## **Uganda Country Programme Evaluation Report: Final Draft**

**Presented by MarketShare Associates** 

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## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

AEO Approved Economic Operator

ASSET Alternative System for Secure Transit
ASYCUDA Automated System for Customs Data

AW ASYCUDA World
BCA Benefit-Cost Analysis
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis
CSO Civil Society Organizations
CDS Corridor Diagnostic Study

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DfID UK Department for International Development

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC East African Community

EAGAP East African Good Agricultural Practices

EASC Euro-Asian Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification

ECT(S) Electronic Cargo Tracking System

eSW/eSwift Electronic Single Window FDG Focus Group Discussion(s)

FTA Free Trade Area

GoU Government of Uganda
HR Human Resources

IBM Integrated Border Management

IRR Internal Rate of Return

JEG Joint Evaluation Group

KII Key Informant Interview(s)

KRA Kenya Revenue Authority

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MEACA Ministry of East African Community Affairs

MINICOM Ministry of Trade and Industry
MOU(s) Memorandum (s) of Understanding
MRA Mutual Recognition Agreement(s)

MSA MarketShare Associates

MIS Management Information System

MTIC Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives

NMC National Monitoring Committee
NOC National Oversight Committee

NTB Non-Tariff Barrier(s)
O/D Origin/Destination

OBR Office Burundais des Recettes
O&M Operations and Maintenance

OSBP One Stop Border Post
PAR Project Appraisal Report
PEC Project Economics Consulting
PSO Private Sector Organizations

RCP Rwanda Country Programme
RDB Rwanda Development Board

RF Results Framework
ROI Return on Investment
SCT Single Customs Territory

SEATINI The Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and

**Negotiations Institute** 

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation

SME(s) Small and Medium Enterprise(s)

SO Strategic Objective

SS South Sudan

TEU Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit(s)

TMEA Trademark East Africa
ToC Theory of Change
ToR Terms of Reference

UCP Uganda Country Programme

Ug Uganda

UNBS Uganda National Bureau of Standards

UNCTAD United National Conference on Trade and Development

UNRA Uganda National Roads Authority

URA Uganda Revenue Authority

VFM Value for Money

## **Executive Summary**

ES-1. MarketShare Associates (MSA) was hired by TMEA to conduct a formative evaluation of the Uganda Country Programme (UCP). Drawing from a desk review, interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders<sup>1</sup>, the evaluation examined the UCP on five key areas: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. This was guided by a set of evaluation matrices that define performance against a four-tier evaluation rubric consisting of "needs improvement", "moderately good" or "good" or "very good." (see Annex 3 for further elaboration). The evaluation rubric, developed by TMEA, and based on internal expectations for performance, is summarized in the following table:

Category	Sub-Category	Key Considerations
Relevance	Project clarity and logic	<ul> <li>Does the project have a clear logic that links outputs to long-term outcomes?</li> <li>Are assumptions explicit and relevant?</li> <li>Are the planned outputs necessary and sufficient to achieve desired outcomes?</li> <li>Do all project implementers have an understanding of the programme logic?</li> </ul>
	Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy	<ul> <li>Are expected outcomes are relevant to the strategies of TMEA, partners, EAC and target populations?</li> <li>Do outcomes contribute to TMEA's aggregate strategic outcomes?</li> <li>Are interventions consistent and complementary with activities supported by other TMEA projects and by other donor organizations?</li> </ul>
Efficiency	Adaptive management of plans and budgets	<ul> <li>Does the project team identify and understand the strategic and operational issues of the project?</li> <li>Are actions promptly taken to overcome implementation issues? If so, are they well founded and insightful?</li> <li>Are the project manager and team proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results?</li> <li>Is the funder alerted to potential issues in a timely manner?</li> <li>Do implementing organizations follow funder management guidelines?</li> <li>Are the context, targeted problem and project plan regularly analysed and adjusted as necessary?</li> <li>Does monitoring occur systematically and is it based on complete monitoring plans?</li> <li>Have innovations or best practices been used in project management?</li> </ul>
	Relationship management and communication	<ul> <li>Does the project team effectively manage relationships with stakeholders and funders and meet them on a regular basis?</li> <li>Do stakeholders and the project team have a common understanding of each other's role and responsibilities?</li> <li>Do all parties strive to build and maintain effective working relations?</li> <li>Is communication open, trusting, and constructive?</li> <li>Does verbal and written communication systematically provide lessons, insights, and recommendations?</li> <li>How timely, relevant and accurate are the project monitoring reports received by TMEA?</li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>A list of the interviews conducted is presented in Annex 2.

	Translating inputs into outputs  Additionality	<ul> <li>Do the planned outputs of good quality and relevant to the desired outcome?</li> <li>Will the expected output targets be achieved?</li> <li>Has the project been or will the project be completed on time?</li> <li>Is there evidence that the project would not have occurred</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	Translating outputs to outcomes, including gender	<ul> <li>with TMEA funding?</li> <li>Have outcome targets been achieved or are they being achieved?</li> <li>How effectively have gender issues been considered? For projects that are well advanced, is there evidence of gender-positive changes?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	<ul> <li>Have clear, specific and relevant activities been included to address sustainability?</li> <li>Has sustainability been monitored?</li> <li>Was a clear and comprehensive exit strategy included in the design and is it fully up to date? Does the strategy describe how project activities and benefits will be sustained post-project? Are responsibilities for implementing the exit strategy outlined?</li> <li>Have all on-going operational costs been thoroughly costed and have funds been set aside to pay for them?</li> <li>Have responsibilities been institutionalized fully in advanced or completed projects?</li> </ul>
Impact	Achieving long-term outcomes	<ul> <li>Has progress has been made on impacts (increasing physical access to markets, enhancing trade environment, and improving business competitiveness)?</li> <li>Has measurement of TMEA's contribution to impacts been completed and does the results chain links TMEA's contribution to impacts?</li> <li>Are impacts differentiated for men and women?</li> </ul>

ES-2. The evaluation team applied the rubric to the overall programme and also to a subset of the programme's portfolio of projects. The selection of the project sample across both countries was conducted based on a set of criteria developed jointly with TMEA to ensure that all key programme areas were represented during the evaluation and a balanced view of programme performance was developed. The evaluation team committed to assess a minimum of 7 projects, but ultimately exceeded this by examining 10 projects.<sup>2</sup> The details of the methodology are provided in Annex 3<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The projects include Mirama Hills road and OSBP, Busia OSBP, URA ASYCUDA World, URA Approved Economic Operators (AEO), URA Electronic Cargo Tracking System (ECTS), UNBS and MTIC Improve Testing, Uganda NTB National Monitoring Committee, MEACA coordination and leadership, MEACA and EAC coordination, and SEATINI. As a part of the methodology, the project team developed evaluation matrices for each evaluated project and for the UCP as a whole. The matrices triangulated multiple lines of evidence to enable a "360 degree evaluation" of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the programmes. The completed matrices can be found in Annex 4.From among these, two in-depth case studies are presented in Annex 5. Pictures captured during the evaluation are presented in Annex 6. The team's approach throughout the evaluation was guided by a quality control guide. This guide is presented in Annex 7. Annex 8 presents a summary of the UCP projects and their linkages to TMEA's strategic objectives. Annex 9 summarizes the assumptions and limitations to the return on investment analysis conducted in support of this evaluation.

<sup>3</sup> Note that the methodology applied to select included projects is describe in the Inception Report.

ES-3. Each evaluation category and/or sub-category was rated on a four-tier scale of "needs improvement," "moderately good," "good," or "very good," using the following ranking approach:

Ranking	Needs Improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
Criteria	100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree		Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
Implication	Performance is not meeting expectations as defined by the evaluation criteria. Significant improvements needed to meet expectations. Evaluation team found evidence of serious concern relative to evaluation criteria in project/programme documentation or through data collected from more than one stakeholder.	Performance meets most expectations. Performance could meet all internal expectations with minor improvements. Evaluation team found element of potential concern in project/programme documentation or through evidence of potentially serious concern through data collected from at least one stakeholder but not verified through multiple stakeholders. May also include evidence of good performance that could not be verified through multiple data sources.	Performance meets expectations. Evaluation team found no elements of concern that could be verified by project/programme documentation or through data collected from multiple stakeholders. Evidence of achievable potential improvement in performance may available. May also include evidence of exceptional performance that could not be verified through multiple data sources.	Performance exceeds expectations. Evaluation team found evidence of performance, relative to criteria, that exceeded expectations via project/programme documentation or through data collected from multiple stakeholders.

ES-4. The evaluation team rated the UCP as "good" overall – on average, across all criteria, the programme is meeting internal expectations. Further, no programme categories or project evaluation categories, save for one project, were ranked "needs improvement", indicating strong performance at the programme and project level in the UCP. Readers should note that to achieve "very good" in a category, performance needs to exceed

expectations as defined by the evaluation criteria. As expectations are generally high, "very good" is difficult to achieve and is not expected to be the default finding in this evaluation. Some of the key overall findings of the UCP evaluation include:

- The UCP is internally very cohesive the projects build well on each other have a lot of linkages that seem to lead to cumulative results that exceed the sum of individual project expectations. The programme is also well linked with TMEA's regional work and other country programmes. This is partly a result of restructuring of the programme upon completion of the revised theory of change.
- The projects themselves have largely met or are on track to meet their intended results. Only one project, Mirama Hills Road, is seriously delayed, and TMEA and its partner have made significant progress catching up.
- Unintended results of projects are typically positive or are well managed. TMEA has
  dealt well with external shocks early SCT implementation on the Northern Corridor,
  conflict in SS and DRC, funding suspense by SIDA, among others and kept projects
  on track, even where co-funders have dropped out. Risks are generally well
  considered in the PAR stage and new risks are actively managed.
- TMEA has maintained good relations with partners and donors who generally feel TMEA has found its area of competitive advantage and complement partner work with both technical expertise and administrative know how. Partners are generally happy with the quality and amount of communication, reporting and cooperation.
- TMEA has reasonably good financial controls and partner vetting approaches, largely resulting in projects that do not go off-course, exceed budgets, or fail to implement projects as agreed in MOUs.

This overall finding is a summation of the following findings by evaluation criteria:

- ES-5. We find that the UCP is "very good" in the relevance category, meaning that the UCP is exceeding expectations. In specific, the programme has a strong logic. It is straightforward to understand the relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes appear very realistic.

  Assumptions are explicit and relevant. We further find that the UCP's expected outcomes are highly relevant to TMEA's overall EAC strategy, to the strategies of the Government of Uganda with respect to Regional Integration, to other partners and donors and to the intended beneficiaries.
- ES-6. We find the UCP is "good" in the efficiency category. The UCP team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the programme. The UCP has generally made good use of the monitoring and evaluation system. There is potential to exceed expectations by moving away from use of the management information system (MIS) as a data repository towards use as a system for active management. We further find that the programme and the project teams exceed

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See section 1.2 Efficiency, for detail.

expectations by managing relationships with key stakeholders and funders proactively and using face-to-face communication on a regular basis (e.g. monthly). At the project level, the planned (original or readjusted) outputs are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome, regularly meeting internal-TMEA expectations.

- ES-7. We find the UCP is "good" in the category of effectiveness. A majority (50 to 75%) of outcomes/targets are achieved (at project-level and in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Gender has been better mainstreamed within the past year than it had been in the programme previously. However, gender targets are somewhat limited within the results framework. UCP could exceed expectations through the mainstreaming of all cross cutting areas including gender from project inception. UCP has already greatly improved in this area. UCP is on track to meet its time and trade targets. We estimate that TMEA-attributable time savings have thus far resulted in a 5.7% reduction<sup>5</sup> in transport time between Kampala and ports since inception, with only a limited number of projects on line. Overall, we estimate return on investment to date to be 14%.<sup>6</sup> Once the majority of projects are completed and generating benefits, we believe it is likely that UCP will exceed expectations in the effectiveness category.
- ES-8. We find the UCP is "good" in the category of impact. There appears to have been strong intended or unintended progress towards impacts (50-75%). We estimate that in 2016, the limited projects UCP has delivered to or near completion will add over \$52 million in attributable, net new trade to the Ugandan economy. Once the majority of Strategy 1 projects are completed and generating benefits, we believe it is likely that UCP will exceed expectations in the impact category.
- ES-9. We find the UCP is "moderately good" in the category of sustainability, meaning that most, but not all, expectations are currently being met. We find that activities are included to address sustainability although they do not always include clear designation of responsibilities or mechanisms to ensure implementation. Only a few project level outcomes are being monitored for sustainability. We observe that there is opportunity for improvement in this category through the inclusion of costing of ongoing operations and maintenance requirements and inclusion of a formal mechanism to guarantee coverage of such costs by project partners.
- ES-10. The ratings and key findings of the evaluation are summarized in the following table.

<b>Evaluation Area</b>	Rating <sup>7</sup>	Key Findings
Overall	Good	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Section 1.3, Efficiency, for analytical detail

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Section 1.3, Efficiency, for analytical detail

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>See Annex 3 for a description of the criteria and rating methodology.

<b>Evaluation Area</b>	Rating <sup>7</sup>	Key Findings
Relevance	Very Good	The UCP has a strong, clear, well-internalized and well
		communicated logic. The projects funded by the UCP each
		have a clear place within the logic. Outputs seem to be
		necessary and sufficient to achieve the hoped for
		outcomes; outcomes are well-integrated with, and
		relevant to, overall TMEA and partner strategies.
		Consequently, TMEA's funding is fully supportive of its
		aims.
Efficiency	Good	TMEA is generally efficient in that fiscal management is
		strong, as is project oversight. TMEA has undergone an
		evolution in its M&E system and approach since inception
		which, while laudable, has resulted in some inefficiencies
		as partners seek to keep up. Communication and
		relationship management with partners and donors is very
		good. Most, but not all, projects are on schedule. The
		general level of consensus, among all stakeholders for all
		projects assessed for this evaluation is that TMEA
		involvement sped up implementation of interventions by 4
Tff - +:	Cand	to 8 years, thereby creating significant additive value.
Effectiveness	Good	Several outcomes in SO1 are not yet measured <sup>8</sup> , while
		import volumes are exceeding expectations and export
		volumes are below expectations. The SO2 outcome is currently exceeding target and SO3 is meeting targets on
		one measure and is not yet expected to meet targets on
		the other. Further, several key project measurements
		indicate good progress towards goals. On the whole, this
		evidence suggests that while UCP is likely to meet its
		targets by the end of Strategy 1, it is not exceeding
		expectations at the present. We estimate that TMEA-
		attributable time savings have thus far resulted in a 5.7%
		reduction in transport time between Kampala and ports
		since inception, with only a limited number of projects
		producing long-term outcomes at this point, suggesting a
		strong probability that UCP will meet its time savings
		target. Overall, we estimate return on investment for
		projects with long-term outcomes to-date to be 14%. One
		key challenge is that not all projects are currently
		measuring their contributions to TMEA's impacts.
Impact	Good	TMEA has not yet determined whether or not it has met
		its targets for 2014/15 trade levels – its top line outcome <sup>9</sup> .
		Trend analysis of the one impact level target that was
		tracked prior to the revision of the ToC suggests that UCP
		will be below target for 2015. However, our analysis of
		the additive trade impact of those few projects that are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lack of updated measurement is due to lack of expected updated measurement by measuring partners, as of the date of field work completion for this evaluation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 2014/15 financial year data on actuals are not yet available.

<b>Evaluation Area</b>	Rating <sup>7</sup>	Key Findings
		already returning benefits suggests that TMEA interventions are beginning to induce new trade in Uganda, a trend we believe likely to grow through the end of Strategy 1. For 2015/16, we estimate TMEA has induced about \$50 million in new trade. As physical infrastructure projects come on line and begin to deliver added time savings, we believe the trade impacts will grow significantly.
Sustainability	Moderately Good	About 1/3 of the projects assessed for this evaluation had benefits that are unlikely to be sustained without on-going TMEA support. On the other hand, some of the landmark interventions had successfully implemented business process changes that would likely sustain the benefits of those interventions. Positively, sustainability is considered in project design and ownership of systems. However, capacity building programmes sometimes focused on staff training for partners often resulting in trained up staff that had the skills to leave partners for better jobs (a reoccurring theme). More importantly, where system or facility maintenance is required, it would be best practice to get a commitment, where possible in the MOU, for maintenance. This is largely lacking, though it has not yet resulted in abandoned or un-maintained systems or facilities.

Key: NI – "Needs Improvement" (fails to meet expectations), MG – "Moderately Good" (meets most expectations), G – "Good" (meets expectations), VG – "very good" (exceeds expectations)

## ES-11. The table below summarizes the findings by project included in this evaluation. 11

Criteria	UCP Overall	Mirama Hills Road + OSBP	Busia OSBP	URA (AW, AEO, & ECTS)	UNBS Standards	NMC NTB Monitoring	MEACA	SEATINI
Overall	G	G	VG	VG	VG	G	G	G
Relevance	VG	VG	VG	VG	G	VG	VG	G
Project Clarity and Logic	VG	VG	VG	VG	G	G	VG	G
Contribution to TMEA & Partner Strategy	VG	G	VG	VG	VG	VG	VG	G
Efficiency	G	G	G	VG	G	G	G	VG
Adaptive Management of Plans & Budgets	G	G	G	VG	G	G	G	VG
Relationship Management & Communications	VG	VG	G	VG	VG	VG	MG	VG

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Section 1.4, Impact, for analytical detail

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Specific discussion on the information collected to support the grading by criteria per project is included in Annex 4.

Criteria	UCP Overall	Mirama Hills Road + OSBP	Busia OSBP	URA (AW, AEO, & ECTS)	UNBS Standards	NMC NTB Monitoring	MEACA	SEATINI
Transitioning Inputs into Outputs	G	MG	G	G	G	G	G	G
Additionality	G	VG	VG	G	G	G	MG	VG
Effectiveness	G	G	G	VG	VG	G	G	G
Transitioning Outputs to Outcomes, Including Gender	G	MG	G	VG	VG	G	MG	G
Sustainability	MG	NI	VG	G	MG	MG	MG	G
Impact	G	MG	G	G	VG	G	G	MG

Key: NI – "Needs Improvement" (fails to meet expectations), MG – "Moderately Good" (meets most expectations), G – "Good" (meets expectations), VG – "very good" (exceeds expectations)

- ES-12. The evaluation found the following key lessons: a) developing an explicit strategy early in the planning process for gender and other key cross-cutting areas helps to ensure that they are considered throughout the project lifecycle, b) supporting 'early wins' creates good will, community respect, and greater donor and partner latitude, c) helping partners change their fundamental business processes and building ownership improves the probability of longer-term sustainability, d) staffing TMEA UCP based on equal division of staffing resources between Strategic Objectives ignores the variation in level of effort both between SOs and over time, and g) contractors must have local knowledge; otherwise mobilisation can be difficult and cause delays.
- ES-13. The evaluation team proposes the following recommendations<sup>12</sup>:
- ES-14. We recommend (1) if new avenues of support are to be opened under strategy 2, the TOC be fully elaborated prior to the start of any new intervention; and (2) new areas of support be integrated into the existing TOC, as opposed to developing a new TOC specifically for Strategy 2. Conceptual development should augment the existing TOC, rather than re-invent it. Further, detailed M&E frameworks, inclusive of baseline and target development, for each individual investment should be the first order of business at project inception.
- ES-15. We encourage UCP to consider expanding interventions that provide information and capacity development on, and physical and process support to access, export potential, export markets, standards, and other processes and requirements to export goods and services producers. These projects have the most obvious link to household-level welfare enhancement and have demonstrated some early wins for TMEA. UCP has articulated its focus areas. We encourage the UCP to consider how producers in these areas can be directly served by future investments (cognisant that there are many programmes that work directly with beneficiaries). Secondly, feedback from stakeholders indicates that one area of

<sup>13</sup>See: Mapping Study – Business Competitiveness for TradeMark East Africa (Uganda Country Programme), Final Report, December 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See Section 3.2 for a fuller discussion of these, as well as additional, recommendations

potential investment worthy of consideration by the UCP, which is not currently served by the programme and which has the potential of deepening TMEA's impact, is in telecommunications infrastructure and systems linked to trade facilitation. We recommend TMEA investigate where shortfalls in the existing system lay, who the key players in investment and management are, and in what kind of role TMEA could best provide effective support.

- ES-16. In moving to the next phase, TMEA should consider trying to estimate its impacts on poverty at the corporate level. At the project level, identification of winners and losers during project formulation and during the process of defining interventions within the programme will help to better mitigate loses and/or enhance impacts for winners.
- ES-17. We recommend that, in addition to staff training, capacity development should include institutional capacity based in systems, procedures and approaches and training manuals and policies to transfer skills. Further, where possible, TMEA should seek commitments in the MOUs for system and facility maintenance.
- ES-18. TMEA should consider opening up access to the MIS, or some portion thereof, to both donors and partners. This could help address the disconnect between partner reports and what gets reported in the MIS. The MIS could also be expanded to include partners feeding information to the system but also having rights to retrieve and analyse information. Further, as the MIS is developed for Phase 2, and an overlay system connecting financial, HR and M&E systems is considered, consideration for user needs and engagement with end users to facilitate improved system design could help to address limited user engagement with the MIS system. This, in combination with allowing direct entry of benchmark and indicator data into the system by partners (with TMEA review capacity) could help shorten the update cycle and make the MIS more useful as an active management tool.
- ES-19. In the second phase of the program, we recommend gender be incorporated at the design phase with clear strategy for what changes the program wants to impart relative to gender and diversity and have a clearly articulated gender strategy with milestones and timelines integrated into the larger strategy and not as stand-alone, add-on projects. Technical expertise and staff should be brought on board to manage and ensure progress on the gender strategy across the program. TMEA should also consider whether they will face similar future pressures with regards to other cross cutting areas particularly environment and work to mainstream these during the phase 2 planning processes.

## **Background to the Evaluation**

1. The TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) programme aims to improve trade competitiveness in East Africa by reducing transport time/costs and improving the trade environment. Its target is to

increase the total value of exports from the East African Community (EAC) by 10% (above trend) by 2016, contributing to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. TMEA was officially launched in February 2011 as a specialist not-for-profit agency and is currently scheduled to close in December 2016, with the possibility of a new programming phase that could last up to 2022. The Uganda Country Programme (UCP) was also launched in 2011. The UCP budget is approximately \$100 million.

- 2. To inform the design of that next phase and assess its impact to date, TMEA has commissioned a mix of formative and summative evaluations. The audience for these evaluations is both TMEA and its investors. TMEA awarded MarketShare Associates (MSA), in collaboration with Project Economics Consulting (PEC), the contract to undertake country evaluations of TMEA's Rwanda and Uganda Programmes, respectively. The Terms of Reference for these studies are presented in Annex 1. This report presents the findings of the Uganda Country Programme evaluation. The findings of the Rwanda Country Programme (RCP) are presented in a separate report.
- 3. The evaluation team was selected to balance evaluators who had previous experience with TMEA's programming with those who had no previous experience with TMEA. This arrangement allowed the evaluation team to quickly get up to speed with the complexity of the TMEA country programme operations, while having a bias-free perspective. Each country evaluation included an Evaluation Lead and a national Evaluation Specialist who brought contextual knowledge and local language skills. These evaluators were supported by an overall Evaluation Methodology Specialist to ensure technical consistency and a Gender Specialist to assess the programmes through a gender lens. The team comprised of Alex Diouf, Team Leader and Rwanda Evaluation Lead; Neil Pogorelsky, Uganda Evaluation Lead and TMEA Programmes Expert; Ben Fowler, Evaluation Methodology Specialist; James Kamukama, Uganda Evaluation Specialist; Johnson Rukundo, Rwanda Evaluation Specialist; and Erin Markel, Gender Evaluation Specialist.
- 4. The evaluation lasted for approximately 2.5 months. It was initiated with contract signing on September 7, 2015 and was finalized in late November.
- 5. The evaluation methodology comprised of (1) a desk review of program documents and (2) in-country data collection through key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). The methodology was based on an iterative design to capture the perspectives of all stakeholders, including TMEA staff, country programme staff and partners, donors, project beneficiaries as well as other stakeholders. A list of the interviews conducted is presented in Annex 2. The selection of the project sample across both countries was conducted based on a set of criteria developed jointly with TMEA to ensure that all programme outputs were covered during the evaluation. The details of the methodology, the evaluation criteria applied, and project selection process are provided in Annex 3.

