB programme also had a small (USD 150,000) awareness-raising component. The objective was to define key messages about EAC integration and to design a pilot communication campaign using various media tools. According to the communication consultant's final report, the objective to develop messages and tools to create awareness of the EAC in Burundi was achieved. The consultant reported that 60 % of the respondents were aware of EAC integration, and generally held a positive perception.

44. The communication endeavours had challenges, which were partially rooted in the MPACEA's limited communications capacity. MPACEA conducted a pilot communication campaign, which included various products, such as a radio show, banners, pamphlets, and simple manuals for border procedures. While the pilot campaign generated initial visibility, it also raised expectations about more regular information exchanges. Interview data suggested that the communication component was too limited and the budget was too low to produce any significant results. The Office Burundais de Recettes (OBR) had a separate, independent communications programme. According to limited interviews, this programme had better results.

45. In sum, with various TA challenges addressed, the CB programme made some recent progress in the completion of its deliverables. The political crisis halted all activities in April 2015, resulting in the government not approving significant documents, such as the National Integration Strategy and MPACEA Strategic Plan and related action plans. Given that progress on mainstreaming EAC commitments across various MDAs requires an overall strategic framework, this contextual challenge severely impacted on programme results. The deliverables include: i) the National Integration Strategy (NIS), ii) the NIS Action Plan; iii) Budundi EAMS, iv) trade policy papers, v) MPACEA Strategic Plan and: vi) Capacity building training

46. MPACEA completed the English language training and communication component. More than 1700 officials including top management, benefited from six-month language courses and 92% reported that English had improved their work performance, including their ability to contribute to regional meetings. The pilot communication efforts were too limited to have any major impact. While about 60% of the population is aware of the EAC, data do not indicate that this is a result of the MPACEA communication component.

Impact

47. *This section explores, to the extent possible, intended and unintended results including the positive and negative impact of external factors.*

48. The potential impact of the CB programme is enhanced by close coordination and synergies with other donors, particularly the African Development Bank (AfDB). The CB programme is building on the EU's initial efforts and is being implemented in close coordination with the AfDB. Limited interview data note that the AfDB projects and the CB programme have many synergies, which could ultimately together increase the impact trade flows; political stability in the country allowing.

Sustainability

49. *This section looks at the extent that the benefits of the capacity building activities are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.*

50. As the CB programme was winding down in 2015, there were plans to develop an exit strategy. However, due to the political crisis the plan was never completed. The lack of this plan constitutes the main challenge to the CB programme's sustainability. While most programme deliverables are reported as completed, they are also reported as not yet approved. A critical example is the National Integration Strategy and MPACEA Strategic Plan, with related action plans, as noted above.

51. The latest quarterly report (January – March 2015) highlighted continuity and sustainability as key challenges for the CB programme. Based on interviews, the TA team is very conscious of the sustainability challenge. The need to ensure transfer of know-how and methods of work to the MPACEA officials was specifically mentioned, along with concerns over the continuity of the Sector Working Group. This included a recommendation to increase MPACEA staff participation by two people and to generate more actionable recommendations by the meeting.[49]

52. According to limited interviews, it was difficult to incentivise MPACEA staff to do any "extra" work and the work entailed by the CB programme was still perceived to be on top of regular duties. For this reason, some interviewees suggested that long-term TA was more sustainable. However, sustainability of TA was affected by high turnover of staff, as those with better capacity tend to move to positions outside the Ministry. Further, interviewees stated that the CB programme was only "scratching the surface" with regards to knowledge transfer, which would influence sustainability. Nevertheless, according to some interviews, the CB programme would likely continue even without TMEA support, such as policy work, M&E (EAMS), reform of the MPACEA structure and human resources, since they formed part of the core work of MPACEA. Interview data however noted that the concern was about the quality of this work, which they thought would be lacking without external TA.

53. Finally, it is highly unlikely that the English training will continue when the CB programme ends as it required substantial financial investment. However, it had "in-built" sustainability mechanism though the training of trainers component, that can be further reinforced by the government or another donor.

Recommendations

54. **Key Finding 1:** Most of the programme deliverables, such as the National Integration Strategy and MPACEA Strategic Plan are completed. However, due to the political crisis that erupted in April 2015, these key deliverables have not been approved by the government. The National Strategy and action plan was the most critical document for the success of future mainstreaming of EAC integration, requiring operationalisation into the individual plans and budgets of relevant ministries. The EAMS Burundi was also developed and operationalised. However, there is a need to finalise the lab to collect the data, conduct training and reinforce ownership.

55. **Recommendation:** The moment the political environment allows, the CB programme should complete remaining deliverables and facilitate the approvals by government.

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[49] Quarterly report, p. 9

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KENYA

List of acronyms

|	
APN	Apex Porter Novelli
ASI	Adam Smith International
ASK	Agricultural Society of Kenya
CB	Capacity Building
CMP	Common Market Protocol
DFID- REAP	Department for International Development (UK) - Regional East Africa Programme
EAC	East African Community
EAMS	East African Monitoring System
EATTA	East African Tea Trade Association
ESAMI	East and Southern Administration and Management Institute
FRA	Fiduciary Risk Analysis
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEAC	Ministry of East African Community (Kenya)
NTB	Non-Tariff Barrier
PAR	Project Appraisal Report
PCU	Policy Coordination Unit
PRU	Policy Research Unit
RA	Research Assistant
RIC	Regional Integration Centre
SP	Strategic Plan
TMEA	TradeMark East Africa
ToR	Terms of Reference

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Context

56.   The Republic of Kenya is a founding member of the East African Community (EAC). Kenya's economy is estimated to have grown by 5.4% in 2014 and is projected to grow by 6% in 2015. The resilience is likely to continue with the economy expanding at 6.6% in 2016 and 6.5% in 2017, according to the latest World Bank Group's economic analysis. The Kenya Economic Update for March 2015 says Kenya is emerging as one of Africa's key growth centres and is also poised to become one of the fastest growing economies in East Africa, supported by lower energy costs, investment in infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and other industries[50] (www.worldbank.org).

### Context of Kenya with regards to Trade

57.   The East African region is a major recipient of Kenya's exports. The World Trade Organisation Trade Profiles Report (2013) identifies two East African Countries, Uganda and Tanzania, as the 2nd and 3rd highest recipients of Kenya's exports. The percentage of Kenya's exports to Uganda which stand at 12.7%, constitute just over 50% of exports to the European Union, the largest importer of Kenyan goods. Tanzania follows on closely, taking up 8.1% of Kenya's, exports. Together, the two East African countries absorb 21% of Kenya's total exports. Given that Kenya possesses the largest manufacturing sector in the region, Kenya therefore stands to benefit considerably from growth in Intra East Africa Trade. Moreover, with Kenya facing a rapidly depreciating currency, partly due to weakening tourist inflows in the wake of terror attacks from Alkhaida and increased protectionism by traditional importers of Kenya goods, growing regional trade offers Kenya the best chance of reversing these worrying trends (World Trade Organisation, 2013).

58.   The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis observed that while the EAC's deepening and expansion had widened the scope for Kenya's businesses, expanding their trade in the region, Kenya was yet to exploit these opportunities fully. The writers attributed that situation to institutional and regulatory barriers to trade within the region (Muluvi, 2011).

59.   It is within these circumstances that TMEA designed a programme that aimed to support partners to substantially increase the implementation of a comprehensive framework of regional integration that is expected to considerably expand intra region trade opportunities among other benefits.

60.   Kenya's regulatory performance over the five-year period that TMEA has supported Kenya's EAC integration effort indicates that after a period of gradual improvement in the country's regulatory environment starting from 2010, the country's rating suffered a decline half way through 2013 and though some recovery is noted since mid 2014. The country is yet to return to its 2010 level. The distance to frontier graph shown below demonstrates.

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[50] World Bank, retrieved from: www.worldbank.org

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Figure 5: Distance to Frontier, Kenya 2010 to 2015

Distance to Frontier Kenya

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Distance to Frontier Kenya	56.57	56.82	56.95	57.14	54.59	54.98

Source: World Bank Distance to Frontier –Doing Business

Figure 6: Overall LPI Comparison East Africa

Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index

61. The 2014 World Bank Logistics Performance Index indicates that while Kenya remain ahead of its East African neighbours. Nonetheless, Rwanda is catching up fast and could easily overtake Kenya, whose performance has experienced little change over the seven-year period starting 2007.

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Ministry of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism

62. The ministry is a successor to the ministries of East African Community, Trade and Tourism and manages EAC and regional integration affairs, develops and promotes trade policies and promotes and markets Kenya as a tourist destination. The ministry has three state departments:

- **The State Department of EAC;** This department manages East African community affairs and coordinates the implementation of community programmes and projects.

- **The State Department of Commerce;** This department manages international trade, export promotion and the development of markets for Kenyan produce.

- **The State department of Tourism;** This department is charged with the responsibility for developing Kenya's tourist industry with an additional focus on eco, cultural, sports and conference tourism.

63. The State Department for East African Community Affairs took over the functions that were originally performed by the Ministry of East African Community (MEAC). The state department is organised around five directorates namely: administration, economic affairs, political affairs, social affairs and the productive and services affairs. This evaluation focuses on the TMEA's support to this state department. For reasons of consistency, this report will refer to State Department of East African Affairs as the Ministry of East African Community (MEAC).

Ministries with which TMEA engages

64. TMEA Kenya engages with several Government Ministries, departments and agencies that are regarded as having a fundamental role to play in the promotion of EAC integration and trade growth[51]. Key among these are: the National Oversight committee chaired by the Principal Secretary, the State Department of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism, The National Treasury; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Deputy President; Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure; Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and Fisheries; and the Ministry of Industrialisation, Enterprise and Development; Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government; the Ministry of Environment, Water & Natural Resources; Ministry of Labour, Social Security & Services. Other key Government departments that TMEA engages with are: The Kenya Revenue Authority; the Central Bank of Kenya and the Kenya Bureau of Standards.

65. It is important to note that the TMEA supported, MEAC capacity building project that is the subject of this evaluation is separate from TMEA's engagements with other MDAS referred to in the previous paragraph. Such engagements, though falling under the broader Kenya programme, were designed and funded separately.

Intervention

Problem(s) being addressed

66. The Adam Smith International (ASI) delivered Fast Track support under the DFID-REAP funded fast track technical assistance. This Fast Track support resulted in concrete outputs (listed below) and recommendations for further interventions, which then informed the MEAC Capacity Building programme.

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[51] Project Appraisal Report, *Institutional Support to the Ministry of East African Community (MEAC)*,TMEA

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67. During the Fast Track phase, ASI provided:

- Strategy and policy advice that included technical papers such as Kenya's EAC strategy.

- Institutional development that included building MEAC's financial, accounting and procurement capacity and the development of a new organisational structure.

- Human resources and organisational development that included developing a new organisational structure, developed a skills and experience inventory and designed a two year training plan and a comprehensive induction training module that incorporated continuous education.

- Communications and public relations work that resulted in a communications strategy that was implemented by MEAC.

- Monitoring EAC decisions and the construction of a computerized M&E system.

- Launching a programme of support to Kenya National Monitoring Committee on Non-Tariff barriers. (ASI Fast Track Report, 2010)

68. Based on this experience, ASI recommended six core output areas for on-going support for strengthening MEAC's institutional development and capacity for EAC-related policy analysis and co-ordination[52]. In March 2011, TMEA provided support to MEAC to achieve these six outputs by December 2014[53]. The six outputs include:

Output 1: Communication & Awareness Campaign Implemented

Output 2: Staff development programme designed and developed

Output 3: Policy Coordination Unit Operational

Output 4: Common Market Protocol (CMP) Implementation Plan developed & executed

Output 5: Financial Management & Procurement Systems Operational, enabling MEAC to pass a Fiduciary Risk Analysis (FRA) assessment; and

Output 6: Monitoring Systems fully operational.

69. In addition, TMEA provided support to the former Ministry of Trade (now the State Department of Trade within the Ministry of East African Affairs, Trade and Tourism) and associated departments and agencies on trade policy, trade facilitation, standards and infrastructure, as well as support to the private sector and civil society. TMEA's support aims to enable Kenya to drive the EAC agenda, unlocking the region's economic potential.[54]

Design of the intervention

70. To deliver the above outputs, TMEA defined 31 activities to be executed over the five-year planning period, starting 1st March 2011 and ending 30th June 2016. These outputs, which are set out in "The MEAC Project Workplan review report of 12.2.2015" are described below. The 31 categories are grouped under the six intended outputs described above.[55]

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[52] Fast Track Report, 2010.
[53] The Kenya programme office's work plan specified June 2016
[54] TMEA Project Appraisal Report (PAR) – Institutional Support to MEAC, 2010.
[55] (MEAC Coordination and Leadership Project Workplan, 2015).

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Outputs/Activities

71. **Output 1: Communication & Awareness Campaign Implemented**

    i.   Conduct 16th Summit Communication and Awareness Campaign

    ii.   Develop IEC materials for dissemination

    iii. Prepare a documentary to be aired on TV before the Summit and during the Summit;

    iv.   Carry out media publicity on the 16th Summit

    v.   Hold media briefing meetings

    vi.   Engage media for improved relations & increased advocacy support

    vii. Update in-house communication tools for MEAC

    viii. Conduct branded media communication campaigns

    ix.   Engage key decision makers

    x.   Conduct Baseline Survey on integration awareness levels

    xi.   Procure and erect digital screens at Lungalunga, Taveta and Namanga border points

    xii. Develop information for dissemination through digital screens

72. **Output 2: Staff development programme designed, developed & implemented**

    i.   Induct MEAC staff on EAC integration coordination

    ii.   Provide support for MEAC and staff from focal MDAs; Team Building

    iii. Train MEAC staff on management

73. **Output 3: Policy Coordination Unit Operational**

    i.   Conduct Research/Analytical Studies

    ii.   Train MEAC staff

    iii. Procure equipment for the PCU

    iv.   File periodic reports on Implementation of EAC Decisions

    v.   Carry out research studies on priority areas

    vi.   Carry out data collection and write report

    vii. Hold stakeholders forums to validate and disseminate study findings

    viii. Develop policy briefs from study findings

74. **Output 4: Common Market Implementation Plan Developed & implemented**

    i.   Provide financial and logistical support to holding workshops/seminars/in-country meetings

    ii.   Provide support to staff participating in regional meetings

    iii. Draft a Bill for enactment to align Kenya's legislation with EAC Common Market Protocol

    iv.   Procure furniture & equipment for MEAC's Regional Integration Centres (RICs)

    v.   Review MEAC's 5-year Strategic Plan (SP)

75. **Output 6: Monitoring Systems fully operational**

    i.   Train MEAC staff on the EAC M&E System

    ii.   Host the M&E computerised system

    iii. Operationalize the M&E System

    iv. Train Ministry staff and focal points from MDAs on M&E

76. TMEA cancelled two of the planned activities, one that focused on training MEAC staff, and one on research studies. The status The MEAC Project Workplan review report of 12.2.2015 indicates that 'Training' was to be restricted to monitoring and evaluation and that all studies were conducted under one title, '*Analytical studies.*'

77. **Output 5 *'Financial Management & Procurement Systems Operational, enabling MEAC to pass an FRA'*** did not have any planned activities. Financial management and procurement systems are prescribed and enforced centrally by the Government of Kenya, public service. Interview data suggested that for this reason, the programme would not be able to effect financial management and procurement systems and practices within the MEAC programme.

Categorisation of interventions

78. A majority of the CB activities contained in the MEAC Project Workplan focus on stakeholder capacity (knowledge and awareness). The target group and primary beneficiary of the communication and awareness campaigns are the general public. MEAC expects the general public to act on their new knowledge by taking advantage of cross border trading opportunities offered by the East African Community (EAC) and the right of free movement that is enshrined in the Common Market Protocol, to access services such as medical care and education across the Kenyan borders.

79. Interview and financial data suggest that capacity building support to the MEAC itself and its staff is a low priority as compared to stakeholders. These data further indicate that individual capacity building received little focus with training being limited to: (1) induction training for MEAC staff; (2) team building sessions bringing together MEAC and MDA staff and (3) Monitoring and Evaluation training for MEAC and MDAs. Two officers were also trained on financial management before work on Output 5 was discontinued, for reasons stated in paragraph 77. This training was, however, not covered by the workplan. The M&E training, though planned, is yet to be offered. Additionally, a Technical Advisor provided a limited amount of mentoring and coaching around the subject of policy research and analysis. Eight Research Officers attached to the technical directorates benefitted from mentoring and coaching support provided by the Technical Advisor.

80. Organisational and institutional support has been offered primarily through the support provided to the Policy Unit, the development of the MEAC strategic plan for the 2013-17 period, as well as support to the development and implementation of the Common Market Plan. Setting up and equipping of the Policy Coordination Unit, assigning a Technical Advisor and hiring Technical Assistants, contributed to policy development. Furthermore, TMEA financially supported MEAC officers to attend Common Market protocol meetings.

81. To deliver broader institution, organisation and stakeholder focused capacity building to MEAC and through MEAC, to other stakeholders, TMEA used various modalities to deliver capacity building to MEAC, and through MEAC to other stakeholders. These ranged from funding communication campaigns targeting the general public, to setting and staffing a policy unit to bolster MEAC's capacity to take leadership in setting the EAC integration policy and negotiation agenda, facilitating public discourses and monitoring the implementation of

the EAC integration process by other MDAs[56]. TMEA also contracted a Technical Advisor who offered mentoring support to Research Officers assigned to technical departments within MEAC. Lastly, TMEA facilitated a limited number of training events that aimed to benefit the MEAC and MDA staff who are involved in EAC integration work (MEAC Coordination and Leadership Project Workplan, 2015).

- The specific capacity building interventions include:

- A one off induction training programme to MEAC staff

- A short-term consultancy to establish the Policy Research Unit and hire three (3) Research Assistants who are tasked with carrying our research and preparing policy briefs. The consultant also trained individuals who were then deployed as Research Officers in each directorate to co-ordinate research activities within those departments.

- Providing support to enhance EAMS and make it interactive; this is in response to challenges in data transfer due to inadequate system capacity and gaps in system functionality.

- Team building training support to MEAC and MDAs, in 2011 and 2012 to promote cohesion within the staff from MEAC and MDAs who are involved in EAC integration work.

82. Interview data also provided several examples of TMEA supported communications and awareness. These include:

- A TMEA funded media campaign run by Apex Porter Noverlli (APN) in 2013, titled 'The journey is on course', on social media. The target was university students and the intent was to enhance awareness amongst the target group on the EAC.

- Various TMEA funded training materials including a documentary on EAC integration prepared by APN and booklets. The booklets were translated into Kiswahili to maximise reach.

- A sensitisation programme on EAC trade liberalisation regime for small scale cross border traders in 2014.

- A training programme for cross border traders on how to do business across the border – trained on how to identify the market, the skills, tools like certificates of origin in 2014.

- Border inter-counties forum on harmonisation of laws rules and regulations on cross border and regional trade that was attended by the top leadership of counties including Governors and the Executives.

- Sensitisation of Security agencies along the northern corridor (Malaba to Mariakani) on NTBs.

83. The Project Appraisal Report (PAR 2011) stated that the programme was to be implemented by a consortium or consultancy firm. It started further that such consortium or consultancy would be from the domestic or regional market, and that the consultants would be paired with MEAC staff for effective knowledge transfer. Interview data further suggests that it was more efficient to hire local consultants because such individuals were more conversant with the local context and challenges. Therefore local consultants were viewed as more likely to generate viable solutions, and be able to work in the Kenyan context. Criteria for recruiting consultants would include experience in coaching, mentoring and training. The only

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[56] End of Project Report, Fast Track support to Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Government of Kenya, ASI, September, 2010

exception was the case of two (2) ODI fellows and a Trades Centre Expert who were contracted for one year.

84. The expenditure report submitted by TMEA in support of this review (MEAC Kenya Expenditure Reports FY 2010 to FY 2014/15) indicates some departure from the original thinking regarding working with a consortium. Instead the report shows payments to seven individual consultants, one international and six local. TMEA only contracted two consultancy firms, Adam Smith International and Apex Porter Novelli (APN), to support the Kenya Programme over the five-year period (2010 – 2015) and in the case of Adam Smith International, the support was quite limited. TMEA has stated that its initial work plans factored in that approach, but MEAC stated that it had received high calibre staffing and that consultants would only be enlisted to fill gaps.

85. The CB programme provided the following support and training:

- MEAC Integration Officers. These officers received training in team building. They have also received financial support to organise and hold workshops and seminar on the Common Market. This support was intended to enable them to work cohesively within MEAC itself and with MDAs undertaking EAC integration work. Expertise using EAMS was also imparted. The support directed towards the organisation of meetings was intended to help MEAC popularise the Common Market amongst citizens.

- MEAC Research Officers. These officers received mentoring and coaching support from the Technical Advisor assigned to MEAC to set up the Policy Coordination Unit. The objective of this support was to enable them to support the Integration Officers to appreciate the policy dimensions of all the aspects of EAC integration that they were engaging with, so that they may provide all encompassing advice to MDAs and facilitate negotiation meetings in a more focused manner.

- Focal point officers engaged by Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) that are involved in EAC integration. This group received training in team building. After receiving this training, the focal point officers were expected to engage more effectively and work more collaboratively with MEAC, through the EAC integration agenda.

- Communities living within border towns across the East African Borders. The information provided to this category was intended to help them take fuller advantage of the provisions of the East African Common Market and move more freely across the borders for trade purposes or to enjoy services offered by the neighbouring country such as education and medical services.

- University students. The communication campaign sought to enable them to participate in EAC promotional activities through the East African Community weeks. It was also assumed that they would share knowledge and information with their peers thereby ensuring that the EAC message received a wider hearing.

- Border County Officials. This group was sensitised over the impact of levies that they were imposing on cross border traders on the growth of trade in the region. The intent in this case was to ensure that the County Officials did not pass laws that effectively became Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs).

- Members of Parliament. The Technical Advisory Support provided to this group is intended to enable then to engage with EAC legislation, treaties, agreements, and budgets and to be better prepared to debate these in parliament as required.

- MEAC as an organisation. These interventions are intended to build MEAC's capacity and effectiveness in executing its role as Coordinator of EAC integration activities for instance by developing relevant and high quality policy papers to inform negotiation both within the country and the region and tracking and reporting on the implementation of Council decisions.

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Key Findings

Relevance

86. *This section explores the extent and how well the intervention suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.*

87. The TMEA Project Appraisal Report (2011) states that TMEA based its support to MEAC Kenya on the Fast Track findings, which resulted in six intended outputs. We compared the MEAC Coordination and Leadership Work Plan (2011) and the Fast Track report (2010). This comparison showed that MEAC's work plans addressed all but one Fast Track recommendation (Output 5). This suggests that the CB programme was relevant.

88. Further, MEAC staff regard TMEA support as relevant. This mainly stems from the ease with which the MEAC is able to propose and secure approval for interventions that address their specific needs that were not part of the original programme. MEAC is particularly appreciative about the Induction training that was provided to Integration Officers with TMEA support and the joint team working training sessions that were conducted for MEAC and MDA staff. MEAC notes that this type of support should continue.

89. What is not often clear, and is demonstrated by looking at each of the outputs, was if how the programme was implemented, and its results, were relevant. For example, communicating information and making people aware of the provisions of Common Market protocol and the freedoms, such as the freedom of movement that it offers East African citizens is relevant; however, it is not clear what people needed to receive which message, in what format, if that message was received by what groups, and how or if it was used to bring about relevant change. According to TMEA those targeted by the communication efforts were selected because they were 'opinion leaders' and television was used to ensure that integration messages reached the general public. However, there are no clear data that show that these messages were received and or impacted behaviour. Reports from the 2015 ASK Mombasa International Trade Fair indicated that those who visited the State Department of the East African Affairs stand showed little understanding of EAC integration process. However TMEA respondents suggested that this population was not the target audience.

90. The sections below provide the data for each output with regards to their relevance to the overall programme goal.

Output 1: Communication & Awareness Campaign

91. The largest number of planned activities fall under this output. To achieve this output, TMEA engaged a dedicated consultancy firm, APEX Porter Novelli (APN). This was a sizeable contract; a review of the MEAC expenditure reports provided by TMEA indicate that a total of US$ 1,152,070.56 was paid to APN, or 35% of the total funds disbursed by TMEA under this programme. Over and above this, TMEA provided financial support to MEAC initiatives to provide EAC information to the general population within Kenya and East Africa, and specific communication aimed at county leadership and also provided financial support to workshop participants. Activities undertaken under this output, included the following:

- Sensitisation programme on EAC trade liberalisation regime for small scale cross border traders, 2013.