- 6. This evaluation has several limitations. First, the findings from the programme beneficiaries are not derived from a purely representative sample. This decision was taken for timing and budgetary reasons, as well as the practical issue that in some of TMEA's projects (e.g., Support to MEACA) there were no clearly defined beneficiaries that could be interviewed. Second, given that the Annual Review of the UCP was scheduled to occur early in the evaluation period, TMEA requested that the evaluation team mobilize quickly in order to participate in and synchronize with the Annual Review meetings. Although the schedule permitted little time for preparation, MSA accommodated this request by adjusting the timing of its field visits to begin earlier than planned. The very short timeline given from contract signing to the field work start offered little to no time to receive feedback from TMEA on the design of the evaluation. Ultimately, comments on the inception report were only received after the completion of field work. Finally, the evaluation team was advised to limit the length of interviews and discussions with stakeholders to avoid over-burdening respondents following their annual review sessions.
- 7. The evaluation team noted that these aforementioned constraints could result in reduced coverage of stakeholders, limited understanding of projects prior to interviews, and insufficient matching of field research instruments to evaluation needs. To mitigate these risks, the team broadened the interview targets (ultimately meeting with over 80 individuals, of which only 30% were from TMEA and donors; the rest being external stakeholders and beneficiaries), used call-backs of subjects met during the evaluation process to ensure limited duplication of data requests, prioritized project documentation during initial review, and adjusted the interview templates during the field work to match the project details and evaluation methodology.

# 1. Assessment of the Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Impact of the Uganda Country Programme

#### 1.1 Relevance

8. Overall, we find that the UCP is "very good" in the Relevance category. In specific, we find that Project Clarity and Logic is "very good" and Contribution to TMEA and Partner Strategies is "very good". 14 The following chart presents the scores for each project and overall. The scores for relevance were consistently excellent; only the SEATINI project did not score at least one Very Good.

Criteria	UCP Overall	Mirama Hills Road + OSBP	Busia OSBP	URA (AW, AEO, & ECTS)	UNBS Standards	NMC NTB Monitoring	MEACA	SEATINI
Relevance	VG	VG	VG	VG	G	VG	VG	G
Project Clarity and Logic	VG	VG	VG	VG	G	G	VG	G

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> For clarification on why each project was scored a particular rating in any category, please see the project evaluation summaries in Annex 4.

11

Contribution to TMEA & Partner Strategy	VG	G	VG	VG	VG	VG	VG	G	
Summary of Observations	We find that UCP exceeds expectations in terms of relevance to partners and donors. We therefore do not present any suggestions of opportunities for improvement. Instead we note the following activities that have helped maintain UCP's high standing in this category: UCP has been very successful at communicating with both the client and donors. In particular, maintaining representation on the NOC of government, donor representatives, and every project, with rotating responsibilities, has helped to maintain engagement. Also, formalizing the revised ToC with a detailed roll out, including re-review of project activities and programme priorities has helped to ensure clear alignment of individual interventions with TMEA's overall strategy. Most project partners understood and could clearly articulate how their projects aligned with the ToC and where benefits were expected. Continuing to engage with those, and new partners, and formalizing monitoring plans within the context of the ToC will help to ensure the programme remains relevant.								

Key: NI – "Needs Improvement" (fails to meet expectations), MG – "Moderately Good" (meets most expectations), G – "Good" (meets expectations), VG – "very good" (exceeds expectations)

- 9. After the 2014 finalization of the revised theory of change, the Uganda Country programme refined and refocused its programme. This included ending less-relevant efforts and refocusing on projects core to TMEA's competitive advantage and in line with its overall objectives. As a result, we find that the programme logic is clear. All projects assessed lined up well with the programmatic goals and reinforce each other in such a way that the long term outcomes are likely to exceed the sum of individual projects. The theory of change itself makes the internal assumptions clear. If All programme participants were able to contextualize both how the programme hangs together and the role of individual projects within the overarching logic. Project partners, for those projects evaluated, were able to articulate the logic of their individual interventions, describe the associated theory of change, and how the long-term benefits would be produced by the outputs. In only one case, were implementers concerned about the ability of the project to deliver long-term outcomes, even though they were confident in the ability to deliver all outputs, suggesting a possible flaw in the project logic.
- 10. We further find that the UCP's expected outcomes are highly relevant to TMEA's overall EAC strategy, to the strategies of the Government of Uganda with respect to Regional Integration, to other partners and donors and to the intended beneficiaries. Uganda continues to push for regional integration and sees opportunity to promote trade and market expansion. The 2015/2016-2019/2020 National Development Plan II also recognizes the progress in establishing One Stop Border Posts, innovation from electronic cargo tracking system and the reduced non-tariff barriers facing economic interactions in the East African community, and potential for fast tracking legal amendment process that will make it possible to effectively implement the common

 $^{15}$  See, for example, the discussion on delay costs in, "TMEA Theory of Change Explanation," May 2014, pgs 9-10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Annex 4, Summary of Project Matrices, "Project Clarity and Logic." Strong or very strong evidence was found of clear understanding of project and programme logic and the ability of project participants to communicate that logic for all projects included in the evaluation.

market protocols. The TMEA program is thus in line with Uganda's expected drivers of growth over the next five years. The projects within the UCP are internally consistent (they support each other) and complementary to projects supported by TMEA in the rest of EAC countries. This is particularly true of the URA, SCT, OSBP, NTB and standards efforts.

- 11. Overall, expected project results map up to programme results. We note very limited programme outputs without corresponding project outputs, of which some may be covered by regional programme efforts not in scope for this evaluation.<sup>17</sup> Of these, the most significant gap is outputs for small traders and women trader border crossing time reductions, which may well be facilitated by overall efforts to reduce crossing times.<sup>18</sup> An evaluation of TMEA projects dealing with women informal traders (2011-2014) found a general increase in formal cross border trade as confirmed by customs officials in the various countries included in the study (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda).<sup>19</sup>
- 12. The process of designing the UCP exhibited best practice approaches, both in the original design phase and in the post-Theory of Change adjustment period in 2014. The original design process focused on co-planning with government to ensure that TMEA interventions matched GoU priorities, both to ensure buy-in from government partners and to avoid conflict and/or overlap with other activities in Uganda. The programme was defined in the context of regional TMEA work and other donor efforts. As a result, the UCP is well-integrated with Government, other TMEA, and partner efforts. After the revised Theory of Change was finalized, the UCP went through a streamlining process to ensure that existing and proposed new interventions continued to be consistent with TMEA priorities and would contribute to programmatic outcomes. As a result, TMEA discontinued one project and ended negotiation on several others. The current program is therefore well aligned with TMEA's internal priorities, but also with those of the GoU, ensuring relevance across stakeholders.

## 1.2 Efficiency

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Examples include: Progress towards development of Mutual Recognition Agreements of Key Product standards identified/recommended by the EASC; Reduction of time spent crossing the border for small traders, women traders etc.; Number and type of tools/law/policy to support the domestication of EAC gender policy on cross border trade developed; and Number of mutual recognition mechanisms operational (MRAs and similar mutual facilitative agreements operational; single visas issued) on TMEA supported interventions. Note that the revised Results Framework incorporates standard indicators across all TMEA programmes for programme outcomes. It is possible, and may be possible in some of the examples cited here, that the UCP does not contribute to all of the outcomes in the overall Results Framework.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See outcome 3.1 and associated outputs under Uganda Results Framework.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Imani Development, May-2015. Formative Evaluation of Formative and Summative Evaluation of Selected PSO/CSO Projects

Overall, we find the UCP is "good" in the Efficiency category. In specific, we find that Adaptive Management of Project Budgets and Plans is "good", Relationship Management and Communication is "very good", Translating Inputs to Outputs at the project level is "good"<sup>20</sup>

Criteria	UCP Overall	Mirama Hills Road + OSBP	Busia OSBP	URA (AW, AEO, & ECTS)	UNBS Standards	NMC NTB Monitoring	MEACA	SEATINI
Efficiency	G	G	G	VG	G	G	G	VG
Adaptive Management of Plans & Budgets	G	G	G	VG	G	G	G	VG
Relationship Management & Communications	VG	VG	G	VG	VG	VG	MG	VG
Transitioning Inputs into Outputs	G	MG	G	G	G	G	G	G
Additionality	G	VG	VG	G	G	G	MG	VG
Summary of Observations	cat wit • Furner dir • The the ma Str	tegory. In particle implement of the imp	ticular, UCP eding partners at as been highly have future to partners, incoming a cechanisms to of gender, sugar	exhibits excell and donors. If successful a opportunity to cluding in the active project accommodat agests that so ander Strategy	ent relationship to tutilizing in-hoto further utile building up consider the new Tome of the effications.	rage, across the mip management ouse expertise ize in-house confict capacity. The ToC and C, as well as miciency challen elays project ki	nt and comn e in support ompetencies I subsequent ore active ges experien	of partner to provide ly adjusting

Key: NI – "Needs Improvement" (fails to meet expectations), MG – "Moderately Good" (meets most expectations), G – "Good" (meets expectations), VG – "very good" (exceeds expectations)

14. TMEA has gone through a number of changes during the course of the programme in its M&E structure which, while improving the overall M&E approach, has led to some problems for partners trying to keep up. The UCP has generally made good use of the monitoring and evaluation system. Uganda has regularly received good rankings on use of the MIS<sup>21</sup>. Most projects are on track for reporting into the M&E system and UCP has regularly received high marks in reviews for its use of the system. But it is largely used as a repository for information and not a system for active management.<sup>22</sup> Further, reporting has been somewhat ad hoc in that TMEA has pushed for results reporting from project inception, prior to there being results to report on. Project implementers for several projects have indicated some frustration with evolving reporting requirements. Specifically, implementers felt pushed to deliver on higher level results, early in the project life. This was in addition to regular activity reporting to meet TMEA donor requirements. Further, in some cases, targets were defined in advance of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>For a discussion of the criteria used to assess efficiency please see Annex 3, explanation of criteria.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> see Annual Review

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> This observation was repeated across the TMEA hierarchy, from senior corporate management to line staff.

establishment of baselines, making it difficult to adequately plan the reporting process. TMEA's official position seems to be that implementers should primarily report on results (outputs and outcomes), in addition to expenditures. We do not believe this a flaw, but rather that clear reporting guidance and a reporting plan needs to be communicated during project planning, and to ensure existing capacity, or plan for capacity enhancement, in monitoring and reporting.<sup>23</sup> Partner dialogue with TMEA on these issues has been constructive and well-received.

- 15. The UCP has exhibited very strong relationship management, communication and reporting approaches. The UCP was challenged during the revision to the corporate theory of change and the resulting re-orientation of priorities and increased focus on areas of competitive advantage. In particular, certain relationships with potential partners and PSOs/CSOs were put on uncertain footing and the UCP had to make a particular effort to re-establish trusting relationships. Further as the donor pool extended beyond DfID, effort was made to maintain reporting and management structures that satisfied multiple new partners. The UCP managed both of these challenges in exemplary fashion. All partners reported good working relationships, satisfaction with the frequency and quality of formalized meetings, informal and ad-hoc meetings and were generally satisfied with the reporting document templates.
- 16. While TMEA's approach did generally result in much shorter procurement times relative to presumed GoU times, most partners felt that by running procurement out of Nairobi, local context, understanding of the players, and even adherence to TMEAs, admittedly shortened, timelines suffered. Further, while TMEA procurement is deemed to be more efficient, several procurements did exceed the, admittedly shortened, schedules expected under TMEA procurement systems.<sup>24</sup> The more successful procurements were handled locally but not by Government (typically by a technical support team and fund manager) which capitalized on shortened timelines and local understanding. The one project that is most off course Mirama Hills Road is reportedly a result of a contractor that lacked contextual knowledge of Uganda and may have been unprepared for the challenges. In addition, some partners felt that this was a result of the Nairobi-based procurement team not understanding the local context.
- 17. We further find that there is some evidence that the projects in the UCP would not have occurred without TMEA funding. The general level of consensus, among all stakeholders

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>It should be noted that all projects have project steering committees and that all projects are represented on the NOC. URA projects, for instance, have a joint steering committee where results reporting arrangements are made clear. However, evidence of a lack of clarity and mixed requirements in reporting was collected from multiple, unrelated project participants, leading the evaluation team to believe reporting guidance is a legitimate concern.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Projects utilizing TMEA procurement systems which exceeded original procurement schedules included Mirama Hills road and UNBS.

for almost all projects assessed for this evaluation is that TMEA involvement sped up implementation of interventions by 4 to 8 years.<sup>25</sup> We do not find it a flaw, however, that most considered projects may eventually have happened without TMEA, as the very design of the programme – integrating TMEA with government priorities through a consultative process - is what grounded the programme, made it effective, and met stakeholder needs. We assess the implication to this Ugandan economy for this acceleration of projects via TMEA intervention, below.

- 18. Project monitoring documents indicate that on balance most projects are generating planned outputs in a timely manner and those outputs are largely relevant to hoped-for outcomes. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The projects are typically completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date. Of greatest schedule and/or outcome concern are:
  - Ntugamo-Mirama Hills Road<sup>26</sup>
  - o Elegu OSBP<sup>27</sup>
  - O SEATINI<sup>28</sup>

#### 1.3 Effectiveness

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Respondents indicated that, for most projects, the implementing partner would have eventually implemented the project, or a similar project, but implementation would have taken 8 to 10 years longer than was achieved with TMEA support.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>The balance of evidence suggests that fault for the delay on the Mirama Hills road portion of the Mirama Hills Road and OSBP project lays with the contractor who did not mobilize resources in a timely manner. This may be a result of selecting a contractor that did not have prior Uganda experience, did not have a suitable track record of performance in the region, or may just be a result of unexpected circumstances. TMEA and UNRA have made significant efforts to bring the project forward, including close supervision and hard deadlines for key performance milestones that do seem to be having an effect. A revised schedule for completion has been developed and there are some indications that this schedule may be met. However, it should also be noted that there is a risk that significant upheaval in staffing and a current corruption investigation may negatively impact UNRA's ability to adequately supervise the new schedule.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Note that Elegu OSBP construction delay was a result of conflict in South Sudan which made cross border work impossible. In response to this external crisis, TMEA reallocated funding and effort to focus on the Ugandan side of the border which was a reasonable mitigation approach. None-the-less, the project will ultimately need to complete work on the South Sudan portion of the project in order to achieve the anticipated impacts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Although SEATINI was behind schedule, it has had success in a short time. It was approved in late 2014 but already has draft ordinances, established an MOU with UNBS and developed standards for maize that are already passed in Nakaseke, both a pilot and focal District for the project. Of greater concern for SEATINI is the ability of the project outputs to result in the projected outcome, even if all outputs meet or exceed targets.

19. Overall, we find the UCP is "good" in the Effectiveness category. In specific, we find that Translating Outputs to Outcomes, Including Gender is "good" and Programme Additionality is "good".

Criteria	UCP Overall	Mirama Hills Road + OSBP	Busia OSBP	URA (AW, AEO, & ECTS)	UNBS Standards	NMC NTB Monitoring	MEACA	SEATINI
Effectiveness	G	G	G	VG	VG	G	G	G
Transitioning Outputs to Outcomes, Including Gender	G	MG	G	VG	VG	G	MG	G
Summary of Observations	<ul> <li>UCP is generally meeting expectations in terms of effectiveness and several projects are exceeding expectations. Current ROI estimated to be 14%.</li> <li>As more projects deliver long-term outcomes, the effectiveness is likely to improve further.</li> <li>For future interventions, the broader the scale of the impact, the more likely the project is to have a significant effect on the economy. One area to consider is the telecommunications network.</li> </ul>							

Key: NI – "Needs Improvement" (fails to meet expectations), MG – "Moderately Good" (meets most expectations), G – "Good" (meets expectations), VG – "very good" (exceeds expectations)

20. As seen in the table below, several outcomes in SO1 are not yet measured, while import volumes are exceeding expectations and export volumes are below expectations. The SO2 outcome is currently exceeding target and SO3 is meeting targets on one measure and is not yet expected to meet targets on the other. Many, but not all projects are measuring their contributions to long term outcomes.<sup>29</sup> Transport volume outcome targets are below expectations for exports and exceeding expectations for imports from Mombasa, suggesting that the Ugandan economy is increasing consumption, but without a corresponding rise in foreign sales. The SO2 outcome is currently exceeding target and most SO3 targets are yet to be set. However, the one SO3 target that has been set is being met. Further, several key project measurements indicate good progress toward goals.<sup>30</sup> The table below describes current UCP outcome level results to-date:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>For example: Mirama Hills OSBP is not yet measuring crossing time (not yet complete); Busia OSBP is not yet measuring crossing time; MEACA is meeting or exceeding all targets other than resource center visitor numbers; MTIC is meeting or exceeding all NTB removal targets, other than bilateral MOUs signed; UNBS is meeting or exceeding all targets other than numbers of harmonized standards; URA is meeting or exceeding all targets other than DPC commissioning and pre-arrival clearance rates. Of particular note:

AEO inspection rate reductions are exceeding target (now reduced to 0 physical inspections)

AEO customs clearance time reductions are meeting target

<sup>•</sup> Customs clearance time reductions are exceeding target

<sup>•</sup> Clearing and forwarding agency integration with ASYCUDA World is exceeding target

Physical inspection rate reductions are exceeding target

<sup>•</sup> Transit time reductions for transit goods is exceeding target (now 2 days from entry to exit)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Examples of goals met to date include: Time to import/export goods through Mombasa is exceeding target; OSBP completion is exceeding target; Common market protocols and customs union commitments implemented to date exceed target; Customs clearance time reduction is exceeding targets; Elimination of physical escort of transit trucks is meeting target; NTB elimination is exceeding target (as counted in the results framework); UNBS testing capacity is exceeding target; UNBS certification capacity is exceeding target; UNBS

Results Level	Expected Result	Indicator	Baseline (2010)	Target 2014/2015	Actual	
	Reduced transport time and	Time to transport from Ugandan producer to Mombasa port	395 hours 376 hours awaiting CDS 2  Source of data: Corridor Diagnostic Study(CDS)  Action Plan Volume 1 (page 22)			
	increased volumes	Time to transport from Mombasa port to Uganda end user	323 hours 306 hours awaiting CDS 2  Source of data: Corridor Diagnostic Study(CDS)  Action Plan Volume 1 (page 26)			
Outcome 1		Total Volume in Tonnes from Mombasa to Uganda	4,028,361 4,663,331 5,132,276  Source of data: Northern Corridor Transport Observatory, KPA bulletin			
		Total Volume in Tonnes from Uganda to Mombasa port	347,314 462,275 389,844  Source of data: Northern Corridor Transport Observatory, KPA bulletin			
Outcome 2	Increased ease of trading across borders	Changes in ranking on Trading Across Borders (Doing Business IFC)	148/183  Source of dat Report	126/189 sing Business		
Outcome 3.1	Enhanced business environment for trade	No. of new/revised policies adopted (including but not limited to government legislation, business charters)	Source of data: SE	2 draft policy briefs ATINI Project Rep	2 draft policy briefs ports	
		No. of new/revised policies adopted that address gender specific issues	0 Source of data: SE	N/A ATINI, UWEAL Pro	N/A Dject Reports	
Outsome	Improved export capability	Increase in export revenue on TMEA supported interventions	TBD  Source of data: TG	N/A GCU Reports	N/A	
Outcome 3.2		No. of farmers depositing grains to certified warehouses disaggregated by gender	TBD  Source of data: TG	N/A	N/A operator reports	

Source: TMEA, Refined Results Framework and Logframe FINAL DRAFT v2 05 11 2015

21. In addition to formal intermediate outcome targets, projects are reporting other outcomes that are likely to contribute to the SO objectives and ultimately the programmatic indicator.<sup>31</sup> These accomplishments suggest that as more projects mature and begin to deliver long-term outcomes, UCP can reasonably expect a positive effect on

testing and certification time is exceeding target; The number of PSO/CSO women-focused policies adopted are exceeding target; and Women's awareness of EAC standards is exceeding target.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>Examples include: ASYCUDA world is reducing processing time for customs submittals by 30%; SCT and URA/KRA integration is increasing preclearance usage and reducing delays in port; Standards compliance growth is increasing agricultural export demand within EAC; Standards compliance is being successfully integrated with local ordinances at the District level; MEACA has become an acknowledged focal point and clearing house for Regional Integration activities and reporting within the Ugandan Government.

long term outcomes. While each positive result will benefit trade conditions, in particular, reductions in processing times for various trade process steps (clearance, movement, delay reductions) and facilitation on new trade markets (standards education and compliance) are driving mid-term outcomes that are likely to have strongly beneficial impacts on long-term effects.

- 22. Further, gender has been better mainstreamed within the past year than it had been in the programme previously.<sup>32</sup> However, gender targets are somewhat limited within the results framework. What targets that do exist are being met with the same, if not better, level of success as other, non-gendered, targets. This suggests that the increased focus on gender at the corporate level and within the UCP has successfully moved projects towards fuller consideration of gender and, further, that a similar focus on other crosscutting areas could similarly result in improved outcomes in, for example, environment.
- 23. Based on current reported results for URA ECTs, AEO and AW, and results for UNBS Standards, we estimate, based on TMEA's Results Meter approach, that the UCP interventions with results to date are contributing a 5.7% reduction in transport time to Kampala origin/destination (O/D) traffic plus transit traffic through Uganda with O/Ds in Rwanda and South Sudan. Given that major time saving projects at Busia, Mirama Hills, Mutukula and Elegu, as well as SCT and Uganda eSW are not yet generating significant, if any, results, this analysis indicates a good likelihood that TMEA UCP will meet its Phase 1 transport time reduction targets. The Result Meter analysis is based on TMEA's regional Results Meter and the following results by project:
  - URA ECTs is reporting that it is delivering an average of 144 hours of time savings relative to the baseline for the approximately 5% of total regional traffic transiting via Uganda (measured as estimated TEU's imported and exported to/from Rwanda and South Sudan as a proportion of total estimated regional TEU exports and imports).<sup>33</sup>
  - URA AEO is reporting that it is delivering an average of about 60 hours of time savings relative to the baseline for enrolled AEOs.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> We note, for example, with respect to the Mirama Hills Road project: ". . . while there has been consideration of Gender while devising the project, such consideration has been limited. No gender indicators were defined at project inception. Since inception, TMEA commissioned a gender study, determined road usage in gender-disaggregated terms, and included an HIV subsidy in the project. The monitoring plan includes a target outcome of a gender action plan established for the OSBP no later than 09/30/15, though the monitoring data indicates this not yet complete." We further note, for example, with respect to URA: "It is less clear that gender issues have been well-considered. The project did retrofit data collection processes in order to mainstream the collection of gender-disaggregated data, but gender has not been prioritized otherwise. Even the mid-term evaluation failed to mention gender." See Annex 4 for further detail.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Validated through examination of URA records.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Validated through examination of URA records

- URA ASYCUDA World is reporting that it is delivering 72 hours of time savings, relative to a baseline processing time of 120 hours for all imports and exports with an O/D in Uganda.35
- Declines in crossing times at Busia of about 6.5 hours.<sup>36</sup>
- 24. After completion of the evaluation, at the request of TMEA, the evaluation team also conducted a limited Return on Investment assessment using the TMEA TRADE tool. Details on the TRADE Tool, the concept, the methodology applied and general assumptions in the tool are described in Annex 9. Specific assumptions related to the ROI assessment of the UCP are provided in the following paragraph.
- 25. Based on current impacts for URA ECTs, AEO and AW, and results for UNBS Standards<sup>37</sup>, we developed a return on investment (ROI) analysis using TMEA's in-house TRADE (TRansportation Analysis and Decision Economics) tool. The return on investment assessment indicates that relative to total UCP expenditure to-date, the impacts of these four projects result in a total net return of \$12 million, or 14%, over the forecasting lifecycle, given the following assumptions:
  - o The listed projects will maintain their current impacts through the forecast lifecycle (the scale of benefit per average beneficiary neither grows nor declines during the forecast, though the number of beneficiaries may change over time, per the normal assumptions used in TMEA's TRADE tool).
  - o The listed interventions accelerated projects that would otherwise have been implemented by GoU or other partners by 4-8 years (that is, we applied a 6 year lifecycle to benefits, relative to the counterfactual).
  - The "present year" dollar terms are stated in 2012 dollars (per TRADE)
  - o The benefits of projects which included contributions from TMEA and GoU and/or other partners were apportioned relative to budgetary contribution to the given project.
  - o All other assumptions and limitations of TMEA's TRADE tool (as described in Annex 9) apply. Benefit categories include transport time savings, other trade costs reductions (taking care to avoid double counting of time savings and freight rate reductions resulting from those same time savings) and profitability on induced trade – additional trade resulting from eased transport conditions.38

We also assessed the return to-date relative to expenditures to-date. To do this we assessed benefit generated, or expected to be generated through the current fiscal year

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> ASYCUDA Project Report, 10 August 2015, pg. 11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> TMEA Results Meter

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> UNBS is reporting a decline in average time for testing from a baseline of 19 days to a current average of 8 days for all tested items at UNBS.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>New revenue generated by URA and UNBS was not counted as a "benefit" as it represents a transfer from users to the authority, but not a net welfare gain.

relative to costs expended or to be expended through the same time period. This analysis indicates that to-date, the UCP has generated an estimated \$35million in benefits in discounted terms relative to a discounted \$67 million in costs<sup>39</sup> (inclusive of estimated added O&M costs)<sup>40</sup>. Given the early stage of most projects in their lifecycle, we believe that the UCP focus on "early wins" will result in net positive payback by the end of 2020; the point of net payback will decrease to sooner in the programme lifecycle as more projects generate long-term outcomes, particularly the OSBP projects. We believe UCP's early focus on projects with "quick wins" – that generate benefits quickly – has given the programme the credibility with partners and donors to support longer turn-around projects.

## 1.4 Impact

26. Overall we find that the UCP is "good" in the Impact category. In specific, we find that Achieving Long Term Outcomes is "good".

Criteria	UCP Overall	Mirama Hills Road + OSBP	Busia OSBP	URA (AW, AEO, & ECTS)	UNBS Standards	NMC NTB Monitoring	MEACA	SEATINI
Impact	G	MG	G	G	VG	G	G	MG
Summary of Observations	<ul> <li>The UCP is not yet hitting its targets for total exports and has not yet measured progress against other impact targets (intra-EAC imports and exports), however, the projects that are now delivering results are impacting trade growth.</li> <li>As more projects deliver long-term outputs it seems likely at this point that UCP will meet expectations.</li> <li>Projects that impact a broader spectrum of Ugandan trade clearly deliver more impact than the more focused projects.</li> <li>Inclusion of substantial gender mainstreaming targets at inception (which UCP has adopted) results in better achievement of gender outcomes in projects.</li> </ul>							

Key: NI – "Needs Improvement" (fails to meet expectations), MG – "Moderately Good" (meets most expectations), G – "Good" (meets expectations), VG – "very good" (exceeds expectations)

27. As of completion of field work, TMEA had not yet determined whether or not it has met its targets for 2014/15 trade levels, its top line impact.<sup>41</sup>

Results	Expected		Baseline	Target	
Level	Result	Indicator	(2010)	2014/2015	Actual

<sup>39</sup> Readers should note that the investment costs include all projects coded in NAVISION as UCP budget lines as well as regional projects under EATIP budget lines (including capital intensive OSBP projects) that are otherwise treated as UCP projects for the purposes of this evaluation. Exclusion of such costs would increase net benefits to-date to -17 million.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> O&M costs are estimated within the TRADE framework at 10% of total capital investment annually. This fixed assessment approach may tend to under-estimate systems costs and over-estimate infrastructure O&M costs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See Uganda data in "New Results Framework Final Draft 12/08/2015," which indicates, at the impact level, that it is awaiting data from UBOS.

Impact Increased Trade		Total Exports from Uganda to EAC and	\$650	\$752	awaiting UBOS data		
		SS(US\$ Millions)	Source of data: Uganda Bureau of Statistics: http://www.ubos.org/statistics/macro-economic/trade-2/				
		Total Imports to Uganda from EAC+SS(US\$ Millions)  Total Exports to World from Uganda ( by each	\$721	\$835	awaiting UBOS data		
	11446		Source of data: EAC Trade Reports				
			\$2,159	\$2,874	awaiting UBOS data		
		country,(+10% above trend at EoP))	Source of data: UNCTAD Comtrade Data B Uganda Bureau of Statistics; EAC Database				

Source: TMEA, Refined Results Framework and Logframe FINAL DRAFT v2 05 11 2015


However, in 2016 the UCP team presented data from the Bank of Uganda that was not included in the evaluation process. Having become available some months after completion of the evaluation, the data has not been vetted or assessed by the evaluation team. However, it is presented here, along with the UCP's assessment of its meaning in order to present as fair and complete a picture as possible.

	Target 2014/2015	Actual 2014/2015					
Total exports from Uganda to the EAC+SS	752	1,289					
Total imports to Uganda from EAC +8.8	835	671					
Total exports to the world from Uganda	2,874	2721					
Source: Bank of Uganda_Direction of Trade Exports							

#### The UCP notes that these data:

- o Indicate that intra-regional exports (formal and informal) from Uganda to the EAC+SS exceeded target
- o Indicate that intra-regional imports from EAC+SS to Uganda was below the target
- o In summary the Uganda has a Favourable Balance of Payments in relation of intraregional exports and imports

Some of the impact level indicators were not tracked under the prior ToC. However, the total exports to the world category was tracked and the trend from 2010 to present is presented below. As indicated in the figures, total exports has tended to fall short of expectations. However, during most of the tracking period, TMEA projects were not yet delivering outcome level results.



As a component of the evaluation team's return on investment assessment, we developed an estimate of the induced trade impacts in 2016 of those UCP projects with existing results that reduced transport times or trade costs. This estimate describes new trade that would not have otherwise occurred without TMEA intervention, and can therefore be described as "attributable new trade" above the baseline (or counterfactual).<sup>42</sup> The trade growth analysis is based on the same projects (URA ASYCUDA World, AEO, ECTs and UNBS Testing) cited in the ROI analysis discussed in Section 1.3. The results are presented in the table below.

Project	Induced Trade Due to Reduced Trade Costs <sup>43</sup>							
		FY 2014/2015		FY 2015/2016				
URA AW & AEO	\$	40,408,243	\$	42,671,105				
URA ECTs	\$	4,009,685	\$	8,243,912				
UNBS Testing	\$	524,395	\$	1,494,525				
TOTAL	\$	44,942,323	\$	52,409,542				

Source: TMEA TRADE Tool

Given the projected shortfall between the FY 2015 target and estimated actuals in the total global exports figure (about \$500 million export shortfall), the induced trade value

<sup>42</sup> Readers should note that it is an estimate, rather than an observation, based on known relationships between transport costs and trade. Further, the TMEA TRADE tool, which was used to develop this estimate, does not disaggregate new trade by direction (import or export), by market (intra-EAC or Ex-EAC) or commodity. The TRADE-based estimates are therefore not a substitute for UCP's planned-for collection of trade data which the evaluation team strongly encourages TMEA to make progress on collecting. Detail on the estimating methodology used in TRADE is provided in Annex 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Readers should note that the induced trade table represents additive trade results from the four projects referenced in the table. However, other projects, not yet generating long-term outcomes, may also be generating new trade (e.g. SEATINI) which is not included in this estimate.

- may not be sufficient to put TMEA on track this year relative to targets. But given the limited number of projects currently contributing to the forecast, we believe that UCP will likely make up ground by the end of strategy 1.
- 29. It is apparent from the results that URA AEO and AW projects contribute the vast majority of the induced trade gains. This is primarily because the URA impacts every Ugandan shipment about 600,000 annually. On the other hand, UNBS testing and ECTs impact only a subset of shipments: UNBS tests approximately 9,940 samples per year in the areas supported by TMEA, and URA uses ECTS to track about 15,000 transit shipments per year. This suggests that TMEA's support for initiatives that are broader in scope may create much larger contributions to its impact targets.<sup>44</sup>
- 30. The UCP has a clear vision of how each of these projects will contribute to overall outcomes and this is articulated in each results chain, adding to the likelihood that project successes will deliver anticipated programmatic success. In addition, there is some consideration of the impact of some of the projects within the programme on women and some projects have features specifically designed to address these differences. These include design of OSBPs to accommodate the specific needs of women and children; design of IBM process to meet the needs of small traders (many of whom are women); outreach to SMEs (many of which are women-owned) to sensitize on standards and grow capacity to export; outreach to women traders via the Women in Trade Project; and outreach and training geared toward women farmers in the SEATINI project. Other projects have been less successful at considering the specific needs of women and incorporating those needs in project design and implementation.<sup>45</sup> These include NTB reporting system, 46 MEACA, URA AEO, ECTS and ASYCUDA World, and Mirama Hills Road. This suggests that UCP can deliver not only economy-wide positive impacts, but also targeted benefits to cross-cutting areas, where a specific emphasis is undertaken.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> In addition to these quantitative findings, TMEA management points to impacts the UCP has contributed to, though specific attribution has not yet been determined. These include: implementation of the Single Customs Territory and inter institutional/ regional sharing of data only made possible by the reforms in ICT4 Trade (e.g. ASYCUDA World); and overall, TMEA's indefinable role in facilitating partners and getting things to happen across government- e.g. instant decisions at the NOC often adopted by Government and partners and implemented e.g. on harmonising GoU and Private Sector positions on implementation of the Electronic Single Window.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup>For further detail on the findings with respect to gender by evaluated project, please see the notes on efficiency, sub-category "transitioning outputs to outcomes, including gender," by project, under Annex 4. <sup>46</sup>Note that women traders have been involved in the awareness sessions for the NTB reporting system (it is a requirement that at least 30% of women traders are invited to awareness sessions and training). However, outreach to women was observed to be negligible in the context of the regional and national NTB forum.

## 2. Analysis of Sustainability and Opportunities for Scaling-Up

### 2.1 Sustainability

- 31. The evaluation criteria define sustainability as: Having clear, specific and relevant activities included to address sustainability. Monitoring of the sustainability of outcomes is undertaken (or planned). In the best examples, monitoring of outcomes goes beyond the project timeframe. A clear and comprehensive exit strategy is included in the design and is fully up to date. The strategy includes a clear description of how project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Responsibilities for implementing the exit strategy are outlined. All on-going maintenance or operational costs have been thoroughly costed and the organisation has set aside funds to pay for these (or has a plan in place to secure funds in adequate time before project funds are completed). For advanced or completed projects, there is evidence of responsibilities having been fully institutionalised.
- 32. Overall, we find the UCP is "moderately good" in the Sustainability category. In specific, we find that Sustainability Addressed; Sustainability of Outputs and Outcomes Achieved is "moderately good".

Criteria	UCP Overall	Mirama Hills Road + OSBP	Busia OSBP	URA (AW, AEO, & ECTS)	UNBS Standards	NMC NTB Monitoring	MEACA	SEATINI	
Sustainability	MG	NI	VG	G	MG	MG	MG	G	
Summary of Observations	<ul> <li>Projects that incorporate business process changes into organizational systems tend to result in more sustainable projects.</li> <li>UCP should increase focus on long-term O&amp;M costs and consider inclusion of on-going maintenance guarantees for physical systems and infrastructure in MOUs.</li> <li>UCP should consider working with partners on staff retention as a component of capacity development, particularly when delivering staff training as a component of an intervention.</li> </ul>								

Key: NI – "Needs Improvement" (fails to meet expectations), MG – "Moderately Good" (meets most expectations), G – "Good" (meets expectations), VG – "very good" (exceeds expectations)

33. Although most of the projects undertaken by UCP have a duration of less than five years, the achievement of their longer-term outcomes typically requires continued investment and effort by stakeholders. Therefore, it is important for UCP to think about ways to sustain projects goals, principles and efforts to reach those goals beyond UCP funding. The evaluation team defines sustainability as the capacity of the partner and other stakeholders, after TMEA funding has ceased, to carry on critical functions required to maintain the project's benefits in the longer-term so that TMEA's intended goal will be achieved. In assessing the sustainability of the RCP, the evaluation team looked particularly at three aspects: a) the human resources capacity of the partner to maintain the activities, b) the existence of a plan that outlines how the project will be sustainable that has been negotiated and accepted by all parties, preferably before or during project

implementation, and c) the identification prior to project completion of an adequate funding mechanism to maintain critical inputs. The latter two aspects are critical to sustainability, as evidence from across a broad range of donor-funded initiatives indicates that without continuous funding of capacity building, capacity will weaken over time as trained individuals depart from their roles. Similarly, without maintenance budgets in place to support significant infrastructure investments, their effectiveness will diminish.

34. Our most significant concern about the UCP is select gaps in the consideration of sustainability built into several of the ten projects assessed. The UCP has made significant investments in capacity building. However, this is sometimes focused on stafftraining at partners, which has resulted in trained up staff that had the skills to leave partners for better jobs. This was a reoccurring theme observed for instance in URA and MEACA. In terms of project design and ownership of systems, this has typically been predefined. TMEA has typically focused on enhancing ownership of investment by project partners. For example, URA has effectively made the projects a way of work- the business processes for AEO, ASYCUDA and ECTS were adopted and the project structures dismantled before the projects wrapped up. This is in line with good practice. On accessing continuing finance, TMEA's support and the ownership by the partners has incentivized the relevant partners to continue to press for O&M funding, but does not guarantee GoU will be able or willing to comply. Further, where system or facility maintenance is required, no commitments have been defined in the MOUs to cater for such recurrent expenditures. 47 To date, there any un-maintained systems or facilities which at least demonstrates the endurance of UCP investments over the project lifetime. However, the findings suggest that the durability of some results will be in question without corrective action.

## 2.2 Opportunities for Scaling-Up

33. The UCP must seek to mainstream a sustainability strategy across its projects. With this approach, UCP ensures that funded projects will continue to operate in whole or in part beyond the conclusion of the program. We note, in particular, that projects which focus on business processes (URA, NTBs for example) face a risk that benefits may be short-lived if the political environment changes or otherwise loses focus on the improvements made to date. Mainstreaming a sustainability strategy would address both system Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and business process improvements. As a development program, TMEA has a limited life and ensuring that its projects can continue beyond the life of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Examples of projects with existing plans to fund ongoing system or facility O&M, but without evidence of a dedicated financing stream include: Mirama Hills Road, MEACA, and NTB reporting system. URA and UNBS have revenue streams associated with the provided systems, though these are not necessarily "dedicated" in sense that there is a legal guarantee in place for the use of that revenue to support O&M in part or whole.

- program can be achieved in several ways including the assumption of the costs incurred by public structures after the utility of the projects are demonstrated.
- 34. Another vehicle to assist the scale-up and amplify the impact of the UCP program is through the creation of a service provider network in which stakeholders can turn to research advisory support for expanding their business, through this the UCP can amplify its impact by reaching more people indirectly. In Rwanda, for example, the RDB (Rwanda Development Board) has worked with TMEA Rwanda to create and enhance a network of service providers that conduct diagnostic performance of companies, the creation of business plans and monitoring the performance of businesses. At the end of the program, the network of service providers can continue to provide services at a fee. The Rwanda pilot has demonstrated that other companies that need advisory service will seek support from these program affiliates.
- 35. In Uganda, development of trade over the past five years has demonstrated the growing importance of trade with South Sudan and DRC. These markets import most of their consumer goods and have demonstrated an acceptance of Ugandan products. Trade between Uganda and these partners is already increasing steadily. By facilitating the improvement of physical infrastructure, and ensuring that enhancement of existing EACfocused interventions are functional for trade with South Sudan and DRC, the UCP can contribute significantly to improve the performance of companies and expand market penetration for Uganda. In general, there is limited direct competition between companies in Uganda and South Sudan or DRC. Even more Ugandan national production could easily be consumed in these markets. For this to occur, political negotiations must transpire to improve relations between the countries. This dialogue could initially focus on the construction of OSBP (One stop border posts) at all border crossings to facilitate movement of goods and people, then attention could be placed on establishing the relations between the private sectors of the two countries so that the means can be set up for companies to place orders to those of Ugandan firms. In the short term, companies producing consumer goods would gain new markets, reduction of transportation costs and facilitation of the movement of goods. The expansion of trade and the opening of markets will not only help the merchants but it will help to make consumer goods cheaper for the poor in both countries, ensuring the multiplier effect that the program seeks to have. The Netherlands government has already expressed interest to support the Northern Corridor initiative through to DRC and duly supports the good neighbour approach. TMEA can take advantage of this expressed interest.
- 36. The establishment of multi-stakeholder structures, bringing together the private sector and the public in identifying and finding solutions to the factors limiting the business is also an opportunity for the scaling up the success of the program. This has been seen with the performance of the NMC platform in identifying constraints and solutions as a mechanism to solve problems that affect the Ugandan private sector. With NMC, the private sector in Uganda is ensuring that barriers to its development are identified and

addressed with support of public sector agencies in charge of regulatory control. This collaboration is beneficial to the private sector in that it allows the identification and rapid implementation of solutions at the national level to remove obstacles that may face all companies that want to import or export goods and services between Uganda and other countries. UCP can expand this concept through the creation of forums addressing other trade issues that integrates both public and private sector actors.

37. It should be noted, as TMEA is well aware, that there is significant donor concern about TMEA expanding beyond its area of core competence (or competitive advantage). As Strategy 2 is being discussed, there is donor concern that TMEA will seek to move into value chain development work as a mechanism to boost trade, which would risk duplication with other donor and NGO work.<sup>48</sup> Our evaluation indicates that the donors are expressing a legitimate concern with respect to value chain work. There are a number of organizations in that space and it is not clear that TMEA has a competitive advantage in most areas. TMEA does, however, have specialized expertise in the realm of working with producers to improve their understanding of broader market opportunities, facilitating use of existing and new systems and infrastructure to access those markets, and reducing the costs of meeting access requirements (standards, testing, warehousing, etc.) through facilitating of sensitization, collective action, and communication strategies.

#### 3. Recommendations

<sup>49</sup> Particularly URA projects.

#### 3.1 Lessons

- 38. UCP's strategy of focusing early resources on project likely to generate "early wins"<sup>49</sup> has been successful at creating good will, community respect, and greater donor and partner latitude for longer-term projects TMEA may wish to pursue. Developing a programme that mixes early win and long-term projects and continually re-emphasizing those early wins has been a successful strategy for the UCP.
- 39. Policy and civil/public sector projects (generally SO3) tend to be most impactful when they are broad in scope, addressing issues and needs of a large population of traders.

<sup>48</sup>In a letter to the UCP, the donors wrote: "The scope and coverage of the proposed strategy II is very broad and there is a risk of drifting away from the core mandate and comparative advantage of the TMEA programme (at the macro level and on regional issues). To avoid mission creep we would like to see a more focused strategy with a clear theory of change . . . TMEA needs to ensure effective coordination and complementarity with other bilateral donor programmes and existing fora, especially at the sector-specific (e.g. in agricultural value chains) and commodity-specific (e.g. the maize and beans platform) levels. This also applies to bilateral and regional trade promotion programmes (such as the United States' Enabling Environment for Agriculture activity and the East Africa Trade and Investment Hub); we would like to see complementarity built into the strategy 2 from inception - possibly including a "cooperation plan" - to avoid competition and duplication."

- 40. UCP's system for finding and vetting partners, including the risk assessment framework has generally worked well in terms of ensuring partner capacity to handle implementation as well as for determining what types of capacity building is most needed. Partners have been most successful when paired with internal TMEA or consulting subject matter experts to deliver technical support.
- 41. Further, the more successful projects have generally engendered a sense of ownership within the implementing partner. Projects which focus not only on provision of new systems or facilities, but in changing the fundamental business processes, improve the probability of longer-term sustainability of project-generated improvements.
- 42. UCP has struggled to effectively implement gender-based outcomes. This is likely a result of a lack, in the early planning process, of an explicit gender strategy. One lesson articulated by both TMEA and partners is that projects with an explicit strategy in place, not just for gender, but for any key cross-cutting areas prior to intervention design, tend to be more impactful in the long-run. Retro-fitting in such strategies after project commencement is widely seen as a second-best solution.<sup>50</sup>
- 43. Selection of contractors that lack local knowledge, at times, can result in slow mobilization and delayed execution. Inclusion of a senior government body in the procurement process to provide technical guidance can result in improved procurement outcomes.
- 44. Staffing TMEA UCP based on equal division of staffing resources between Strategic Objectives ignores the variation in level of effort both between SOs and over time. Staff easily become overwhelmed during intensive periods and cross-support between SOs is vital to meeting partner needs.

#### 3.2 Recommendations

45. Recommendations presented below include both strategic and operational improvements highlighted by the evaluation as likely to add value to TMEA interventions. They are ordered by our perceived priority, but TMEA should ultimately determine which recommendations to adopt and to prioritize.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Note that TMEA has made substantial progress in refining its approach to gender mainstreaming and has made significant strides in achieving improved gender outcomes. However, projects that revised their gender approach midstream have been less successful (not unsuccessful) at addressing gender, the basis of this lesson learned.