- Training programme for cross border traders on how to do business across the border – trained on how to identify the market, the skills, tools like certificates of origin, wow to navigate around the process, 2014.

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- Border inter-counties forum on harmonisation of laws, rules and regulations on cross border and regional trade. This forum targeted the top leadership of counties along Kenya's borders, 2014/15

- Training of security agencies and other stakeholders working along the northern corridor -Malaba to Mariakani on NTBs.

- Breakfast meeting for the media to familiarise them with the EAC agenda; 2013.

- Sensitisation sessions for Members of Parliament including breakfast meetings and retreats with the intent of influencing legislation.

92. Both the initiatives executed by MEAC staff and those undertaken by APN drew on a variety of media to reach the broader population within Kenya and East Africa. MEAC also used breakfast meetings, social media, talk shows and publications. As demonstrated above, MEAC's communication focused on cross border traders, residents of border trading centres, university students, common mwananchi and politicians.

93. Our review indicates there was no empirical study used to choose these groups. Interview data suggest that implementers made assumptions about which groups to focus on , based on intuitive understanding of the roles of opinion leaders. It was expected that the targeted groups would benefit from the communication. Further they assumed that the group's newly acquired information would result in actions that would contribute to EAC integration. Our review has established, for instance, that the social media platform project that targeted university students was not informed by an understanding (e.g. theory of change) of how improved knowledge and awareness of the EAC would impact student's behaviour, data that showed student's understanding before implementation (e.g. lack of a baseline) or data that measured the results. Therefore understanding what was expected to happen, and what did happen, is not clear.

94. At the same time, interview data indicate there was a need to run awareness campaigns on EAC integration in general and the common market in particular, given that EAC integration is relatively new in Kenya and the wider East African region, and the Common Market protocol was only ratified five years ago. Therefore awareness of EAC integration is likely to be low within the Kenya population. While this suggests that the intervention was relevant, it does not reflect that it was a sound intervention, or one with many results.

95. Some interventions were more informed, though not empirically. For example, MEAC interview data indicates that the sensitisation programme on EAC trade liberalisation regime for small scale cross border traders, and the training programme for cross border traders on how to do business across the border, were based on information provided by the Regional Integration Office; there is no data to show how this information was received and or analysed. In response, MEAC trained the traders how to identify the market thus providing needed skills for instance on how to obtain and utilise certificates of origin and secure duty free access for their goods into the neighbouring EAC country. However, MEAC has not provided us with evidence that it monitored or evaluated the training (e.g. the quality of the training,) nor tracked improvements in cross border trade. Therefore no data exist that reflect if this training achieved the overarching objective of increasing trade in the region.

96. County top leadership such as Governors and County Executives attended MEAC's sensitisation programme on harmonisation of laws rules and regulations on cross border and regional trade. Following the workshop, the MEAC staff reported instances of the repeal of regulations imposing County taxes, commonly known as cess on cross border traders. This suggests that the workshops contributed to impacting behaviour and leading to a reduction in Non Trade Barriers along the borders. The review did not identify further data to confirm this result.

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Output 2: Staff development programme designed, developed & implemented

97. While we could not identify a staff development plan developed by TMEA to guide staff development interventions in MEAC, we did identify two capacity building activities. First, TMEA inducted MEAC staff on EAC integration coordination. The MEAC staff reported that though the one off induction exercise helped staff to settle down in their roles as integration officers, most of the staff trained have since left and the new joiners have not benefited from such training. TMEA reported that it had expected that the new employees would be trained by the incumbents. According to TMEA, no request for further induction training was received from MEAC. TMEA therefore assumed that there was no further need.

98. A second activity focused on teambuilding activities for MEAC and MDA staff with the intent of promoting improved coordination between the MEAC and MDAS in respect to integration activities. MEAC staff report improved coordination with MDAs. Interview data indicated that two of the MDAs reported "turf wars" between some MDAs and MEAC. There are no data to provide further explanation or additional insight. Other data suggested that there are challenges between MEAC and a trade association, where there is a perception that MEAC does not support the Association's agenda. One example provided was that MEAC does not participate in the sectoral meetings. There are no data to show how widespread this problem is. TMEA interview data suggest that there is evidence of MEAC participating in Roundtable meetings with associations and of providing resource persons to address Private Sector and Community Service Organisations.

99. Interview data indicates that in August 2014, all MDAs/partners were exposed to M&E tools and processes and that in the 2014/15 final work plans, all partners included M&E training in their work plans. The M&E training for MEAC staff was scheduled for December 2014 but MEAC staff reportedly failed to attend. Management training for MEAC staff was removed from the plan after only four staff had been trained. Available data did not provide further insight.

100. Evaluation data suggested the following challenges with regards to Output 2's relevance:

- The TMEA training activities in the MEAC work plan were not derived from, and not linked to, MEAC's training needs assessment or training plans. MEAC undertook two training needs assessment exercises and developed two training plans during the implementation period. Training needs identified through these processes do not appear to have influenced the design and execution of the capacity building activities of the programme.

- Some of the planned staff development activities were subsequently expunged from the plan. No explanation has been provided for this action.

- Fast Track recommendations regarding the required on-going support to MEAC's capacity building efforts include: operationalisation of the two-year training plan developed under that project, managing change within the organisation and providing on-going support to the Human Resources Department, these were all set aside.

101. These data indicate that activities and outputs for Output 2 though relevant, were of a very limited scope. The lack of baseline data and empirical evidence did not allow for assessment of change at the outcome level.

Output 3: Policy Coordination Unit Operational

102. TMEA provided support to MEAC to establish a Research Policy Unit. This support included provision of a Technical Advisor who was engaged for one year and the training of seven Research Officers. These Research Officers were then assigned to MEAC's technical departments. We did not obtain data that clarified the extent of this Output, such as the number of trained Research Officers involved, that are still in MEAC to-date, their gender or other relevant data. TMEA hired three (3) Research Assistants (one male and two females), on a one-year contract basis to support the Ministry to meet its on-going policy research and

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analysis needs. One was assigned by the Ministry to support EALA (Kenya Chapter) legislators to carry out research and produce briefing materials. MEAC has reported that these Research Assistants produce policy papers that inform the development of appropriate EAC Policies on an on-going basis. Based on available data, the status of implementation of this output is extremely low (TMEA Work Plan Status Report, 12.2.2015). For example, of the eight activities that were planned, only two have been completed and both relate to the setting up and furnishing of the office.

Output 4: Common Market Implementation Plan Developed & Implemented

103. MEAC planned five activities under this output. Three activities are completed and two have been started (Status Report, 12.2.2015). One activity reported as completed in 2011, the draft bill on the EAC Common Market Protocol, has not progressed to enactment. TMEA reported that informal discussions between the Kenya Country Programme and one legislator pointed out that the 27 pieces of legislation that are pending approval may not be submitted for discussion parliament as a single undertaking and that that contentious ones will call for further consultations. This might explain the delay. The remaining two are the provision of logistical support to the holding of workshops and seminars and the provision of support to staff participating in regional seminars. The extent of progress against the 'started' targets is not indicated (Status Report, 12.2.2015). A further activity undertaken as part of support to the implementation of the Common market protocol, but which was not specified in the detailed work plan, is the work done for MEAC by a law professor towards the development of the Mutual Recognition Agreements.

104. As with the outputs 1, 2 and 3, no baselines were conducted prior to the design of this output; thus it is not possible to say if the activities undertaken under this Output have brought about the expected change.

Output 5:   Financial Management & Procurement Systems Operational, enabling MEAC to pass an FRA

105. Output 5 was not covered in the TMEA 2011 work plan. Interview data notes that TMEA's decision to exclude this output from the work-plan was based on structural constraints. A Government of Kenya's Ministry would not likely be affected by a financial procedures intervention given that financial management and procurement decisions are centrally set and enforced across the public service. Thus Output 5 is not assessed.

Output 6: Monitoring Systems fully operational

106. This EAMS system was hosted as planned and reportedly operationalized. However, the system is not fully operational. MEAC has approached TMEA to support a system upgrade to ensure full connectivity of the MEAC portal to Central (Arusha). Considerable work still needs to be done to deliver this output. TMEA has reported that a Consultant has been contracted to undertake the required work.

Political Economy

107. Since the start of TMEA CB Programme the EAC integration has deepened. The Customs Union is now fully fledged, the transitional phase of the Common Market ends in November 2015 and the Monetary Union has been launched. This means that the focus of MEAC's coordination responsibilities towards EAC integration coordination agenda are shifting.

108. MEAC's structure and mandate has also changed. In the post 2013 Government of Kenya Structure, a new Ministry (the Ministry of East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism was established by the bringing together the three former ministries of East African Community (MEAC), Trade and Tourism. With this change, the mandate of the Ministry was broadened to include responsibility for coordinating the entire Regional Integration activities of the Country with the following key responsibilities with responsibility for:

- Co-ordination and implementation of Regional Integration initiatives (COMESA, EAC and COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area).

- Coordination of implementation of the EAC regional programmes and projects.

- Implementation of the Treaty for the establishment for the EAC.

- Kenya South Sudan Support Programme (KESSP)

- National Trade Policy Development

- Fair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection

- Promotion of Retail and Wholesale Trade and Markets

- Business Premises Dispute Resolution mechanism

- Promotion of Small Medium Enterprises and other interest groups through training, counseling, consultancy and Research.

- Promotion of Exports

- Tourism Policy Management

- Tourism Development, and

- Tourism Promotion

109. With the positioning of EAC as a Common Market, all third party multilateral or bilateral engagements by Kenya are benchmarked on the EAC Commitments rendering the role of MEAC even more key to the effective coordination of trade development within the country. More so, the signing of the EAC- COMESA- SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement in May this year whose activities are coordinated by the Ministry of East African Community has further expanded the scope of the Ministry.

110. On the other hand, the establishment of the 'northern corridor' as an alternative avenue for initiating and implementing cross border development projects amongst group members has seen the Ministry of Foreign Affairs take on responsibility for regional development coordination for the corridor, albeit in coordination with the MEAC.

111. These changes call for broader skills and resources on the part of MEAC in order to execute its expanded role effectively. They also offer TMEA an opportunity to explore options for integrating the support offered to the three state departments of the Ministry and take advantage of the resulting synergies. Concurrently, TMEA may wish to adjust the support it offers MEAC, to enable it to execute its broader mandate more effectively.

112. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also likely to require support to develop its own leadership and coordination capacity, in light of this new coordination mandate. Helping the two Ministries to develop and implement a framework that takes advantage of their varied skills and resources to effectively coordinate of these multiple regional trade and development initiatives without stepping on each other's toes would go a long way to helping Kenya to take fully advantage of what these regional groupings have to offer.

Were the TMEA policies and programmes supportive of gender equality and other human rights?

113. The Project Appraisal Report made special mention of the Gender Environment in Kenya and even made reference to the constitutional provisions on the subject. MEAC on its part reported that the programme design did not place specialised attention to gender, disability

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etc. Nonetheless in the course of implementation, MEAC had made efforts to ensure that the standards set for effective gender participation (a minimum of 30%) for each gender is achieved. The Ministry has also sought to ensure that other interest groups such as the disabled and the youth are also represented during sensitization events. More so, specific actions have been taken to invite special interest groups to meetings for instance, individuals from border (marginalised) counties and interpreters, including sign language experts have been used during capacity building sessions. Policy briefs addressing gender issues have also been prepared.

Flexibility and responsiveness

114. The implementation modalities that were adopted by the Kenya programme team have created a highly flexible and responsive implementation environment where emerging priorities/needs drove MEAC staff activities. This is because, rather than implementation being based on a comprehensive programme document with prescribed activities, the work plan has tended to serve as a general guide. MEAC has been able write proposals and submit them to TMEA. This flexibility has been particularly evident in respect to the communication and awareness component.

115. Another example is with the Research and Policy Unit. TMEA responded to MEAC's needs by providing three Research Assistants who replaced the Technical Advisory support. In respect to the M&E component, TMEA also responded to the emerging issues by contracting a consultant to fine tune the EAMS systems, and develop manuals in order to overcome challenges that had constrained its utilisation. Was the TMEA CB programme planned and implemented in a manner sensitive to the country's political and cultural sensitivities?

116. The MEAC capacity building programme was largely non-controversial hence the risk of political or cultural challenges arising was extremely low. Nonetheless, the programme sought to win over political will in favour of EAC integration agenda so as to promote a politically favourable environment for integration. The Technical Assistance offered to the parliamentary committee on EAC integration, MEAC's breakfast sessions with Members of Parliament and the MEAC run inter-counties forum on harmonisation of laws rules and regulations on cross border and regional trade are all intended to achieve the same objective.

Efficiency

117. *This section explores the extent to which the intervention used the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results [considering sound management and value for money.*

Was the TMEA programme implemented in a cost-effective manner?

118. The information provided by TMEA in respect to project expenditure is presented in such a manner as to render it extremely difficult to determine how it was expended on the project. This is because the information is provided by invoice/payee and not output or activity. The analysis presented below is based on a reconstruction of financial data.

How was the budget applied to the cost at hand?

119. The Project Appraisal report provided an estimated budget of US$ 5,966,000 to be split between the seven outputs, that originally included Output 7, *The Coordination and rationalisation of Kenya's membership in Regional Integration Groupings by Office of the Prime Minister Improved,* but which was ultimately expunged from the work plan. A separate project, number 0925 was ultimately set up to undertake this work. The VfM analysis undertaken in this report excludes this output and its budgetary allocation of US$ 400,000. Table 2 presents the six outputs that were ultimately included in the Kenya Country programme work plan.

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Table 2: Budget utilisation compared to implementation status

Output	Budgetary Allocation (USD)	Budget Utilisation	Budget Balance	Status of implementation[57]
Outputs 1- Communication & Awareness campaign implemented	1,000,000	N/A	N/A	**12 activities** 7 completed 5 started stage
Output 2- Staff development programme designed and developed	404,000	N/A	N/A	**3 activities** 2 completed 1 expunged from work plan
Output 3- Policy Coordination Unit Operational	834,000	N/A	N/A	**8 activities:** 2 completed 2 have just started 2 were cancelled
Output 4- Common Market Plan Developed and Implemented	1,576,000	N/A	N/A	**5 activities** 2 completed 3 started
Output 5- Financial Management & Procurement Systems Operational; MEAC passes FRA assessment	**995,000**	**N/A**	**955,000**	**Expunged from final work plan**
Output 6- Monitoring systems fully operational	807,000	N/A	N/A	**4 activities** 3 completed 1 planned
Total	**5,566,000**	**3,299,932**	**2,266,067**	

120. Table 2 above demonstrates that the Kenya programme has expended 60% of the funds allocated to it. However, eliminating the budgetary provisions for Output 5, reduces the funds available for the project to: US$ 4,611,000 and increases the level of utilisation to 72%. It is noted further that of the 31 activities that were planned for the five-year period, only 16 or 50% have been completed and of the remainder, 3 are still at the planning stage, while the remaining 12 have just been started.[58] It would seem therefore that the level of project funds utilisation is somewhat higher what would be expected given the relatively low level of implementation. TMEA has reported that some of the MEAC funds have been used to support EALA/National Assembly to undertake research and produce required briefing materials. No data have been provided on the actual amount expended and the resulting materials were not provided for review.

121. Did the implementation of the TMEA programme make effective use of time and resources to achieve the results?

Table 3: TMEA Expenditure Analysis (2010-2014)

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[57] From Kenya Project Workplan
[58] Kenya programme work plan status 12.2. 2015

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Category	2010	2011	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	Total	%
Consultancy/professional fees	93,803	224,062	561,194	146,013	298,924	1,323,996	40.1
Project Funding		66,530	0			66530	2.
Advertising		194,197	243,726		15,705	453,628	13.8
Other expenses		43,342	0	100,934	222,169	366,445	11.1
Participants' expenses		148,693	357,953	105,307	110,432	722,385	21.9
Rental facilities		12,195	0		8,318.91	20,514	0.6
Project Asset Purchase		21,178	36,554	616	25,410	83,758	2.5
Travel expenses		31,527	76,889	35,073	119,188	262,678	8
	93,803	**741,723**	**1,276,315**	**387,944**	**800,146**	**3,299,932**	
%	2.84	22.48	38.68	11.76	24.25	100.00	
PAR Budget		1,420,000	1,680,000	1,233,000	1,233,000	5,566,000	
Variance (%)		52.23	75.97	31.46	64.89	59.29	

122. Table 3 above has grouped expenditure in categories to enable the evaluators to form a view as to how the budget allocated was actually expended. The PAR report stated that the capacity building support would be offered through the provision of Consultants. The evaluators are also aware that a considerable proportion of the support was in the form of communication and awareness creation. In light of this, the expenditure of 61% of project funds on consultants and participants' expenses would appear to be reasonable as is a travel expenditure budget of circa 8% given the commitment to facilitating the MEAC team to attend key meetings.

123. The Kenya Country Programme does not provide data that links expenditure to outputs. Therefore we cannot determine the extent to which the funds expended contributed to the generation of a specific activity, let alone outputs.

124. Available information does provide some indication of actions taken by TMEA to minimise costs, as indicated by the following:

- Requiring MEAC staff to use buses, and not fly, to travel to Mombasa for events, which cost less in money but a lot in time.

- Requiring MEAC to send staff to local institutions, instead of East and Southern Administration and Management Institute (ESAMI).

- For field studies, a cost sharing approach was applied with TMEA providing allowances, and MEAC providing vehicles.

- An open tender system was used for securing service providers for all support funded by TMEA in order to ensure cost efficiency.

- For all proposals, the Concept note includes budget to ensure no wastage and costs is assessed by TMEA pre approval, and

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- Procurement of venues is done by TMEA as a means of ensuring effective control.

125. Expenditure on Output 1, Communication and Awareness, exceeded the original budgetary estimates. While the budgetary allocation for this Output was US$ 1,000,000, payments to APN alone stand at US$ 1,152,070.56. Including expenditure on advertising which has been reconstructed to amount to US$ 453,628.26 raises the figure expended on communication and awareness activities to US$ 1,650,698 or 50% of the entire expended funds. No data are available to explain the reasons for such a significant reallocation of funds. Information provided by TMEA indicates that APN's original contract of US$ 1 million was extended by 50% in consultation with approval of TMEA procurement. Expenditure against the remaining outputs is below budget. There are no data to show which of these outputs has been negativity influenced the most from under spending.

126. Interview data collected from two focal MDAs indicates that these organisations received considerable financial contribution from TMEA (from separate budgets), to implement communication and awareness campaigns targeting communities that are also targeted by the MEAC programme. This provides an indication that centrally planned communication and awareness campaign could have promoted better cooperation and more efficient use of resources.

Contracting, on-boarding and implementation

127. Information provided by TMEA and MEAC indicates that the Terms of Reference for each intervention were both clear and extensions quite rare. The responsible MDA oversaw implementation and TMEA receives regular reports. Formatted templates are also completed by the user agency before payment can be released to the service provider.

Was the TMEA programme designed and/or amended throughout the implementation period for optimal value for money?

128. There is evidence of new projects being brought on board or eliminated from the work-plan in response to the changing environment. TMEA has indicated that the purpose was to fast track agreed milestones. Examples include the numerous instances where MEAC presented proposals to TMEA for funding. These include: (i) A training programme for cross border traders on how to do business across the border, which was requested by MEAC, (ii) Border inter-counties forum on harmonisation of laws, rules and regulations on cross border and regional trade, and (iii) Sensitisation sessions for Members of Parliament including breakfast meetings, retreats, etc. Projects taken out of the work plan included training for MEAC staff and research studies.

129. New initiatives were not always introduced through the MEAC work-plan per se but in the relevant MDAs or private sector organisations a number of which had been part of the TMEA Kenya programme portfolio right from the outset. For instance, TMEA implemented the Standards Project for the Kenya Bureau of Standards. Another example is that TMEA, under the auspices of EATTA, providing capacity building support for tea processes in the East African region in a bid to promote the growth of the tea sector across East Africa. The support was in the form of capacity building to tea processing plants and focused on supporting the processors to adopt processing standard and where possible attain certification. The results of this support were commendable with 112 processing companies participating in 3-day training sessions between 2011– 2013 and 40+ achieving certification post sensitization. It should be noted that support to both entities was provided under separate projects/funding.

Did the TMEA programme achieve results as expected in light of resources spent?

130. The lack of empirical data does not permit an assessment of most TEMA results. MEAC states that its coordination ability has improved and the MDAs interviewed agree; however neither provided concrete information or examples.

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131. Some interview data indicate positive findings, such as the increased ability of border traders to move goods across the border with improved ease, the number of border residents who are sending their children to school and attending hospitals across the border which may be related, at least in part, to the integration activities undertaken by MEAC. Interviews also suggested that the repeal of county tax laws commonly known as cess within some border counties is another positive result that may be linked to the awareness campaigns. We did not identify further data to support this finding. TMEA noted that for policy intervention projects, it is unlikely that impact could be identified in the short term.

132. The MEAC presented data indicating that the performance contracting rating of the MEAC has been going up starting 2012/13 when a rating of 4.1367 was achieved, to 2013/14 when it rose to 3.0173 and has improved further to 2.9966, during the last financial year (2014/15) a situation that MEAC sought to attribute to the TMEA CB programme. However, the evaluators are unable to say whether this improvement is attributable to TMEA support or to some other initiatives undertaken by MEAC on its own accord or even a natural consequence of the maturing of the Ministry and the EAC integration process as whole. There are two reasons for this. First, over the duration of the five-year MEAC Coordination and Leadership programme, MEAC has undertaken two training needs assessment exercises and designed and implemented two training plans without support from TMEA. Second, the TMEA programme has only supported two training activities that were of direct benefit to MEAC staff; the Induction and Team Building activities, which though relevant, are unlikely to directly impact MEAC's leadership and coordination capability.

How efficient is the relationship between the secretariat and the member state? (How up to date, and how useful, are the EAMS/ Common Market Scorecard - how efficient is this way of sharing data?)

133. There is collaboration between Kenya and the Secretariat to the extent that the EAC calendar of activities informs the MEAC work plan and that MEAC gives consideration to the EAC Strategy when preparing its own strategic plan. MEAC reported at least one intervention that has been undertaken in collaboration with the EAC Secretariat, the cross border awareness campaigns undertaken in the wake of the Common Market protocol.

134. Interview data provided examples where the Secretariat provided support MEAC activities. For instance, the Secretariat provided facilitators for the training on monitoring and evaluation. In addition, for Secretariat initiated the 'Vuka Mpaka' campaign, the EAC provided some funding. Finally, Secretariat staff attend meetings and plan alongside MEAC.

135. Regarding EAMS and the score card, while the digital system allows for the uploading of decisions, the on-line the system is not currently connected to Central due to hardware and software limitations following a recent upgrade by Central that created compatibility problems between the Kenyan and Arusha systems. TMEA has reported they are waiting for an official request to support an upgrade of MEAC hardware from MEAC.

Were activities/results monitored regularly and corrective measures taken?

136. MEAC has reported the existence of annually agreed indicators with TMEA. However, the application of the TMEA framework to the MEAC CB programme has been constrained by the lack of baseline data for all planned programme activities. MEAC has an internal M&E framework that is assessed quarterly, it is not clear to what extent that data is used and by whom to make what informed management decisions, or take corrective measures.

Effectiveness

137. This section examines the extent to which the activity attains its objectives by considering its ability to reach intended beneficiaries; achieve trade and social gains; and avoid unintended results.

138. Due to a lack of concrete data, it is a challenge to assess most of the CB programme's effectiveness at the outcome level, and to some extent the output level. To start with the output level, while the CB programme aimed to achieve five outputs, only two can be regarded as having been achieved to a reasonable extent. In the case of **Output 2:** Staff development programme designed, developed & implemented**,** if we disregard the fact that no specific staff development programme was designed and that the management development component was expunged from the workplan, then it can be said activities that were included in the work plan were undertaken. In the case of **Output 6- Monitoring systems fully operational**, three out of the four planned activities were completed, a reasonable performance when compared to overall performance against the workplan from an activity point of view. Both interview data and the MEAC project workplan however confirm that there are on-going connectivity challenges between the MEAC based system and the Arusha portal. Hence, the expected results from this activity will not be realised until these challenges are resolved.