- 46. While we believe TMEA took a needed step in revising the TOC, we recommend that if new avenues of support are to be opened under Strategy 2, TMEA's overall TOC be fully elaborated first, prior to the start of any new interventions. This will ensure that all interventions and projects have clear alignment to TMEA's overall vision. In other words, we recommend that TMEA's Strategy 2 investments continue to be guided by its TOC and that the TOC be used as a method of testing such alignment up-front. Now that quick wins are less vital to the organization than they were in 2010, given that TMEA has established itself with its partners, funders and other stakeholders, time should be taken for the conceptual development process for the development of Strategy 2 prior to any new investments. Further, detailed M&E frameworks, inclusive of baseline and target development, for each individual investment must be the first order of business at project inception. This means ensuring the competency of staff and partners in M&E.
- 47. Review of UCP projects across several categories indicates some areas that TMEA may choose to consider for further or future investment. In particular, we encourage UCP to consider expanding interventions that provide information and capacity development on, and physical and process support to access, export potential, export markets, standards, and other processes and requirements to export goods and services producers. These projects have the most obvious link to household-level welfare enhancement and have demonstrated some early wins for TMEA. UCP has articulated its focus areas.<sup>52</sup> We encourage the UCP to consider how producers in these areas can be directly served by future investments (cognisant that there are many programmes that work directly with beneficiaries). Projects that are designed to improve communication of opportunities and requirements for trade to participants in these sectors or that provide physical capacity for improving export performance may have significant positive effect. Secondly, feedback from stakeholders indicates that one area of potential investment worthy of consideration by the UCP, which is not currently served by the programme, is in telecommunications infrastructure and systems linked to trade facilitation. Many of the interventions currently supported by UCP rely on the existing, but often insufficient, telephony and internet systems. Many stakeholders indicated limitations in the ability to access and benefit from existing investments, due to limitations in the telecommunications network. These limitations had impacts on the use of the NTB reporting system, URA AW, and URA ECTs. There were even some indications that IBM processes at the funded OSBPs might be compromised in the future due to telecommunications limitations. We recognize that (1) the telecommunications system is a massive existing capital investment (2) telecommunications may not be in TMEA's area of competitive advantage, and (3) telecommunications infrastructure is an area of significant private sector activity, unlike many of TMEA's larger infrastructure

<sup>51</sup>It should be noted that no evidence was presented to suggest that TMEA would not, or was not planning to fully develop the Strategy 2 TOC prior to investment. This recommendation was born out of observation of the process for Strategy (or Phase) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>See: Mapping Study – Business Competitiveness for TradeMark East Africa (Uganda Country Programme), Final Report, December 2014.

investments. For this reason, we recommend TMEA investigate where shortfalls in the system lay, who the key players in investment and management are, and in what kind of role TMEA could best provide effective support. Finally, TMEA is unique among donorfunded initiatives in East Africa in its focus and breadth of activities. This offers significant potential for TMEA to become the model in the region for catalysing trade facilitation and regional integration. In crafting its Phase 2 strategy, TMEA should draw from its recently-commissioned evaluations and own experience to determine and focus on the areas that are essential for facilitating that model. While this should include learning from the past, the model for phase 2 must also remain sufficiently flexible that TMEA can pursue new opportunities as they emerge.

48. With respect to first line beneficiaries, some of the projects evaluated did have benefits that clearly went to the household level (SEATINI, UGC, OSBPs). For others that are focused on trade and transport systems and facilities - the beneficiaries were defined in the project documents and were typically delivered to, though there are instances where there have been negative consequences for some beneficiaries. In particular, the clearing and forwarding industry exhibited hostility to many of the URA interventions. In the end, however, TMEA's mandate is to grow trade and reduce costs of transport and these results are being achieved. Further, the Electronic Single Window project (as well as a next phase of system enhancement in line with UNCTAD recommendations) is currently in early implementation, is expected to stabilize the customs system, addressing some of the negative consequences of the earlier URA work. In moving to the next phase, TMEA should consider trying to estimate its impacts on poverty at the corporate level. At the project level, identification of winners and losers during project formulation and during the process of defining interventions within the programme will help to better mitigate loses and/or enhance impacts for winners. To begin, this should be reflected through the inclusion of the poor in TMEA's theory of change and in the design phase for each individual project. While TMEA's concern about measurement difficulty is well taken, it is important that TMEA seek to periodically check that the assumed relationship between lower transport costs and reduced poverty is valid. This can be done through a theory-based review of the relevant results chains and through an investment to collect evidence on relevant indicators (e.g., consumer prices in relevant commodities) that would indicate what impact TMEA may be having. TMEA's donors expressed significant interest in better understanding this relationship during the evaluation, and generating learning in this area will be important for demonstrating the return on donors' investment. There are undoubtedly impacts that TMEA is having; being able to estimate those impacts would have a significant impact on demonstrating its value to stakeholders. At present, this evidence is lacking. Without an effort to understand the impacts of faster and cheaper trade on final consumers, TMEA's ultimate impacts can only be assumed or guessed at. We understand TMEA has recently started efforts to model impacts on poverty at the national level, using a macro-economic framework. This is a good start toward addressing this issue. In addition, we suggest TMEA consider adding a more detailed poverty impact section to the PAR form, which

- will require project teams to articulate the specific impact at the project level, on impact to vulnerable populations and on poverty and an enhancement/alleviation plan, depending on what the impacts are.
- 49. Sustainability is considered in project design and ownership of systems and is typically pre-defined. Some of the RCP projects demonstrated strong sustainability. However, we felt that more could be done here. Capacity building programmes often focused on stafftraining at partners resulting in trained up staff that had the skills to leave partners for better jobs. Further, where system or facility maintenance is required, it would be best practice to get a commitment where possible in the MOU for maintenance. This is largely lacking, though it has not yet resulted in abandoned or un-maintained systems or facilities. We recommend that, in addition to staff training, capacity development should include institutional capacity based in systems, procedures and approaches and training manuals and policies to transfer skills. This will help to build a system for ongoing capacity improvement even as current staff leave their positions. Further, where possible, TMEA should seek commitments in the MOUs for system and facility maintenance. Where such commitments are not forthcoming, TMEA should reflect on the viability of the project and consider alternative investments or sources of funding. Moving forward, all projects need robust sustainability plans that consider future access to both human and financial resources post-project. This should be a part of every PAR, and reviewed at least annually. Where it is clear that initial commitments are not materialising, TMEA should adjust its support and strategy accordingly.
- 50. TMEA has gone through a number of changes during the course of the programme in its M&E structure which, while improving the overall M&E approach, has led to some problems for partners trying to keep up. We observed that targets are at times not reasonable or are set without first establishing a clear baseline. While it is appropriate for TMEA to focus on strengthening monitoring, the first order of business for new partners should be M&E capacity building. The M&E system has been used in UCP. Most projects are on track for reporting the M&E system and UCP has regularly received high marks in the AR for its use of the system. However, the system, is largely used as a repository for information and not a system for active management. The MIS itself is not widely used for active management. This is both an internal culture issue, where staff feel the MIS is an added step of duplicate reporting, as opposed to a means of management, and also a result of challenges with the system itself (limitations to inclusion on impact-level results, limitations cross-intervention tracking of common outcomes). Further reporting has been somewhat ad hoc, in that TMEA has pushed for results reporting from project inception, prior to their being results to report on. TMEA has sought both results and activity reporting to fill its own management and reporting needs, though officially it should be focused on results reporting only. It may be that there should be a combination of activity and results reporting and TMEA should define the reporting plan from inception with the partner. TMEA should consider opening up access to the MIS, or some portion thereof, to both donors and partners. This could help

address the disconnect between partner reports and what gets reported in the MIS. The MIS could also be expanded to include partners feeding information to the system but also having rights to retrieve and analyse information. Further, as the MIS is developed for Phase 2, and an overlay system connecting financial, HR and M&E systems is considered, consideration for user needs and engagement with end users to facilitate improved system design could help to address limited user engagement with the MIS system. This, in combination with allowing direct entry of benchmark and indicator data into the system by partners (with TMEA review capacity) could help shorten the update cycle and make the MIS more useful as an active management tool. TMEA should consider training among SO managers on utilisation of the system for active management of projects based on regular information flows, and eventual support to partners.

- TMEA recognizes that most of the projects in its portfolio were not well designed to mainstream gender. A lot of progress has been made in this respect particularly with respect to gender disaggregated data collection. But few projects have gender outcome targets, beyond those projects aimed specifically at women. In the second phase of the program, gender needs to be incorporated at the design phase with clear strategy for what changes the program wants to impart relative to gender and diversity and have a clearly articulated gender strategy with milestones and timelines integrated into the larger strategy and not as stand-alone, add-on projects. Technical expertise and staff should be brought on board to manage and ensure progress on the gender strategy across the program.TMEA should also consider whether they will face similar future pressures with regards to other cross cutting areas particularly environment and work to mainstream these during the phase 2 planning processes.
- 52. TMEA believes its procurement approach is preferred by its partners over Gov't direct procurement. However most partners disagreed. TMEA should consider duplicating the procurement approach used in the MEACA project for other projects of size or to have TMEA procurement add or move some staff to the local office to support decentralized procurement.
- 53. Finally, the staffing plan within the UCP is hampering the ability of the programme's ability to supervise and particularly to provide technical, M&E, and administrative support to projects. TMEA UCP has organized staffing by providing equal staffing to each SO, but the work load is not equally distributed, either in total or in time, resulting in overwhelmed staff and short-changing some projects that could have benefited from TMEA technical expertise, but where staff only had capacity, at best, to provide management. In phase 2, TMEA should consider options to address this issue. Solutions could include better aligning local staffing to the level of work expected under each SO, having a floating support staff member that can move between SOs as work load shifts

over time, periodically engaging consultants with the specialised expertise relevant to each SO to assume tasks, or identifying and delegating tasks that do not require specialised expertise to generalists supporting the entire programme team.

### **Annex 1: Terms of Reference**

# PRQ20141673 LOT 2: FORMATIVE EVALUATION ON THE RWANDA AND UGANDA COUNTRYPROGRAMMES

### **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

### 1. Background

TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) programme aims to improve trade competitiveness in East Africa by reducing transport time/costs and improving the trade environment. It targets an increase in trade of10% (above trend) by 2016, contributing to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. TMEA was officially launched in February 2011 as a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement a programme to promote trade growth in East Africa. TMEA is currently funded by the UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and USA. TMEA's secured budget to date totals about \$600m). The programme is currently scheduled until December 2016 with the possibility of a new programming phase beyond that. TMEA's strategy has been set out in its Theory of Chance (TOC) which was recently refined at both corporate and country by developing Results Frameworks (RF) for each of these levels with related indicators.

### Rwanda Programme

The Rwanda Country Programme is part of the TMEA wide programme to: increase market access; enhance the trade environment and increase product competitiveness across East Africa. In 2011, the programme following a process of consultation with partners, projects were formulated and started that year. The Rwanda Programme is split into two phases. Phase 1a is for all the projects that have been running from 2011 until today with approximately \$33 million and 27 projects. Phase 1b involves a set of new projects and funding which will start implementation in 2015/16. The criteria for selection will be to capture a cross section of the different types of project in the programme (at least 7).

### Uganda Programme

The Uganda Country Programme was established in 2011 and projects have been in a wide range of areas from PSO/CSO support (e.g. with SEATINI), Infrastructure (e.g. the Ntungamo to Mirama Hills road & institutional support for enhancing trade effectiveness like the URA ASYCUDA World Project. To capture the breadth and diversity of the programme, 6 projects will be selected from those that started the early stages of the TMEA programme (2009 onwards). The criteria for selection will be to capture a cross section of the different types of project in the programme (at least 7).

### 2. Purpose and primary audience

With the TMEA Programme entering the final stages as it runs until end 2016, TMEA is undertaking awave of formative (on-going projects) and summative (projects that have ended) evaluations at bothproject level and country level in order to assess what results and impact have been achieved or

are likely to be achieved and to capture the collective results. This will be important for TMEA and its investors, both in terms of seeing what results were achieved with the funds invested but also to feed the lessons into the strategy development for TMEA's next phase of programming and explore what can be replicated and continued.

The primary purpose therefore of this assignment is to undertake two country evaluations of the TMEA Rwanda and Uganda Programme from 2011 until mid-2015 in order to assess results achieved and to capture the lessons learned, innovations and good practice for future programming. The evaluation is therefore not only a backward looking exercise but also a forward looking exercise which provides recommendations on both technical aspects of programming but also on PCM management and partnership building aspects.

The primary users of the findings will be TMEA and its partners and stakeholders who include the project partners, the Country Programme National Oversight Committees (NOC) and the Joint Evaluation Group (JEG). The findings will be among the key documents that will be used to improve the focus and delivery of the Country Programmes and also will be used in the process of formulating TMEA's phase 2 Programme.

### 3. Scope

Using the country RFs as a framework for evaluating the programmes, the evaluation will need to assess a critical sample of projects5 across each of the strategic objectives in TMEA's ToC. In both country programmes there are a number of project evaluations that will have been completed or are in the process of being evaluated.

From a VFM perspective, the selection of the projects assessed will need to include these projects which will only require limited inputs, while the main focus of the experts work will be to look at other projects which have not been evaluated. By expanding the coverage in this way it is hoped to maximize the contribution both exercises make to enhance the subsequent learning.

Although the evaluation will necessarily look at a sample of projects, it will also be important for the evaluation to be programmatic in its approach. In addition to looking at the project results the evaluation will need to look at programmatic aspects as well including coherence of the projects inline TMEA's ToC and national priorities, governance and management issues including Programme/Project Cycle Management as well as partnership.

It is expected that the evaluation will propose some potential areas and partnerships for future partnership in Rwanda & Uganda taking into consideration the TOC, as well as emerging high value opportunities and emerging priorities (e.g. addressing gender issues and poverty).

### 4. Key questions

The country evaluations will focus on the following key questions:

### Efficiency

Efficiency refers to the use of the minimum required effort and resources to achieve the objectives(this is determined by assessing alternatives at the initiation stage and selecting the one that can achieve the result with the minimum required effort & resources).

· For the 2 Programmes, has project/programme management and delivery been efficient?

What innovations or best practices have been used during the delivery? With hindsight, could the projects have been delivered in a more cost effective and efficient manner?

· How were capacity challenges in TMEA or the partners addressed? Where the strategies put in place effective in improving the efficiency?

### Effectiveness:

Effectiveness refers to the extent to which a development intervention has achieved its objectives, taking their relative importance into account.

- · To what extent have the programmes contributed to the attainment of TMEA's Results Framework & Theory of Change?
- · Were the institutional partnerships selected the most appropriate for attaining the programmes objectives? Were all the required partners adequately engaged?
- · To what extent have the planned results been achieved? What difference has this made to the beneficiaries?
- · If gender mainstreaming targets were set at the programme's inception, did the programme achieve the targets; if not were there any significant achievements with regards to addressing gender issues?
- · Were the identified risks effectively addressed resulting in minimal impact to the program?
- · Is there any significant evidence to demonstrate that if the programme had not taken place, the results achieved would not have been attained?

### Sustainability

Sustainability is the continuation or longevity of benefits (the continued impact) from a development intervention after the end of development assistance.

· Is there any evidence that there will be sustainability of the projects outcomes and impact as well as institutional capacity and sustainability after the end? Has there been sustainable capacity built among the partners who could be built on in the case of a future partnership?

### Lessons

- · What main lessons have been learned since the TMEA Rwanda & Uganda Country Programmes began?
- · In what ways, have these lessons been used to adapt the programmes (changes in expected outcomes, outputs, implementation approaches, management arrangements and procedures)? Have the changes made a difference?
- · Which of these lessons can be replicated to other countries that TMEA supports?

### Relevance

Relevance is the extent to which a development intervention conforms to the needs and priorities of the target groups, the policies of recipient countries and donors and TMEA's strategy.

- · How relevant have TMEA's programmes in Uganda & Rwanda and the projects been aligned with the needs and priorities of the government of Rwanda, the EAC, the target institutions and the focal beneficiaries?
- · Are the interventions consistent with TMEA's policies and priorities? Are the interventions consistent and complementary with activities supported by other programmes in TMEA and/or by other donor organisations?

### **Impact**

Impact refers to the totality of the effects of a development intervention, positive and negative, intended and unintended. The impacts are the tangible long-term outcomes to which the programme contributed.

Additional key questions that the evaluation will answer are:

- · For the Uganda programme & Rwanda programme phase 1a, what has been the impact so far? (Intended and unintended, positive and negative)? How have the programmes affected the well-being of different groups of stakeholders?
- · What is the impact of the programmes on *Increasing physical access to markets; Enhancing trade environment* and *improving business competitiveness*?

### 5. Methodology

The Evaluators will use scientific and technical methods of collection and organising data. The consultant will treat the evaluation questions as a hypothesis and use scientific methods to verify them. The consultant also use mixed methods to appropriately assess the processes and impacts of interventions. Methods should be tailored to the problem at hand and the resources available.

Methods used may include: a desk Survey (Secondary data), informal and formal stakeholder interviews, focus groups, and data triangulation.

### 5.1 Desk Survey

The desk top survey will entail a detailed review of relevant project documents that will be availed by TMEA and the project partners. These will include the Uganda & Rwanda programme Strategies and Business Plans; Projects Appraisal Reports (PAR), projects work plans, monitoring plans (including results chains), risk plans, quarterly and annual progress reports, consultants' progress reports, and end of project evaluations as well as TMEA Theory of Change/Strategy among others. The Evaluators will also analyse relevant secondary data including relevant policies and technical data on areas like time and cost of shipping and consumer prices.

### 5.2 Level of Effort Implementation Issues

For a significant number of the projects, reviews & evaluations will have been undertaken by the time of this evaluation so the analytical work will be less labour intensive. There are also project periodic reports, baseline survey's and other relevant documents for this process which will make the desk survey a major part of the evaluation process. Most of the projects and key stakeholders are within the capital cities and in the cases where travel outside the capitals will be required, the infrastructure and accessibility is good and so will not be very demanding. Internet access is reasonable and administrative and logistical services are available so the consultancy will not be demanding in these areas.

The evaluators should be configured to provide adequate skills, experience & language skills (French is needed for Rwanda and English is adequate for Uganda). Ideally a single team with two separate sub-teams covering Uganda & Rwanda should be the arrangement as it would enable concurrent fieldwork, but other arrangements will be considered.

### 5.3 Interviews and focus group discussions

The evaluators will have the option of conducting structured and semi structured interviews as well as focus group discussions and Key informant interviews. Due attention will be paid to language to ensure effective communication. People that will be interviewed will include TMEA Programme staff and Director, Projects staff and Senior Management, Staff of partner agencies, relevant consultants & selected members of the National Oversight committee's (NOC's). More in-depth interviews may be undertaken as required.

### 5.4 Case studies and Project Site visits:

The project sites will be visited and the target beneficiaries will be interviewed to ascertain their perspective and experiences. When possible, photos, video clips and audio recordings of the interviews will be collected. Case studies showcasing positive impact should be developed where applicable.

Information from different sources, e.g. existing documentation and interviews, focus group discussions will be triangulated to ensure its validity. The Evaluators team will develop an assessment tool, outlining the evaluation methods being used and share these with TMEA for feedback so that they are in line with TMEA's policies & standards.

### 6. Expected deliverables

The Evaluators are expected to provide the TMEA with the following deliverables:

- · A detailed inception report with a work plan and draft data collection tools two weeks after signing the contract. The detailed inception report should comprehensively demonstrate the technical approach (and data collection tools) that will be effectively and efficiently address the Uganda & Rwanda phase 1a evaluation questions within the consultancy timeframe;
- $\cdot$  A 1st draft evaluation report of the Uganda as well as the Rwanda phase 1a evaluations will be presented to TMEA and the JEG for their evaluation and input;
- · A 2nd draft evaluation report for the Uganda as well as the Rwanda phase 1a evaluations will be presented to the Joint Evaluation Group committee, TMEA Senior Management and

Leadership Teams and Rwanda & Uganda Country Teams;

· Final evaluation reports for Uganda & Rwanda phase 1a will be presented to the Uganda & Rwanda National Oversight Committee's and the TMEA Programme Investment Committee (PIC) for adoption. The final reports will be a written report (MS Word) with an executive summary and a Power point presentation on key findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Annexes will provide detailed information collected during field visits (focus discussion reports, summaries of interview sheets, summaries of responses to questionnaires); and

· During the interviews and trips, the Evaluators will take photos at project sites and record and take some photos during some of the interviews of the stakeholders that will be submitted along with the reports at the end of the Uganda & phase 1a evaluations.

The evaluation reports shall be written in English, be of no more than 20 pages (excluding annexes), use numbered paragraphs and should be structured into 3 sections; the first part will be devoted to the evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the project; the second part will provide an analysis of sustainability and the opportunities scaling up; and the third part will focus on recommendations for future. Annexes will provide detailed information collected during field visits (focus discussion reports, summaries of interview sheets, summaries of responses to questionnaires).

During the interviews and trips, the Evaluators will take photos at project sites and record and take photos during some of the interviews of the stakeholders & project sites that will be submitted along with the reports at the end of the evaluation. For these multimedia products, email and phone contacts will be provided.

### 7. Commencement date and period of execution

The Country evaluations will each be executed over a period of 8 weeks. A detailed work plan with clear and measureable deliverables and timelines should be included in the technical proposal for this consultancy and the awarded consultant(s) will develop and finalise the proposed work plan and budget (as part of the inception report) within 1 week of starting the assignment.

Schedule of deliverables

### **Date Deliverables**

Date	Deliverables
	Contract Signed
7 Working days after Contract Inception Report	First draft evaluation report
21 Working days after receipt of TMEA	1 <sup>st</sup> draft phase 1a evaluation report
comments on Inception Report	
7 Working days after receipt of TMEA	Final draft evaluation report
comments on the 2 <sup>nd</sup> draft phase 1a evaluation	
report	

### 8. Budget Uganda & Rwanda Phase 1a evaluations

The overall budget for these 2 evaluations will not exceed USD 300,000.00 for an estimated 8 weeks.

Any bidder whose Financial proposal exceeds USD 300,000.00, shall be disqualified.

### 9. The Evaluation Team Composition and Required Competencies

To ensure the independence of the evaluations, and the credibility of the findings, the evaluations will be conducted by a team of external consultants identified through a transparent selection process.

The team will include members with an appropriate balance of expertise in evaluation methodologies, relevant technical expertise and practical experience. For local and regional context, the team should ideally include an experienced East African. The evaluation team leader is expected to be evaluation professional with substantial successful experience leading and managing complex evaluation assignments, particularly relating to Country Development Programme's and have indepth knowledge of the latest evaluation methodologies and strong knowledge and experience in Trade & Markets and Private Sector Development. The team leader should have at least 10 years' experience. The team should have a member with strong experience in evaluation of Trade & Market development programmes and ideally regional integration as well as someone with good qualitative and quantitative skills. The team should have among them fluency in English, French and ideally have

some local language skills. Provision should be made when the need arises for interpreters local languages to facilitate effective communication when needed.

The evaluation team should combine the following expertise and experience:

- · Experience of designing and undertaking evaluations of multi-component development programmes, using mixed methods approaches that meet recognised standards for credibility and rigor;
- · Education qualification of at least a Master's Degree (Team Leader & technical Team members) in Development Studies, Economics or relevant Social Sciences;
- · Demonstrated experience of using evaluations as a tool for lesson-learning both during programme implementation and beyond;
- · Strong stakeholder management skills and ability to work flexibly with donors, partner countries, private sector entities; demonstrated ability to manage and sensitive relationships tactfully and productively;
- · Strong understanding of the strengths and limitations of different designs and how to interpret and present findings accurately to both researchers and non-researchers;
- · Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of various quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies for demonstrating impact;
- · In-depth knowledge of trade issues, particularly in East Africa (ideally Rwanda & Uganda), and experience of working on evaluations of customs management systems, trade policies and programmes;
- · Understanding of the possible impact of efficient Customs trade systems and processes to trade and a range of other areas (e.g. business costs, revenues, poverty) on different segments of the population, and ability to generate data to analyse project/programme effects for these (e.g. women vs. men, low income vs. middle income, rural vs. urban, etc.);
- · Understanding of social inclusion and gender issues in programming in East Africa;
- · Strong communication skills being strategic as well as able to communicate complex studies and findings in an accessible way for non-technical people; and
- · Selected company should have quality assurance processes in place.