139. Despite the considerable level of activity and expenditure around **Output 1: Communication & Awareness Campaign**, five of the 12 planned activities are yet to be completed. On the question of effectiveness, mixed observations have been made by the evaluation team. On the one part,, interview data from MEAC indicates that the communication and awareness campaigns are yet to be felt. During an interview, an Officer from MEAC stated that reports from 2015 Agricultural Society of Kenya (ASK) Mombasa International Trade Fair indicated that individuals who visited the State Department of East African Affairs seemed not to understand the EAC integration process. MEAC's explanation for this situation was that the funding provided so far were limited to support the level of activity that would be required in order to achieve the required level of awareness. On the other part; however, data from a Survey of Knowledge and Awareness of the EAC that was commissioned in 2013 by MEAC with TMEA funding indicated that progress was being made. According to this report, 56.5 percent of those surveyed reported some improvement in awareness of the EAC within the general public since 2011 while 44% reported improved awareness on their own part. The report did observe however, that the findings of the survey were mixed and that while awareness of EAC integration had improved amongst implementing agencies, the general public was yet to be adequately sensitised. Given that the individuals who visited the trade fair fall within this latter category, it would seem that the disparity of awareness between the implementers and general public remains.

140. For **Output 3**- Policy Coordination Unit Operational, only two of the eight planned activities have been completed by the status report date and both relate to the setting up of the office. MEAC interview data has stated that 'in-depth economic analysis on issues such customs union and common market is giving Kenya strategic depth in the face of negotiations and that as a result of this research, MEAC is able to give policy advice that has found its way in the budget and influencing of policies. The very limited implementation progress reported against this output also raises questions as to the level of results that can reasonably be expected in respect to this output.

141. For **Output 4-** For **Output 4-** Common Market Plan Developed and Implemented, only two of the five planned activities are reported as completed. 'Draft a Bill for enactment to align Kenya's legislation with EAC Common Market Protocol and procuring furniture & equipment for MEAC's Regional Integration Centres (RICs). No data were provided on the progress that has been made against the 'started' activities; hence we are unable to comment on the progress made against these.

142. Assessment of effectiveness at outcome level is constrained by the fact that for most TMEA and MEAC activities, it is not clear who the targeted population were and therefore, if they were reached. The evaluation team was provided a list of beneficiaries, however we are unable to compare this list to a specific target group and determine the extent to which there is a match. Without a clear and explicit theory of change or pathway to change, empirically identified target groups, few activities with scoping exercises or baseline studies, and a lack of clear indicators to measure anticipated change, there is a lack of empirical data on which

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to assess much of this programme's effectiveness. According to TMEA, the lack of baselines is attributable to the fact that implementation under phase 1 could not be delayed until baseline data were established, but that the challenge has been addressed over time and is part of the work to be completed before transition to phase 2.

143. For activities within MEAC, there are clear signs of effectiveness. For example, the Policy Unit exists and has furniture, and Research Assistants are in place and are producing research papers. At the same time, MEAC staff received Induction training and attended team building training alongside focal point staff. TMEA's support to the review of MEAC's strategic plan may help the Ministry to sharpen its focus on mandated strategic engagement; once the plan is implemented. Implementation delays have been occasioned by financial constraints at MEAC level.

144. Interview data from key MEAC staff and MDAs points to the perception on the part of MEAC and the MDAs that there is improved coordination. However, when probed to provide examples of such improvement, the MDAs were unable to go beyond the observation that MEAC communicates scheduled EAC meetings and where the joint Kenya position papers are required, draws up such position papers by putting together contributions from the implementing MDAs. No data was presented to demonstrate this represents an improvement from the period prior to commencement of the CB programme.

145. The MEAC presented evidence on its part that supported its perception of its enhanced leadership and coordination by presenting data that demonstrated improvements in its performance contracting rating over a three-year period starting 2012/13 when a rating of 4.1367 was achieved. The ratings were reported to have improved in the 2013/14 Financial Year to 3.0173 and finally to 2.9966 in (2014/15). MEAC sought to attribute this change to the TMEA CB programme. However, MEAC provided no data to enable the evaluators directly attribute this improvement to TMEA support. Available data presents a possibility that such improvement is attributable to some other initiatives undertaken by MEAC on its own accord, such as the implementation of the two training plans that MEAC has developed over the period. This perception by the consultants is influenced in part by the very limited direct support to the development of MEAC staff's capacity under the programme and the very limited progress that has been made towards the implementation of planned activities under Output 3- Policy Coordination Unit Operational**.**

146. MEAC also sought to attribute the reported elimination of 66 the non-tariff barriers over the last two years to this support. However, no data has been presented linking the MEAC Co-ordination and leadership programme to this result. Ultimately, without a theory of change or concrete data, it is difficult to link these findings to TMEA's support.

Impact

147. *This section explores, to the extent possible, intended and unintended results including the positive and negative impact of external factors.*

148. We did not identify any impact at the stakeholder level. While the interview data suggest that the communication and awareness activities have increased awareness of target populations of cross border trade opportunities there are no data to confirm this perception. Key MDAs have been sensitised on regional integration issues but there are no data to show if such activities have had the expected impact. The fact that TMEA is running parallel EAC integration activities with the same MDAs means that even in the future when such data may be available, it will be very difficult to draw a line between changes brought about by the CB building support offered to such MDAs through the MEAC project and the support received from TMEA directly.

149. We did not identify any impact at the institutional level beyond the creation of a policy unit. Limited data indicates that policy briefs that have the ability to inform regional integration thinking and planning are now available to the Ministry and that MEAC's capacity to engage

partners has been enhanced. It can be hoped that with time, this policy unit will be integrated fully into the MEAC structure and policy analysis integrated fully into MEAC's operations, thus positively impacting the quality of MEAC's operational and overall effectiveness. At the organisational level, a strategic plan for 2013 – 2017 is in place though internal MEAC challenges, specifically funding, have delayed roll out. The concern however, is that with the planning period now at half way stage, it is unlikely that the strategic goals specified in the planning document will be achieved during the life of the plan. Based on MEAC's assertion that this plan is linked to the EAC plan, failure to deliver the goals specified therein is likely to negatively impact the delivery of the EAC integration agenda for the planning period.

150. With seven Research Officers trained and placed in technical departments, research assistants engaged at the Policy Research Unit, and integration officers inducted in EAC integration related matters, there is potential for future impact. At the same time, in the Policy Unit Research Assistants' contracts have been extended until June 2016. This was in recognition that longer contracts are needed to bring about sustained impact because 12months is simply not enough for the RAs to impact MEAC thinking around policy and foster change within the organisation. The scope of the individual focused capacity building activities undertaken in the course of the programme have; however, been so limited that they are unlikely to impact MEAC's coordination and leadership capability either now or in foreseeable future.

151. From the design stage, TMEA recognised the importance of cooperation between MEAC and MDAs to the success of the EAC integration process and sought to foster such cooperation by designing and implementing programmes that bring together several MDAs to address issues of common interest. A good example if the team working training that benefited several MDAs and MEAC itself. Nonetheless, TMEA chose to provide disparate support to MDAs that are key actors in the EAC integration agenda, rather than design an integrated Kenya programme has also resulted in overlapping activities across the various MDAs, for instance in the case of communication and awareness creation may have contributed to unhealthy competition between agencies interview data has made reference to turf wars between MEAC and some MDAs. This approach also poses challenges to attributing outcomes and impact of the various components of the overall Kenya programme to any specific intervention and to confirming value for money in respect to those interventions that are being implemented by various MDAs.

152. The overall MEAC CB programme may have been challenged by the Kenya Government structure, specifically the two tier government structures – County and National. These two levels appeared to have introduced complexity to the local regulatory and policy making framework particularly as as it pertains to the trade regulations with counties introducing tariffs to generate funds and the requirement for stakeholder participation resulting in delayed decision making. Interview data has revealed that the mechanisms for the harmonisation of laws has identified that there are 27 laws that still require to be changed to allow seamless integration. MEAC has a tough role to coordinate the progress towards a Unified East Africa.

Sustainability

153. *This section looks at the extent that the benefits of the capacity building activities are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.*

154. There are four examples of potential CB programme benefits continuing after the programme has ended. MEAC interview data suggests that:

- Knowledge and skills that have been acquired through the capacity building exercise are being cascaded to other officers through on- the-job-training, mentoring and coaching. The placement of research officers in each directorate appears to be mainstreaming research in all activities.

- Future strategic planning activities can be executed internally through management team meetings, without inputs from TMEA.

- Integration Officers can be used to build the capacity of MDAs going forward, eliminating the need for support from TMEA.

155. A challenge to long-term sustainability is the shifting focus away from regional blocks towards Africa wide blocks. Interview data indicates that the new Cape to Cairo agenda that is being spearheaded by the African Union means that the drive towards a deep rooted African Union may soon overshadow the EAC integration agenda.

156. TMEA is in general agreement with the sustainability proposals of the MEAC but regards them as ambitious. According to TMEA, the key obstacles to the implementation of the sustainability measures are inadequate staff numbers, lack of capacity to coordinate the strategic planning process within limited timeframes.

Recommendations

157. **Key Finding 1**: The programme has multiple design challenges that include: (1) no clear, explicit theory of change; (2) no baseline studies; (3) often no identification of clear stakeholder groups beyond broad categories (e.g. students) and (4) no indicators or set targets to measure change. This challenges the programme to make informed management decisions regarding programmes and activities or understand if they are moving towards, or away from, their intended results. The MEAC programme results chain developed by the Kenya Country Programme goes some way to redress the challenges posed by the lack of an explicit theory of change but does not provide enough information. A monitoring plan has been developed for the Kenya programme.

158. **Key Recommendation**: A clear theory of change, that is specific to the MEAC Kenya Country programme, should be developed that illustrates how TMEA aims to bring about change. This can then be used to develop a strong monitoring and evaluation plan that includes measurable outputs and outcomes. It will allow KCP to strengthen the MEAC results chain, clearly identify its target groups, assess their needs, and then develop a focused and targeted campaign with clear measurable results.

159. **Key Finding 2**: The interdependency between the MDAs that impact regional trade in Kenya calls for a comprehensive programme that addresses the EAC integration agenda. TMEA recognises this interdependency, hence its decision to run parallel capacity building programmes with relevant MDAs and private sector organisations that are engaged in or are beneficiaries of EAC integration. However, this support is not provided within the ambit of a comprehensive strategy and has resulted in strained relationships. A comprehensive strategy and programme would help to ensure that sufficient mechanisms for the coordination of the Kenya programme across all MDAs and the private sector players that TMEA wishes to support are put in place.

160. **Key Recommendation**: TMEA should develop a comprehensive programme that identifies key players that are relevant to its Kenya programme (and also considers those that are key in addition to MDAs) that are most likely to provide pathways for the benefits of EAC integration to trickle through to Kenyans in particular and East African in general. The Kenya programme should then engage with these organisations in a comprehensive manner and together address the critical capacity gaps facing them.

161. **Key Finding 3**: TMEA contracted two consultancy firms and seven independent consultants to implement the Kenya programme. Independent consultants were contracted against specific project proposals based on specific needs. However there was no provision to review how the different pieces of work fit together (e.g. ensured no overlap) to support one comprehensive programme.

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162. **Key Recommendation:** We recommend that TMEA assigns a Programme Manager to manager all small and large tasks, ensuring a comprehensive, relevant and cost effective programme.

163. **Key Finding 4**: Consultants were not always paired with MEAC staff. This did not build the knowledge within MEAC, which impacts on potential sustainability.

164. **Key Recommendation**: We recommend that consultant's terms of reference require that they work with a local MEAC staff member, and develop learning objectives to guide the mentoring process. More extensive involvement of MEAC officers in any CB intervention will enhance MEAC's capacity and help to ensure MEAC's and an intervention's, sustainability.

165. **Key Finding 5**: Changes to the EAC coordination environment, for instance the implementation of a new MEAC organisation structure that saw both trade and tourism brought under the same wing with EAC regional integration and the introduction of the 'northern corridor' group called for TMEA to re-examine its approach to supporting the regional integration agenda of newly restructured Ministry as well as the Ministry of Tourism, in order to ensure on-going effectiveness. Such action would have enabled TMEA to realign its interviews in line with the new structures to eliminate overlaps and enhance efficiency. It is true that the overlaps are caused by the Government, not TMEA, but it is in interest of TMEA to support the development of streamlined implementation frameworks to ensure effectiveness.

166. **Key Recommendation**: We recommend that TMEA reviews the support that is offering to the various departments within the newly restructured MEAC and to the Ministry of Tourism in respect to the northern corridor, with a view to streamlining the various programme activities.

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RWANDA

List of Acronyms

CB   Capacity Building

CET   Common External Tariff

CSO   Civil Society Organisation

EAC   East African Community

EAMS   East African Monitoring System

EDPRS   Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy

FDI   Foreign Direct Investment

LGA   Local Government Association

M&E   Monitoring and Evaluation

MDAs   Ministries, Departments and Agencies

MINEAC   Ministry of East African Community (Rwanda)

MINICOM   Ministry of Trade and Industry

MOU   Memorandum of Understanding

NCM   Non-Confirming Measures

NOC   National Oversight Committee

NTB   Non-Tariff Barrier

ODI   Overseas Development Institute

PSF   Private Sector Federation

RDB   Rwanda Development Board

SCT   Single Customs Territory

SME   Small-, and Medium-sized Enterprises

TA   Technical Assistance

TMEA   TradeMark East Africa

TNA   Training Needs Assessment

ToR   Terms of Reference

UNDP   United Nations Development Programme

Context

167. Between 2001 and 2013, real GDP growth in Rwanda averaged about 8% per annum. The poverty rate dropped from 59% in 2001 to 44.9% in 2011 while inequality measured by the Gini coefficient reduced from 0.52 in 2005 to 0.49 in 2011. The country was named top performer in the Doing Business 2014 report, among the 10 most improved economies in 2013, and is now ranked the second easiest place to do business in Sub-Saharan Africa.[59]

168. The poor state of East Africa's trade infrastructure, high transport costs, burdensome customs procedures, and unpredictable transit systems collectively work to constrain trade and investment. For example, transport costs in the region are, on average, 80% higher than the USA and Europe. One of the most important factors in ensuring growth of the Rwandan economy is reducing costs and risks of doing business by removing trade barriers and upgrading regional trade infrastructure.[60]

169. Rwanda joined the East African Community (EAC) Customs Union in 2009. This led to a shift in Rwanda's trade patterns, with Uganda becoming the largest trade partner and Tanzania exhibiting the largest growth in trade flows. Figure 7 summarises exports from Rwanda to the EAC from membership onward, with exports levelling off between 2013 and 2014, while imports have continued to grow. Compared to total trade flows for the period from 2009 to March 2015, EAC imports accounted for 28% of Rwanda's total imports, while exports to the EAC are 24% of the total.[61]

Figure 7: Total Trade between Rwanda and the EAC

Source: MINEAC Regional Integration Performance Report 2015

170. Rwanda's top ten exports to the EAC accounted for approximately 69% of the value of all exports for the period 2009-2015:Q1, with traditional products dominating. Domestic agricultural product consists of the following main products: coffee, tea, pyrethrum (insecticide made from chrysanthemums), bananas, beans, sorghum, potatoes and livestock.

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[59] MINEAC website, retrieved from http://www.mineac.gov.rw/index.php?id=52
[60] Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015, MINEAC, 2010, 9
[61] Regional Integration Performance Report 2015, MINEAC, p. 3

Industrial production includes cement, agricultural products, small-scale beverages, soap, furniture, shoes, plastic goods, textiles and cigarettes. The industrial production growth rate was 11.3% in 2012/13.[62] Table 4 below summarises the Top Ten products exported into the EAC from Rwanda. Value addition is a major challenge, as all value-added goods on the list are actually re-exports.

Table 4: Top 10 Rwandan Exports to the EAC

Product	Value (RWF bn)	Main destination (% of total exports)
Tea	214.3	KE (99.6%)
Jet fuel	37.3	KE (96%)
Hides and skins	22.7	KE (82%)
Motor vehicles	14.6	BI (83%)
Gas containers	10.7	TZ (99%)
Machinery and its parts	8.5	KE (99%)
Coffee	7.6	UG (49%); KE (35%)
Beans	5.2	BI (45%); UG (39%)
Mobile phones	4	TZ (98%)
Boxes, cases, etc	2.6	BI (99%)

Source: MINEAC Regional Integration Performance Report 2015

171. During 2008-2014, Tanzania and Kenya were the origin of approximately 82% of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to Rwanda from within the EAC, with USD 80 million and USD 77 million respectively.[63] Investment from Tanzania tends to be one-off manufacturing ventures, while Kenya is a more consistent investment partner.

Figure 8: Total FDI Inflows by EAC Country (2008-2014)

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[62] MINEAC Strategic Plan 2010 - 15, 9
[63] Draft MINEAC Regional Integration Performance Report 2015, 20

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
Source: MINEAC Regional Integration Performance Report 2015

172. In addition to being a top performer on the World Bank Doing Business Index, Rwanda has also made steady progress on the Logistics Performance Index (see Figure 9), becoming a regional leader also in this regard.

Figure 9: Overall LPI Comparison East Africa

Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index

MINEAC

173. The Rwandan government established the Ministry of East African Community (MINEAC) in March 2008 to fulfil the joint commitment of the East African Community Partner States to establish national ministries with primary responsibility for EAC matters. It serves as an operational link between the Government of Rwanda and other national stakeholders, and the EAC organs and Institutions with the main aim of coordinating EAC activities at national level. The Ministry's mission is to lead the widening and deepening of the EAC integration process, thus promoting the development goals of Rwanda and the region. MINEAC core functions include:

- Promote Rwanda's interests;

- Facilitate and coordinate the development and harmonisation/approximation of domestic and regional legal and policy instruments, as well as programmes;

- Sensitise national stakeholders on regional integration;

- Enhance capacity to strengthen regional cooperation and partnerships;

- Monitor and evaluate the impact of legal & policy instruments and programmes; and

- Support investment promotion in the region and beyond[64]

174. Figure 10 summarises the Ministry's current structure. According to the Ministry's Strategic Plan, the Ministry should have between 35 and 37 people on staff, split into seven units: Finance and Internal Resource Management; Strategy, Policy and Research; Communication Unit and then four technical units. The first three units report to the Permanent Secretary and the four technical units report to a Director General.[65]

Figure 10: MINEAC Organigramme

Source: MINEAC Strategic Plan 2010

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[64] Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015, MINEAC, 2010, p. 13
[65] Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015, MINEAC, 2010, p. 14

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Intervention

Design of the intervention

175. The programme logic suggest that if the MINEAC improves its strategic leadership and coordination capacity and if key stakeholders, such as the public, improve their knowledge on regional integration, then the project will achieve the outcome of Partner States increasing the implementation of a comprehensive framework for regional integration. To accomplish this, ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) need to increase the implementation of EAC decisions, the Common Market Protocol, and regional integration implementation plans.[66] Figure 11 summarises Rwanda's programme results chain:

176. The main activities of the CB programme are to:

- Support to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) (particularly East African Monitoring System - EAMS)

- Design & implement of the communications strategy

- Produce policies, strategies and other papers

177. The main vehicle for delivery was Technical Assistance (TA) and financial aid to MINEAC.

Key Findings

Relevance

178. *This section explores the extent and how well the intervention suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.*

179. The Rwanda Vision 2020 is to become a lower middle-income economy (USD 900 per capita) operating as a knowledge-based service hub by 2020. Regional and international economic integration is one of the six pillars of the Vision 2020 and is critical for opening up the region, minimising barriers to trade and promoting foreign investment.[67] Rwanda has embraced private sector and specifically regional integration by developing its Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II), with regional integration as one of the crosscutting issues.[68]

180. MINEAC's role is to coordinate other Rwandan MDAs, private sector and civil society organisations that are directly involved in implementing the EAC Treaty, protocols, decisions, policies and legislation. In 2012, using a consultative process, the MINEAC developed the Strategic Plan 2013 – 2017. This plan is grounded in Rwanda's national policies and strategies such as the Vision 2020, the EDPRS II, and the EAC Development Strategy for 2011-2016.[69] The website states that MINEAC's Strategic Plan has facilitated the alignment of regional objectives with the EDPRS II; also through annual reporting on regional integration achievements.

181. Based on the desk review and interview data, the MEAC Capacity Building (CB) programme is fully aligned with the MINEAC Strategy. In general, a number of interviews confirmed that there is a high level of ownership and appreciation of the MEAC CB programme at MINEAC.

182. According to interview data, MINEAC has played a pivotal role in mainstreaming regional integration into the EDPRS II and subsequently in the plans and budgets across key MDAs. Mainstreaming into the EDPRS II required about a year of intense influence over every MDA

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[66] Results Chain
[67] Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015, MINEAC, 2010, p. 7
[68] Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II), Republic of Rwanda, 2013
[69] Strategic Plan, MINEAC website, retrieved from: www.mineac.gov.rw/index.php?id=32

in the country. According to another interviewee, despite the commitment of the country to regional integration, individual MDAs have competing priorities and support cannot be taken for granted. For example, the TMEA-funded TA responsible for non-tariff barriers is responsible for the National Monitoring Committee at the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). However, the TA reports as frequently or even more often to management at MINEAC, as he does to MINICOM. MINICOM has many other priorities, such as job creation and industrialisation, with EAC integration and NTBs only constituting a small fraction of the total portfolio.

183. The CB programme has facilitated reaching out to different groups of stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector to identify their opportunities and challenges related to regional integration through various awareness raising events and communications products.

184. Private sector in Rwanda is small overall, but the exporters, which are the main target audience of MEAC, are both small and large. According to the Rwanda Development Board (RDB), exporters range from larger companies with more than 100 employees to small- and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with less than 20 employees. There are more than 10,000 companies registered by RDB, but it is not certain how many still remain in business. The main challenges of private sector relate to access to electricity, finance, and familiarity with export procedures. There are also challenges relating to packaging, particularly since the universal ban on plastic bags by the Rwandan government. Domestic products have to compete with imported ones, which are still allowed to use cheaper, plastic packaging. Sensitisation efforts have had an impact on private sector interest. According to the TMEA Country Team, as compared to before MINEAC sensitisation efforts, today, the private sector is demonstrably keen to learn about regional market opportunities and challenges.

185. This success has been attributed to the Communication Strategy and targeted awareness raising, focusing on specific interest areas of target groups (e.g. the export procedures mentioned above). Civil society and private sector have participated in general awareness raising events and more specific events including particular sessions for media. The programme has worked through the Private Sector Federation (PSF), which is the umbrella body of all national associations. A number of interviewees confirmed that private sector breakfast meetings, where the MEAC Minister is always present, provide a particularly effective space for interactive dialogues among private companies and associations. Since the beginning of the programme, seven breakfasts have been held.

186. There is nevertheless a need to further engage with private sector players on concrete challenges (e.g. packaging); increasingly also those of the service economy with a view to the next steps of East African integration. According to interview data, with significant progress already made on the liberalisation of the goods market, progress on the services market is becoming increasingly important. Related professional associations (representing service providers) remain unaware of regional opportunities (and remaining constraints), as well as related procedures, such as the free movement of people and services and the right of establishment.

187. The evaluation also looked at the pro-poor imperatives of the programme. Interview and desk review data indicated that MINEAC and TMEA are very conscious of the programme's lack of sufficient attention to marginalised groups. Initial efforts concentrated on engaging these specific target groups through awareness-raising. There is a strong willingness by TMEA and MINEAC to work more actively with SMEs and even directly with farmers (e.g. small agribusiness, traders) especially on supply side constraints and regional market access; manifested particularly in the pilot work on women traders. At the same time it should not be forgotten that mid-size and larger firms can have catalytic potential to generate employment and income across the economy, with potential significant spin-off effects for marginalised groups.

188. According to the TMEA Country Team, there is a need for strong civil society to ensure accountability of government through its watchdog role, as well as equitable distribution of

benefits across citizenry. However, not a single Rwandan civil society organisation (CSO) was focused on regional integration issues prior to various TMEA interventions. CSOs needed a basic level of capacity in order to fill that watchdog role, and TMEA started an intervention by initially engaging with one CSO that focused on rural development.

189. At the time of this review, other TMEA support is channelled through a new umbrella body, the Civil Society Forum, with all 15 civil society umbrella bodies, as well as 743 individual CSOs as members. The platform focuses on research and advocacy, awareness raising and capacity building on regional trade-related issues. There has been a particular emphasis upon participation in regional meetings (e.g. Secretary General CSO Forum) and various negotiations. The Rwandan forum has conducted independent awareness raising activities (including studies and awareness targeting 17,000 individuals in border communities), with support from MINEAC in the development of information materials. Interviews with CSO representatives suggest that broader outreach to the public could have been facilitated by a greater engagement of civil society and its grass roots network in the MINEAC outreach activities. According to interviews, the secretariat of the forum has suffered from loss of staff and management challenges.

190. Everyone is keenly aware of gender issues, but there is a need for gender mainstreaming to be designed into concrete interventions and applied in practice. According to PROFEMME, a CSO specialised on women's issues and active on the regional agenda, specific gender challenges relate to preferential treatment of men, sexual harassment, lack of bargaining power and street kids. Some of the TMEA interventions have already empowered women cross-border traders to confront errant customs officials.

191. The CB programme was fully in line with overall Rwandan support to EAC integration, as well as the strategic plan of MINEAC. At the same time, support from various MDAs cannot be taken for granted. Mainstreaming EAC commitments requires significant coordination efforts by MINEAC. Increasingly, the CB programme has also supported MINEAC to reach out to private sector and civil society more broadly, with increasingly a more specific definition of the target audience. All interviews nevertheless pointed to the need to improve engagement of more marginalised groups and women specifically.

Efficiency

192. *This section explores the extent to which the intervention used the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results [considering sound management and value for money].*

193. The MINEAC Capacity Building Programme (2011-2014) had an overall budget of USD 5.5 million. This was amended to USD 6.271 million. Part of the budget is executed as direct aid (e.g. TA) another part through financial aid to MINEAC. According to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between MINEAC and TMEA, the total amount was USD 1,742 million but MINEAC received USD 1,367,151 and the balance remained in TMEA for Capacity building of MINEAC staff and stakeholders.

194. Financial Aid is managed through the ministry financial management system.

Table 5: Expenditure Summary of support to MINEAC, Rwanda

In $000	Actual Expenditure					Budget			Total
SO2 Project :1215	2010	2011	12/13	13/14	14/15	15/16	16/17	17/18	10/18
MINEAC	199	1,325	2,233	851	473	904	286		6,271

Source: TMEA Financial Summary of MEAC Project Expenditure Reports

195. Of the total budget of USD 6,271,000, USD 5,081,406.37 was spent by the end of 2014/15. Out of the total expenditure, 3,283,299 (65%) was spent on consultants fees.[70] Total Financial Aid constituted only 1,317,613 (26%). The proportion of spending on consultancy fees was high and reflected the programme's predominant delivery modality, technical assistance.

196. A mix of international contractors and direct contracting of local consultants was used. At the same time, the unit costs for international TA, whatever the ultimate nationality of the advisor, is significantly more expensive than direct contracting of local expertise. The fresh graduate's fellowship programme was an attempt to promote sustainability and build capacity at lower cost; the total expenditure for this component being only USD 241,250. Attempts were also made to reduce TA costs. For example, the position of the Communications Advisor was terminated at the end of the last contract. UNDP is now financing a similar position for MINEAC.

197. A breakdown of the Financial Aid component from 2011-2014 (the last transfer) reports that out of a total expenditure of USD 1,367,151, 19% was spent on various awareness raising and communications activities and 13% on capacity building. The proportion of expenditure on communications is relatively high, especially considering that the role of awareness raising is less clear in the achievement of the programme outcome. According to interviews, adjustments were made to communication activities to reduce costs, such as stopping the SMS campaign, where unit costs were very high.

198. Considering the centrality of the M&E system for mainstreaming EAC integration across the MDAs, the dedicated expenditure (1%) is low. Presumably, most of this component was funded via TA. At the same time, it is not possible to assign a monetary value and conduct more rigorous cost-benefit analysis of the mainstreaming of EAC integration.

199. Programme activities were largely completed on time, with 87% of the MINEAC action plan completed in the Financial Year 2013/14. There have been some delays relating to procurement issues. For example, significant turnover of staff has been acerbated by major gaps between contracts of TAs of between 8-12 months. Some tenders have also had to be re-launched due to procurement delays.

200. The programme is also well integrated in regional decision making structures and processes, as well as the planning and implementation processes of the Rwandan government. The Sector Working Groups, chaired by MINEAC, play a central role in coordinating between different MDAs. Quarterly review meetings are held, though individuals at meetings are not always the same, due to duty travel. Representation on the National Oversight Committee (NOC) is more consistent. According to a private sector representative, the higher-level meetings, such as the private sector breakfast meetings and the NOC appeared to be more effective channels of influence than the technical working groups.

201. The management of the programme is facilitated by it being mainstreamed into government institutions and systems. For example, programme reporting is simply extracted from MINEACs own system and reporting requirements. Political leadership and close monitoring,

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[70] Considering that only the budget lines for consultancy fees were calculated, this percentage is likely to be still higher, as the nature of the other expenses related largely to technical assistance support costs.

along with the embedded accountability culture of the Rwanda public service have been critical to successful coordination and the achievement of legal and policy harmonisation and concrete regional integration results.

202. Some of the challenges with linking the regional and national level relate to the "translation" of Summit and Council Decisions. There is a required role here for the EAC Secretariat to ensure that the actions required from Council Decisions are clear. Another challenge in the relationship with the EAC Secretariat is the lack of opportunity to influence plans. Feedback is only possible after studies are completed - not on the original Terms of Reference (ToR).

203. Overall, the CB programme has delivered value for money, considering particularly the significant achievements summarised in the next section. There are some concerns about the costs of international TA, but the programme has made attempts to achieve costs savings through phasing out TA positions and introducing the graduate fellowship programme. The structures and procedures are also in place and functional for efficient project management. The remaining concern relates to communication with the EAC Secretariat.

Effectiveness

204. *This section examines the extent to which the activity attains its objectives by considering its ability to reach intended beneficiaries; achieve trade and social gains; and avoid unintended results.*

205. Overall, the programme has achieved the outcomes sought and targets set. Rwanda provides regional best practice on the mainstreaming of regional integration into the policies, plans and budgets of MDAs. While formally all of the EAC Partner States have adjusted their tariff schedules in line with EAC commitments, only Rwanda has not "replaced" tariffs with charges of equivalent effect, including additional taxes and charges, according to the most recent EAC Common Market Score Card publication 2014.

206. Overall, Rwanda has the highest score in the region (91.4%) on the elimination of tariffs in intra-regional trade. Rwanda also has the lowest ratio of % of total non-tariff barriers (NTBs) reported over % of total EAC imports (.50). Non-conforming measures (NCMs) still persist in services (11 in total). On the free movement of capital, Rwanda is also only second to Kenya in the region, with 15 out of 20 unrestricted operations, according to the Score Card. [71] Further progress has been made since the publication of the 2014 Score Card, with the number of restrictions reduced to Capital (4), Services (9) and Goods (3), though these results still require verification.[72]

207. According to the final report of the Legislative Compliance Programme support, Rwanda has complied with over 85% of obligations relating to the Common Market Protocol, and 70% of all obligations across the broad span of the EAC Treaty. It is also in the process of implementing another 25% of all obligations.[73]

208. The Headline Policy Achievements of the CB programme include:

- Mainstreaming of regional integration into the EDRSP II, as a key cross cutting issue;

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[71] Common Market Score Card 2014 Presentation, 41

[72] The latest update was kindly calculated and provided by the M&E Advisor to MINEAC. It is based on data gathered from stakeholders, but has not yet been verified by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) team of the World Bank. Some difference of interpretation may still arise and may slightly misp I would also like to point out that several of the restrictions were not actively removed (i.e. laws amended) but rather the stakeholders in the workshop felt they were not restrictions because already existing laws were in place to address them - this will need to be discussed with the IFC going forward and skews the picture in terms of progress made.

[73] Rwanda EAC Legislative Compliance Programme Phase One Completion Report: Development of the Programme, TMEA/Law Reform Commission, 2014

- Introduction of prioritised draft bills, Companies Act/Partnership Act, Insolvency Act and Investment Act 74;

- The total number of restrictions reduced from the 44 reported by the Common Market Score Card 2014, to 15 reported in May 2015 on the free movement of capital goods and services;

- Single Customs Territory (SCT) developed and launched;

- MINEAC Strategic Plan and annual Action Plans

209. Significant progress was made on the removal of NTBs, as a headline achievement of TMEA as a whole. 21 NTBs were successfully eliminated through MINEAC's efforts to advocate and engage with relevant MDAs to eliminate NTBs; 6 NTBs were eliminated between February 2014 and September 2014; 11 were eliminated between September 2014 and December 2014; and a further four were eliminated between December 2014 and March 2015 thus making it 81 NTBs eliminated cumulatively. However 18 NTBs were unresolved and 4 NTBs were reported as new. By March 2015, 83 NTBs had been resolved since the start of the Programme, with 21 NTBs resolved during the period July 2014 – March 2015. Four NTBs were reported as newly identified, thus bringing the total of currently unresolved non-tariff barriers to 22.[75]

210. According to interview data, regional integration focal points are not required and have not facilitated coordination efforts and the achievements made. In addition, there are no specific budget lines in MDA budgets concerning regional integration. Rather it is woven into existing MDA plans (e.g. how the regional power pool is factored into the plans to increase electricity production in Rwanda). According to the Rwanda Case Study on Mainstreaming, capacity building of MDAs, districts and MINEAC, as well as networking across government were critical success factors. MINEAC also required powerful government allies; the President's Office and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN).[76] It is necessary to "avoid any extra burden" on MDAs, according to those interviewed. Networking with MDAs depends heavily upon personal relationships and the energy of a few individuals and face-to-face meetings. Also, centralised planning at the beginning of the cycle has significantly facilitated the mainstreaming work. MINEAC presents priorities for the year, engaging and harmonising these priorities with respective MDAs. It is critical that these priorities are attached to specific budget lines (e.g. hotel classification). These commitments then need to be regularly followed-up. Another level of the coordination challenge relates to the relationship between central government and local government; with local government associations (LGAs) in border communities being particularly important.

211. Data from the execution of the annual work plan demonstrates that the activity implementation capacity of MINEAC has significantly improved. In 2013/14 87% of the work plan was achieved and 13% partially achieved.[77] This was in comparison with an 8% completion rate in 2010/11.[78]

212. As a part of these work plans, MINEAC has prepared various studies through TA support. The NOC (2014) notes the following:

- Baseline Study on Stages of EAC Integration: The study has provided baseline data that is helping to measure Rwanda's progressive benefits from regional integration in the EAC.

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[74] This was achieved through support by a separate project relating to East African Legislative compliance.
[75] Draft Annual Report 2014/15, MINEAC
[76] Mainstreaming Regional Integration in Rwanda: The Case Study, TMEA, 2013
[77] PowerPoint, NOC, August 2014
[78] There were some differences in these figures in different sources (Annual Progress Report, NOC presentation), with performance ranging from 83% fully or partially completed to 87% fully completed and 13% partially completed in 2013/14.

- Development of Statistical Database: This now houses data from the baseline study, which is updated on a monthly basis. It has provided a single point source of data on Rwanda's performance since joining EAC.

- Impact Assessment of the Single Customs Territory on Rwanda: Will provide policy direction on how key stakeholders should position themselves in order to maximise potential benefits from the SCT.

- Research and Analytical work in preparation for the review of the Common External Tariff (CET) in 2015: Will support Rwanda in developing a strong country position to ensure maximum impact at the CET review.[79]

- Simplified Trade Regime (Rapid assessment study)

- Duty Remission Scheme

- Common External Tariff

- Regional Integration Performance Report 2014/15 (draft)[80]

213. The evaluation was not able to assess the quality or use of these reports by MDAs. However, interview data suggests that the research from these papers feeds into MINEAC's decision-making process and has helped to foster an evidence-based management culture.

214. The programme has provided M&E support through dedicated TA. The EAMS is a corner stone of that system that tracks implementation of regional integration commitments, including Council Decisions, and the implementation of the Common Market Protocol at regional and country level. EAMS Rwanda has been designed and rolled-out across MDAs. However there are a few identified issues.

215. First, monitoring after so many decisions have been taken presented MINEAC with a challenge. However they have diligently worked through the backlog and EAMS is now up-to-date. Second, due to the rapid implementation advances, initially EAMS Rwanda was not able to link up to EAMS central due to technical reasons. The technological challenges with the interface between EAMS Country and EAMS Regional have been resolved, allowing for automated updating and full interoperability between the two systems. While data entry remains manual, based on excel matrixes filled in by MDAs, EAMS is populated with the latest data. According to interviews, it is expected that MDAs will input data for the first time directly into the web-based platform this year (2014/15). According to interviews, there are concerns over EAMS quality assurance and that the data entered by the EAC Partner States is not verified independently. Data goes from the country level via the EAC Secretariat to the Council, without any independent verification. This is left completely to the MDAs. MINEAC has also developed an internal monitoring and evaluation system for tracking implementation of weekly activities.[81]

216. MINEAC conducted a Training Needs Assessment (TNA) in 2012. There was not great divergence between the need for more general introductory issues on regional integration (e.g. theories of regional integration) and more specific, technical matters or even skills areas, such as negotiation, project management or communications. Roughly 50-60% of the director and technical level respondents welcomed further training on all these matters. There was slightly greater interest in specific trade policy research and methods (75%) and regional integration research and policy analysis (67%).[82] While evaluations have been conducted for a few individual training events, there has been no cumulative analysis or database of the individuals trained. According to interviews, there is a strong preference for

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[79] PowerPoint, NOC, August 2014
[80] Draft Annual Report 2014/15, MINEAC
[81] PowerPoint, NOC, August 2014
[82] Training Needs Assessment, MINEAC, 2012, p. 17

on-the-job mentoring and support, rather than formal training sessions. The TNA had already noted that MINEAC and MINICOM provided mentoring of staff via TA unlike other MDAs.

217. MINEAC has benefited from significant, long-term TA including a Regional Integration Advisor, Communication Adviser, Legal Adviser, Lead Economist, and M&E Adviser. The Lead Economics and Communication Adviser are no longer present, but support has continued via a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-funded Communications Advisor and Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Fellow (economist) funded by other donors. According to interviews, while the TA support has concrete, time bound deliverables, usually research papers; their time is absorbed into the daily tasks of MINEAC, with research conducted on weekends. Arguably, they provide up to 90% of the initial, intellectual input on background research, planning and assessment, with staff focusing namely on the implementation of related supporting duties. Based on a review of two of the TA ToRs, the balance of research and capacity-building, as well as the emphasis upon the latter is adequately captured.[83]

218. Concrete deliverables have included the Development of the National Strategy on Regional Integration and its implementation plan, the communication strategy, MINEAC strategic plan 2012-2018 and various pieces of research (see earlier list of research products produced.) TA has also played a formidable role in mainstreaming regional integration in the EDPRS II and plans and budgets of relevant MDAs.

219. Based on data from a MINEAC report (2014/15), support from TA resulted in the design and implementation of a Communication Strategy. Implementation of the strategy began in 2012-2013 and 87% of the annual communication plan was already implemented.[84]

220. Cumulative activities have included:

- Radio (e.g. Rwanda Rwanda, Contact FM, Isango star, Flash FM and City radio) & TV (e.g. TVR, CNBC) programmes

- Newspaper supplements and articles

- Promotional materials

- Booklets

- Training manuals

- EAC Flags (1,000)

- Billboards

- Integration Affairs Magazine (quarterly)

- MINEAC new website[85]

- Social media presence (twitter)

- Press releases (12)

- Press Conferences (4)

- Media breakfast (1)

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[83] Terms of Reference of the Lead Economist and Legal Advisor, MINEAC
[84] PowerPoint, NOC, August 2014
[85] www.mineac.gov.rw

- Sensitisation sessions

221. MINEAC disseminated more than 11,448 copies of materials to various stakeholders and held over 50 radio/TV programmes. Through these communication efforts, MINEAC sensitised 508 members PSF chamber members and over 500 border communities.[86] In addition, MINEAC sensitised 65 journalists through study tours conducted to Gatuna and Kagitumba to witness the implementation of EAC commitments. MINEAC followers on Twitter account increased to 8,037, tweets 2,000 and 30 favourites.[87]

222. There has been increased awareness about regional integration across the population, as well as among key stakeholder groups. According to the latest public perception survey, general awareness of the EAC is at 92% of the population, while awareness of MINEAC is only 44%. 44% of the respondents reported to know EAC Integration through radio, 18% had read billboards.[88] Given the lack of a baseline, it is not clear if this has increased since the CB programme funding started, or the extent of the increase from the start of sensitisation activities in 2010. These data suggest that radio is the most effective medium to reach the population. Private sector feedback was also positive. According to an interviewee, "today, individuals (also companies) are keen to learn. They have been exposed not only to information, but actual opportunities that relate to their particular interests".

223. The CB programme has been highly successful in promoting the mainstreaming of EAC commitments across the government, especially on the promotion of the free movement of goods. The next challenges relate to the free movement of capital and services, though progress has also been recorded on the mainstreaming of these freedoms. The role of MINEAC coordination and monitoring, particularly, but not only through the EAMS system has arguably played a pivotal role in these results. MINEAC has increasingly been able to focus their messages to the challenges of particular target groups.

224. The initial Project Appraisal identified a number of potential risks to the programme. The first key risk to achieving the sought outcome related to the level of MDA responsiveness to regional integration issues, which could result in a lack of progress in the implementation of Common Market Protocol commitments. The programme has been able to navigate the first challenge, namely through the skilful navigation of intra-governmental relations by MINEAC, the close utilisation of existing and new personal networks of the TAs with MDAs, and the strong Rwandan accountability and delivery culture. A second concern focused on the MINEAC's absorption capacity, especially regarding knowledge transfer and sustainability. Data suggest that this is the programme's main challenge.

Impact

225. *This section explores, to the extent possible, intended and unintended results including the positive and negative impact of external factors.*

226. By their very nature, institutional capacity support measures take a long time to have an actual impact upon actual policies and benefits on the ground. It is difficult to attribute changes to a single factor, due to the complexities of social change.

227. *For governance projects that focus on institutional capacity strengthening, the theory of change linking the project intervention to the trade objective is likely to be much weaker and difficult to quantify. It is unlikely that evidence will be available to demonstrate the causal link between improved institutional performance and trade performance. In these cases it will be necessary to limit the evaluation to governance outcome indicators.[89]*

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[86] PowerPoint, NOC, August 2014
[87] Draft Annual Report 2014/15, MINEAC
[88] Findings of the Perception Survey, MINEAC, 2014, PowerPoint
[89] TMEA, 2012, p. 63

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228. It is difficult to attribute the role of MINEAC coordination and likewise the contribution of the programme to the growth in both exports and FDI due to other factors, not least market forces themselves. A major factor of unpredictability is the politics involved and the policies and actions of the other EAC Partner States; particularly due to Rwandan dependence on its neighbours for access to regional and global markets. The MINEAC Regional Integration Performance Report 2015 conclusions site the need to further diversify exported products and focus on value addition processes. The data also make a stronger case for strengthening product value chains in order to integrate with regional and global value chains.[90] The increased competitiveness of Rwandan products and productivity of firms "behind-the-border" are critical assumptions underlying increased trade and not completely within the control and influence of the regulatory environment.

229. While the accountability and delivery culture that dominates Rwandan public service has certainly facilitated Rwanda to obtain benefits from the Customs Union and Common Market, it also has a potential negative-effect. Due to the focus on delivering immediate outputs and action plans, there has been less time to reflect upon the influence of various MINEAC initiatives on broader economic trends, mainly through its influence upon the plans and budgets of other MDAs. There have been few opportunities to look back and learn from successful and challenged initiatives. There is a tension between MINEAC's immediate, activity-oriented demands of daily work and the broader, higher visibility impacts expected by the programme. According to interviews, the TAs "wear both hats".

230. Another potentially negative impact is around the fact that while Common Market Protocol refers to various freedoms, in reality, many are still not implemented. There is a risk of raising false expectations among private sector players in particular. Therefore, more targeted awareness raising on actual opportunities and remaining challenges needs to be circulated.

231. Another unforeseen impact could results from the dominance of TMEA support to MINEAC, which has created almost exclusive reliance. This is a distinct, but interconnected challenge with extensive reliance on TA that can perpetuate dependence and act as a further de-motivator of ministry staff. According to interviews, there are concerns about the complacency of ministry staff; "staff do not make an effort to buy (services of TA)" and "staff cannot be expected to participate, considering their salary level". TMEA is now encouraging other development partners to come on-board (e.g. World Bank, UNDP).

232. The ultimate impact of the CB programme is highly dependent upon externalities, even beyond Rwandan borders in EAC Partner States, due to the dependence of the Rwandan economy on its neighbours for market access. Despite significant achievements in the improvement of the Rwandan business environment and conformity with EAC commitments, the impact upon its economy will still depend upon its neighbours doing the same. With the immediate pressures of delivery culture in the Rwandan public service, opportunities to reflect, learn and improve means to address these more strategic challenges may not be exploited. High dependence upon TA has potentially also negative consequences for MINEAC staff morale and ultimately, the sustainability of the programme.

Sustainability

233. One of the greatest concerns of both TMEA and MINEAC is the sustainability of the TA support and the transfer of knowledge to MINEAC staff. TAs prepare the majority of first drafts (80-90%) of all key documents. Based on individual approaches, some TA providers are more successful at delegating work, according to interviews. The main challenge is obtaining and maintaining quality of deliverables without TA support; applying international standards to research and analysis. According to interview data, there is a focus on evidence-based policy making, which requires a high level of staff skill. While the institutional structures and processes are in place, there is still great reliance upon TA support for content. There is also a skills gap, with prevalent expectations of sophisticated econometric analysis

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[90] Regional Integration Performance Report, MINEAC 2015, p. 29

and the actual ability of MINEAC staff (e.g. challenges with the use of excel). There is also growing awareness of the need to focus on less technical skills, such as writing and presentations, as well as project management.

234. The most pressing concern is lack of time to transfer skills from TAs to staff. Knowledge transfer is not just about communication. It is embedded in people, networks, tools and procedures; is often tacit, rather than explicit. It is not only about data and information, but the ability to apply this information in a flexible way to different challenges. According to interviews, efforts have been made to introduce simple systems, such as electronic archiving and hand-over notes to improve knowledge management.

235. Consideration is being given to working more closely with the National University of Rwanda to improve knowledge on regional integration and trade issues through a specific course, in cooperation with the University of Lund in Sweden.

236. Generally, high turnover is also a problem. At the highest level, the programme has experience the changeover of two Ministers and four Permanent Secretaries, with many more staff rotations. According to most interviewees, the main reason for high turnover is better financial incentives outside of the public sector. Often bright, young staff double their salary in the private sector. Interview data also suggest that turnover has impacted TAs, with particular difficulties in retaining legal advisors; the current Permanent Secretary is the former TMEA funded Legal Advisor to MINEAC. Interview data also show that with the departure of the former M&E Advisor, all of the associated staff left.

237. The programme introduced the Graduate Fellowship programme to address the sustainability challenge. The programme sponsors recent graduates and pairs them with a TA. However, the lack of a guaranteed future at MINEAC is a challenge. Based on the evaluator's observations, it is also quite clear that graduates are not perceived as MINEAC staff.

238. Overall, sustainability of the CB programme achievements is its main challenge, with the transfer of knowledge from TA support to MINEAC staff at its core. The challenge is exacerbated by high turnover of MINEAC staff.