10.	Imp	lementation	Arrangements
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The Evaluation Panel:

The phase Evaluators will be responsible for all logistical arrangements required to conduct the evaluation work. TMEA will facilitate convening of meetings and site visits where necessary. All relevant expenses should be covered by the evaluation contract budget.

The Evaluators will report to TMEA Results Director, who will manage day to day contractual and organisational issues with the evaluation team, monitor implementation progress, and provide progress updates to the Joint Evaluation Group (JEG). The evaluation consultants will work closely with the TMEA enhanced trade environment regional and national teams, Strategic Objective Team Leader, and relevant partner staff.

Governance and quality assurance may be further strengthened by peer evaluations. The role of the peer evaluators is to evaluate the scientific and technical quality of the independent evaluation; to ensure that the design and implementation of the evaluation is robust and credible & unbiased, and will stand up to external scrutiny.

The phase evaluation reports will be presented to the JEG and subsequently to the TMEA Uganda & Rwanda programme National Oversight Committee (NOC) and the TMEA programme Investment Committee (PIC) for evaluation, quality assurance, acceptance and final sign off.

# Annex 2: List of Meetings and Interviews Held

Date	Person	Title	Institution	Project	Organization Type
22-Sep	DamaliSsilli	Programme Officer	TMEA UCP	M&E	TMEA
22-Sep	Moses Sabiiti Senior Programme Manager TMEA		TMEA UCP	URA	TMEA
22-Sep	Moses Sabiiti	Senior Programme Manager	TMEA UCP	NTB	TMEA
23-Sep	Moses Sabiiti	Senior Programme Manager	TMEA UCP	MEACA	TMEA
2-Sep	Moses Sabiiti	Senior Programme Manager	TMEA UCP	UNBS	TMEA
23-Sep	George Wolf	Sr. Director for physical market access	TMEA Corporate	OSBPs, Mirama Hills Road	TMEA
23-Sep	Allen Sophia Asiimwe	UCP Country Director	TMEA UCP	Management	TMEA
23-Sep	Sjoerd Visser	Director, OSBP	TMEA Corporate	Busia, Mirama Hills Road	TMEA
29-Sep	Annette Mutaawe	Chief Strategy & Results Officer	TMEA Corporate	M&E	TMEA
24-Sep	David Stanton	Deputy CEO	TMEA Corporate	Management	TMEA
30-Sep	Jose Maciel	Director NTBs & Standards	TMEA Corporate	UNBS, NTB	TMEA
29-Sep	Margaret Magera	Senior Programme Advisor	DANIDA	All, NOC	Donor
24-Sep	Ephraim Sentamu Kaddu	Secretary General	KACITA Uganda	UNBS	PSO
24-Sep	Alex Manzi	CEO	Uganda Shippers Council	NTB, URA, OSBP, UNBS	PSO
1-Oct	Thembo Mwesigwa	Executive Director	The Grain Council of Uganda	UNBS, SEATINI, URA, OBPS	CSO
23-Sep	Michael Ojatum	OSBP Manager for Uganda	TMEA UCP	OSBP	TMEA
2-Oct	Henry Gidudu	Consultant	Imani Consulting	MEACA	Consultant

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25-Sep	Katamba Francis	Principal Economist / Head Planning Unit	MEACA	MEACA	Partner
25-Sep	Edith Nsajja Mwanje	Permanent Secretary / Chairperson NOC	MEACA	MEACA, NOC	Partner
25-Sep	Hez Kimoomi Alinda	Principal Policy Analyst / Head Policy Unit	MEACA	MEACA	Partner
28-Sep	Martin Olwa, PE	Project Officer	UNRA	Mirama Hills Road	Partner
23-Sep	Vincent Rudahunga	Programme Manager Infrastructure, SO1	TMEA Corporate	Mirama Hills Road	TMEA
28-Sep	Kassim Omar	Chairman, NMC private sector	NMC	NTB, URA	Beneficiary
28-Sep	Kinene Byron	Chairman	Regional Lorry Drivers & Transporters Association / NMC	NTB, URA	Beneficiary
28-Sep	Joseph Ssemakula	Principal Economist	Office of the President	NTB	GoU
28-Sep	Dr. Steven Kasiima	Director, Traffic and Road Safety	Uganda Police Force	NTB	Partner
29-Sep	Sandra Kirenga	Project Officer	TMEA UCP	SEATINI	TMEA
29-Sep	Vicky Tumwebaze	Temporary Project Manager	TMEA UCP	SEATINI	TMEA
23-Sep	Lina Asiimwe	Programme Officer	SEATINI	SEATINI	Partner
23-Sep	Alana Ammanuen	Assistant PO	SEATINI	SEATINI	Partner
25-Sep	Ainebyona Denis	Programme Coordinator	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives	NTB, QUISP/UNBS	Partner
25-Sept	Emmanuel Atwiine	Commercial Officer	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives	NTB Project Manager	Partner
1-Oct	Deus Mubangizi	Manager, Testing Department	UNBS	UNBS	Partner
28-Sep	Mugeni Joseph Francis	Imports Manager	Roofings, Ltd	URA, NTB, UNBS	Beneficiary
2-Oct	Al-Hajj Jaffer Farjallah	Managing Director	Jaffer Freighters, Clearing & Forwarding	URA, NTB	Beneficiary
2-Oct	Leah Mambaliswa	Clearing Agent	Jaffer Freighters, Clearing & Forwarding	URA, NTB	Beneficiary
2-Oct	Joseph Ssakabira	Logistics Coordinator	Hima Cement / LaFarge	URA NTB	Beneficiary
2-Oct	B. W. Rwabwogo	General Manager - Operations	Mukwano Group of Companies	URA, NTB, UNBS	Beneficiary
25-Sep	Sarah Mwesigye	Assistant Commissioner, Field Services	URA, Customs Department	URA	Partner
25-Sep	Mutebi Tobias William	Supervisor - Customs Business Systems Enhancement	URA	URA	Partner
25-Sep	Angela AchiengBarungi	Project Coordinator	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives	UNBS	Partner
24-Sep	Alban Odhiambo	Sr. Programme Manager	TMEA Corporate	OSBP	TMEA
14-Oct	Johanna Polvi	Consultant	Jpolvi Consulting	NTBs	Consultant
1-Oct	Various Farmers (3)	Farmer 1		SEATINI	Beneficiary
1-Oct	Local Government Rep	Farmer 2		SEATINI	Beneficiary

1-Oct	PSO Rep	Farmer 3		SEATINI	PSO
1-Oct	SEATINI Staff (2)	Local Official 1		SEATINI	Partner
5-Oct	George Kanyomoozi	Programme Officer	DfID	NOC	Donor
5-Oct	Christine Mugoya	Deputy Programme Manager	DfID	NOC	Donor
5-Oct	Sofie Berghald	First Secretary, Economic Growth and Employment	SIDA	NOC, UNBS	Donor
7-Oct	Makena Mwiti	Director, Gender	TMEA Corporate	All	TMEA
9-Sep	Rona Serwadda	Commissioner	MEACA	MEACA, NOC	Partner
9-Sep	Martin Lutaaya	Economist and Technical officer, EAMS	MEACA	MEACA	Partner
9-Sep	Daniel Mugulusi	Undersecretary	MEACA	MEACA	Partner
9-Sep	James Kisaale	Assistant Commissioner, Customs Enforcement	URA	URA	Partner
9-Sep	Dickson Kateshumbwa	Commissioner, Customs	URA	URA	Partner
9-Sep	Magera Stephen	Assistant Commissioner, Trade	URA	URA	Partner
9-Sep	BenonKajuna	Director of Transport	MoWT	OSBP	Partner
9-Sep	Eng Wilfred Okello	Assistant Comissioner/Chief Materials Engineer	MoWT	OSBP	Partner
10-Sep	Silver Ojakol	Commissioner, External Trade	MTIC	NTB, Standards	Partner
10-Sep	Francis Koluo	Principal Commercial Officer	MTIC	NTB, Standards	Partner
10-Sep	Jane Nalunga	Country Director, SEATINI	CSO	Standards	cso
10-Sep	Kirabira George Kamya	Farmer	SEATINI	Standards	CSO
10-Sep	Charles Kareba	Chairperson USC, and Forwarder	USC	Standards/Advocacy, NTB	PSO
10-Sep	GududaBasaza,	Chairperson	UWEA	RI	cso
10-Sep	Monica Malega	Program Officer, Research Policy and Advocacy	UWEA	RI	CSO
11-Sep	Jorn Leeksma	First secretary economic cooperation,	Netherlanda	NOC	Donor
11-Sep	Sophie Berghald	First Secretary, SIDA	Embassy of Sweden	NOC	Donor
11-Sep	Chris Bold	Growth and Resilience Advisor	DfID	Growth and Resilience Advisor	Donor
11-Sep	Jackie Wakweya	Private Sector Development	USAID	NOC	Donor
11-Sep	Herbert Byaruhanga	President	UTB	RI	Partner
11-Sep	Jackie Kuteesa	Investment Officer	UTB		Partner
11-Sep	Luseesa David	Programme Manager	The Grain Council of Uganda	Standards	Partner
12-Sep	Moses Ogwampus	Assistant Commissioner, Tax Policy Department	Ministry of Finance	GOU	Partner
12-Sep	Tumwesigye Simon	Supervisor	URA	URA	Partner
12-Sep	Kirevu Siriman	Site in Charge	Contractor OSBP	OSPB	PSO
12-Sep	Egessa Arafat	Chairman UCIFA-Busia	Contractor OSBP	URA, Trade facilitation	Partner
15-Sep	Young Avraham (ASHI)	CEO	GFI	Standards	Partner

15-Sep Bagonza Yus	uf Customs Officer	URA	URA	Partner
15-Sep <b>Mujasi Hilary Owor</b>	Customs Officer	URA	URA	Partner

# **Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology**

## Project Selection Criteria

Selection Criteria	Rationale for Criteria
Project evaluability	Capacity of the project to be evaluated by this evaluation, as determined by:
	The existence of a results chain
	The existence of baseline data
	<ul> <li>Project duration (projects must have operated for a minimum length of time for it to be reasonable to expect results)</li> </ul>
Representativeness of the portfolio	<ul> <li>The evaluation is meant to draw conclusions from a representative sample of the performance of TMEA's country portfolio. Therefore the selected projects must adequately represent key characteristics of the portfolio. This can be approximated by considering:         <ul> <li>Investment size. Priority will be placed on projects with larger budgets, as these represent a larger percentage of TMEA's total investment</li> <li>Representativeness of the various project types. Looking at projects from the various parts of the TMEA project portfolio will enable a comprehensive understanding of the results emerging from across the portfolio and permit an assessment of the projects with better or worse performance. An effort will be made to include projects from the different major TMEA programme outputs.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Project has not already been evaluated	TMEA's value for money of the evaluation will be maximized by building on information already available and thus not re-evaluating projects that
	have already been evaluated.

Evaluation methodology accompanies this report. The following table presents an evaluation rubric<sup>53</sup> that was applied by the evaluation team to both the country programme overall and to the constituent projects that were selected for in-depth analysis.

		Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
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 $<sup>^{53}</sup>$  The following rubric has been adapted from a rubric shared by TMEA and developed by Dr. Donna Loveridge.

		Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non-fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE	Project clarity and logic	The project logic is undefined or has several missing elements. It is mostly impossible to see the relationship between most of 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. There may be large leaps in logic between outputs and outcomes e.g. leap from an output to a long term outcome. Few or no outcomes appear realistic. Assumptions are not included or only minimally outlined. Where assumptions are noted they do not appear relevant. Most project implementers have a poor understanding of the programme logic, a weak or superficial understanding of the problem, and the relationship between the parts and cannot or can only weakly explain the logic and reasoning to others.	The project logic is partially explained (with quite a few exceptions). It is possible to see only some of the relationships between most of 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. There are some leaps in logic between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes do not always appear realistic. Assumptions are only sometimes included or when included do not always appear entirely appropriate or relevant. Most project implementers have a basic understanding of the programme logic and the problem being addressed, and the relationship between the parts and cannot fully explain the logic and reasoning to others. Perhaps only the project, rationale and problem.	The project has a solid logic. It is mostly clear and easy to understand the relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. However, there are some points that could be strengthened. Outcomes appear realistic. Assumptions are mostly included. Most outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. Most project implementers have a good understanding of the programme logic, the problem being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can explain the logic and reasoning to others.	The project has a strong logic, which is a clear and easy to understand relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes appear very realistic. Assumptions are explicit and relevant. The outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. All project implementers have an excellent understanding of the programme logic, the problem that is being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can convincingly explain the logic to others.

Most expected outputs/outcomes are Most relevant the strategies Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy outputs/outcomes of TMEA, the partner appear to have only organisations, the EAC, partial relevance to The expected the target government outcomes are highly strategies of TMEA, and target the partner relevant to the The outputs and beneficiaries, as strategies of TMEA, organisations, the EAC, outcomes appear to applicable. It is mostly the target government the partner have very limited or no clear how they and target organisations, the EAC, relevance to the contribute to beneficiaries, as the target government strategies of TMEA, aggregate strategic applicable. It is not and target the partner outcomes and very clear how they beneficiaries, as organisations, the EAC, contribute to a contribute to TMEA's applicable. It is clear the target government coherent TMEA aggregate strategic how they contribute to and target strategy. Where there outcomes. Where aggregate strategic beneficiaries, as are discrepancies in there are discrepancies outcomes and applicable. They are the relevance to the in the relevance to the contribute to a not consistent and various organizations, various actors, the coherent TMEA complementary with the organisations have organisations have an strategy. Interventions activities supported by a good understanding are fully consistent and adequate projects in TMEA of the issues and understanding of this. complementary with and/or by other donor implications for the Interventions are activities supported by organizations. organisations. partially consistent and projects in TMEA Interventions are complementary with and/or by other donor mostly consistent and activities supported by organizations. complementary with projects in TMEA activities supported by and/or by other donor projects in TMEA organizations. and/or by other donor organizations.

Adaptive management of plans and budgets

The project team rarely identifies and understands operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are often not well founded but provide few or limited insights. The project manager and team is nearly always reactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs, very rarely outcomes) and rarely implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is infrequently alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team often does not follow funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is rarely analysed and project plan adjusted. Monitoring rarely occurs and is frequently not based on updated and complete MPs. There is no evidence that innovations or best practices have been used during project management.

The project team identifies and understands a few of the strategic and some of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are sometimes well founded but provide few insights. The project manager and team are normally reactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and sometimes implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is sometimes alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team sometimes follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is only sometimes analysed and project plan adjusted accordingly. Monitoring occurs on an ad-hoc basis and is not always based on updated and complete MPs.There is limited evidence that innovations or best practices have been used during project management.

The project team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are usually well founded and provide some insights. The project manager and team are normally proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and usually implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is mostly alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team usually follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is periodically analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure activities, outputs and outcomes are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs on a regular basis and is mostly based on updated and complete MPs.There is moderate evidence that innovations or

best practices have

The project team identifies and understands all of the strategic and operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are well founded and insightful. The project manager and team is always proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (outputs and outcomes) and implementing actions to avert or overcome them, enlisting others support where necessary. The funder is alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the implementing organisation always follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is regularly analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure they are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs systematically and is based on updated and complete MPs. There is strong evidence that innovations or best practices have been used during project management.

			been used during project management.	
Relationship management and communication	Mostly, the project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders poorly and infrequently and there is not a clear or agreed understanding of the others roles and responsibilities. The parties put limited effort into building and maintaining working relations. Face-to-face communication occurs infrequently and verbal and written communications often does not provide useful implementation insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always late and incomplete, with	Mostly, the project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders adequately and face-to-face communication occurs on a mostly periodically basis (e.g. less than quarterly). There is not always a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities and the parties put in mostly adequate effort into maintaining working relations. Verbal and written communications sometimes provide useful implementation insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Although, quite often	Mostly, the project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders proactively and face-to-face communication occurs on a mostly regular basis (e.g. quarterly). Stakeholders and the project team have a good and common understanding of theirs, and each other's, roles and responsibilities. Most parties take time to build and maintain effective working relations.  Communication is fairly open and mostly constructive. Verbal and written communications generally provides useful implementation insights, lessons	The project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders proactively and faceto-face communication occurs on a regular basis (e.g. monthly). Stakeholders and the project team have a good and common understanding of theirs, and each other's, roles and responsibilities. All parties put in considerable effort to build and maintain effective working relations.  Communication is open, trusting and constructive. Verbal and written communications systematically provide useful implementation insights, lessons

		many inaccuracies. Follow-up is always needed. Reporting against the monitoring plan is very partial or does not occur at all. It is difficult to get a picture of performance.	elements are incomplete. Regular project monitoring reports are often late, and have a number of inaccuracies or are incomplete. Only a partial picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans are presented. Often follow-up or clarification is needed.	learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are mostly received on time, are mostly accurate, and usually results orientated in that they provide a picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans. Only little follow-up or clarification is needed.	learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always received on time, are accurate, informative and results orientated in that they provide a clear picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans.
	Additionality	There is evidence that the project or initiative would have occurred even without TMEA funding.	There is unclear evidence on whether the project or initiative would have occurred even without TMEA funding.	There is evidence that the project or initiative would not have occurred without TMEA funding.	There is strong evidence that the project or initiative would have not occurred without TMEA funding.
	Translating inputs into outputs	The planned (original or agreed readjusted) outputs are often of inadequate quality and rarely produced in a timely manner. Produced outputs sometimes do not appear relevant. The targets are not or only very partially achieved. The project is completed or expected to be completed more than 6 months after originally planned.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted) outputs are only sometimes of adequate quality and sometimes produced in a timely manner. Produced outputs sometimes do not appear relevant. The targets achieved are only partially the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 3 and 6	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a timely manner, are of a very good quality and remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are those that are planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed early or within 1 month of the expected completion date.

			months are the original end date.		Most (e.g. 75% +)
EFFECTIVENESS	Translating outputs to outcomes, including gender	Few (> 25%) outcomes/targets achieved (at project- level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement peaks at short-term outcomes (or below - outputs only). Where implementation is on- going, there is little evidence of outcomes being achieved. No consideration has been taken of gender issues.	Some (25 to 50%) outcomes/targets achieved (at project- level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievements mostly focus on short term outcomes. Where implementation is on- going there is partial evidence that some short term outcomes are being achieved. Limited consideration has been taken of gender issues, even if superficially.	A majority (50 to 75%) of outcomes/targets are achieved (at project-level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement predominantly focuses on short and medium term outcomes. Where implementation is ongoing, there is good evidence that short term outcomes are being achieved. Moderate consideration has been taken of gender issues; if implementation is advanced some gender-positive changes have been observed.	outcomes/targets are achieved (at project-level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement peaks at long-term outcomes and changes have occurred at short and medium term outcomes also. Where implementation is still occurring, there is good evidence that short and medium term outcomes/targets are being achieved. Strong consideration has been taken of gender issues; if implementation is advanced many gender-positive changes have been observed.

SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	No activities are included to address sustainability. The project doesn't clearly articulate changes beyond outputs. And an exit strategy does not exist.	A few activities are included to address sustainability although they are not always clear. Only a few outcomes are being monitored for sustainability. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated and includes a description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Several ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad plan of how to fund these, although plans may not always be realistic.	Several activities are included to address sustainability and are mostly clear and relevant. Monitoring of the sustainability of some of the outcomes is planned or undertaken. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated. The strategy includes a broad description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Most ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad and realistic plan of how to fund these.	and relevant activities have been included to address sustainability. Monitoring of the sustainability of outcomes is undertaken (or planned). In the best examples, monitoring of outcomes goes beyond the project timeframe. A clear and comprehensive exit strategy was included in the design and is fully up to date. The strategy includes a clear description of how project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion.  Responsibilities for implementing the exit strategy are outlined.  All on-going maintenance or operational costs have been thoroughly costed and the organisation has set aside funds to pay for these (or has a plan in place to secure funds in adequate time before project funds are completed). For advanced or completed projects, there is evidence of responsibilities having been fully institutionalized.
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There has been some There has been strong intended or intended or There has been unintended progress unintended progress substantial intended or There has been no or (25-50%) towards longtowards impacts (50unintended progress limited intended or term outcomes (i.e., 75%) on long-term towards impacts unintended progress Increasing physical outcomes (i.e., (75%+) on long-term (0-25%) towards longaccess to markets; Increasing physical outcomes (i.e., term outcomes (i.e., Increasing physical Enhancing trade access to markets; Increasing physical access to markets; access to markets; environment and Enhancing trade Enhancing trade improving business environment and Enhancing trade Achieving long-term outcomes environment and competitiveness), or improving business environment and improving business this is moderately competitiveness), or improving business competitiveness), or this is likely to occur in likely to occur in competitiveness). this is very unlikely to occur in future. Little future. Some future. Measurement Measurement of the or no measurement of measurement of the of the project's project's contribution the project's project's contribution contribution to these to these outcomes has contribution to these outcomes has been to these outcomes has been completed, and outcomes has been been completed, and completed, and the the results chain completed, and the the results chain results chain convincingly results chain does not articulates the linkage convincingly articulates the linkage articulate the linkage to these ultimate to these ultimate articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts. No impacts (whether to these ultimate impacts. Strong consideration has been consideration has been impacts. Moderate convincing or not). taken of differential Limited consideration consideration has been taken of differential impacts for men and taken of differential impacts for men and has been taken of women. differential impacts for impacts for men and women. men and women. women.

# Annex 4: Summary of Project and Programme Assessment Matrices<sup>54</sup>

Project Name: Mirama Hills Road

**Project Code: 1042** 

Project Type: Road

OVERALL Needs improvement Moderately good Good Very good

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Readers should note that details, for each project, on additionality, can be found in the effectiveness section of each project table. Additionality was originally assessed as a component of effectiveness but was later reorganized into the efficiency section to improve clarity of presentation.

		Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non-fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE	Project clarity and logic	The Mirama Hills Road project has a relatively simple, straight-forward logic which is easy to understand and which all stakeholders interviewed could describe, explain and defend. Any shortfalls in the implementation of project do not appear to emanate from the structure and logic of the project, but rather in unanticipated risks related to procurement and project administration.  However we do note two area where the project logic does not connect as well as possible to project activities  (1) The highest level long-term outcome in the project results chain is "increased efficiency in cross border processing at the Mirama Hills OSBP". While we believe this is a likely outcome of the two projects – Mirama Hills Road and OSBP - it is not actually a supported outcome of the project activities which, on their own, are more likely to achieve increased throughput and improved safety on UG-RW transport trips. However, we do not find this lack of a direct link from project activities to highest level outcome to be a significant flaw, as the project is clearly conceived of as a part of the overall OSBP project.  (2) One intermediate outcome of the project is increased awareness of the upgraded road among transporters. We find this to be a likely outcome of the planned awareness meeting outputs. However, the results chain links this intermediate outcome to road commissioning. It ii more likely however, to support increased traffic on the road, a higher level outcome in the results chain. This possible error in results chain logic is unlikely to have an impact on project success, or the ability to monitor and evaluate the project in the future.		The project has a strong logic, which is a clear and easy to understand relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes appear very realistic. Assumptions are explicit and relevant. The outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. All project implementers have an excellent understanding of the programme logic, the problem that is being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can convincingly explain the logic to others.	