Recommendations

239. **Key Finding 1:** Rwanda has been successfully mainstreaming EAC commitments across government, with concrete progress on the implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol and other commitments. At the same time, the EAC regional integration agenda does not remain static, but is highly political and is continuously evolving. Inevitably, other MDAs have other, potentially competing priorities. On the working level, MINEAC has been successful at networking and successful mainstreaming, but these results may not be sustainable without ministries' full political commitment. Much depends upon the political stewardship of the new Minister and her ability to convene support. In order to ensure continued relevance of support, there is a need to proactively plan for the future direction of integration, as well as both the national and regional political context. While the commitment of various MDAs cannot be taken for granted, there are sufficient mechanisms in place to spearhead integration, also into new areas, such as free movement of capital and services with MINEAC leadership.

240. **Recommendation:** MINEAC should continue to play a central catalyst and coordination role on the mainstreaming of EAC commitments across the government. There is a need to exercise caution in absorbing the mandate of other MDAs and adopting a greater implementation role. Achievement, such as the progress on NTBs, is an effective example of mainstreaming that can be replicated on other issues, without over-stepping the MINEAC mandate. MINEAC should utilise the experience to disseminate learning across government on both the mechanism for coordinating regional integration issues, as well as the concrete benefits obtained by private sector. With a view to the particular challenges faced in other

EAC Partner States, the Rwandan best practice should also be disseminated across the region.

241. **Key Finding 2:** There were several key findings regarding the need to strengthen and sustain MINEAC staff. Knowledge transfer and the sustainability of TA is the programme's main challenge. At the same time, while the mentoring programme was found to be useful, it is outside of the regular MINEAC structures, which suggests that when TMEA funding ends, so will the mentoring programme.

242. **Recommendation:** To address the first challenge, we suggest that concrete deliverables on knowledge transfer are attached to all appropriate TA's ToRs, with a work plan that details how that knowledge will be transferred. To address the second challenge, we suggest that MINEAC formally identify departments/units for mentoring relationships.

243. **Key Finding 3:** While general awareness-raising was considered a central priority during phase I, popular consciousness has improved and there is now a need to address more specific integration opportunities and challenges of more segmented groups of beneficiaries, especially relating to "behind the border" challenges. The Private Sector Federation also wants to increasingly engage with specific associations on regional integration issues. Stakeholders were universally conscious of the need to give additional attention to marginalised groups and women in particular.

244. **Recommendation**: Considering its particular added value, TMEA could identify more specific target groups and obtain significant leverage from linking major infrastructure projects (e.g. Northern Corridor) with support to the productive sector; especially to value-chains along transportation corridors. More rigorous analysis needs to be conducted around potential value-chains for development; especially what may prove to be regional supply chains. Gathering of baseline data will facilitate both the identification of the most relevant target group, as well as the best means for reaching the target group, in addition to establishing a benchmark for measuring performance over time.

245. In light of this evolution, engagement with a supra-umbrella organisation of fifteen other umbrella groups, as is the case with the **Civil Society Platform should be revisited**; also due to some of the management challenges faced by the body.

246. MINEAC should continue its more targeted messaging and use of media, demonstrating actual opportunities and challenges of market access to stakeholders. Instead of conducting the communications activities independently, it would be more effective to work through established private sector associations and civil society networks for delivery.

247. **Key Finding 4:** EAC decisions are not always clearly formulated, allowing broad interpretation of Partner State commitments. The EAC Secretariat does not always engage Partner States in the preparation of ToRs for studies at an early stage, despite the formal approval processes of the EAC Generally, there are some challenges with communication from the regional to the national level (e.g. analysis and feedback on EAMS data)

248. **Recommendation:** EAC decisions should be carefully transcribed, with a clear description of Partner State commitments. The EAC Secretariat should also work more closely with MINEAC during the design phase of studies and interventions. The EAC Secretariat should improve communication and provide more relevant feedback to MINEAC. Likewise, MINEAC is encouraged to proactively influence the design of studies and interventions and seek analysis and feedback on generated data (e.g. EAMS data submissions) through EAC processes (e.g. technical meetings).

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List of acronyms

BMO	Business Membership Organisations
CB	Capacity Building
CMIS	Common and Market Integration Strategy
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DPP	Departments for Policy and Planning
EAC	East African Community
EACSOF	East African Civil Society Organisations Forum
EAMS	East African Monitoring System
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FRA	Fiduciary Risk Assessment
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
LAN	Local Area Network
LPI	Logistics Performance Index
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MEAC	Ministry of East African Cooperation (Tanzania)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NOC	National Oversight Committee
NTB	Non-Tariff Barrier
OSBP	One Stop Border Post
POPSM	President's Office: Public Service Management
PS	Permanent Secretary
PSO	Private Sector Organisation
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
TA	Technical Assistance
TANGO	Tanzania Association of NGOs

Context

249. The Tanzanian economy has experienced fifteen years of buoyant growth, with 7.3% growth recorded in 2013 (GDP USD 38.8 billion) and is projected to remain above 7% in the medium term.[91] At the same time, growth remains highly unequal. According to the household budget survey conducted in 2011/12, more than a quarter (28.2%) of the Tanzanian population fall below the basic needs poverty line and 9.7% falls below the food poverty line.[92] Over 80% of the population still relies on agriculture for their livelihoods, while agriculture has only grown by less than average 4% during the same time period. Increasing agricultural productivity is therefore key to drawing Tanzanians out of poverty.[93]

250. Exports from Tanzania averaged 506.80 USD million from 2006 until 2015, reaching an all time high of 900.80 USD million in December of 2014 and a record low of 228.70 USD million in March of 2006.[94] The balance of trade improved from a deficit of USD 33.90 million in 2005 to a surplus of USD 30.90 million in 2011. The number of projects established in Tanzania from East African Community (EAC) Partners States increased from 35 projects worth USD 39.65 million in 2005 to a total of 265 projects worth USD 718 million in 2012.[95]

251. The largest Tanzanian growing sectors in relation to global demand are summarised in Figure 12.

Figure 11: Growth of Tanzanian Supply and International Demand in 2014

Source: International Trade Centre

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[91] African Economic Outlook, retrieved from: www.africaneconomicoutlook.org
[92] Key Findings of the Household Budget Survey 2011/12, 3
[93] African Economic Outlook, retrieved from: www.africaneconomicoutlook.org
[94] Trading Economics, Tanzania Exports, 2015, retrieved from: www.tradingeconomics.com/tanzania/exports
[95] Medium Term Strategic Plan for the Ministry of East African Cooperation 2013/14 – 2017/18, MEAC, 2013

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252. Oil seed, organic fruit and grains, as well as edible vegetables, roots and tubers are particularly strong growth sectors, alongside mining products. Also wood, articles of wood and charcoal figure in this upper right hand quadrant.

253. While Tanzanian exports exhibit a growth trend, in relation, exports to the EAC have grown only modestly. The percentage of EAC exports from world exports has actually a declining trend-line, having reduced from 12% in 2007 to 10% in 2013.[96]

254. On the overall business environment, the general sense is that Tanzania has also not been faring very well, with the World Bank Doing Business Index often sited as evidence of decline. With the revised Distance to the Frontier methodology, the prognosis is not quite as bleak, with a recorded improvement in the past year (see Figure 13).

Figure 12: Tanzania Distance to the Frontier Score 2010-2015

Distance to the Frontier: Tanzania 2010 - 2015

	DB2010	DB2011	DB2012	DB2013	DB2014	DB2015
Distance to the Frontier: Tanzania 2010 - 2015	52.62	55.38	56.51	56.51	55.82	56.38

Source: World Bank Doing Business Index

255. The indicator Distance to the Frontier Score increased by .56% from 2014 to 2015.[97] On the Trading Across Borders sub-indicator, the improvement was even higher at 2.31%.[98]

256. When comparing the performance of Tanzania to the rest of East Africa[99] since 2007, there is a notable decrease in performance since 2012. Tanzania has gone from being the regional leader to the laggard in logistics performance (see Figure 14). When considering the enormous potential for growth stemming from serving the land-locked countries of Zambia, Malawi, Eastern Congo, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda, the trend is worrisome.

Figure 13: Overall LPI Comparison East Africa

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[96] ITC, Trade map, retrieved from www.trademap.org
[97] The Doing Business Country Rankings should not be utilised for cross country or longitudinal comparison due to methodological reasons.
[98] World Bank, Doing Business, retrieved from: www.doingbusiness.org
[99] Comparison done using the World Bank Logistics Performance Index

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
Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index

257. Figure 15 provides a more detailed look at the six main variables of the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) specifically in Tanzania since 2007. The figure demonstrated the decline in performance across the six sub-indicators and highlights the challenges with customs, infrastructure and tracking and tracing, resulting in an average 60% failure rate of Tanzanian goods at inspection.

Figure 14: LPI Tanzania 2007 - 2014

Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index

Ministry with which TMEA engages

258. In accordance with the Presidential Instrument Government Notice No.494 published in 2010, the Ministry of East African Cooperation (MEAC) was established with a mandate to coordinate the government on EAC matters; not other regional integration. Other regional integration commitments remain within the mandate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The MEAC mandate is strictly restricted to coordination, with other ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) responsible for actually implementing EAC commitments, as emphasised by all interviewees.

259. MEAC has several functions, which include to: 1) oversee, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the East African Community Treaty and Protocols; 2) lead the Tanzanian delegation on negotiations with EAC Partner States; 3) mobilise commitment to EAC peace and security issues; 4) analyse and respond to enquires related to trade, investment and productive sectors from stakeholders and the public; and 5) facilitate and coordinate the implementation of the Judiciary orders, among others. Interviews suggest that the MEAC has limited technical capacity, despite its 103 staff, and limited financial resources to fulfil its mandate.

260. Various studies on the political economy of regional integration paint a nuanced picture of Tanzania's political commitment to EAC integration. For example, Parliament appears much less engaged on regional and international policy compared to the domestic agenda. Most members of parliament (MPs) are ill informed about the EAC, and there are low levels of accountability for EAC integration across MDAs. As a result, other EAC members perceive Tanzania as a country that is cautious towards integration.[100]

Intervention

261. The MEAC Strategic Plan suggests multiple challenges faced by MEAC. Some of these challenges include: 1) lack of funding; 2) poor awareness of EAC integration in Tanzania; 3) MDAs not mainstreaming EAC issues in plans, budget and strategies; and 4) the rapid expansion of the EAC, which is not met by an increase in the research, financial and human resources to MEAC.[101] The MEAC Strategic Plan also goes on to note that there is a "low level of importance and adherence attached to EAC integration matters in national agenda" and an urgent need of elimination of Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) to enable full realisation of the objective of establishing a Customs Union.[102]

262. According to the original TMEA Project Appraisal Report (2011) existing institutional frameworks for inter-agency coordination (e.g. focal points and committees) on East Africa integration have focused primarily on the EAC Common Market Protocol negotiations, with little attention to implementation. Consequently, there is no official monitoring system to follow up implementation of required actions. Many of these challenges are a result of capacity and financial resource constraints, as well as insufficient political will and direction at the higher levels of government. These challenges reduce Tanzania's scope to take advantage of EAC integration, and hence threaten investment, growth and job creation.[103]

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[100] Project Appraisal Report-Support to Ministry of East Africa Cooperation (MEAC) and other MDAs, TMEA, 2011

[101] Medium Term Strategic Plan for the Ministry of East African Cooperation 2013/14-2017/18, MEAC, 2013, p. 17

[102] Medium Term Strategic Plan for the Ministry of East African Cooperation 2013/14-2017/18, MEAC, 2013, p. 34-35

[103] Project Appraisal Report-Support to Ministry of East Africa Cooperation (MEAC) and other MDAs, TMEA, 2011

263. The project appraisal also noted the inadequate involvement of other stakeholders (e.g. business and civil society); inadequate knowledge of potential market opportunities in the EAC; and lack of information on implementation and progress.[104]

Design of the intervention

264. It is within this context that TMEA designed the Capacity Building (CB) programme together with stakeholders in Tanzania. While a results chain summarises the CB programme, it was no longer clearly visible due to an information and communication technology (ICT) upgrade. With the exception of the original impact statement, the evaluator recovered the following logic**.**

265. The logic appeared to be that if the MEAC rolled out a national strategy and developed policy, implemented a long term capacity development plan, produced and disseminated regular regional integration monitoring reports, and was equipped and resourced, this would improve MEAC strategic leadership and coordination of EAC integration and lead to an increase in the implementation of a comprehensive framework for regional integration in Tanzania.

266. To increase the implementation of EAC commitments across MDAs, the CB programme aimed to mainstream EAC integration issues into laws, policies, strategies, plans and budgets. Activities included the drafting of the National Integration Policy Common and Market Integration Strategy (CMIS), MEAC Capacity Development Plan, along with various studies, identification of regional focal points in MDAs and support to monitoring and evaluation (M&E)- namely through the East African Monitoring System (EAMS).

267. Finally, the CB programme also aimed to enhance awareness and knowledge on EAC integration through developing and implementing a communications strategy. Activities included the drafting and implementation of the Communications Strategy, including the design and dissemination of various communication products and conduct of awareness raising via various media, including stakeholder meetings.

268. MEAC implements the project drawing on long and short-term technical assistance. Subsequent to passing the Fiduciary Risk Assessment in 2013 (FRA), funds were also channelled directly to the ministry, according to interviews.

Key Findings

Relevance

269. *This section explores the extent and how well the intervention suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.*

270. The MEAC CB programme is fully in line with the EAC Treaty; the EAC treaty called for the creation of such ministries in all EAC Partner Countries. However the Tanzania Vision 2025 does not mention regional integration or the EAC. Neither does the national growth and poverty reduction strategy (MKUKUTA II) 2010/11 – 2014/15. Nonetheless, regional trade integrate is formulated as a part of the government's New Foreign Policy.[105] Some of the concrete objectives on improving the business environment, especially the Dar es Salaam

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[104] Project Appraisal Report-Support to Ministry of East Africa Cooperation (MEAC) and other MDAs, TMEA, 2011

[105] Tanzania Foreign Policy the Case of Economic Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, retrieved from: http://www.foreign.go.tz/about/tanzania-foreign-policy-the-case-of-economic-diplomacy

port, are also included in the latest strategic Big Fast Results Initiative that commenced in 2013/14.[106]

271. The CB programme is in line with MEAC needs. The MEAC Strategic Plan 2013/2014 – 2017/2018 emphasised the mainstreaming of EAC integration issues in National and MDAs plans, budgets and strategies and stakeholders involvement in the EAC integration processes to optimally benefit from the EAC integration.[107] With the exception of some linguistic differences, there is almost 1:1 correspondence between the main objectives (C, D, E) of the MEAC Strategic Plan and the intermediate outcomes of the CB programme.

272. From 2014, and in accordance with the principle of country ownership, MEAC began implementing the CB programme, using its procurement and financial management procedures. This was not the original implementation modality. From 2011-2013, the programme had been managed exclusively by TMEA. The shift was possible after MEAC passed the fiduciary risk assessment.

273. According to the TMEA Country Team, the definition of the MEAC "client" or target group has a number of layers. The most immediate "clients" are the other MDAs serviced by MEAC through its coordination function. According to various interviews, through the identification of regional integration focal points in the Departments for Policy and Planning (DPP) at key MDAs, MEAC has attempted to establish a coordination and communication channel.

274. At times, this is by-passed, when technical departments are directly engaged in EAC matters; particularly during negotiations. Links are particularly strong with the Trade Department at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. According to MEAC, the only way to ensure mainstreaming and effective implementation is through the formal planning and budgeting process; hence the focus on the DPP. However, coordination across MDAs in Tanzania was an intransigent challenge, beyond the regional integration agenda alone.

275. Private sector, civil society, and the Tanzania population, are also MEAC stakeholders in so far as regional integration benefits or harms their interests. So far, the MEAC focus has mainly been on the intra-governmental coordination function. Based on the review of the results chain and interviews, MEAC introduced broader target groups into the design of the programme and directly addressed them through the public awareness component.

276. Despite inclusion into the programme design, as well as key performance indicators (KPIs), civil society and private sector are still not fully engaged by MEAC. Most notably, according to civil society representatives, the Minister cancelled a keynote speech at a December 2014 meeting in Arusha with 24 hours notice and provided no replacement. Some civil society representatives insinuated that quarterly meetings were already taking place at MEAC on an ad hoc basis (due to lack of funding). However, MEAC did not have the impression that external participants were regularly invited. Other CSOs confirmed that they had not been invited by MEAC and suggested that MEAC may not be consulting a legitimate cross-section of private sector and society.

277. Due to the absence of civil society organisations (CSOs) focusing explicitly on regional integration, the EAC has struggled to identify a local chapter for the East African Civil Society Organisations Forum (EACSOF). Currently, the EACSOF Chapter is hosted by Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO). It had established an EAC Forum in 2012, but the forum did not appear have a single member as of August 2015.[108] Apparently, the forum was off-line.

278. The linkage with civil society and private sector has been mostly via separate grants. Despite the fact that the business membership organisations (BMOs) represent private sector

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[106] Big Results Now, the United Republic of Tanzania Prime Minister's Office, 2015, Retrieved from: http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/quick-menu/brn/
[107] Medium Term Strategic Plan for the Ministry of East African Cooperation 2013/14-2017/18, MEAC, 2013, p. 17
[108] Direct observation of Tango, 27 August 2015, retrieved from: www.tangoforum.or.tz

through their membership, the composition and legitimacy varies significantly between these associations. There is a conscious recognition of the need to engage with more marginalised groups, such as farmers, which has not been accomplished so far. There is a recognised need to work with small- and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (e.g. small agribusiness, traders) especially on supply side constraints and regional market access, according to most interviewees. Despite interview data reflecting that these needs are recognised, there is no strong evidence that suggests engagement with more marginalised groups or the use of pro poor approaches.

279. While a gender strategy is under preparation, there is one programme that addressed gender issues. There is a new regional, cross TMEA programme to address gender in cross-border trade to mitigate potentially negative impacts of increased efficiency, trade and market integration.

280. The CB programme was challenged by the general reticence of the Tanzanian government toward regional integration. The coordination challenge among MDAs is a particularly intransigent problem that pervades across government. With the cabinet reshuffle and change in the Minister responsible for MEAC, as well as the Permanent Secretary, there was an opportunity for change. However, any momentum has now been absorbed by the upcoming elections. While there was some engagement of a broader group of stakeholders, these efforts were only recently channelled to more specific target audiences, with MEAC recognising particular challenges to reaching women and more marginalised groups.

Efficiency

281. *This section explores the extent to which the intervention used the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results [considering sound management and value for money].*

282. Despite the programme being designed in 2011, active implementation has only been on-going for the past 1.5 years (6 quarters). Programme start-up was delayed due to the need to finalise the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), conduct the FRA, as well as to make the first disbursement. Therefore, spending also picked up in 2013/14 and almost tripled in 2014/15. Nevertheless, the CB programme spending was well below target. Out of the total budget of USD 2.758 million, only USD 1.803 million (65%) has been spent, with approximately another year left of the programme.[109]

Table 6: MEAC CB programme Financial Summary

In $000	Actual Expenditure					Budget			Total
SO2 Project: 1119	**2010**	**2011**	**12/13**	**13/14**	**14/15**	**15/16**	**16/17**	**17/18**	**10/18**
MEAC Tanzania		28	336	886	554	500	455		2.758

Source: TMEA Financial Summary of MEAC Project Expenditure Reports

283. The total MEAC budget for 2014/15 was approximately USD 10,370,000. Of this, USD 6 million was the Tanzanian contribution to the EAC, leaving approximately USD 1.6 million as the annual operational budget of MEAC. Actual expenditure of the CB programme, was therefore more than half of the operational budget of the ministry. According to the budget

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[109] Capacity Building Programme Financial Summary, MEAC

speech by Minister Mwakyembe, MEAC also received a clean certificate from the audit of its accounts.[110]

284. Due to the reliance on direct hiring of local consultants, even long-term Technical assistance (TA) costs amounted to USD 258,561 (14% of the total) at the end of Fiscal Year 2015. Meanwhile, the grant component USD 1,115,608 constituted 62% of the total expenditure.

Project Management, Coordination and Communication

285. According to interviews, the outcomes and outputs, with related indicators in the results chain were monitored through a TMEA designed M&E Plan. There were weekly management meetings at MEAC, in accordance with general government guidance. In addition, the National Oversight Committee (NOC) met quarterly to review progress. An annual progress report was produced and shared with the evaluator. According to interviews, the Quarterly NOC meetings and related performance assessment matrix has created friendly competition among partners. The Permanent Secretary provided charismatic leadership to these meetings. Generally, interview data suggest that MEAC reporting had evolved into a more results-oriented mode and progress review meetings, in addition to the regular management meeting on Mondays had grown more common; also at departmental level.

286. There have been two long-term, local technical assistants. The contract of the Communications Advisor was not renewed due to lack of funds, and the M&E Advisor contract is still on-going. At the TMEA Country Office, oversight is provided by a Programme Manager, with additional support furnished by a Project Officer, especially on M&E.

287. When asked about support from the EAC Secretariat, reference was made only to the recently procured video conferencing facilities.

288. The significant under-spend in comparison with original budget projections was due to the delayed start of the CB programme and translated into the lack of results reported in the next section. At the same time, MEAC is highly dependent upon the CB programme funding, with actual expenditure of the CB programme being more than half of the operational budget of the ministry. Despite initial delays, adequate project management structures are now in place.

Effectiveness

289. *This section examines the extent to which the activity attains its objectives by considering its ability to reach intended beneficiaries; achieve trade and social gains; and avoid unintended results.*

290. Despite the delayed start, the programme has largely been implemented as originally designed. However, also due to the delayed start, during interviews, both MEAC and TMEA stated that it was also premature to expect achievement of the indicators at intermediate outcome level (see Textbox 1 for summary of indicators).

Textbox 1: Intermediate Outcome Indicators

(i) Increase in the # of commitments implemented for Customs Union and Common Market Protocol

(ii) Increase in the # of key milestones implemented annually under SCT roadmap

(iii) Reduction in average time to process export and import clearance including inspections

(iv) Reduction in total # of documents required to export and import

(v) Increase in the # of key trade information available through trade portals

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[110] Budget Speech 2015/16

291. While EAMS Country will eventually allow for the tracking of fully and partially implemented commitments for the Customs Union and Common Market Protocols, the MDAs have not gotten the pre-requisite support to understand and operationalise these commitments, not to speak of fully implementing them.

292. As indicator iii and iv can also be completed based upon secondary data gathered by the World Bank, these data could have already been included in the M&E Matrix by MEAC staff and analysed in regular progress reports.

- In the 2015 World Bank Doing Business Ranking, on the Trading Across Borders sub-indicator, the number of documents to export remained 7, with no change recorded since 2011.

- Customs clearance for export took 4 days; a deterioration compared to the baseline (3.2 days) in the TMEA M&E Plan

- For imports customs required only five days; exceeding the set target (6.1 days by 2017) in the TMEA M&E Plan (See Figure 16 for further details)

Figure 15: Trading Across Borders Sub-Indicator: Tanzania

Source: World Bank Doing Business Index

293. How the CB programme contributed to these changes is difficult to isolate. Other contributing factors likely include other TMEA support (Dar Port, One Stop Border Posts (OBSPs) and other government initiatives (e.g. Big Results Now).

294. During interviews, both TMEA and MEAC stated that it was premature to make achievements toward the Short Term Outcomes (see Textbox 2 below for a summary)

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Textbox 2: Short Term Outcome Indicators from M&E Plan

(i) Number and categories of stakeholders involved in EAC integration matters

(i) Level of implementation of EAC commitments by MDAs

(ii) Number of MDAs mainstreaming EAC integration outcomes compared to total MDAs in Tanzania

(i) Number of citizens who are aware and knowledgeable against total number interviewed disaggregated by gender

295. According to interview data, the level of implementation of EAC commitments and mainstreaming of EAC outcomes was not possible to track because:

1. MDAs had not yet been sensitised to the importance of regional integration;

2. MDAs were not producing and/or transmitting progress reports (annual) to MEAC; and

3. EAMS Country had not yet been launched, with MDAs trained on its use

296. Similarly, the level of mainstreaming of regional integration into the strategic plans, work plans and budgets of other MDAs had not yet been assessed. So far, the main achievement of the CB programme was the identification of regional integration focal points in MDAs.

297. MEAC has recently introduced a new approach to promote mainstreaming in Tanzania; the definition of EAC Outcomes. It is not clear to the evaluator how these outcomes relate to existing national or MDA plans. The outcomes relate to the following:

- Increased goods and services trade;

- Increased foreign direct investment (FDI) from neighbouring EAC countries;

- Stable macro-economic conditions;

- Reliable and regionally integrated transport and communication networks;

- Improved tourism and sustainable conservation of natural and cultural resources;

- Increased agricultural production and value addition;

- Strengthened human capital, science and technology transfer; and

- Enhanced good governance and rule of law

298. The outcomes all relate to Tanzania benefiting from the opportunities and addressing the challenges of EAC integration but miss tailoring to the existing priorities of the government.

299. It was not possible to assess the level of popular awareness about the EAC, as the planned Awareness Survey had been designed, but not yet implemented.

300. As for concrete outputs, the National Integration Policy had been drafted, but the government shifted responsibility to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for developing a more comprehensive regional integration strategy. Interview data indicated that the CMIS had been finalised, and is with cabinet for approval. A number of impact studies had been planned in the areas of Customs Union, Common Market and, the post-Bali agreement on trade facilitation but had not yet been commissioned.[111] The original concept of a MEAC "Think Tank" was overruled

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[111] TradeMark East Africa Tanzania Programme – Institutional Support to the Ministry of East Africa Cooperation - Progress Review and Areas for Future Support, MEAC, 2015

by central government. Formally, MEAC is to rely on the research services provided by the President's Office: Public Service Management (POPSM).

301. Concerning improved monitoring and follow-up on implementation of EAC commitments, only the focal points have been identified in MDAs. These data suggest that achieving the set target of three concrete commitments/MDA by June 2016 are unlikely.

302. EAMS Central has been introduced, is populated with data and accessible at MEAC. EAMS Tanzania has been designed but is so far filled only with "dummy" data. The MEAC experienced difficulties in obtaining data and regular reports from MDAs. When reporting is required, MEAC staff must call, and sometimes even visit offices to gather data. Interview data suggested this is an endemic challenge and not likely be addressed by the introduction of automated reporting via EAMS.

303. According to the Progress Review (2015), the MEAC Capacity Development Plan had been designed and implemented and focuses almost exclusively on training. The CB programme trained 62 of MEAC's operational and management staff on various themes such as policy analysis and development; negotiation skills, research techniques and methodologies and, in economic diplomacy and intelligence. Managers received additional training on leadership and management skills.[112]

304. While MEAC conducted a capacity and training needs assessment in 2011, MEAC reported needing a repeat assessment that included other MDAs and Local Government Authorities.[113]

305. MEAC benefited from several infrastructure investments. The Resource Centre, which aims to serve a broad group of internal and external users was fitted with paper-based resources and launched. A new local area network (LAN) was installed. According to interview data, compared to challenges in previous years, ICT quality in general should improve with the introduction of a single server across government. During the evaluation visit the wifi access at the Resource Centre was turned off. New equipment (e.g. laptops, photocopier etc.) has also been procured. The videoconference facility was installed, though via support from the EAC Secretariat.

306. MEAC developed a Communication Strategy that resulted in the following:

- Customs Union Trade Module;

- MEAC Annual Calendar;

- Booklets and fliers on Common Market and Customs Union; and

- EAC Newsletter

307. Civil society uses some of these communication materials in their own outreach activities. MEAC, with TA support, updated their website with new content. MEAC also designed a number of TV and radio broadcasts with MEAC staff participating as resource persons. Civil society also participated in the broadcasts. MEAC actively participated in various events, particularly trade fairs (Dar es Salaam International Trade Fair, Public Service Week, Juakali/Nguvu Kazi, Nane Nane, Zanzibar Revolutionary Day and Bagamoyo Small Entrepreneurs Exhibition.[114]

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[112] TradeMark East Africa Tanzania Programme – Institutional Support to the Ministry of East Africa Cooperation - Progress Review and Areas for Future Support, MEAC, 2015

[113] TradeMark East Africa Tanzania Programme – Institutional Support to the Ministry of East Africa Cooperation - Progress Review and Areas for Future Support, MEAC, 2015

[114] Such as Dar es Salaam International Trade Fair, Public Service Week, Juakali/Nguvu Kazi, Nane Nane, Zanzibar Revolutionary Day and Bagamoyo Small Entrepreneurs Exhibition.

308. Interview data from civil society and MEAC show that the simplified version of the Common Market Protocols, as well as the rules and regulations for SME traders were particularly valued communications products. The basic rules and regulations have subsequently been designed into large billboards at border crossing points.

Textbox 3: Bible Woman Story

A honey producer from Tabora has been using the simplified MEAC border procedures pamphlet to confront harassment of errant customs officials. The pamphlet, which she has termed her "bible", was tattered from use. She requested many more pamphlets to share with other women traders. Apparently, these Tanzanian women can be aggressive entrepreneurs.

309. Public presentation of customs and other border procedures on billboards and pamphlets encourages transparency and facilitates relations with customs and other border officials. (see textbox above) MEAC also conducted sensitisation of business people on EAC Integration issues in border communities (Sirari-Tarime, Namanga-Arusha, Holili-Kilimanjaro, Tarakea-Kilimanjaro, Horohoro-Tanga, Mutukula, and Rusumo) was also conducted.[115]

310. According to civil society representatives, the implementation of communication activities could have benefited from more civil society support to engage at the grassroots level.

311. Data shows that the CB programme has not yet achieved its intended outcomes or successfully engaged with other MDAs. This applies particularly to the implementation of EAC commitments and mainstreaming of EAC obligations. The identified and combined risk of insufficient political will to support regional integration (at the highest level) and the difficulties encountered in influencing and coordinating other MDAs has significantly protracted the timeline, with achievements only expected well into the future.

312. Nevertheless, some progress has been made on the policy framework. National Integration Policy had been drafted, but responsibility was shifted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for developing a more comprehensive regional integration strategy. The CMIS had also been finalised, and is with cabinet for approval. MEAC has also introduced a new means of mainstreaming through so-called EAC outcomes. However, according to the evaluator, they have limited relationship to EAC decisions and the implementation of concrete obligations in the Common Market Protocol.

313. EAMS Country has been designed but not rolled out across the MDAs. Due to the significant challenges with obtaining data from the other MDAs in more standard reporting formats, this challenge will probably not be overcome by the introduction of automated reporting via EAMS.

314. The CB programme has been more successful in its awareness-raising and communications efforts, with evidence of concrete changes for final beneficiaries, such as women traders. However, measurable results across the broader population can only be reported based on the planned EAC perception survey.

Impact

315. *This section explores, to the extent possible, intended and unintended results including the positive and negative impact of external factors.*

316. After 1.5 years, when legal harmonisation and implementation of EAC measures remains a major challenge, it is simply too early to even try to trace the impact upon trade flows or the general business environment in the region.

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[115] Sirari-Tarime, Namanga-Arusha, Holili-Kilimanjaro, Tarakea-Kilimanjaro, Horohoro-Tanga, Mutukula, and Rusumo

Sustainability

317. *This section looks at the extent that the benefits of the capacity building activities are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.*

318. Several respondents noted that the main challenge to the overall programme's sustainability relates to the general lack of commitment of Tanzania to regional integration, which is further compounded by MEAC being highly dependent upon external funding. According to interviews, this lack of commitment to regional integration across the government and political buy-in had not significantly changed during the lifetime of the programme and remains the main challenge for achieving related results, especially across other MDAs.

319. The sustainability of EAMS is questionable due to issues in obtaining reports from other MDAs and technological challenges relating to access of a reliable and fast Internet connection. Further EAMS is sustained largely with support from the long-term M&E TA. Finally, evaluation data strongly suggest that electronic data management solutions have been explicitly discouraged as a standard dimension of the M&E framework of MDAs in Tanzania.

Recommendations

320. **Key Finding 1:** Trade integration in the EAC did not factor significantly in the Government's vision or their overall development plans. The lack of political commitment to the EAC integration agenda was evident in the lack of progress made on the implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol. MEAC's ability to coordinate and mainstream EAC commitments into the plans and budgets of other MDAs was significantly constrained, with progress limited to the identification of regional integration focal points. EAMS Tanzania was not yet launched, with MEAC having concerns about MDAs willingness to provide regular updates. The parallel effort to define so-called "EAC Outcomes" was introduced to improve engagement, but may divert attention from actual EAC commitments.

321. **Recommendation:** After the elections, we recommend that a political economic analysis be conducted to assess potential champions of regional integration and improving the business environment generally in the new administration to inform how to shape more powerful mechanisms for the stewardship of EAC integration during a potential Phase II of support. MEAC will need to demonstrate its continued added value for spear-heading integration in the dynamics of the tripartite negotiations and the "variable geometry" in East Africa. This will have benefits across the TMEA portfolio in Tanzania. There is also a need to think beyond the traditional approach to inter-ministerial coordination (e.g. identification of MDA focal points), which could also be included as a part of the political economic analysis.

322. Due to the challenges experienced and foreseen for the roll-out of EAMS Tanzania, reliance upon the EAC Common Market Score Card may prove the best way to assess progress on EAC commitments for the moment. Further, we recommend clarification around the role of the new draft EAC Outcomes and its relationship to existing national commitments and EAC commitments.

323. **Key Finding 2:** MEAC has focused more on intra-governmental coordination, rather than broader engagement of private sector and stakeholders, despite public awareness raising efforts. The Communication Strategy was designed and related activities implemented, with messages increasingly channelled to a more segmented target audience. However, it was not possible to assess the effectiveness of these interventions across the population, as the public perception survey had not yet been implemented. Civil society reported that the awareness raising efforts need to be further informed and influenced by existing grass-roots networks.

324. **Recommendation:** We recommend a mechanism for regularly sharing information and soliciting input from a broader group of stakeholders, which would likely increase the

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relevance and potential impact of MEAC efforts. With regard to improving engagement of civil society, a more formalised mechanism for CSO/PSO (private sector organisation) consultation, opening existing quarterly meetings, and identifying concrete CSO/PSO activities and budget allocations would help to improve collaboration. Guidance can be sought from the EAC PSO/ CSO Dialogue Mechanism. The Public Awareness Survey should be launched that identifies the most effective means for transmitting information to the public (e.g. TV, radio, billboards, pamphlets, other).

325. **Key Finding 3:** The results chain, developed by TMEA headquarters with external support, has not been revised since the original design and requires review and revision, with a stronger emphasis upon knowledge uptake, coalition building and factoring in the constraints of the external environment required in the logic, making it more adapted to the particular Tanzania context.

326. **Recommendation:** We recommend developing a clear theory of change and related results chain that has concrete, achievable outputs.

List of stakeholders consulted

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UGANDA

List of acronyms

ASI	Adam Smith Institute
CB	Capacity Building
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CET	Common External Tariff
CMP	Common Market Protocol
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
EAC	East African Community
EAMS	East African Monitoring System
EU	European Union
Finaid	Financial Aid
FTAs	Free Trade Areas
FTP	Fast Track Project
GoU	Government of Uganda
LAN	Local Area Network
LT	Long Term
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MEACA	Ministry of East African Community Affairs (Uganda)
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NIC	National Implementation Committee
NPEACI	National Policy on EAC Integration
PS	Permanent Secretary
PSFU	Private Sector Foundation of Uganda
PSO	Private Sector Organisaiton
RIC	Regional Integration Centre
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SEATINI	The Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
STE	Short Term Expert
TL	Team Leader
TMEA	TradeMark East Africa
TOC	Tripartite Oversight Committee (Uganda)

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TSU	Technical Support Unit (Uganda)
TWG	Technical Working Group
UCSI	Uganda Coalition of Service Industries
UMA	Uganda Manufacturers Association

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Context

327. The Republic of Uganda is a landlocked country, which is bordered in the east by Kenya, in the north by South Sudan, in the west by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the southwest by Rwanda, and in the south by Tanzania. The southern part of the country includes a substantial portion of Lake Victoria, which it shares with Kenya and Tanzania.

328. Uganda had a population of 38.8 million in 2014. Its economy grew strongly in the two decades between 1992/3 and 2012/3, during that period poverty dropped from 56% of the population to 19.7%[116] The Ugandan economy is dominated by three main sectors: Services, Agriculture and Industry. A majority of the poor are employed in the agricultural sector – a sector that contributes 67% of total employment, and a sector in which earnings are five times less than those in the public sector. Imports have been growing faster than exports (see Table 7 below), resulting in a growing trade imbalance. Most of Uganda's imports are consumables rather than industrial/production inputs[117].

Table 7: Uganda's External Trade (USD mil)

Fin Year	10/11	11/12	12/13	13/14	14/15
EXPORTS					
TOTAL:	**2,297.74**	**2,660.41**	**2,912.11**	**2,712.24**	**2,672.07**
EU	497.99	550.04	561.33	509.36	503.16
Middle East	119.74	213.05	180.42	100.17	214.50
Asia	157.31	149.83	130.25	168.34	175.54
The Americas	29.72	47.38	39.63	47.98	42.62
EAC					
Kenya	214.50	226.52	268.86	342.08	390.80
Rwanda	175.25	208.41	217.43	220.25	179.62
Tanzania	38.98	45.39	54.02	49.88	56.63
Burundi	39.69	42.39	50.29	55.24	38.87
IMPORTS					
TOTAL:	**4,668.92**	**5,222.00**	**5,041.32**	**5,045.75**	**4,988.36**
EU	704.95	630.06	557.85	549.12	640.58
Middle East	643.86	848.49	613.17	568.30	540.64
Asia	2,039.86	2,240.18	2,720.32	2,687.97	2,546.58
The Americas	259.13	227.27	198.12	123.58	121.50
EAC:					
Kenya	535.07	680.82	614.84	598.77	608.88
Rwanda	6.12	8.94	7.75	11.99	9.58
Tanzania	32.47	54.82	49.60	54.60	54.88
Burundi	1.32	1.76	0.57	1.39	2.27

Source: Bank of Uganda

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[116] World Bank, Uganda Overview, 2015. Retrieved from www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/overview
[117] Uganda High Commission, Retrieved from www.ugandahighcommission.co.uk

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329. Uganda's exports have increased steadily over the past five years to Kenya and Tanzania (apart from 2013/14). Exports to Rwanda and Burundi increased steadily from 2010/11 to 2013/14, but dropped to both countries in 2014/15 when exports to Rwanda dropped just above the 2010/11 level and to Burundi to below the level of 2010/11. Ugandan imports from its four EAC partners showed a more mixed picture with imports from Kenya peaking in 2011/12 and then declining except for a slight increase in 2014/15 (but it is interesting to note that between 2011/12 and 2013/14 imports from Kenya were higher than imports from the EU), imports from Rwanda declined from 2011/12 to 2014/15 (apart from in 2013/14), imports from Tanzania remained steady from 2011/12 to 2014/15 (apart from 2012/13), while imports from Burundi increased between 2010/11 and 2014/15 (apart from in 2012/13 when they dropped dramatically).

330. The standard measure of a country's business environment is the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business indicator. Uganda has not done very well in 2015 as compared with its EAC peers. In the 2015 rankings Uganda was ranked at 150, as compared to Rwanda at 46, Tanzania at 131 and Kenya at 136. Uganda's ranking was only slightly higher than the worst EAC performer Burundi which ranked 152. With regard to the World Bank's Distance to the Frontier methodology, the prognosis has also not been good with its highest score in 2011, declining thereafter with a slight improvement of 1.73% in the past year.

331. Uganda's Distance to the Frontier Score peaked in 2011 after which it worsened until 2014 after which it returned roughly to the level it was at in 2011.[118]

Figure 16: Distance to Frontier

Distance to Frontier Uganda

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Distance to Frontier Uganda	48.94	51.14	50.05	50.09	49.54	51.11

Source: World Bank Doing Business Index

332. Despite its poor performance in the World Bank's Doing Business Index, Uganda was the best EAC performer on the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index between 2007 and 2010 (see Figure 17), thereafter there are no further statistics for Uganda.

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[118] World Bank, Doing Business, retrieved from: www.doingbusiness.org

Figure 17: Overall LPI Comparison East Africa

Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index

Ministry with which TMEA engages

333. In 2006, the Government of Uganda established a department for East African Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister. In 2007 the Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA) was established as a distinct Ministry, with a mandate to coordinate Uganda's implementation of its obligations under the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. This was in compliance with Article 8 (3a) of the Treaty which states that "Each Partner State shall designate a Ministry with which the Secretary General may communicate in connection with any matter arising out of the implementation or the application of this Treaty, and shall notify the Secretary General of that designation". MEACA's mandate is: "to steer Uganda's regional integration agenda in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community."

334. To fulfil its mandate, MEACA undertakes the following functions: 1) Implement Uganda's National Policy on EAC integration; 2) Coordinate harmonization of EAC laws and policies; 3) Communicate decisions and directives of the EAC Council of Ministers and the Summit to the relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) for their action and compliance; 4) Follow-up, monitor and evaluate the implementation of EAC policies, decisions, directives, programmes and projects; 5) Liaise with public, private sector, non-governmental organisations, civil society and other stakeholders on EAC cooperation matters; and 6) Maintain linkages between EAC organs and institutions with Uganda ministries and institutions. Thus, its mandate and function is to coordinate and monitor the other MDAs, and other stakeholders in the EAC integration process. MEACA thus has no mandate to implement EAC commitments and decisions – this responsibility remains with these other MDAs[119.]

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[119] Thus, MEACA's role with respect to bringing various existing laws and regulations into conformity with Uganda's commitments made at the EAC level with respect to the implementation of the CMP, is to identify non-conforming domestic

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335. There has been a significant increase in awareness of the EAC within GOU, civil society and the private sector. There is now a much greater awareness of EAC in the rural areas, whereas previously awareness was concentrated in urban areas. The Ugandan business community is increasingly aware of the opportunities in the EAC markets and also of the systems in place to facilitate cross-border business, including mechanisms for overcoming problems such as non-tariff barriers. For providers of educational services, it is now easier to supply these services to citizens of other EAC countries in Uganda due to easier Ugandan visa regulations for educational purposes. For ordinary citizens tangible benefits include easier cross border travel to Rwanda and Kenya using their national identity documents (so they do not need to apply for passports) and the implementation of the 'common telecoms area' which facilitates seamless mobile phone roaming and recharging using one's national SIM card.

Intervention

336. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) provided USD 5.3 million for a capacity building (CB) programme that supported Uganda's Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA). This included USD 890,000 of financial aid (Finaid) for MEACA. Finaid funded: 1) the implementation of the national East African Community (EAC) integration policy; 2) research; 3) the Common Market Protocol (CMP) implementation action plan; 4) MEACA visibility and EAC awareness campaigns; 5) MEACA Strategic Plan updates; 6) MEACA training; 7) East African Monitoring System (EAMS); 8) the MEACA Resource Centre; 9) material support for MEACA; 10) implementation of the M&E system, and; 11) law and policy reform.

337. Imani Development implemented the four-year CB programme between August 2011 and June 2015. Imani's implementation team consisted of combination of long-term technical assistance and short-term specialists. The long-term technical assistance consisted of a Team Leader/Trade Economist (TL), a monitoring and evaluation expert, a trade lawyer (for the initial three years), a principal programme officer and a communications expert. Due to the work-load of the TL, and at the request of MEACA, TMEA funded an additional trade economist for the final two years of the programme. These long-term technical assistants were known as the Technical Support Unit (TSU). The long- and short-term experts reported to the project TL. Wherever feasible each of the long-term experts worked with one or more MEACA counterparts. The TL reported to the Director of MEACA[120].

338. The CB programme focused on strengthening MEACA staff and the organisation. In addition, the programme aimed at reaching MEACA's primary stakeholders to increase their awareness of EAC integration and boost MEACA's role as the coordinator of this process. These stakeholders included many of the Ugandan Government's MDAs, legislators, PSOs, CSOs, CBOs, SMEs, the media and the general public.

339. The Uganda CB programme did not have an explicit theory of change. The overall objective of the TMEA supported CB programme for MEACA was: "Uganda substantially increases its effective implementation of the comprehensive programme for EAC integration". In addition to this overall objective, the project also had an intermediate outcome of "improved strategic leadership and coordination of EAC integration across government by MEACA". It also had two short-term outcomes: 1) enhanced awareness of EAC integration of EAC integration by MDAs, PSOs, CSOs, CBOs, educational institutions, local governments, legislators, media, professional bodies, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the Ugandan public; and 2)

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laws and regulations. The actual changing of these laws and regulations remains within the mandate of the Attorney General, Parliament and the President. This will be discussed further later on.

[120] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015

increased implementation of EAC priority laws, decisions and programmes by selected MDAs.

340. Based on this understanding, the TSU discussed and then developed a draft results chain (which went through a number of revisions and was finalised in 2013) and a four-year M&E plan. Agreeing on indicators for the results chain proved difficult. For instance, the MEACA training programme's diversity was such that a single indicator would not suffice. Therefore it was agreed that the number of selected training modules implemented would be the appropriate indicator. The agreed results chain is provided in Annex 4.

Key Findings

Relevance

341. *This section explores the extent and how well the intervention suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.*

342. The four-year CB programme is relevant to the Ugandan context. First, the four-year CB programme objective is in line with Uganda's 2010 to 2015 National Development Plan[121] objectives and its Vision 2040[122]. Second, the design of the programme was based on identified needs and developed after wide consultation. Third, the implementing partner, Imani Development, worked in partnership with MEACA to identify the specific CB activities to be carried out to support their overall strategic plan.

343. Most interview data indicated that MEACA was not a very powerful or influential Ministry for the first few years of its existence due to being under-capacitated in financial and human resources. In January 2010 with a goal to boost the MEAC's capacity to carry out its mandate, the Government of Uganda (GoU) – with TMEA support – implemented a 14 month CB project; the Fast Track Project (FTP). The Adam Smith Institute (ASI) implemented the FTP, which identified MEACA's capacity gaps, needs and problems. ASI, in consultation with MEACA, then developed a draft strategic plan and a training plan. This process informed the design of the subsequent four-year CB programme currently under review.

344. In addition, ASI and MEACA undertook an extensive and widespread consultation of MEACA stakeholders from August to October 2010. The team consulted with representatives of various Ugandan MDAs, PSOs, CSOs, CBOs, legislators and Ugandan eminent persons. Further, the team held consultations with the EAC Secretariat and counterpart Ministries of EAC affairs in Kenya and Rwanda.

345. MEACA finalised, validated and officially launched its Strategic Plan (2012 -17) during the first year of the four-year CB programme. During this time, Imani Development and MEACA agreed which components of the ministry's training plan would be implemented over the four years. MEACA's review of the training plan's implementation concluded that by early 2015 most of the agreed courses had been held, and that nearly all MEACA staff had participated in one or more of these courses, along with staff from 18 MDAs[123].

346. There were a number of other activities undertaken that were in line with identified gaps. These included:

> 1. Mentoring of MEACA staff at different points throughout the implementation of the programme as specific requests were made.

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[121] Which emphasizes enhancing the competitiveness of Uganda's goods and services in the EAC, identifying opportunities and addressing the supply side constraints, and boosting the Ugandan population's awareness of the EAC integration agenda.

[122] Which articulates Uganda's aspiration to be a modern and prosperous country, which is a major player in a strong EAC, COMESA and the global market.

[123] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015

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2. The small research grants programme for MEACA staff to do background research into specific areas arising from their work programmes. These staff grants were introduced from Year 2 of the programme. As a part of this component the TL or trade economist provided the staff member with research skills training, a mid-way review of the draft research document and a final review prior to the completion of the research. This resulted in 16 separate research reports.

3. The production of policy related studies and research undertaken by the TSU or by commissioned STEs. Many of these studies were subjected to validation workshops in order to test their usefulness.

4. The Private Sector Foundation of Uganda (PSFU) and the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) were funded to produce a position paper on the CET, and the Uganda Coalition of Service Industries (UCSI) was commissioned to produce a study on additional liberalisation commitments in services under the CMP (see Case Studies 1-3 in Appendix 3 where these are explained in more detail).

5. M&E capacity building was provided to the planning unit of the Ministry to also help them to implement and run EAMS. Other MEACA staff who provided input into, or used, EAMS were also trained along with users in other MDAs.

6. The TSU's Communications Expert focused on improving MEACA's communications and public relations to promote EAC integration, filling a critical role until MEACA appointed a full time Principle Public Relations Officer.

7. The programme provided Finaid to support MEACA staff to participate in peer-to-peer learning by organizing meetings with counterparts in other states. For example, MEACA staff visited Kenya to study their multi-institutional committee of stakeholders for EAC implementation.