The Expected outcome for the Mirama Hills Road Project is increased efficiency in cross-border processing at the Mirama OSBP. We believe this is highly relevant to TMEA's strategy as well as to the primary partner, UNRA. Target beneficiaries of the road are potential users of the OSBP at Mirama Hills. Access to and usage of the OSBP hinges upon an accessible route, which this project provides. Without such a route, it is unlikely that transporters will shift away from the Gatuna Border Post which carries most current goods to Rwanda. Review of the Mirama Hills OSBP documentation and studies indicates a strong likelihood that if such a shift is enabled, vehicles will opt to utilize the Mirama Hills OSBP and significant time savings will be experienced – both in transit due to the difficult conditions faced on the Gatuna road and due to improved process, service and facilities at the Mirama Hills OSBP as compared to the Gatuna Border Post. In this way, not only is the logic of the project supported, it demonstrates strong linkages to other TMEA interventions in the region. Further, transporters described the route as preferential, particularly during rainy periods, to the current hilly route to Gatuna where accidents are quite common. The project aligns well with GoU priorities, as is demonstrated by the keen interest of the office of President in the project. Further it aligns well with EAC priorities as it will enable improved transport access and facilities to Rwanda shippers and generally will improve the norther corridor.

However, we do have some concerns about the achievement of expected benefits in two categories:

- (1) The need for OSBPs in general may be obviated by further regional integration, specifically implementation of the Single Customs Territory. Once the SCT is implemented in full, customs inspection and clearance at land borders may no longer be necessary. In such a case, however, the road itself would still provide a safer, more reliable, and possibly quicker route to Rwanda than the existing route via Gatuna.
- (2) The monitoring plan expresses additional hoped for outcomes beyond time savings at the OSBP. Namely, The Monitoring Plan States:

"The project will upgrade the Ntungamo- Mirama Hills Road (37Km) from gravel to bitumen standard. The road will improve access to goods/passenger transport services and reduce transport costs along the Kampala-Kigali route. The road will also improve access to social and economic development opportunities for communities living along the route and will ensure that no roadside communities become worse off as a result of the road upgrading works"

We have some concern that the process of ROW acquisition has created hardship for the local communities, both in terms of the speed of payment, and in terms of the rate of reimbursement, which is government by GoU policy. The road may improve mobility for local communities, but forecast usage focuses primarily on through traffic. The community around the OSBP may experience economic benefit due to increased market for goods and food and hoteling opportunities. However, any opportunities in this area would be net transfers away from the communities around the Gatuna Border Post. Only total growth in Uganda – Rwanda traffic could result in net gains in this area.

Most expected outputs/outcomes are relevant the strategies of TMEA, the partner organisations, the EAC, the target government and target beneficiaries, as applicable. It is mostly clear how they contribute to aggregate strategic outcomes and contribute to a coherent TMEA strategy. Where there are discrepancies in the relevance to the various organizations, the organisations have a good understanding of the issues and implications for the organisations. Interventions are mostly consistent and complementary with activities supported by projects in TMEA and/or by other donor organizations.

FFICIENCY

Adaptive management of plans and budgets

At time of writing, the Mirama Hills Road project is about 6 months behind schedule (51% of contact time elapsed, 23% of project complete). There have been delays in both ROW acquisition and in contractor performance. ROW acquisition delays are a results of GoU process difficulties in price negotiation and particularly in payment for land taken. Contractor performance delays resulted from very slow mobilization and internal contractor communication issues. Stakeholders agree that slow mobilization is not a result of contractor cashflow issues as the contract allowed for a 20% advance. Given the contractor performance issues, partners are rightly concerned about project success. However, both UNRA and TMEA has been proactive in addressing concerns with the contractor, establishing a regular monitoring program and assisting the contractor with resolving issues. While the project is behind schedule, it has reduced delay by about 50% over the past three months. The system for payment, with TMEA holding funds and approving all payments, has adequately assured financial controls. TMEA also used its own internal guidelines for procurement which has both positive and negative consequences: Procurement was done significantly faster than would otherwise have happened under GoU processes. Procurement was completed in 90 days, which is a record for Uganda, though it did take longer than anticipated, none-the-less. Procurement under TMEA guidelines also assured that the project was protected from a later corruption crisis that enveloped the project partner, UNRA, and experienced no related delays as has happened with other current UNRA projects. On the other hand, TMEA's practice of running procurement through Nairobi has the consequence of distancing the procurement process from the local context. While TMEA expresses believe that there was full ownership of the procurement by the partner, other stakeholders has expressed contrary opinions and point to this issue as a cause for poor contractor performance. The selected contractor had never before completed work in Uganda and some stakeholders believe they were not adequately prepared for the specific challenges of working in this country. Further they suggest that had procurement been conducted out of Kampala, understanding of local conditions might have been better considered in the procurement process. There is no specific evidence that this belief is accurate.

Donors have been regularly apprised of the financial position of the project and of the issue of delays. The project receives regular attention at the NOC meetings each quarter, as well as at quarterly donor meetings. Further the project has been an area of intense focus from the office of the President, with the project team receiving multiple requests for progress briefing each week. Perhaps due to this external pressure, and the general pressure resulting from contractor mobilization delay, the project plan and implementation is continuously monitored. Project stakeholders visit the site regularly (at least once per month) and monitoring occurs continuously. The most innovative aspect of project management, which has largely proceeded using very standard UNRA procedures, has been the use of a hard time limit progress requirement given as an ultimatum to the contractor. This appears to have worked, resulting in a significant (if not complete) reduction of project delay.

The project team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are usually well founded and provide some insights. The project manager and team are normally proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and usually implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is mostly alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team usually follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is periodically analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure activities, outputs and outcomes are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs on a regular basis and is mostly based on updated and complete MPs.There is moderate evidence

that innovations or best practices have been used during project management The project team The project team has proactively managed relationships with its key Relationship management stakeholders. In addition to the standard quarterly reports to the NOC, the and communication manages project team meets regularly with the contractor to review performance, relationships with key and particularly with contractor mobilization issues, the team has been stakeholders and highly active in regular review and project site visits. Project monitoring funders proactively has been regular, and due to the recent performance ultimatum to the and face-to-face contractor, has at times exceeded planned frequencies. The partner is communication highly experienced in infrastructure project monitoring. Because UNRA occurs on a regular has routine monitoring and reporting processes built into its projects, basis (e.g. monthly). monitoring has not been a learning process as was experienced by other Stakeholders and the partners for other projects. As a result, project monitoring data has been project team have a produced regularly, communicated on-time, and has met TMEA's needs for good and common reporting to its stakeholders. TMEA has maintained a good working understanding of relationship with its partners at UNRA. This may now be jeopardized, theirs, and each however, as UNRA is currently undergoing a complete reorganization that other's, roles and may involve significant staff turnover. responsibilities. All parties put in considerable effort to build and maintain effective working relations. Communication is open, trusting and constructive. Verbal and written communications systematically provide useful

			implementation insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always received on time, are accurate, informative and results orientated in that they provide a clear picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans.
	Translating inputs into outputs	Given that the project is still in construction, it is not yet known whether the quality of the outputs are relevant or sufficient. However, the project is significantly behind schedule, and while the contractor has made up some ground, the lack of completion of ROW acquisition, the lack of backup for key equipment (rock crusher, for example) and the overall slow progress relative to plan suggests that performance in this area is only partially adequate.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted) outputs are only sometimes of adequate quality and sometimes produced in a timely manner. Produced outputs sometimes do not appear relevant. The targets achieved are only partially the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 3 and 6 months are the original end date.
EFFECTIVENESS	Translating outputs to outcomes, including gender	Given that the project is still under construction, the extent to which targets will be ultimately achieved is not yet known. The long-term outcomes of the project include:  • Road commissioning by September 30, 2016; and • 30% reduction in border crossing time  However, several key outputs are not yet achieved indicating at least the potential for issues in this category. Given the delay in completion, it is entirely possible that the commissioning deadline may be missed. If the	Some (25 to 50%) outcomes/targets achieved(at project- level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievements mostly focus on short term outcomes. Where

		road is not completed, there will not be border crossers using enjoying the benefits of improved crossing time at the border post.  Further, while there has been consideration of Gender while devising the project, such consideration has been limited. No gender indicators were defined at project inception. Since inception, TMEA commissioned a gender study, determined road usage in gender-disaggregated terms, and included an HIV subsidy in the project. The monitoring plan includes a target outcome of a gender action plan established for the OSBP no later than 09/30/15, though the monitoring data indicates this not yet complete.	implementation is ongoing there is partial evidence that some short term outcomes are being achieved. Limited consideration has been taken of gender issues, even if superficially.
	Additionality	The consensus among stakeholders is that the Government of Uganda may have eventually funded construction of the Ntungamo-Mirama Hills road, but that it would have taken at least four more years to start, and the overall process would have also taken significantly longer. Partners and donors credit TMEA with spearheading the project and leveraging its own internal expertise to bring it forward.	There is evidence that the project or initiative would not have occurred without TMEA funding.
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	Sustainability of any road benefits are typically tied to the ongoing maintenance of the facility after construction. There is not clear agreement between the implementing partner (UNRA) and TMEA about the plan and requirements for such. TMEA is under the impression that the policy of the GoU for tarmac maintenance is no maintenance for 15 years and that the contractor's terms include 10 years civil liability for construction faults. UNRA, on the other hand, believes the liability period is 1 year, and states that maintenance is the responsibility of UNRA's Management Department, who will be tasked to carry our spot repair, periodic maintenance and overlay. The costs of this are to be covered by the Uganda Road Fund, a source with many competing needs and limited dedicated funds. This lack of mutual understanding of the maintenance requirements, responsible party, and funding source are indicative of needed planning, estimation of cost, and documentation of a maintenance plan. Further, UNRA is undergoing a complete reorganization that will likely involve significant staff turnover. As such, any staff capacity building undertaken may well be lost and the is no evidence that the road construction project has included activities to change institutional management approaches at UNRA that might be carried forward to future projects or the maintenance of this project.	A few activities are included to address sustainability although they are not always clear. Only a few outcomes are being monitored for sustainability. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated and includes a description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Several ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad plan of how to fund these, although plans may not always be realistic.

### There has been some There is reasonable evidence that, when complete, the project will exhibit substantial progress on long-term outcomes. The results chain intended or unintended progress adequately articulates the linkage from outputs to ultimate impacts. The impact category is currently ranked "moderately good" for two reasons: (25-50%) towards long-term outcomes (1) The project is not yet complete and is therefore unable (i.e., Increasing demonstrate adequate progress on outcomes to-date; and physical access to (2) Only limited consideration of differential impacts for men and markets; Enhancing women has been demonstrated. trade environment and improving Having said that, there is good evidence that the project will achieve a Achieving long-term outcomes business ranking of "good" to "very good" at the time of project completion. There competitiveness), or is a clearly demonstrated need for the project, it links very well to other this is moderately TMEA investments in the region, and its relationship to the programmatic likely to occur in goals of the programme are unambiguous. future. Some measurement of the project's contribution to these outcomes has been completed, and the results chain articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts (whether convincing or not). Limited consideration has been taken of differential impacts for men and women. We note two area where the project logic might be refined, if TMEA finds it useful to do so: (1) The highest level long-term outcome in the project results chain is "increased efficiency in cross border processing at the Mirama Hills OSBP". While we believe this is a likely outcome of the two projects - Mirama Hills Road and OSBP - it is not actually a supported outcome of the project activities which, on their own, are more likely to achieve increased diversion to Mirama Hills from Gatuna, or possibly increased throughput and improved safety on UG-RW transport trips. However, RECOMENDATIONS we do not find this lack of a direct link from project activities to highest level outcome to be a significant flaw, as the project is clearly conceived of as a part of the overall OSBP project. (2) One intermediate outcome of the project is increased awareness of the upgraded road among transporters. We find this to be a likely outcome of the planned awareness meeting outputs. However, the results chain links this intermediate outcome to road commissioning. It iis more likely however, to support increased traffic on the road, a higher level outcome in the results chain. This possible error in results chain logic is unlikely to have an impact on project success, or the ability to monitor and evaluate the project in the future.

Project Name: Busia OSPB IBM

**Project Code:** 1062

Project Type: OSBP

OVE	RALL	Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
		Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non-fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE	Project clarity and logic	to clear cargo at Busia bowhere all necessary officinandled at once other the handles 17.4% of the total the time spent on the boto and from Uganda. The translates to increased treatment of the spent on many drivers way than it used to be. The transport time and increasimproved implementation assumption that Kenya a EAC agreements. This assess for both governments and flagging it.  A 2012 traffic survey find at Busia, but interaction withat on average it takes as clearance time is not combut other improvements completion of the border reduced. The project staff rationale of the project in	ect is intended to reduce to parder post by constructing ers are housed so that com an having multiple clearant all Uganda volume of trade order, logically means the transcription that reduced rade (long term) is logical so will be saved since a driver he outcomes appear realist ased volumes, with an intended to the outcomes appear realist and Uganda cooperate and sumption is realistic becaused cannot operate without do that it takes on average with customs officials during a day to clear goods on the stributed by the OSBP since in URA systems might have a post, the average waiting if interacted with underston cluding the requirements of procedures for both Keron customs procedures.	The project has a strong logic, which is a clear and easy to understand relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes appear very realistic. Assumptions are explicit and relevant. The outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. All project implementers have an excellent understanding of the programme logic, the problem that is being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can convincingly explain the logic to others.	

Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy Adaptive management of plans and budgets

This project was originally under World Bank EATFB project to facilitate crossing times between Uganda and Kenya, and World Bank lacked adequate funding to continue funding up to the end. The design and expectations are thus in line with partner priorities like WB. The project also contributes to TMEA strategy of increasing trade volumes in EAC and outside as well as contributing to mandates of partner agencies like URA, MEACA and Government Agricultural departments, since they will be able to handle their clients in one location. This will ultimately increase overall customer satisfaction- those that directly interact with border officials and those happy with services at border posts after their goods have been timely transported. The integrated interventions including construction offices as well as construction of staff houses will increase retention of staff at Busia post because working conditions will improve. The approach at the border post also recognises that there will be training of human resources so that border staff are conversant with border processes, harmonisation of border procedures and that there will be enactment of institutional framework that guides border operations at Busia OSBP.

The expected outcomes are highly relevant to the strategies of TMEA, the partner organisations, the EAC, the target government and target beneficiaries, as applicable. It is clear how they contribute to aggregate strategic outcomes and contribute to a coherent TMEA strategy. Interventions are fully consistent and complementary with activities supported by projects in TMEA and/or by other donor organizations.

The project is implemented by the Ministry of Works through a project manager that works closely with contractor. All of them meet regularly (every two weeks) to report on progress and iron out any outstanding issues. There has however been problem of delayed approval of cost overruns due to lack of funds by the GOU to construct access roads at the OSBP. However, after discussions, the Ministry of Finance has taken it up and government is yet to issue out matching money to complete the access road. There was also need to work on staff houses to pave way for construction of parking yard, which was done and the management also resolved the issue of demarcation between Uganda and Kenya border which took some time and delayed the construction that would take place in that location. This was also finally resolved by both parties.

The project undertakes adaptive management utilising the power of a customized management information system where project plans are uploaded, updated if need be. They include workplans, risk plans that get updated when needed for instance risk plans are updated when a risk materializes. The Busia OSBP procurement of contractor was done under standard procurement guidelines but to reduce the potential delays, TMEA involved the services of a procurement expert to avoid hurdles with procurement right from the beginning. This is innovative utilisation of government procurement by ensuring that procurement gurus are involved and do advice on avenues of fast tracking and avoidance of likely challenges.

The project team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are usually well founded and provide some insights. The project manager and team are normally proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and usually implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is mostly alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team usually

management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is periodically analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure activities, outputs and outcomes are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs on a regular basis and is mostly based on updated and complete MPs.There is moderate evidence that innovations or best practices have been used during project management.

follows funder

# Relationship management and communication

The project management team maintains a clear line of communication with workers on the ground including the contractors and supervisors. There are regular platforms of interaction between these stakeholders, and there are regular progress reports from Busia (field) and TMEA regarding progress of procurement of for instance office equipment, payments to the contractor and government commitments to funding the project. The different project management team know their roles and responsibilities, including other partners on the border, who have since continued with their duties. However, there are some key stakeholders on the border post that are not aware of the intended use and management of the structure for instance the association of clearance agents has an earmarked office in the new structure but has not yet been informed of such an arrangements, because the structure is still gazzeted awaiting completion (at 85% completion by time of visit). This project is one that has been visited by high profile donors including DfID representatives, Netherlands ambassador and the region has hosted one of the NOC conferences thus becoming platform for communicating the work of TMEA and role in promoting CMP agenda.

Mostly, the project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders proactively and face-to-face communication occurs on a mostly regular basis (e.g. quarterly). Stakeholders and the project team have a good and common understanding of theirs, and each other's, roles and responsibilities. Most parties take time to build and maintain effective working relations. **Communication** is fairly open and mostly constructive. Verbal and written communications generally provides useful implementation insights, lessons

			learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are mostly received on time, are mostly accurate, and usually results orientated in that they provide a picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans. Only little follow-up or clarification is needed.
	Translating inputs into outputs	The project has met most of its outputs including training of border staff in border regulations using. However, there has been some delays in construction due to initial works to relocate government staff before erecting their structures which led to partial operation of the site. Much as the official plan was to complete the structure by October 2015, actual completion was slated for March 2016 according to practical estimate from site estimator.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date.
EFFECTIVENESS	Translating outputs to outcomes, including gender	Since the OBSP is not yet completed, it is very early to know if the outputs will lead to better outcomes. However, there are already good signs there will be reduced time of clearance from Kenya to Uganda and viceversa looking at the arrangements and the already observed time reductions from establishment of ASYCUDA world solution to URA. The border posts was also constructed with gender in mind, and there are both male and female provisions for lavatories. The grading provided here is based on expectation rather than observation, and is derived from observed behaviour, quality and progress pf works.	A majority (50 to 75%) of outcomes/targets are achieved (at project-level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement predominantly focuses on short and medium term outcomes. Where implementation is on-

			going, there is good evidence that short term outcomes are being achieved. Moderate consideration has been taken of gender issues; if implementation is advanced some gender-positive changes have been observed.
	Additionality	This project was inherited from the World Bank, and there were already plans but effecting these plans needed money which World Bank did not have. Much as the original designs were precursors to the support for this project, we feel that the speed and possibility of completing this project is highly attributed to TMEA funding. The results to be achieved by this project would have been possible but not as early as TMEA has fast tracked it.	There is strong evidence that the project or initiative would have not occurred without TMEA funding.
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	The eventual management of the OSBP is a sustainability plan. URA has been chosen to be the overall manager for the structure already exists, has a strong financial record and interest in ensuring that border operations are clean. On top of that, the structures constructed have got income generating avenues for instance gadgets for testing goods for quality, office rental fees and commercial recreational spaces like food centres. These will be utilised to provide for supplemental income to pay running the OSBP when TMEA funding ceases. There is a clear understanding of the different role of the actors  URA could maintain IBM at border. URA has both human resource and financial muscle (infrastructure and processes). Plus they know the process and bought in since inception.	Several activities are included to address sustainability and are mostly clear and relevant. Monitoring of the sustainability of some of the outcomes is planned or undertaken. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated. The strategy includes a broad description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Most ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad and realistic plan of how to fund these

### There has been strong intended or unintended progress towards impacts (50-75%) on long-term outcomes (i.e., **Increasing physical** access to markets; Enhancing trade environment and Achieving long-term outcomes Since the project has not yet been fully completed, it is possible to justify improving business impact, but there are already some indicators of changes in livelihoods that competitiveness), or can be demonstrated that have come up as a result of border operations. this is likely to occur in There is for instance upcoming traders in on the border to its increasing future. Measurement of the project's external outlook, selling various goods and services. To some tenants, they will definitely loose business as track drivers will spend less time on border contribution to these and there will also be less work for clearing agents. outcomes has been completed, and the results chain convincingly articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts. Moderate consideration has been taken of differential impacts for men and women.

**Project Name:** URA ASYCUDA World, AEO, ECTS

**Project Number:** 1044a, 1044b, 1056

**Project Type:** Revenue Authority Support

OVERALL	L	Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
		Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non-fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE Project clarity and logic	Project clarity and logic	considerable or high considerable or high degree		The project has a strong logic, which is a clear and easy to understand relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes appear very realistic. Assumptions are explicit and relevant. The outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. All project implementers have an excellent understanding of the programme logic, the problem that is being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can convincingly explain the logic to others.	

Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy

The Expected outcomes for the URA Projects are:

- (1) Reduction in average clearance times
- 2) Reduction in % of shipments undergoing physical inspections
- (3) Increase of use of pre-arrival information for clearance
- (4) Reduction in clearance times for AEOs
- (5) Reduction in time from entry to exit (ECTS)
- (6) Reduction in total time spent at border posts (ECTS)
- (7) ASYCUDA World roll-out to all stations
- (8) Interface of ASYCUDA World with other Government Agencies (OGA)
- (9) Regional Interconnection of ASYCUDA World

In this way, not only is the logic of the project supported, it demonstrates strong linkages between the three URA projects, to other TMEA interventions in the region like OSBPs/IBM, eSwifts, and SCT, and to other donor work in the region (such as World Bank OSBP work).

Monitoring data indicates the projects have achieved or exceeded the majority of expected beneficial outcomes and are likely to ultimately achieve those still outstanding (pre-clearance use, OGA interfaces). However, we do have some concerns that may be considered for the next phase of intervention:

- (1) Our major concern, captured through stakeholder and beneficiary interviews at every level (CSO, PSO, Shippers, Clearing and Forwarding Agents, the Partner and TMEA staff) is the impact of system stability on the ease of use, and ultimate adoption of the system. The results clearly indicate the highest level outcomes are being achieved, so difficulties with system stability are clearly not inhibiting the realization of benefits. However, as URA is aware, there is substantial dissatisfaction with the system which ranges from irritation to outright hostility. The major problem, as TMEA is aware, is that Uganda's internet access infrastructure is not reliable resulting in difficulties accessing the system and occasional problem keeping the system on-line for those who do maintain access.
- (2) While ECTS is generally viewed as a success by stakeholders, there are some issues with sensitization – not all stakeholders were sure if there was a cost associated with use. Further there is some concern about reliability, particularly along the DRC border where there may be GSM interference from DRC's network, and security where the seals will not always stick to non-metallic container elements and where the seals are perceived as non-tamper-proof.
- (3) AEO is intended as a program for the largest, most reliable shippers. By targeting these shippers the system is able to more easily facilitate goods movement for a significant proportion of traffic while minimizing the timely and intensive clearance of AEO participation. However, some stakeholders expressed concerns about the difficulties of qualifying. This concern took two forms: First, organizations which probably could qualify expressed hesitancy because they perceived that the added benefits beyond those already achieved via implementation of ASYCUDA World and ECTS might not be worth the difficulty of application (though they admitted they

The expected outcomes are highly relevant to the strategies of TMEA, the partner organisations, the EAC, the target government and target beneficiaries, as applicable. It is clear how they contribute to aggregate strategic outcomes and contribute to a coherent TMEA strategy. Interventions are fully consistent and complementary with activities supported by projects in TMEA and/or by other donor organizations.