8. Finally, MEACA used Finaid to provide staff with much needed IT equipment.[124]

347. While the vast majority of CB programme focused on MEACA, CB also took place with other key stakeholders. Examples include EAMS training for other MDA officials, PSFU and the UMA private sector research on common external tariff (CET), and EAC awareness campaigns that covered almost 50% of Uganda's Districts. Though TMEA initially allocated resources for developing the capacity of other MDAs, this was not realised due to resource constraints[125].

348. The programme promoted gender equality and human rights to a limited extent. For example, the programme's cross border trade initiatives were chosen due to the importance of this for women SME traders[126]. The programme also supported the provision of Swahili lessons for Ugandan cross-border (mainly women) traders, as Swahili is not very common in Uganda but is the effective lingua-franca in both Kenya and Tanzania. The border regional information centre established at the Busia border post mainly serviced women traders. The EAC sensitization programme was a major initiative focused primarily on women traders in rural areas of Uganda. By the end of the programme MEACA was able to provide gender disaggregated data on its outreach/capacity building/sensitisation activities. This programme also emphasised the human rights that the EAC Treaty guaranteed (such as the free movement of people throughout the Community, the right to seek work and the right to set up business or trade in the other Partner States). Although the information centre within MEACA also provided information on all of the rights that the EAC Treaty guaranteed, evidence did not suggest that this unit was very pro-active.

349. By the time the CB programme came to a close in June 2015, 19 of the 24 major recommendations made in the programme's mid-term review had been addressed, two had

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[124] Finaid was used for many interventions.

[125] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015

[126] This was illustrated in the case study on Annie's Metalworks provided in Imani's end of project report. This is a case study on a small-scale woman-owned company manufacturing metal furniture and house gates which has been able to break into the Rwandan and Kenyan markets with the assistance of MEACA. See Imani 2015 Annex 5.

not been implemented as they proved to be impractical, and three recommendations to TMEA were beyond the scope of the programme[127].

Efficiency

350. *This section explores the extent to which the intervention used the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results [considering sound management and value for money.*

351. TMEA's CB programme for MEACA was a USD 5.3 million programme, which included USD 890,000 of financial aid (Finaid) for MEACA. In the initial design of the programme the Finaid component was budgeted at USD 490,000. However, by the end of the second year nearly three quarters of this Finaid had been spent, and an additional USD 400,000 was allocated.

352. MEACA used Finaid to fund: the implementation of the national EAC integration policy (14%); research (5%); the Common Market Implementation Plan action plan (18%); MEACA visibility (29%); MEACA Strategic Plan updates (2%); MEACA training (7%); EAMS and Resource Centre (9%); material support for MEACA (9%); implementation of M&E system (6%); and law and policy reform (1%)[128].

353. In order to ensure due diligence and transparency with respect to the disbursement of the Finaid funds, Imani Development built into its original technical proposal that its partner Aclaim Africa Ltd, an independent Ugandan financial management company, would manage the Finaid funds. Interview data show that TMEA (Uganda)'s management team and MEACA senior management were satisfied with this arrangement and the professionalism with which it was carried out.

354. TMEA disbursed the Finaid funding on an annual basis to Aclaim Africa Ltd who then paid out against specific drawdown requests. After the initial allocation in the first year of the programme, the unspent amount that was carried forward from the previous year was topped-up by TMEA to meet the anticipated expenditure under that year's work programme. By the end of the programme the Finaid component was fully utilised. The disbursement and utilization of the Finaid funds is illustrated in the following table:

Table 8: Disbursement of Finaid funds

Financial Year Start	Jul-2011	Jul-2012	Jul-2013	Jul-2014
TMEA Funding	$330,800	$159,200	$200,000	$200,000
Carry over	-	$121,500	$77,300	$17,300
Funds Available	**$330,800**	**$280,700**	**$277,300**	**$217,300**
Expenditure	$209,300	$203,400	$260,000	$217,300
Available	63%	72%	94%	100%

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[107] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015, p. 66

[128] Compiled from financial reports by the project fund manager (Acclaim Africa Ltd)

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355. A number of the activities undertaken under the Finaid component of the programme were specifically designed to ensure value for money. For instance:

- **Training.** This was mostly local (in Kampala) and avoided expenditure on daily travel allowances. Participants from outside Kampala were given a small transport allowance.
- **IT equipment.** Prior to providing MEACA with IT equipment an initial connectivity and needs analysis was done by a short term IT expert to identify the gaps in the Ministry's systems and equipment, and the most cost effective solutions to address these. Thereafter procurement occurred, in line with the most cost-effective solution proposed by the expert. In order to ensure that this equipment was provided timeously, TMEA was able to innovatively utilise its procurement processes. MEACA chaired the procurement process and supervised its implementation, thus ensuring ownership and transparency.
- **Outreach and sensitization activities.** Imani used a cluster approach in regional areas, to reach as many people as possible. This entailed meeting with the district civil and political leaders and sensitising them about EAC integration opportunities and benefits, and then it was theorized that these local leaders would in turn sensitise the people in their districts. It is not clear if this happened. In Uganda radio is the most important media, and so the programme's outreach activities usually included radio interviews. A good example is the launch of the Regional Integration Centre (RIC) at the Busia border post in May 2015. The night before the launch the MEACA Permanent Secretary and Commissioner for Production and Social Services, as well as the Busia Resident District Commissioner, participated in a one-hour radio programme at a local radio station. The subject of this programme was to discuss the Regional Integration Centre (RIC) and how this fitted in to the work of MEACA and EAC integration. The launch itself "… was used as a valuable marketing tool for the RIC, providing an excellent opportunity to invite area stakeholders and the border community to find out more about the functions of the RIC and learn more about the Ministry of EAC Affairs and the EAC Integration in general. It was also a sensitization outreach with numerous Central Government MDAs and Busia District Local Government representatives and other stakeholders."[129]

356. At the start of the programme, Imani Development implemented a coherent programme management oversight and reporting system. This included a four-year work plan which was subsequently adjusted as needed through the development of annual work plans. These annual work plans included annual log frames and budgets. The project steering committee, which was chaired by the MEACA Director and included all departmental heads and counter-part staff, approved the programme's annual work plans. The programme's annual work plans were aligned with MEACA's annual work plans, and were reported on through monthly and quarterly progress reports.

357. MEACA and Imani Development agreed on a detailed M&E system. The TSU's M&E expert managed the system and also assisted MEACA to develop their own indicators and reporting system, and provided mentoring and capacity building to the counter-part MEACA staff. The Permanent Secretary (PS) chaired MEACA's Tripartite Oversight Committee and members included the TMEA Country Director and Imani top management. This committee provided strategic and policy guidance.

358. Data taken from Imani reports suggest that the programme management structure ensured sound programme management, and that the programme was able to efficiently respond to the needs of both the Ministry and TMEA. This reporting structure also ensured that the project adhered to its agreed work plans and annual budgets, and where delays occurred these could be transparently understood or addressed by the steering committee and/or Tripartite Oversight Committee [130] . Interview data show that the TMEA (Uganda) management team and MEACA noted their satisfaction with this programme management structure. This structure ensured that the Ministry was able to exercise effective control over

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[129] Activity for the Launch of EAC Regional Integration Centre at Busia Border Post, MEACA, 2015
[130] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015

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the programme, that it responded timeously to MEACA's changing needs, and that its activities were fully aligned with ministerial priorities.

359. Imani Developed adopted a programme implementation model that aimed to fully embed their LT experts in MEACA with designated counterpart staff who would receive mentoring from these experts. In any CB programme the capacity of an organisation is usually developed at three levels – institutional, organisational and individual. In MEACA's case, especially at the early stages of the programme, resource constraints meant that some key MEACA technical staff posts were either not filled, or a replacement was not appointed when the previous incumbent left. As a result there were times, especially in the early phases of the programme, when the TSU staff would actually perform some of the tasks that would have usually been expected of the Ministry.

360. An example of this problem was the communications function where for much of the period the Ministry did not have a full time communications officer. The TSU communications expert therefore had to step in, or work with a number of different people in the Ministry on the outreach programme. While this did build the organisational capacity of MEACA temporarily, this was neither an efficient use of the TSU staff nor a viable solution to the Ministry's capacity gaps. This situation was only addressed when a full time Principle Public Relations Officer was appointed in MEACA, which enabled the TSU's Communications expert to then play the intended mentoring role.

361. TMEA Uganda management responded to this situation to ensure that the TSU experts reverted to their agreed mentoring role. This was then largely addressed by Imani Development following a change in the TSU's TL.

362. Interview data indicate that the MEACA senior management perceived that having a single consortium managing the whole programme as an appropriate approach. They commented that is was an efficient way of ensuring that the programme was well implemented and managed at both the technical support and fiduciary levels. While the senior TMEA (Uganda) staff largely concurred with this assessment, they also expressed some concerns.

363. One concern mentioned was that the TSU did not have enough regional and wider experience due to the high percentage of local experts in the team. TMEA (Uganda) senior staff noted that while the replacement of the TL did to some extent address this, it would have been more beneficial if the new TL, with his extensive external experience, could have been based full-time in Uganda. MEACA senior management said that they were not concerned with the nationality or origin of the experts, rather what was important for them was their expertise. MEACA concurred with TMEA-Uganda's senior staff that it would have been better if the replacement TL could have provided his experience and strategic vision to the programme on a full-time basis, however this would have had financial implications for the programme.

Effectiveness

364. *This section examines the extent to which the activity attains its objectives by considering its ability to reach intended beneficiaries; achieve trade and social gains; and avoid unintended results.*

365. The CB programme's intermediate objective was "Improved strategic leadership and coordination of EAC integration across government by MEACA." Interview data gathered from a broad range of stakeholders that included the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Co-operatives, the Law Reform Commission, UMA, SEATINI and the Uganda Coalition of Services Industries agreed that this was achieved. These interview data indicated that MEACA has been able to progressively assert its strategic leadership and coordination of Uganda's EAC integration agenda over the implementation period of the CB programme.

366. Two examples[131] demonstrate MEACA's effectiveness, as shown through its strategic leadership of the integration process, are:

- The adoption of the EAC integration mainstreaming indicators developed by MEACA by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, and its 2013/14 directive that MDAs must ensure that they have allocated adequate resources in their budget estimates for mainstreaming the EAC integration agenda. Subsequent to this directive eight MDAs complied in 2013/14, while by mid-2015, 13 MDAs had included mainstreaming EAC integration in their Ministerial Policy Statements; and

- The establishment of the Technical Working Group on EAC Implementation in the Office of the Prime Minister in 2013. In the work of this TWG the coordinating role of MEACA was fully recognised by all of the other MDAs involved. For instance, MEACA was mandated by this TWG to screen memos being sent to Cabinet for their possible impact on EAC integration.

367. As noted in the Relevance section above, the planning for the four-year CB programme began during the preceding 14 month Fast Track (FT) Project implemented by ASI from January 2010. One of the outputs of this FT Project was a staff training plan. At the start of the CB programme Imani Development agreed with MEACA which of the elements of their staff training plan would be implemented during the four years of the CB programme.

368. A subsequent internal review of MEACA's staff training plan (2011 - 15) conducted by MEACA during December 2014 and January 2015 concluded that "80% of the identified group training courses had been implemented during the course of the project period. In terms of coverage, 92% of the technical courses identified in the Training Plan were conducted; 82% of the 17 identified general courses were undertaken; whilst only 40% of the identified general management courses were undertaken. Practically all MEACA staff, covering administrative and support staff as well as professional staff, had participated in one or more of these courses. Furthermore eighteen MDAs had also participated in some of the training. These were: Ministries of Water and Environment; Defence; Foreign affairs; Office of the Prime Minister; Agriculture; Tourism and Wildlife; Housing and Urban Development; ICT; Bureau of Statistics; Export Promotion Board; Judicial Service Commission; Curriculum Development Centre; Police; Registration Services Bureau; Uganda Broadcasting Corporation; Parliament of Uganda, Inter-University Council of East Africa and Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency"[132].

369. In order to monitor and track the progress of Uganda's implementation of its EAC integration commitments the TSU worked closely with MEACA to develop EAMS Uganda as a fully web based database that was compatible with EAMS central hosted by the EAC Secretariat in Arusha. MEAC finalised this system in mid-2013 and training sessions were conducted for the MEACA staff that were tasked with updating and operating the system. MEACA introduced EAMS Uganda to the National Implementation Committee (NIC) for the Common Market in September 2013, and the various MDAs that were responsible for implementing the different elements of Uganda's EAC commitments were invited to nominate their contact point officials for training on how to operate and update EAMS Uganda. This formal training was done in December 2013 and January 2014. Thereafter the TMEA funded IT expert in MEACA continued to provide technical assistance to MDA contact points.

370. At the start of the CB programme the TSU's M&E expert assisted MEACA to establish an M&E system to monitor the implementation of MEACA's five year Strategic Plan. This Strategic Plan was implemented through the development of annual and quarterly work plans. EAMS Uganda tracks the implementation of MEACA's five year Strategic Plan, and MEACA's annual and quarterly work plans. The CB programme's own four year work plan,

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[131] Further examples will be elaborated on in Impact section below.
[132] Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015, p. 19

and its annual and quarterly work plans, were closely aligned with MEACA's work plans, and included annual log frames and budgets. The programme's steering committee approved these annual work plans and the programme's quarterly progress reports. The programme also reported quarterly through the TMEA management information system. The programme steering committee was chaired by the MEACA Director and included all departmental heads and counter-part staff. Strategic guidance and policy was provided by the programme's Tripartite Oversight Committee (TOC) (chaired by the PS of MEACA, and including the TMEA Country Director and Imani top management).

371. A 2014 evaluation report noted that:

"The TOC and Programme Steering Committee in most cases appear to discuss similar agenda, including issues delaying planned interventions. To remove this overlap, it is necessary that both committees adhere to their agreed TORs. In this regard, the PSC should approve all planned monthly activities and progress reports for the subsequent month. The combined 3-monthly reports (activities and progress) should thereafter be summarized into the quarterly progress reports for submission by the PSC to the TOC"[133].

372. In response to this recommendation, two committees' TORS were redefined, giving more clarity on their specific roles and thus addressing this problem.

373. In most cases this rigorous programme monitoring and management structure (with its regular reporting to, and oversight by, MEACA and TMEA Uganda) meant that corrective measures could usually be taken when the programme diverted from the agreed implementation plan. This contributed to TMEA Uganda and MEACA's senior management noting satisfaction with the programme's effectiveness.

374. However, there were instances where external factors beyond MEACA's control caused delays. This was especially the case where the implementation of needed changes identified by MEACA was outside of its mandate which is to coordinate and monitor the other MDAs responsible for implementing EAC commitments[134]. One example of this was the attempt by MEACA to identify and align the various domestic laws that needed to be reformed in order to implement Uganda's commitments to implement the EAC Common Market Protocol (CMP). MEACA, through the CB programme, commissioned a well-respected Ugandan Legal consultancy firm that identified 58 laws that would need to be reviewed. These initial findings were presented to a stakeholders workshop that concluded that seven principle laws and four subsidiary laws were in conflict with the CMP. Interview data noted that it was proposed that the most efficient way of dealing with this would be to develop an Omnibus Bill that would make the necessary reforms to the seven principle laws and four subsidiary laws identified. The consultant worked with the Uganda Law Reform Commission and a draft Omnibus bill was presented to the Attorney General's office. Unfortunately the Attorney General's office disagreed with the proposed Omnibus bill, as they thought that the individual bills would need to be reformed and the proposed changes presented to Parliament by their respective Ministers. The up-coming national elections are a further complicating factor as Parliament is focused on these, and so it is unlikely that these seven principle laws and four subsidiary laws will be reformed (either individually or through an Omnibus bill) until sometime after the election.

Impact

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[133] Mid-Term Review (MTR) TMEA – Funded Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs MEACA, AESA, 2014, p.25

[134] MEACA's mandate was discussed in paragraph 334.

375. *This section explores, to the extent possible, intended and unintended results including the positive and negative impact of external factors.*

376. Identifying significant impact data in September 2015 for a programme that ended in June 2015, is unlikely. Despite this reservation, we provide some evidence of a few of the CB programme's potential impacts.

377. Programme reports and interviews suggest that the public sector and the wider community in Uganda have increased their awareness of the EAC integration programme, and the coordinating role of MEACA in this process. Interviews with TMEA Uganda management suggest that the CB support programme's co-ordination, sensitization and publicity activities contributed to this perceived change. Some data also suggested that MEACS's profile has been enhanced in relation to other MDA's. For example, there was close co-operation between MEACA and the Uganda Law Reform Commission in identifying regulations and laws needing reform in order to implement Uganda's EAC integration commitments, and the remedial action that could be taken to facilitate these changes. The close co-operation that occurred during this process (detailed in Efficiency section) suggests clear recognition by the Uganda Law Reform Commission of MEACA's legitimate role in this process.

378. Other data also show some indication of MEACA's growing strength and potential influence that is likely linked to the CB programme. For instance, MDAs accepted MEACA's mandate to call on them to attend EAC related regional meetings under their leadership. MEACA was able to work with a number of MDAs to develop EAC integration indicators that were incorporated into their own work plans and budgets. By mid-2015 13 MDAs had mainstreamed their EAC integration indicators into their work plan. Further, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development accepted these integration indicators in their 2013/14 2nd Budget Call Circular135. Finally, the GoU recognised MEACA's strategic role in 2013 when it was one of the few MDAs that did not experience a cut in its allocation in the 2013 National Budget136.

379. The data also suggested some potential negative impact. First, enhanced prominence of MEACA may have resulted in resentment by other MDAs regarding resources that have been given to MEACA by TMEA, and relatedly, that these resources have also enabled MEACA to undertake activities that are 'outside their mandate'. For example, some interview data from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Co-operatives indicated that MEACA was going beyond its mandate by assuming a leadership role in the development of Uganda's inputs into the EAC common position with respect to the Tripartite negotiations between the COMESA, EAC and SADC.

380. The MEACA Communications Strategy, developed through the support of the CB programme, emphasised the use of radio as a major means of information dissemination and where feasible incorporated interviews with local radio stations in the regions or districts being targeted. The main source of information and news (especially in the rural areas) is radio; the Uganda Communications Commission reported that as of December 2011 there were 275 registered radio stations broadcasting in Uganda (ucc.co.ug). The Strategy also used a number of other forms of communication and the so-called 'cluster approach'. MEACA issued a quarterly newsletter; produced hard copy information sheets on various specific EAC subjects and issues; developed a MEACA website, Twitter account and Facebook page; and supported the formation of EAC clubs in schools. The 'cluster approach' involved the sensitisation of local administrative and civic leaders in districts being targeted for awareness of EAC related issues, and aimed to have these leaders spread the news to their respective constituents.

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135 Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda (MEACA) August 2011 – June 2015, Imani Development, 2015
136 Mid-Term Review (MTR) TMEA – Funded Capacity Building Support to the Ministry of East African Community Affairs MEACA, AESA, 2014, p. 29

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381. An example of the combined use of radio and the cluster approach was when MEACA undertook a sensitisation campaign for the Kisoro District centered on the Cyanika border crossing into Rwanda. At 8pm on 5 March 2015 Radio Muhabara hosted a one hour talk show with the Minister of State for EAC affairs, the MEACA Commissioner for Economic Affairs, the Kisoro Resident District Commissioner, and the Chairman of the Kisoro District Local Government. The next day these dignitaries, and the Mayor of Burera Prefecture in Rwanda, were the guests of honour at the sensitisation event which was held at the Cyanika border post and attended by many people from the surrounding Kisoro District.

382. Both of these communications strategies (using radio and other media, and the "cluster approach") have continued to be used by MEACA in their on-going post-programme EAC sensitisation activities. In recognition of the potential impact of these sensitisation activities, TMEA has made a further post-programme allocation of USD 500,000 to MEACA to enable them to continue employing a communications expert, and funding the activities, after the close of the CB programme in June 2015.

Sustainability

383. *This section looks at the extent that the benefits of the capacity building activities are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.*

384. The data suggest that the TMEA funded CB programme for MEACA has built capacity during the implementation of the programme at three levels: institutional, organisational and individual.

- **Institutional –** The CB programme built MEACA's capacity to carry out its mandate of coordinating Uganda's implementation of its EAC integration commitments through several results. First, MEACA gained acceptance of this mandate from many other key MDAs, the private sector and other non-state stakeholders. Second, MEACA dramatically improved Uganda's wider community's understanding of the opportunities and challenges that the EAC represents through implementing its successful communications strategy. Third, MEACA appears to have enhanced its capacity to generate policy and provide research based inputs into the EAC policy debate in Uganda through research carried out by the programme's TSU experts, short term experts, and through mentoring of MEACA staff. Fourth, MEACA has developed and implemented EAMS Uganda which provides an up-to-date and transparent view of Uganda's achievements with regards to its EAC commitments.
- **Organisational –** The CB programme provided MEACA with new IT equipment that upgraded the Ministry's internal LAN and servers and provided key staff with the lap tops and mobile technology to enable them to carry out their tasks. The CB programme also funded and equipped a resource centre at the MEACA head office and provided for an information centre at one of the country's busiest border posts. The programme provided MEACA a social media presence (including a web site, Twitter account and Facebook page) that enhanced communications with its stakeholders.
- **Individual –** Finally, most MEACA staff were equipped with the skills they needed to carry out the organisation's mandate. The CB programme built the individual capacity of MEACA staff members through the development and implementation of a coherent staff training programme and through mentoring for MEACA counterparts. Further, MEACA staff were provided with small research grants that enabled them to develop their skills to generate research based solutions and/or policy to address specific challenges faced by Uganda in implementing its EAC commitments.

385. While it is clear that all of the above are achievements of the TMEA supported MEACA CB programme, now that the programme has ended, the question to be asked is how sustainable is this capacity into the future?

386. This question applies to all three levels of the capacity built at MEACA. There is no guarantee that capacity built yesterday will still be relevant or even available tomorrow.

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387. At the institutional level MEACA will only sustain the acceptance by the other MDAs and non-state stakeholders of its continuing mandate if it can show that it can still generate relevant research based policy initiatives. MEACA will need to draw on its own staff's newly built capacity to undertake relevant research, or obtain the resources it needs to commission short-term experts where it does not have in-house expertise. In the first two years of the programme, TSU's long term experts drafted much of the 'in-house' policy research. After the programme's mid-term review (MTR) the TL was replaced and emphasis was placed on ensuring that the research was undertaken by MEACA staff members with mentoring from the TSU. MEACA will need to sustain the momentum of its successful communications strategy through continued engagement with the wider community through various media. Currently it does have access to post-programme dedicated TMEA funding for this, but MEAC will likely need to identify alternative funding once this limited support ends. MEACA also has a small allocation from the national budget to support attendance at CMP meetings, however this is not currently enough to support all of the meetings anticipated by the EAC Secretariat. Previously attendance at CMP related meetings were supported by the programme, for this to be sustainable going forward MEACA is going to need to prove its on-going relevance in the EAC integration process to the GoU in order to increase its allocation for attendance at CMP meetings from the national budget.

388. At the organisational level, the IT equipment provided by the CB programme is already beginning to show its age. For MEACA to sustain its presence in the fast- changing and increasingly important e-media world, it is essential that it finds the resources to review and renew its IT equipment. The same applies with respect to its resource centre where most available information is hard copy, which is expensive to update and challenging to store. For MEACA to roll out its information centre nationally, and to ensure its continuing relevance and accessibility for private sector operatives and public sector officials needing to access the latest information, resources need to be digitalized. This enables access via mobile and other devices or through a downloadable app.

389. With respect to capacity building of MEACA staff, a number of staff members trained under the CB programme have already left MEACA to take up other opportunities presented to them (e.g. two of these have moved to senior positions in the EAC Secretariat in Arusha). SEATINI, a critical stakeholder who accessed support from the TSU, noted their concern about MEACA's loss of this capacity since the ending of the CB programme.

390. The dynamics of the EAC integration suggest that sustainability of MEACA should also be considered. The leaders of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have been frustrated with the pace of integration in recent years and have responded by utilizing the Northern Corridor or the "coalition of the willing" to implement agreed policies faster than the other two EAC members have been willing to move. These initiatives have been in areas such as the common customs area, the common mobile network area, the single air space, the single tourist visa, the use of national identity documents when nationals cross borders, and various infrastructure projects (e.g. the common gauge railway). In this situation MEACA will need to ensure its continuation as the coordinator of Uganda's further integration within East Africa by showing the other MDAs and the wider Ugandan community that is conducting relevant research on the consequences of this 'two speed' integration process for Uganda, and producing policy proposals which will ensure that Uganda continues to thrive and remain at the forefront of the integration process no matter how it evolves.

391. Two additional factors that influence MEACA's sustainability concern are that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates the Northern in Uganda, not MEACA, and that MEACA lost its very influential Minister with his death two years ago.

392. For MEACA to maintain its current capacity, the quality of advice provided by MEACA officials needs to continue. Further, the GoU (including the President) and potential donors and funding partners need to remain convinced that MEACA is an institution that has an important coordinating role to play in Uganda's further integration with East Africa.

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Recommendations

393. *As the TMEA CB programme for MEACA has already ended, this section will only make proposals and recommendations on possible future support for Uganda's further integration within the wider EAC.*

394. **Key Finding 1**: The TMEA CB programme met most of its intended outputs however there has been some attrition of staff trained by the programme.

395. **Recommendation**: We suggest four potential areas for consideration to ensure that the capacity built under the CB programme continues to be strengthened: (1) Provide limited replacement of IT equipment supplied under the CB programme that has become obsolete, and cannot be replaced under MEACA's budget allocation from the GoU, also some very limited support for EAMS which would be in addition to GoU budget support for this; (2) Provide funding to enable MEACA to contract short-term expertise to undertake background specialist studies on issues relating to Uganda's further integration with its EAC Partners, where internal capacity does not exist, and continuing the staff research grants initiated during the CB programme; (3) contract a short-term training expert to assist MEACA to develop an in-house training programme for new staff; and (4) support MEACA to obtain resources to finance on-going staff development and training programme from the GoU national budget or external financial partners.

396. **Key Finding 2**: The current trading environment that Ugandan entrepreneurs face, and the dramatic improvements that have occurred with respect to liberalisation of the regional telecoms market (e.g. access to digital data), means that the physical hard-copy based information centre funded under the CB programme is no longer fit for purpose.

397. **Recommendation**: We recommend support for MEACA to create a digital 'virtual information centre' that would be delivered, via the MEACA web page or a dedicated app, to the mobile devices of entrepreneurs, public servants and any other Ugandans requiring this information. Apart from the regulatory and market intelligence information required by formal and informal producers and traders, this 'virtual information centre' could also include EAMS and the e-version of the EA Common Market Score Card. This system could also be used to roll out nationally the EAC sensitisation campaigns that MEACA currently runs in regional areas of Uganda.

398. Implementing this recommendation could provide effective support to MEACA which would – (1) ensure its role in the forefront of coordinating Uganda's EAC integration process, (2) significantly meet the information needs of Ugandan traders and producers (both formal and informal/small scale) exporting to EAC, and (3) greatly assist MEACA to build its relations with MDAs on the 'front line' of Uganda's trade promotion and facilitation activities.

399. **Key Finding 3**: The EAC integration process, and Uganda's role in this, has significantly changed since 2010/2011 when the CB programme was designed. This has arisen due to the frustration with the slow pace of implementation of the agreed EAC integration agenda, and the desire of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda to press ahead with implementing key elements of the agreed agenda through the Northern Corridor.

400. MEACA needs to demonstrate that it still has a coordinating role to play in this new environment. MEACA needs to demonstrate to both the GoU, and potential donor supporters, that the capacity built under the CB programme means that it is able to still play a significant coordinating roll in Uganda's further integration with the EAC, and in the GoU's regional integration sensitisation campaign with the wider Ugandan community. MEACA will only be able to do this by continuing to produce research backed policy proposals and position papers on the way forward for Uganda regardless of whether this integration occurs within a two-speed EAC, or an EAC in which all five Partners keep up the momentum together and move at the same pace (these issues are partially addressed through the support proposed in Recommendations 1 and 2).

401. **Recommendation**: If MEACA is to continue with its crucial EAC integration sensitisation activities, any proposed successor support programme should include a sub-component to boost the effectiveness of sensitisation activities. This could include continuing with the sensitisation activities currently funded by TMEA as part of their post-CB project communications support, rolling out the digital version of their information centre as proposed in recommendation 2, and boosting their presence in social media in order to ensure that they are able to reach this increasingly important segment of the Ugandan community.

List of stakeholders consulted

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ANNEX 4 - CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1 – PSFU and UMA

MEACA and the CB programme engaged with representatives of three Ugandan non-state actors in order to assist them to participate more fully in the EAC integration process. In line with MEACA's mandate as coordinator of Uganda's EAC integration agenda, this process aimed to ensure that non-state stakeholders are able to engage with the EAC integration agenda and influence it in a meaningful way.

Private Sector Foundation of Uganda (PSFU)/ Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA)

The EAC Common External Tariff (CET) is reviewed every five years with the next major revision in 2017. In the interim period any of the EAC Partner States are permitted to introduce temporary suspensions of the CET as it applies to the import of specific products. In addition there is a very complicated duty remission process under which companies can import raw materials duty free, but then pay the full CET rate on their products if they are exported to other EAC members.

Many members of the UMA and the PSFU are convinced that there is need for the CET to be reassessed as part of the lead-up to the anticipated 2017 CET revision. In response to these concerns, and to help build capacity in these institutions, MEACA proposed to UMA and PSFU that they undertake an initial review of the CET exemption list, which would then form part of their input into the wider 2017 review. UMA and PSFU proposed that they would do a representative position paper on what changes the private sector wanted to see in the operation of the exemptions list, and the justification for product inclusion or exclusion from this list. In order to better understand the exemptions, they would consult with companies benefitting from the exemptions. The CB programme provided funding and technical support for UMA and PSFU to research and produce this position paper.

The UMA is the representative body of the manufacturing sector in Uganda. About 400 of their 700 members are directly involved in manufacturing of one sort or another.

The PSFU is Uganda's peak private sector representative body. Its membership is grouped into three categories – corporate membership (individual private corporations), ordinary membership (business, professional and services associations) and associate membership (private and public organisations that support private sector development in Uganda). The PSFU's membership includes most Ugandan private sector representative bodies, and many of the country's major corporations.

In December 2014 UMA and PSFU produced their report entitled "Assessment of Ugandan Private Sector Interest in Re-Assessment of EAC-CET Exemption Study." This report identified 54 products which the private sector believed should be given CET exemption for at least five years, and a further six products that should be given an exemption for two to three years. This list, if accepted, would mean that the Ugandan CET exemption list would be reduced from 128 products, and this would also create a more predictable CET regime. The report also identified and provided reasons for other mechanisms that should be used to promote regional competitiveness. UMA and PSFU are using this report to lobby the GoU to change the way the CET exemptions are determined and as part of their input into the CET's 2017 revision.

Case Study 2 – The Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute - SEATINI

SEATINI has tirelessly worked, through its in-house research and its mobilisation of other civil society organisations (CSOs) and interest groups, to ensure that civil society is recognised as one of the partners in the Ugandan national debate and policy making fora dealing with EAC integration. SEATINI also closely monitors the regional integration processes at national and regional level and updates stakeholders. Over the past few years it has developed position papers (both on its own and in collaboration with other CSOs) which have been submitted to MEACA, other Ugandan MDAs (such as the Ministry of Gender that deals with labour issues) and to the EAC Secretariat. These position papers have covered various issues such as the free movement of workers and of goods within the EAC, the implementation of the proposed monetary union, and the enactment of EAC wide pro-development intellectual property legislation.

> SEATINI is a NGO with country offices in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In Uganda it undertakes research, offers training, and is involved in advocacy activities to ensure that small-scale business people and civil society organisations are able to understand and benefit from the various international and regional trade negotiations and agreements that Uganda is a part of. It is also an advocate for a regional trade regulatory environment that is conducive to enhanced development and investment.

SEATINI's accomplishments have been recognised in several ways. In recognition of the contribution it has made to trade, SEATINI has been invited to serve on the TMEA Uganda oversight committee. SEATINI has also been nominated to lead CSO engagement in the trade sector for the national dialogue framework. Third, SEATINI has been involved into the CMP's implementation framework. Finally, SEATINI is a member of the Common Market National Implementation Committees dealing with the free movement of workers and the free movement of goods.

SEATINI believes that it is important for MEACA to understand what SEATINI does, and their position on these topics. Therefore when SEATINI organises events on EAC integration, they invite MEACA.

The meetings organised by SEATINI have provided MEACA with a platform to raise the awareness on the EAC integration process and to solicit feedback from these critical stakeholders. SEATINI's close involvement with MEACA also enabled them to access technical assistance and advice from the TSU.

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Case Study 3 – UCSI

The Uganda Coalition of Service Industries (UCSI) mainly undertakes advocacy work on behalf of its smaller members that are involved in providing various types of professional and other services both in Uganda and in the EAC regional market.

It is often these voices are not heard by decisionmakers involved in making trade policy or negotiating trade agreements. UCSI's diverse membership has very clear interests in various aspects of the liberalisation of the services sectors in the EAC integration process.

For example, UCSI members are interested in the immediate implementation of the free movement of persons, the right of establishment, and the mutual recognition of professional qualifications provisions of the CMP. However, they are advocates of the gradual opening of the Ugandan retail market to other EAC Partner States. This will enable their smaller members in this sector time to adjust to the (as they see it) inevitable 'onslaught' from large Kenyan retailers. UCSI members are also supportive of liberalising services such as telecoms throughout the EAC. They believe that this will enhance competition, reduce prices and improve services for their members.

> UCSI is a representative organisation for companies involved in the various services sectors in Uganda. It has been the main advocate for the interests of this sector for the past 17 years. Their membership currently consists of 12 professional associations, three public sector agencies (the Export Board, the Investment Authority and the Management Institute), and 25 corporate members (private business operators).

Through the CB programme, UCSI has been involved with MEACA in two distinct areas:

- UCSI served on MEACA's Committee of Experts that addressed the movement of persons and the rights of establishment. Prior to the establishment of these committees, UCSI engaged with the GoU through the PSFU. UCSI believed that their distinct interests tended to get 'drowned out' by PSFU's more powerful members. By serving on MEACA's Committee of Experts, UCSI were able to directly represent their members and ensure that their voice was heard; and

- MEACA was invited UCSI to undertake a study that would inform Uganda's national position on additional liberalisation commitments in services under the CMP. Further, MEACA provided UCSI with financial and technical support. UCSI feels notes that this has resulted in an important breakthrough. UCSI stated that the resulting study will likely be the most significant (and perhaps only) input into Uganda's position on the future services liberalisation negotiations within the EAC.

UCSI strongly believes that it is important for their members to continue to be involved with MEACA; MEACA listens to their voice. UCSI is not convinced that the so-called fast-track integration as advocated by the three countries of the Northern Corridor is necessarily in the interests of their members, who are mainly small-scale service providers. Therefore they believe that working with MEACA is critical to ensuring that EAC integration continues to involve all five of the Member States moving together based on consensus and gradual incremental integration.

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Case Study 4 – Using Social Media Platform to reach out to University Students on EAC integration

In September 2012, MEAC kicked off a social media campaign to increase awareness and knowledge around the benefits and opportunities of EAC integration. Before the launch, MEAC brought together student influencers from 14 universities who were inducted on the "Connect Vuka Border" EAC Inter-University Media Campaign in a day-long training session.

The campaign used posters and flyers which were distributed in campuses, the "Connect Vuka Border" Facebook page and Twitter account were set up and various activities, such as debates, games and sports, were held to create awareness on EAC integration.

Results:

- Over 4 000 students attended the forums in their respective university
- 21 639 conversations on Facebook in three months
- A reach of 18554 people
- 905 037 likes of the Facebook page
- 16 blogs created on EAC integration
- Winning university Egerton University sponsored five students to a week-long East Africa trip
- Six print stories and several TV and radio stories

Over 4000 university students in 14 institutions were targeted in order to collect i-petitions with the aim for the institutions to introduce an "EAC Week" as an annual activity. During the campaign, over 12500 signatures were collected. As a result, four institutions held an EAC week (Maseno, Moi, University of Nairobi and Egerton)[137].

Source: APEX PORTER NOVELLI

Left: A top Conversationalist during the Connect Vuka Border Inter-University Social Media Campaign Awards Ceremony. Right: Raphael Mbatha Egerton University Champion, Hon Musa Sirma, Minister for the EAC and his PS, Mr Chiboli Shakaba

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Case Study 5: East African Monitoring System (EAMS)

The Ministries for East African Cooperation (MEACs) core mandate is to provide strategic leadership, guidance and support for EAC integration and ensure timely and effective implementation of EAC decisions, policies and programmes by Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). Therefore the MEAC's main functions include: 1) coordinating the implementation of EAC decisions and directives; 2) harmonising laws and policies; and 3) reporting on the implementation status of Council Decisions and Directives. The East African Monitoring System (EAMS) - funded separately by a German Cooperation (GIZ) project[138] - is in place to support MEACs' coordination and reporting efforts. The system provides a platform for the collection, display and manipulation of data by the Ministry of EAC Affairs and the implementing MDAs.[139]

This short study explores EAMS in three countries to further understand the system's usefulness and it challenges.

Purpose of EAMS

The primary purpose of the web-based monitoring system is to ensure that the decisions and directives of the Summit, Extra-Ordinary Summit, Sectoral, Council of Ministers, Extra-Ordinary Council of Ministers, the Common Market Protocol, and the 4th EAC Development Strategy are monitored. EAMS therefore has 4 modules: Summit decisions, Council of Ministers decisions, Sectoral council decisions, and Common Market Protocol Commitments.

EAMS Status

EAMS Central has been designed and populated with some data. While all Summit Directives are in the system, there have been some delays on Council Decisions and Sector Council Decisions. For example, Rwanda is currently waiting for Council Decisions to be uploaded. For the Sectoral Council Decisions, the Secretariat is in the process of allocating decisions in their respective sectoral councils and Partner States and are yet to upload them in the system.[140] The EAC Secretariat is in the process of developing indicators for the 4th EAC Development Strategy.

The EAC Partner States are at different stages in the design and implementation. In Rwanda, all Summit Directives have been uploaded in EAMS Rwanda. MINEAC has also identified all Council Decisions concerning Rwanda to be uploaded into EAMS Central, however as of yet has not completed this task. Rwanda's commitments under the EAC Common Market Protocol are in the system.[141]

EAMS Rwanda

EAMS Rwanda had progressed very quickly with design and roll out. Initially the system was not able to link up to EAMS central due to technical reasons. The technological challenges with the interface between EAMS Country and EAMS Regional have been resolved, allowing for automated updating and full interoperability between the two systems. Focal points from 24 MDAs have been trained. While data entry remains manual, based on excel matrixes filled in by MDAs, EAMS is populated with the latest data and all modules are available. Interviews suggest that this year MDAs will input data directly for the first time into the web-based platform.

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[138] Institutional Strengthening of the Secretariat of the East African Community, GIZ, retrieved from: http://eacgermany.org/planning-monitoring-evaluation/

[139] . EAC Monitoring and Evaluation System. InfoTronics Business Systems. 2014, p. 18

[140] Brief on Effective Operationalization of the East African Monitoring System (EAMS). MEAC, 2015, p. 2.

[141] Brief on Effective Operationalization of the East African Monitoring System (EAMS). MEAC, 2015, p. 2.

EAMS Tanzania

EAMS Central has been introduced, is populated with data, and accessible at MEAC. EAMS Tanzania has been designed and filled with "dummy" data. While focal points are identified in eight prioritised MDAs, the system has not yet been introduced. The MEAC is experiencing difficulties in obtaining data and regular reports from MDAs. When reporting is required, MEAC staff must call, and sometimes even visit offices to gather data. Interview data suggested this is an endemic challenge and not likely be addressed by the introduction of automated reporting via EAMS.

EAMS Burundi

EAMS Burundi has been designed and populated with data. An EAMS implementation guideline has been developed. The guidelines cover communication of EAC commitments/decisions/directives through EAMS Burundi, and the steps needed to implement individual decisions by relevant MDAs under the coordination of the MPACEA/MDA responsible for the sector. The reporting cycle and the needed interactions between MPACEA and other MDAs are also covered. Most recently, an Automatic Report Generation section was added complete with a data dashboard. The Burundi EAMS Case Study praised the low investment required in the web-based system, noting its facility to add new applications as new needs arise, good flexibility and scalability, and availability of online support services.

What is unique to Burundi is that EAMS will not be rolled-out to MDAs. This is due to concerns about capacity and Internet connectivity. The CB programme has gone some way to address this challenge centrally at MPACEA, by providing a power generator and laptops (5). However, MPACEA still does not operate on a single network server and there are still problems with Internet connectivity. Therefore, MPACEA is holding quarterly "labs" where MDA staff key in the data onto 6-7 computer terminals at the Ministry. EAMS has generated one report that the Minister has signed. Data suggest that regular reporting creates peer pressure among MDAs to perform. Burundi's main challenges for the implementation of EAMS Burundi include EAC commitments not yet mainstreamed into their own work plans, staff do not have access to computers and Internet and the relationship between MPACEA and the MDAs is not clearly defined.

Common Challenges to, and Key Lessons for, Implementing EAMS

The common challenges include:

- The transcription decisions and directives and their related coding. This challenge emanates from: 1) concerns about the quality of the input from Summit, Ministerial and Sector Council Decisions 2) at times, action required by Partner States is not clear which then 3) affects the EAMS coding of decisions.

- Sub-indicators in EAMS Central have been amended frequently. This negatively influences measurement of aggregate performance.

- There are different parallel data collection tools to measure the implementation of EAC decisions, directives, harmonization and implementation in EAC Partner States. This creates unnecessary duplication.

- Concerns remain over data quality and lack of independent verification of data entered into EAMS Country that is directly uploaded into EAMS Central.

Lessons include: 1) When measuring process, the EAC Common Market Score card and related reporting is likely more appropriate; and 2) Structural, organisation, political and technological issues affect MDA's ability, and willingness, to provide data. This challenge may not be resolved by an automated database, irrespective of a user-friendly, web-based interface.

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ANNEX 5 - RESULTS CHAIN

Kenya

The Theory of Change

TMEA Kenya did not develop a Theory of Change for its CB programme. TMEA did develop a results chain. The results chain suggests that TMEA's capacity building support to MEAC and focal persons within MDAs was intended to enhance MEAC's ability to coordinate and lead the implementation of the EAC regional integration agenda in Kenya. TMEA's expectation was that capacity building offered to MEAC would ultimately contribute to improvements in MEAC' efficacy at coordinating activities related to the reduction of non-tariff barriers and trade facilitation activities, hence, contribute to an enhanced trade environment and ultimately, increased trade.

Figure 18: Results Chain

Source: TMEA

Rwanda

Figure 19: MINEAC Capacity Building Programme Results Chain

Source: TMEA

Uganda

Figure 20: Uganda Results Chain


Source: TMEA

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
ANNEX 6 - SURVEY DATA – PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK[142]

**Q6: What is the approximate level of your current position? (6 skipped)**

| Answer Choices	Responses	
Top-management	6.06%	2
Mid-management	39.39%	13
Programme officer	45.45%	15
Administrative support staff	9.09%	3
Total		33

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[142] Data resulting from e-survey are not statistically significant and therefore cannot be used to assess the programme. We sent the survey to 233 resource persons and followed up with several reminders. Ultimately, the e-survey generated 39 responses (a response rate of <20%).

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Q7: How long have you been working on regional integration-related issues?

Q8: Have you received capacity development support?

| Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	**76.92%**	30
No	**17.95%**	7
Not sure	**5.13%**	2
Total		39

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Q10: Which type of capacity development support have you received?

Q11: If you have received training, in which topics? (4 skipped)


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
Q12: What was your level of overall satisfaction with Technical Assistance (TA) provided? (2 skipped)


Q13: What is your overall level of satisfaction with training provided? (6 skipped)

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
Q14: Thinking back, what was your level of satisfaction with the relevance of your skills for your daily work prior to the capacity support received?

Q15: What is your current level of satisfaction with the relevance of your skills for your daily work?

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Q16: What is your level of satisfaction with your own organisation's ability to:

	Not at all satisfied	Slightly satisfied	Moderately satisfied	Very satisfied	Extremely satisfied	Total
Negotiate with the EAC and EAC member states	15.79% 6	7.89% 3	26.32% 10	42.11% 16	7.89% 3	38
Define and analyse national policies related to regional integration	2.56% 1	10.26% 4	33.33% 13	48.72% 19	5.13% 2	39
Coordinate with other national MDAs	2.70% 1	5.41% 2	35.14% 13	35.14% 13	21.62% 8	37
Conduct monitoring and evaluation	8.57% 3	11.43% 4	34.29% 12	40.00% 14	5.71% 2	35
Raise awareness and communicate on regional integration topics	2.56% 1	7.69% 3	33.33% 13	38.46% 15	17.95% 7	39
Conduct rigorous research on regional integration matters	5.41% 2	29.73% 11	27.03% 10	24.32% 9	13.51% 5	37
Manage regional projects	8.11% 3	13.51% 5	27.03% 10	32.43% 12	18.92% 7	37

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ANNEX 7 – OVERALL ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

#	Evaluation aspect	Assessment Criteria	CRITERIA FOR RATING				
			Excellent (5)	Very good (4)	Good (3)	Fair (2)	Poor (1)
1	Relevance	Does TMEA capacity building fill its intended niche? Was the TMEA CB programme design was technically sound? Section 12.01 To what extent capacity building met relevant country needs Section 12.02 The targeted population was covered (reached) Section 12.03 Were TMEA policies and programmes supportive of gender equality and other human rights? Whether the programme was adjusted throughout its implementation to align it with emerging priorities/needs and to ensure support for best practice	Consistent and exceeds all the assessment criteria for relevance	Consistent with all the assessment criteria for relevance	Consistent with most of the assessment criteria for relevance	Partially consistent with the assessment criteria for relevance	Serious problem and not consistent with all the assessment criteria for relevance
2	Efficiency	Was the TMEA programme implemented in a cost-effective manner?	The activities of the CB programme were implemented in a time- and cost effective manner and outputs were achieved to a very satisfactory level	Most of the activities of the CB programme were implemented in a time- and cost effective manner and outputs were achieved to a satisfactory level	Some of the activities of the CB programme were implemented in a time- and cost effective manner and outputs were achieved to a satisfactory level	Some of the activities of the CB programme were implemented in a time- and cost effective manner and results were achieved to a fairly satisfactory level	The activities of the CB programme were not implemented in a time- and cost effective manner and outputs were at a dissatisfactory level

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3	Effectiveness	Was the TMEA CB programme implemented according to plan? Was the necessary support for implementation provided? To what extent did the CB achieve its set targets, outcomes, and where possible impacts? Was timely corrective action taken where needed? Did TMEA shift the key indicators amongst the target population country/ trade results? Were intended results achieved?	The CB programme was implemented according to plan and achieved all of its set targets, outcomes, results to a very satisfactory level	The CB programme was implemented according to plan and achieved all of its set targets, outcomes, results to a satisfactory level	The CB programme was implemented according to plan and achieved most of its set targets, outcomes, results to a satisfactory level	The CB programme was implemented according to plan and partially achieved its set targets, outcomes, results to a satisfactory level	The CB programme was not implemented according to plan and failed to achieve its set targets, outcomes, results to a satisfactory level
4	Impact	Did TMEA achieve sufficient scale-up of the programme to improve key trade indicators?	Exceedingly successful scale-up of the programme and results attributed to the programme	Very successful scale-up of the programme and results attributed to the programme	Successful scale-up of the programme and results attributed to the programme	Partially successful scale-up of the programme and results attributed to the programme	Scale-up of the programme has not been successful and results cannot be attributed to the programme
5	Sustainability	Are we achieving results in a sustainable manner? Are we achieving results in adherence to gender equality and other human rights?	Exceedingly sustainable results and in adherence to gender equality and human rights	Very sustainable results and in adherence to gender equality and human rights	Sustainable results and in adherence to gender equality and human rights	Partially sustainable results and in adherence to gender equality and human rights	Results and lack of adherence to gender equality and human rights are not sustainable

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