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			probably would apply at some point in the near future).  Secondly, small organizations expressed dismay that homegrown Ugandan organizations would not be able to qualify because they lacked the scale and financial stability required.	
			The most significant challenge resulting from the upgrade to ASYCUDA World (the backbone upon which all the Uganda Revenue Authority interventions sponsored by the UCP sits) has been system stability. Across the spectrum of stakeholders – donor, TMEA, partner, beneficiary – everyone has recognized the limitations of access to ASYCUDA World due to poor national internet infrastructure. Poor internet access has resulted in frequent down times, system interruption and limitations in access. The Mid Term Evaluation noted:	The project team identifies and understands all of the strategic and operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended
		nd budgets	"More investment in the Stability of IT based customs systems brings more rewards in customs operations. The experience drown from the frequency of down time of ASYCUDA World of 2 times a day and 3 days point to the need for further investment to address the challenge of instability with additional infrastructure. This instability is the main factor in slowing down the full realization of the project outcomes." [sic]	actions to overcome implementation issues are well founded and insightful. The project manager and team is always proactive at monitoring
	EFFICIENCY	Adaptive management of plans and budgets	The last project report notes:  "The major challenge facing the implementation of ASYCUDA World during the period has been the rampant downtimes. This led to the postponment of a number of system enhancements including the upgrade of ASYCUDA World to the New Version 4.2.2.  The Technical team managed to contain the situation as exhibited by the stability of the system observed in the month of June, 2015 until the time of finalizing this report." [sic]	implementation and progress towards results (outputs and outcomes) and implementing actions to avert or overcome them, enlisting others support where necessary. The
		∢	This contrast indicates both awareness of the system stability issues and ongoing efforts to contain the effects.	funder is alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely
			Further, the URA team has recognized the need for ongoing training and sensitization of both internal and external ASYCUDA World users, holding over 1,800 trainings, to date, of which, more than half have been for external users.	manner; and the implementing organisation always follows funder management
			The projects have produced regular reporting, at no less than 4 times per year, along with mid-term evaluation and follow up. The issues raised in the MTR resulted in renewed focus on system management, training and business process re-engineering. Active project management resulted in	(financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation

timely implementation, effective achievement of milestones, through

monitoring and evaluation, and innovative use of alternative

context and problem

to be addressed is

procurement arrangements to accelerate hardware acquisitions – estimated to accelerate procurement from a 2 year baseline to a 3 month realized process.

regularly analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure they are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs systematically and is based on updated and complete MPs. There is strong evidence that innovations or best practices have been used during project management.

## selationship management and communication

Relationship management has generally worked well on the URA projects. Communication on project issues and implementation has been regular and effective. Stakeholders are consulted regularly, with a minimum of one progress report per quarter. The progress reporting system has worked well, in that all levels of stakeholders have a common understanding of progress, issues and performance. The progress monitoring has been an exemplary example of clarity on key performance metrics and outstanding issues. Progress reporting has also been used to effectively refocus efforts to address any shortfalls.

The team undertook serious efforts address shortfalls noted in the midterm evaluation including:

- 2 Aggressively working to reduce system downtime and tracking and understanding the causes of such system failures
- 3 Improving the feedback flow between agents/operators/users and the ASYCUDA team
- 4 Refocusing on business process re-engineering and implementation
- 5 Improving data collection for intermediate output tracking
- Improving the quality and reach of system training, including to end users external to URA.

The project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders proactively and face-to-face communication occurs on a regular basis (e.g. monthly). Stakeholders and the project team have a good and common understanding of theirs, and each other's, roles and responsibilities. All parties put in considerable effort to build and maintain effective working relations. Communication is open, trusting and constructive. Verbal and written communications systematically provide useful

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			implementation insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always received on time, are accurate, informative and results orientated in that they provide a clear picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans.
	Translating inputs into outputs	Almost all planned outputs have been achieved, with the notable exceptions of roll out to one station, 1 ASYCUDA world module that still remains to be implemented (and may not be till the net version of ASYCUDA World is in place), 1 customs business process that still needs to be re-engineered, 2 other government agency interconnections remaining to be implemented (Foreign Affairs and Uganda Coffee Development Authority) <sup>55</sup> . Further outputs have been largely on schedule and targets are mostly achieved (remaining targets are: continuing reduction on physical inspections, significant percentage increase in use of cargo pre-clearance, 2 other government agency interfaces remaining to be completed). For the most part, the URA projects were completed with agree-upon indicators met on-time.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date.
EFFECTIVENESS		Most URA targets have been met or exceeded. The key performance indicators: Reductions in clearance times, reductions in physical escorts, and further reduction in clearance times for AEOs, have all been exceeded. A few indicators show remaining work to be done, but given the projects ability to exceed to-line indicators, it is clear that the URA projects have been effective in terms of their intent.	Most (e.g. 75% +) outcomes/targets are achieved (at project- level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement peaks at

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 55}$  Per Asycuda Project Report of 10 August 2015

		It is less clear that gender issues have been well-considered. The project did retrofit data collection processes in order to mainstream the	long-term outcomes and changes have
		collection of gender-disaggregated data, but gender has not been prioritized otherwise. Even the mid-term evaluation failed to mention gender.	occurred at short and medium term outcomes also. Where implementation is still occurring, there is good evidence that short and medium term outcomes/targets are being achieved. Strong consideration has been taken of gender issues; if implementation is advanced many gender-positive changes have been observed.
	Additionality	Most stakeholders agree that TMEA was key to making the URA projects happen in a timely manner, both through the provision of funding and through the leveraging of TMEA technical and administrative expertise. The general consensus among stakeholders interviewed is that TMEA intervention brought the projects forward by about 4 years.	There is evidence that the project or initiative would not have occurred without TMEA funding.
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	The URA projects have resulted in a revenue increase for URA of about 50 (48% as of June 2015), which both TMEA and URA see as evidence for the sustainability of the project. As a revenue generating function, URA rightly sees its needs as a priority on the GoU budgeting process. However, we note that the MoU does not specify minimum operations and maintenance requirements for AW, maximum charges for ECTS to users or guarantee a minimum GoU funding level for upkeep. There does not seem to be an immediate risk of under-investment in O&M, but there is a long term risk given the lack of firm legal commitments. Best practice would suggest that such assurances be agreed to in the MoU or in another separate legal document.  Otherwise, URA has a clear strategy for O&M of the systems, tracking of key performance indicators, and benefit sustenance and further enhancement.	Several activities are included to address sustainability and are mostly clear and relevant. Monitoring of the sustainability of some of the outcomes is planned or undertaken. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated. The strategy includes a broad description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Most ongoing maintenance or

		The URA projects represent some of the best performing examples of	operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad and realistic plan of how to fund these.
IMPACT	Achieving long-term outcomes	The URA projects represent some of the best performing examples of TMEA intervention in Uganda. They represent the most significant progress to-date toward the programmatic long-term outcomes, including an overall three-day reduction in total transport times and enhancing the trade environment via reduced transit costs and ease of doing business. The project has done well monitoring progress toward these outcomes and given the impacts to-date the results chain is considered to be validated  It is less clear that gender issues have been well-considered. The project did retrofit data collection processes in order to mainstream the collection of gender-disaggregated data, but gender has not been prioritized otherwise. We note, for example, that the mid-term evaluation failed to mention gender.	There has been substantial intended or unintended progress towards impacts (75%+) on long-term outcomes (i.e., Increasing physical access to markets; Enhancing trade environment and improving business competitiveness). Measurement of the project's contribution to these outcomes has been completed, and the results chain convincingly articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts. Strong consideration has been taken of differential impacts for men and women.

**Project Name:** UNBS and MTIC Improve Testing

**Project Number:** 1046

**Project Type:** Standards

Very Good	Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
	Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non- fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE Project clarity and logic	partner staff can explain understanding of the lo outcomes and outputs, Outcomes are generally achievement of outcomes. Where the logic could be assumptions and outcomes are sults chain. The result to achieve outcomes. Winhibited the achievement of outcomes and outcomes of the country of th	is clear and easy to underson it clearly and beneficiaries gic behind the relationship as well as long and short to realistic and outputs seemes.  e strengthened is a clearemes and in the provision of the consider this a minor doesn to f positive outcomes. Effort to fill in gaps identificand the link between the became pertinent when Slicet partners clearly under the cage between these project and could have constituted.	es express clear between expected erm outcomes. In necessary for the r link between f more detail in the nk all necessary actions efect, in that it has not The project was ed in a prior SIDA SIDA and TMEA work is IDA implementation was estood, and thus were etts, the project logic is	The project has a solid logic. It is mostly clear and easy to understand the relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. However, there are some points that could be strengthened. Outcomes appear realistic. Assumptions are mostly included. Most outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. Most project implementers have a good understanding of the programme logic, the problem being addressed and the relationship between

		the parts and can explain the logic and reasoning to others.
Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy	There is a strong linkage between the UCP work with UNBS and other UCP efforts (particularly, the NMC, URA, SEATINI and UGC efforts), there is also strong linkage to regional TMEA standards work on harmonization and to other donor work, particularly SIDA's work with UNBS on the QUISP initiative. The highest level outcomes of the UNBS effort – reduced delay for testing ties clearly to TMEA's strategic objectives. Further, the quality of life impacts of improved standards and standards compliance clearly impacts the overall health and safety of Ugandans at the broadest level.	The expected outcomes are highly relevant to the strategies of TMEA, the partner organisations, the EAC, the target government and target beneficiaries, as applicable. It is clear how they contribute to aggregate strategic outcomes and contribute to a coherent TMEA strategy. Interventions are fully consistent and complementary with activities supported by projects in TMEA and/or by other donor organizations.

Adaptive management of plans and budgets

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The project team has largely managed the strategic and operational issues of the project effectively. Where there have been implementation issues, particularly with respect to the halting of SIDA funding for complementary work, TMEA and partner staff have been effective at managing the resulting impacts and maintaining project momentum. Project monitoring has been mostly effective, though during the course of the project some effort was necessary to improve reporting – both the establishment of baselines and outcome tracking and reporting. This effort was rewarded with improvement in reporting. The project has not had significant financial problems – procurement was effective – though some equipment was more costly than originally hoped for, resulting in reserving certain equipment to a hoped for phase 2 of the project. Because the project was born of a gap-filling effort, little effort was made to re-evaluate priorities or adjustment of the project plan. On the other hand, the project was executed as envisioned and resulted in hoped-for outcomes. The project management pan was faithfully executed and the approach to procurement was successful both in ensuring timely provision of new equipment and in ensuring high-quality equipment was supplied.

The project team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are usually well founded and provide some insights. The project manager and team are normally proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and usually implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is mostly alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team usually follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is periodically analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure activities, outputs and outcomes are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs on a regular basis and is mostly based on updated and complete MPs.There is moderate evidence that innovations or best practices have

been used during project management. For a good portion of the implementation period, the overall UNBS The project team project was managed via a multi-part oversight arrangement between manages relationships MTIC, UNBS, TMEA and SIDA which was both proactive and effective. with key stakeholders When SIDA suspended funding, the high quality of the relationship and funders between MTIC and TMEA helped to ensure non-interruption of proactively and face-Relationship management and communication implementation and coverage of key SIDA sponsored areas – particularly to-face standards awareness sensitization. Evaluation of TMEA's standards work communication occurs and quarterly reporting indicate that written communication was regular on a regular basis (e.g. and of high quality, resulting in completion of all planned activities as of monthly). January 2015. Stakeholders and the project team have a good and common understanding of theirs, and each other's, roles and responsibilities. All parties put in considerable effort to build and maintain effective working relations. Communication is open, trusting and constructive. Verbal and written communications systematically provide useful implementation

			insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always received on time, are accurate, informative and results orientated in that they provide a clear picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans.
	Translating inputs into outputs	The UNS project has been completed with significant success, meeting or exceeding planned targets. The project budget was effectively maintained through the management of procurement processes to ensure no over-spending. Further other inputs was tracked through the reporting process to make sure outputs were achieved. The project was largely completed on time.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date
EFFECTIVENESS		The UNS project has been completed with significant success, meeting or exceeding planned targets. Overall outcomes include the reduction of average testing time from 19 days to 8 days, the reduction of average testing cost from \$350 to \$100. Further the project has been successful at supporting SMEs, half of which are women-owned and at generally raising awareness of the value of standards and standards certification both for producers and consumers. There is further evidence that supermarket supply chains have adjusted in relationship to the project to require QUISP mark standards certification of suppliers, resulting in likely better health and well-being outcomes at the end-line beneficiary level.	Most (e.g. 75% +) outcomes/targets are achieved(at project- level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement peaks at long-term outcomes and changes have occurred at short and medium term outcomes also. Where

			implementation is still occurring, there is good evidence that short and medium term outcomes/targets are being achieved. Strong consideration has been taken of gender issues; if implementation is advanced many gender-positive changes have been observed.
	Additionality	The consensus between TMEA and partner staff is that TMEA support brought the UNBS project forward by at least 4 years, and possibly more given the suspension of SIDA funding, mid-project.	There is evidence that the project or initiative would not have occurred without TMEA funding.
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	The UNBS project has resulted in a growth in testing capacity and total number of tests per year by over 2,500. However, the realized project goal of reducing testing cost has an impact on revenue generation. Further, the realized project goal of increased standards awareness (evidenced by a greater than doubling of standards inquiries since inception) means that greater stress is being put on the system to accommodate a greater need for testing. In this environment, there is necessarily some stress on the sustainability of the intervention. On the positive side, awareness of standards seems to have created a virtuous circle of self-increasing demand for certification in a greater number of areas. A number of beneficiaries interviewed for this evaluation mentioned in other contexts, desire for standards in additional areas as a means of trade growth. On the negative side, there is not a clear, agreed-upon plan for financing operations and maintenance of new equipment. Both TMEA and the project partner clearly articulate that UNBS is responsible for such maintenance. But as it is likely to be expensive (major repairs will require manufacturers' representatives to travel to Uganda for service calls), it is unfortunate that a clear, binding agreement is not included in the MoU. Maintenance requirements were included in project planning to some extent, provision and installation tenders were required to include routine maintenance training for UNBS staff. However, best practice would suggest that O&M assurances be agreed to in the MoU or in another separate legal document.	A few activities are included to address sustainability although they are not always clear. Only a few outcomes are being monitored for sustainability. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated and includes a description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Several ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad plan of how to fund these, although plans may not always be realistic.

### Achieving long-term outcomes

The UNS project has been completed with significant success, meeting or exceeding planned targets. Overall outcomes include the reduction of average testing time from 19 days to 8 days, the reduction of average testing cost from \$350 to \$100. Further the project has been successful at supporting SMEs, half of which are women-owned and at generally raising awareness of the value of standards and standards certification both for producers and consumers. There is further evidence that supermarket supply chains have adjusted in relationship to the project to require QUISP mark standards certification of suppliers, resulting in likely better health and well-being outcomes at the end-line beneficiary level.

Overall, these results have also greatly improved business competitiveness vis a vie other EAC trading partners and well as for import substitution. Trade with South Sudan and DRC continues to grow, but is probably less likely to benefit from standards improvements. Lack of standards certain sectors and standards harmonization in others continues to function as a non-tariff barrier in Uganda, particularly for trade with Kenya, and is a key area of improvement that TMEA should consider for its phase 2 strategy.

There has been substantial intended or unintended progress towards impacts(75%+) on long-term outcomes (i.e., Increasing physical access to markets; Enhancingtrade environment and improving business competitiveness). Measurement of the project's contribution to these outcomes has been completed, and the results chain convincingly articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts. Strong consideration has been taken of differential impacts for men and women.

**Project Name:** Uganda NTB National Monitoring Committee

**Project Number**: 1045

Project Type: NTB

Go	od	Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
		Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non- fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE	Project clarity and logic	the logics and the under relationship between th causality of that relation relationship between re specified. While the cur clear strengthening of th	Both TMEA and partner solving assumptions. There is short and long-term out ship is not totally clear. Supporting and on-going removers the NMC within the project elationship between reportions and the supporting are supported by the supporting and sup	is an obvious comes. However the pecifically the oval of NTBs is not working, and there is a , nothing in the project	The project has a solid logic. It is mostly clear and easy to understand the relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. However, there are some points that could be strengthened. Outcomes appear realistic. Assumptions are mostly included. Most outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. Most project implementers have a good understanding of the programme logic, the problem being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can

		explain the logic and reasoning to others.
Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy	Stakeholders were generally positive about the project and its objectives and all indicated the objectives continued to be relevant to their needs. The need to reduce NTBs to trade was cited by both large and small traders in our stakeholder interview process and many interviewees cited the NMC and the NTB reporting system as a step in the right direction. There is also a clear logic to the relationship between the Uganda NMC work and the regional work on NTBs sponsored by TMEA. Donors mentioned this as a key area for further TMEA work.	The expected outcomes are highly relevant to the strategies of TMEA, the partner organisations, the EAC, the target government and target beneficiaries, as applicable. It is clear how they contribute to aggregate strategic outcomes and contribute to a coherent TMEA strategy. Interventions are fully
Contr		consistent and complementary with activities supported by projects in TMEA and/or by other donor organizations.

## Adaptive management of plans and budgets

The project team has been active in managing the complexities of implementation. Implementation has required oversight on two separate and quite different fronts: (1) development and implementation of the technical system for mobile phone-based NTB reporting and dissemination and (2) NMC capacity building and support. Both aspects have been well-handled. The team has been proactive at addressing implementation issues on the reporting system, procurement of equipment, system specification, and development of usage protocols. NMC capacity building has generally been successful. The 2015 evaluation of NMC work concluded that, as noted here, more focus should be put on strategic, long-term removal of NTBs as opposed to one-off removal under the current approach. The project team has not yet put a revised approach into place in response to these recommendations.

The project team has been responsive to working around implementation issues. For example, the original intent, to develop an advocacy forum, was determined to be infeasible due to the complexities of impact measurement, so this was dropped in favor of the current approach. Also, there has been a push to create a legal mandate, via new laws empowering the NMC. There is a diversity of opinion regarding this approach – the need, the potential, the legal complexities, the organizational complexities, and the team has been active working with stakeholders to help the NMC develop a position on this question.

The NMC leadership and project team has followed funder guidelines for financial management. There has been some confusion and frustration over the reporting requirements – activity vs. outcome reporting – but this has not resulted in management problems.

The project team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are usually well founded and provide some insights. The project manager and team are normally proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and usually implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is mostly alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team usually follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is periodically analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure activities, outputs and outcomes are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs on a regular basis and is mostly based on updated and complete MPs.There is moderate evidence that innovations or best practices have

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		been used during project management.
Relationship management and communication	Relationships with key stakeholders and funders are well managed. The NMC meets quarterly, plus is represented quarterly at the NOC. Roles are clearly defined and interviews from all levels of participation have a common understanding of what those roles are and how they are intended to function in the context of this project. Project reporting and monitoring has generally proceeded as intended.	The project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders proactively and faceto-face communication occurs on a regular basis (e.g. monthly).  Stakeholders and the project team have a good and common understanding of theirs, and each other's, roles and responsibilities. All parties put in considerable effort to build and maintain effective working relations.  Communication is open, trusting and constructive. Verbal and written communications systematically provide useful implementation

			insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always received on time, are accurate, informative and results orientated in that they provide a clear picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans.
	Translating inputs into outputs	The project is on-schedule and within budget. There has been some difficulty in achieving and maintaining quality reporting, though this has been largely resolved. The project has been successful at raising awareness of NTBs, developing the reporting system, and generally successful at getting usage.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date.
EFFECTIVENESS		A majority of outputs have been achieved, but, per the June 2015 progress report there are some planned outputs still outstanding. These include:  1. Establishment of a Task Force to assist MTIC on the Institutional Structure of NMC  2. Procurement of data services, domain and sub domain to act as backup link for the NTB Reporting system  3. Signing of the MoU between MTIC and four outstandinguser institutions  4. Training of NMC institutions on NTB reporting system, which is delayed pending funding	A majority (50 to 75%) of outcomes/targets are achieved(at project-level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement predominantly focuses on short and medium term outcomes. Where

		<ol> <li>Further training of private sector and stakeholders on NTB reporting system, which is delayed pending funding</li> <li>Stakeholder workshop on NTBs, including an NTB sensitization workshop for women and youth groups</li> <li>Media training workshops, which are delayed pending funding; and</li> <li>Review of work plan and M&amp;E system for NTB elimination</li> <li>While some consideration of gender issues has been included in the project plan this is largely limited to gender-focused sensitization and gender disaggregated data collection. NTBs present an opportunity area to work with SMEs on trade issues, many of which are women-owned.</li> </ol>	implementation is on- going, there is good evidence that short term outcomes are being achieved. Moderate consideration has been taken of gender issues; if implementation is advanced some gender-positive changes have been observed.
	Additionality	The NMC was established prior to TMEA involvement. There is a widelyheld perception that TMEA provides support to formalization and regional collaboration that would not have otherwise occurred.	There is evidence that the project or initiative would not have occurred without TMEA funding.
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	Sustainability has not been well-addressed within the NTB project. This was a major finding of the mid-term review and our evaluation has found little progress has been made on this issue in the intervening time. The success of the project hinges largely on the continued willingness of participants, particularly those representing MDAs, to address NTBs once reported. But it is not clear that any change has been or will be made to institutionalize this beyond current political will. There is no long-term strategy for continuing the enhanced NMC capacity should further TMEA funding not be forthcoming. Though the NMC has been strengthened and likely would continue on in some capacity. But the ability to coordinate with the EC and other regional NMCs would be limited. No formal agreement is in place to guarantee the O&M costs of the NTB reporting system, though the MTIC has taken on the system and internalized the management and upkeep requirements.	A few activities are included to address sustainability although they are not always clear. Only a few outcomes are being monitored for sustainability. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated and includes a description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Several ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad plan of how to fund these, although plans may not always be realistic.

## Achieving long-term outcomes

There continues to be a strong interest in the elimination of NTBs among stakeholders at all levels – large firms, SMEs, and logistics providers. Most believe that the NTB reporting system is a step in the right direction. However, use of the system, while having rebounded somewhat over the past three months, continues to be low. Most firms interviewed indicated that they tell their drivers about the system, but not in any formal or directive way. Several indicated a wish for printed materials which they could distribute to drivers. The project is measuring outputs and contribution to outcomes, but the linkage to overall trade growth is not explicit. The project could likely be more impactful if, as the mid-term review noted, there were stronger linkage to regional NTB elimination efforts. One element of this, is the lack of systems interoperability with other regional reporting systems. Much of the Uganda system relies on the availability and continued willingness of stakeholders to quickly address NTBs as they are reported.

At the same time, there is strong evidence that the NMC is operating more efficiently since project implementation. NTBs have been regularly addressed and removed, if on an ad hoc basis, and monitoring of NTBs and their removal has been greatly improved.

There has been some consideration of gender in project execution, including planned women-owned business awareness workshops, though the follow on impact of these is not yet assessed.

There has been strong intended or unintended progress towards impacts(50-75%) on long-term outcomes (i.e., **Increasing physical** access to markets; Enhancingtrade environment and improving business competitiveness), or this is likely to occur in future. Measurement of the project's contribution to these outcomes has been completed, and the results chain convincingly articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts. Moderate consideration has been taken of differential impacts for men and women.

Project Name: MEACA coordination and leadership, MEACAs and EAC improve coordination

Project Numbers: 1048, 1049

**Project Type:** EAC Integration

Good		Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
		Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non-fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE	Project clarity and logic	regional integration procapacity of MEACA to promonitoring and evaluat supported to coordination and to have the right coordination spearhead integration will be high goods and services betwoof the world. The EAC romarket Protocol and of the MEACAs when supincrease awareness to sincreased trade, one of goal of project was 'Ugimplementation of the and the purpose of procoordination of EAC inthas two outcomes, below.  Increased implementation institution professional bodies the support of MEACA advocacy, research, mooutputs including the Normal MEACA training including Popularisation of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions of outcomes and institutions of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected flow of outcomes and institutions are considered to the support of sector achievement expected fl	entation of EAC priority la	trengthened there MDAs. MEACA was experience and lessons ith a strong national effits of regional increased volume of the EAC and the rest including the Common incebarriers to trade. The esseries including the Common incebarriers to trade. The esseries is effective including the MEACAs. The esseries its effective including the Common incebarriers to trade. The esseries is effective incebarriers and incompany meadership and incompany meadership and incompany medical incompany	The project has a strong logic, which is a clear and easy to understand relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes appear very realistic.  Assumptions are explicit and relevant. The outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. All project implementers have an excellent understanding of the programme logic, the problem that is being addressed and the relationship between

the parts and can convincingly explain the logic to others. EACA exists to ensure that Ugandans benefit from EAC integration processes. MEACA coordinates other stakeholders for input into legislation that guide the protocols enacted by member states. The The expected TMEA capacity building project has assisted Uganda meet its outcomes are highly obligations to Ugandans including inclusion of their views and relevant to the dissemination of relevant information to Ugandans and building the strategies of TMEA, necessary internal capacity to do a central role of coordination of the partner different actors. To achieve increased trade within countries and organisations, the outside east Africa, TMEA believed that a multi-sectoral approach EAC, the target Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy would work since different sectors contribute to imports and exports government and volumes, are responsible for policy formulation and ensuring standards target beneficiaries, or ensuring a conducive environment. TMEA strategy will be possible as applicable. It is by coordinating the functions of others while ensuring that legislations clear how they at the EAC secretariat are implemented among the various MDAs. The contribute to project thus contributed to the achievement of TMEA overall goal aggregate strategic through strengthening the capacity of MEACA in core areas of business outcomes and like coordination, information management and policy advocacy. contribute to a Other partners like Government of Denmark have the same mission of coherent TMEA increasing regional trade and implementation of the customs territory, strategy. through harmonization of procedures Just like TMEA and its main Interventions are funder (DFID). In short, the support to MEACA is supposed to ensure fully consistent and achievement of EAC integration objectives, which when well achieved complementary with will contribute to increased regional and international trade, the activities supported primary objective of TMEA. Most trade in East Africa is for instance by projects in TMEA constrained by barriers that are not recorded, and yet they keep and/or by other hampering trade. It is up to the MEACA to bring to front these barriers donor organizations. to the EAC and they can be removed after many countries have embraced the idea of common market and regional integration.

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Adaptive management of plans and budgets

Project implementation was guided by a project design document, annual and quarterly work plans with monthly targets both on what the consultant should have achieved and what MEACA staff and practices should have gone (milestones). The technical support unit works closely with MEACA officers to build their capacity as well as work on other areas like internet and information system installations. To respond to current situations, the technical support unit reported to the project steering committee that ensured management and operational efficiency, and approved adjustment of plans. Initially, the activities as given in consultant terms of reference were not flexible to change, but later in the project life, there were some amendments for instance indicator in capacity building instead was changed to measure trainings (frequency and quality), number of research papers released and meetings attended to capture short term accomplishments. The consultant team was looking at milestones for performance and would proactively do activities to contribute, including the support for the monitoring strategy for the ministry of finance that was completed with TSU support. MEACA being a chair to the NOC, the progress of capacity building support was always communicated in NOC meetings. TMEA was part if project steering committee and was normally alerted of progress. Much as there was vested interest for results, some of them took time to materialize for instance publication of research on key areas of integration and policy on integration, due to the low capacity of the ministry to make this happen, with guidance of the consultants.

Much as most planned activities were accomplished, they were not completed in budget thus requiring the approval of more funds to complete the activities. TMEA was thus flexible on reasonable utilization of resources but was not flexible on the changes in activities as originally agreed.

The project team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are usually well founded and provide some insights. The project manager and team are normally proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and usually implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is mostly alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team usually follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is periodically analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure activities, outputs and outcomes are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs on a regular basis and is mostly

	based on updated
	and complete
	MPs.There is moderate evidence
	that innovations or
	best practices have
	been used during
	project
	management.

# Relationship management and communication

The project operated with other stakeholders like MDAs and MEACA ensured that it attends regular partner meetings and informed them of regional integration. The relationship between MEACA and other actors in regional integration has been consistent and positive. MEACA has dedicated a budget for regular attendance of meetings in different sectors. Internally, the project team had different roles and each technical staff was attached to an officer in a related area to allow for transfer of knowledge. At one time, the consultant was designated to the office of the Permanent Secretary to manage the EAC calendar for the six months which they ably did including providing leadership to the Ugandan delegation during the EAC meetings. The TSU reports were to be approved by MEACA before submission for final approval from TMEA but it would take so long with the office of the permanent secretary, and at times the project team would submit unapproved copies of the reports to TMEA to enable them report. It was also brought to our attention that there was misunderstanding of what the consultants were supposed to do between TMEA and the MEACA management, and that at times the ministry felt that consultants worked below expectations and deserved low pay. In such instances, the ministry would feel disempowered because the consultants would still make their way to make their reports approved, thus downplaying the established project management infrastructure and having lesser outputs than mutually agreed upon.

Communication was ensured through monthly progress reports to the Project Steering Committee, Quarterly progress reports to the Tripartite Oversight Committee, and regular circulation of minutes from these meetings to wider TSU and tripartite representatives for actions and follow up. However, we note that these reports used to be weak and inconsistent in informing TOC or PSC on progress as well as level of detail. There had also been lack of financial reports tied to activity reports, which brought a weak picture of progress and weak basis for committee members to offer an informed opinion about performance.

The meetings also irregularly happen due to other important adhoc meetings by the representatives. The TSU however think that this was due to lack of guidance or standard for reporting, that was later rectified.

Mostly, the project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders adequately and face-to-face communication occurs on a mostly periodically basis (e.g. less than quarterly). There is not always a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities and the parties put in mostly adequate effort into maintaining working relations. Verbal and written communications sometimes provide useful implementation insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Although, quite often elements are incomplete. Regular project monitoring reports are often late, and have a number of inaccuracies or are incomplete. Only a partial picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans are presented. Often follow-up or clarification is needed.

Translating inputs into outputs	Nearly all targeted outputs as given in the logical framework were achieved or exceeded. These included design and implementation of MEACA communications strategy, drafting of the national policy on EAC integration, publication of 7 research papers and 10 policy briefs, finalisation of the common market implementation framework-Uganda being the first country to have this. Selected modules of MEACA training plan were realised including training in diplomacy and Kiswahili and the monitoring and evaluation system is running.  These outputs will remain relevant for regional integration and some for instance the policy on integration is the menu and engagement framework for future engagements by the ministry.  The project was implemented within the planned 4 years. However there are some planned outputs that had either lagged behind target or was not achieved for instance the target of 100 visitors monthly was not achieved because of the location of the location of Regional Integration centre and awareness levels of its existence. There was a target of 20 MDAs to use EAMS to report but the realised one was only three.	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date.

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EFFECTIVENESS	Translating outputs to outcomes, including gender	MEACA has made tangible strides in ensuring that key deliverables are accomplished including establishment of national policy on integration, establishment of M&E system and staff capacity built. However most of these outputs have not translated to outcomes. For instance, much as a national policy on M&E is in place, only 3 responsible MDAs are using it for reporting, and the community still lacks awareness on regional integration.  Regarding implementation of EAC directives, Uganda hoped that by end of capacity project, 50% of EAC decisions, directives and programs are implemented by instead 54% had been fully implemented while 27% was partially implemented by close of TMEA capacity program support. The project also aimed to ensure that 80% MEACA technical staff with designated access are using information from the M&E system installed by the project, and in practice all the staff of MEACA have full access to LAN and M&E system. The project wanted an improvement in implementation of agreements in EAC, but among all countries that ratified it is Uganda that has more number of exemptions on the flow of goods and capital, after signing of the 2010 common market protocol. Much as this might not be attributed to the work of MEACA alone, their coordination with partners and awareness raising could have contributed to this realization. It should also be noted that the decisions made at the secretariat are not legally binding other countries, and it is up to Uganda to implement such decisions through respective MDAs.  Before the support, the ministry had a dormant gender strategy, but this has since been activated and now there is a gender focal point person who has since ensured that trainings and materials are gender sensitive. The EAC strategic plan among others, calls on member states to eliminate regulations and customs that ate discriminatory against women. This has not yet been directly emphasized by MEACA in its current previous and current interventions.	Some (25 to 50%) outcomes/targets achieved (at project- level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievements mostly focus on short term outcomes. Where implementation is on-going there is partial evidence that some short term outcomes are being achieved. Limited consideration has been taken of gender issues, even if superficially.
	Additionality	The MEACA was established to steer Uganda's regional integration agenda. The ministry at that time lacked capacity to implement its challenging role that included awareness creation. Moreover, the staff that made this ministry were contributed from different other ministries without expected diverse experience in regional integration issues. Most funding for capacity building had been channelled to EAC secretariat and this did not get back to address local needs that Uganda faced in fostering integration. To perfect its coordination function, the ministry needed capacity and diverse technical knowhow in diverse areas, information on status of trade barriers, a knowledge sharing platform for diverse actors. All these were provided by TMEA funding. Much as most of the support has not yet translated into real outcomes as reflected in TMEA results chains, there a starting point for instance there is a national policy on reintegration, a monitoring and evaluation system and in built capacity in research and reporting which would not have possible had there're not been funding by TMEA. There were some staff turnover after training, but some left to join the secretariat thus possibility of serving MEACA Uganda in at another	There is evidence that the project or initiative would not have occurred without TMEA funding.

		level. Overall, we see an additionally by the grant, and information on	
		EA integration continues to be disseminated.  The project uses capacity building as entry point, which is implemented	
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	through training of staff and stakeholders as well as skills transfer where experts get attached to key staff. However we note that most deliverables including reporting, design and implementation of some research projects were either done by consultants, stakeholders or outsourced which can limit the MEACA staff hands on experience. Much as this is empowering in one way, it would have been beneficial that key permanent staff within MEACA participate fully and grasp the skills.  There are some important deliverables for instance the national policy on integration, various policy briefs that have been produced but the plan for dissemination or utilisation of proceeds from these outputs has been unstated or not clear. There are outputs that will take long with possible beneficial results like the EAMS for reporting and monitoring of decisions from EAC. Given the unclear continuous funding to the project, it is not guaranteed how long results from this can go or if somebody will keep the maintenance of the server where this system is hosted, given the staff turnover and continuous alternation of staff in within ministries. The infrastructure needs of EAMS have been budgeted for by MEACA.  However, there is no provision for continuing induction and training to deal with staff turnover.  MEACA says that there is additional funding to the ministry but it is not clear how much of this funding is or can be allocated to pushing forward the deliverables from TMEA for instance continuous use of EAMS, continuous awareness on Regional Integration, coordination of other sectors and tabling relevant bills for enactment by parliament.  However the support was well appreciated by the Ministry and there is already improved reporting skills among the staff in various departments, and they are able to do action research.	A few activities are included to address sustainability although they are not always clear. Only a few outcomes are being monitored for sustainability. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated and includes a description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Several ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad plan of how to fund these, although plans may not always be realistic.
IMPACT	Achieving long-term outcomes	The project is likely contributing to observed improvements in trade environment, increased cross border trade. There is a deliberate objective by TMEA to stimulate the participation of women in cross border trade so as to benefit from regional integration just like it has been with their male counterparts. The EAMS for instance reports that 200 women were realised out of the 70 targeted women for information on regional integration. The MEACA is now well accepted to steer and coordinate the East Africa Community agenda, across	There has been strong intended or unintended progress towards impacts (50-75%) on long-term outcomes (i.e., Increasing physical access to markets;

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	MDAs, PSOs and CSOs than before, which is a higher result as spelt in	Enhancing trade
	MEACA project results chain.	environment and
		improving business
	The Ministry has speeded up the activation of East African Identity card	competitiveness), or
	that works in Kenya and Rwanda, which has helped people to cross	this is likely to occur
	borders and transact. Previously, people did not know that East	in future.
	Africans do not need Visas to travel in East Africa, but MEACA made	Measurement of the
	awareness and people are aware and crossing border more regularly.	project's
		contribution to these
		outcomes has been
		completed, and the
		results chain
		convincingly
		articulates the
		linkage to these
		ultimate impacts.
		Moderate
		consideration has
		been taken of
		differential impacts
		for men and women.

**Project Name: SEATINI** 

**Project Number**: 1071

**Project Type:** Standards

(	Good	Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
		Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non-fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE	Project clarity and logic	good understanding of The two can easily exploutcomes as well as the challenges to project support to EAC standards for the and traders leading to its sesame from Uganda to will be reduced rejection poor quality and more for maize and sesame. It development of sesame standards in Uganda to multi-stakeholder advocationation to maize and sesame. However, and the able to increase districts in Uganda that period. Uganda being agricultural product so assumptions are always monitoring and project logic under consideraticassumptions might not	ment as well as SEATINI ment how activities will lead to ain the relationship between overall project logic with access. The project aims to geted Ugandan Maize a fincrease in exports of EAC to East Africa as well. The constant of maize and sorghun farmers and traders being The contributing outputs to increase exports as well or accept strategy and implementation of the contribution	co expected outcomes. Ween outputs and the assumptions and to Increase compliance and Sesame producers Compliant maize and intermediate outcomes at borders due to g aware of standards for instance ion of EAC maize as development of mentation plan, all have reasing exports of d scope of project might ace it is only three 8 months project d its major export is sesame is logical. The ocation to guide both also relevant for the investment some ing that data on	The project has a solid logic. It is mostly clear and easy to understand the relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. However, there are some points that could be strengthened. Outcomes appear realistic.  Assumptions are mostly included. Most outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. Most project implementers have a good understanding of the programme logic, the problem

being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can explain the logic and reasoning to others. Most expected outputs/outcomes are relevant the strategies of TMEA, the partner SEATINI is a trade and advocacy organisation as also identified in TMEA organisations, the project appraisal report, and from its strong grassroot farmer EAC, the target membership and partnerships in trade and negotiations. SEATINI government and objective has been to increase marketing of farmer produce by target beneficiaries, improving quality produce at different levels of value chain and as applicable. It is advocating for good policies. The organisation had however, not been mostly clear how strong in regional integration. TMEA contribution thus contributes to they contribute to SEATINI objective of increasing farmers' incomes through trade in the **Contribution to TMEA and partner strategy** aggregate strategic EAC. By increasing farmers' awareness on regional integration and outcomes and relevant standards for major export crops, it will contribute to increase contribute to a in Exports from Uganda and ultimately from the East African coherent TMEA Community, which are major objective of TMEA. Maize is a major strategy. Where export from EAC while Sesame is an upcoming oil crop with income there are enhancing potential in Uganda Lobbying Uganda government to discrepancies in the implement maize standards and ensure design and implementation of relevance to the Sesame standards, increased awareness of these standards and various reduced rejection rates of these products across the borders all organizations, the contribute to TMEA's export capability thematic area, under its organisations have a Strategic objective three. SEATINI also works alongside the Uganda good understanding Grain Council who have networks of farmers that are supported of the issues and through good storage for maize across different regions of Uganda so implications for the as to increase standards as well. Through this partnership, the number organisations. of farmers receiving information on regional integration on maize Interventions are standards across the value chain is increased, and together with the mostly consistent grain Council, the process of ensuring passing of the Uganda grain and complementary policy will be accelerated. with activities supported by projects in TMEA and/or by other donor organizations.

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Adaptive management of plans and budgets

SEATINI's advocacy intervention is factual and based on studies on key issues, challenges of the advocacy issue. SEATINI has been engaged in interactive research processes for instance research on challenges faced in meeting standards for maize and sesame so as to inform development of multi-stakeholder strategic plan as well as production of policy briefs. All this research has gone through processes of validation and wide collection of facts and adapting findings for founded results. SEATINI is also a member of various value chain platforms and in most meetings the recurring problem is that various exports are being rejected in various markets. Through such interactions, research and validation platforms, SEATINI is sure to implement relevant activities to achieve expected outcomes. SEATINI has a functioning monitoring and evaluation plan that is fed by the results chain linked to overall TMEA SO3 strategy. SEATINI has always provided its progress reports on time, regularly attends both TMEA partner meetings and wider advocacy platforms including parliamentary forums where it has representation on agriculture committee and the National Monitoring Committee for Non Tariff barriers. In its regular interaction with Project Officer at TMEA and its representation at National Oversight Committee, SEATINI has had a chance to communicate challenges it faces, and progress it is making with SO3 Project Management at SEATINI. SEATINI has not experienced significant budget adjustments and is still implementing both activities and budgets as per donor guidelines.

The current SEATINI project is a follow on project from what TMEA previously funded, mainly to improve SEATINI capacity to implement Regional Integration awareness among population. Some of the products from the first phase including mobilisation for enacting of the national engagement of stakeholders has helped SEATINI garn the necessary experience that has seen it complete most of its outputs because it knows the entry points.

The project team identifies and understands all of the strategic and operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are well founded and insightful. The project manager and team is always proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (outputs and outcomes) and implementing actions to avert or overcome them, enlisting others support where necessary. The funder is alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the implementing organisation always follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is regularly analysed and the project plan adjusted as necessary to ensure they are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs systematically and is based on updated and complete MPs. There

is strong evidence that innovations or best practices have been used during project management. SEATINI represents SO3 on NOC where it has a chance to communicate The project team its mandate, progress of work. From SEATINI side, the project office manages runs the day to day management of the grant and is funded fully by the relationships with project, and this officer works closely with TMEA project manager for key stakeholders and SO3. SEATINI has embarked on standards work with other funders proactively stakeholders like MEACA, The Grain Council of Uganda, Uganda Bureau and face-to-face of Standards, all of which contribute to achievement of its project goal. communication SEATINI regularly attends national stakeholder forums and TMEA occurs on a regular organised meetings and regularly updates TMEA on progress. SEATINI basis (e.g. monthly). has a good working relationship with TMEA and its contribution is well Stakeholders and the Relationship management and communication taken by partner organisations like DFID and bilateral donors. It project team have a regularly updates TMEA with reports, adhoc and planned good and common achievements and passes some of its advocacy work through its understanding of website, where a page has been created specifically for the project. theirs, and each This has assisted many stakeholders to embrace SEATINI work and for other's, roles and TMEA to be fluent in the strategies and lessons that SEATINI has responsibilities. All experienced. Our team finds a close relationship between what parties put in partners told us about SEATINI tasks, what the farmers confessed to be considerable effort experiencing and what TMEA management explained about the to build and maintain project. effective working relations. Communication is open, trusting and constructive. Verbal and written communications systematically provide useful implementation insights, lessons learned, recommendations

Franslating inputs into outputs

and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always received on time, are accurate, informative and results orientated in that they provide a clear picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans.

Previously SEATINI had capacity gaps to implement the project as determined from a due diligence. Later, this has been resolved and TMEA has assisted in capacity enhancement making the ratings higher. This has greatly improved its capacity to conduct trainings, conduct advocacy tasks than was possible before. SEATINI also relies on long established networks of women and other farmer organizations in districts of operation that have helped it cheaply mobilize farmers and also get benefits closer to the person that needs them most. The organization works closely with ministry of East Africa Community Affairs and Uganda National Bureau of Standards to acquire green lights and popularize the standards to a wider audience.

SEATINI employed a cluster training approach, where few farmers, traders and groups have received training on standards and regional integration, and only one district has been supported to come up with ordinances on maize standards. The trained farmers are expected to reach out to others through multiplier effect, while through exchange visits, farmers will come to Nakaseke (model maize standards district) and go back to implement the standards in their districts, thus increasing both the direct and indirect project outputs by working. This approach has been possible because SEATINI already had long established networks of women and farmer groups, and its being able to work closely with strategic agencies like MEACA, UNBS, MTIC that would help the organisation quickly seal through processes of passing grain bylaws.

SEATINI originally planned outputs have generally been achieved on time and in some instances over exceeded. By the time of evaluation, TMEA had planned to have reached 10000 farmers but had exceeded it to 21000 people, due to the efficiency of its advocacy campaigns. At this rate, with a national civil society advocacy plan, maize standards tabled in parliament and agreement on sesame standards reached with UNBS, all project outputs will be achieved as planned.

The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date.

EFFECTIVENESS	Translating outputs to outcomes, including gender	SEATINI has already achieved most of its short-term and intermediate outcomes, for an MOU is already signed with government showing the different roles to be taken in development of sesame standards; the recommendations of different stakeholders have been incorporated in the current draft maize standards for adoption by Uganda, through research and various validation platforms. There has been more than the targeted number of skills training to farmers, traders in maize and sesame on standards and regional integration. However, there are some outcomes where there has been significant effort by lack of data on them does not allow the evaluation team to make a clear conclusion on whether targets have or will be met. These include the reduction in rejection rates for maize and sesame due to quality issues and the number of farmers that are indirectly reached through awareness programs. At project design, gender was not so much an issue considered by the project, but during implementation, the project team leader/TMEA ensured mainstreaming of gender in all aspects including gender disaggregated data collection and targeting for those to benefit from trainings. There is however no evidence that the volume of trade in maize has increased in Uganda as a result of TMEA support or that the number of maize export rejections have reduced as a result of TMEA intervention.	A majority (50 to 75%) of outcomes/targets are achieved (at project-level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement predominantly focuses on short and medium term outcomes. Where implementation is on-going, there is good evidence that short term outcomes are being achieved. Moderate consideration has been taken of gender issues; if implementation is advanced some gender-positive changes have been observed.
	Additionality	SEATINI is an advocacy and trade facilitation organisation but has not been with competence in regional integration. Through this initiative, its visibility in regional integration issues has increased by creating for it platforms to share findings and advocate for maize and sesame standards. Without this support, SEATINI would not have thought of such a project with cross border implication and given that in Uganda, SEATINI had also been implementing its other programs in the same districts (three out of over 100 districts in only Uganda).	There is strong evidence that the project or initiative would have not occurred without TMEA funding.

SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved

The standards work has so far been supported by consultants including those that develop the district ordinances, conduct research before advocacy resumes. Much as there is currently not adequate inhouse capacity to complete these research activities in TMEA, the activities have often been facilitatory rather than fully engaged consultants. This has allowed chance for cross learning between consultants and staff, and is a good area where such activities are locally empowering to staff, that will run the organisation/project once the project moves.

SEATINI standards project is facilitatory and recognizes that numbers and alliances matter to ensure effective lobbying for standards of maize not only in Uganda but in EAC. In its core activity, SEATINI has developed a civil society advocacy strategy plan, that will be used but itself as well as other organisations working to promote standards in Uganda including in districts where SEATINI does not operate. This plan can be used with or without SEATINI, which will allow for continuation of project objectives even without SEATIN active future participation.

The interventions are also channelled through districts for instance the Nakaseke district maize ordinance has been embraced and passed by district Council, and the district officials have been involved at different activities promoted by the project including trainings on standards, awareness sessions. The ordinances in force now are district ordinances and will be monitored through district commercial office structures as well as district forums on value chain development, where they exist.

SEATINI also makes deliberate efforts to engage relevant departments to push forward its agenda. Through engagements, some government ministries have benefited from its work for instance MEACA has borrowed its advocacy strategic plan for formulate its Advocacy strategic Framework which will guide MEACA to meet its motives for promoting regional integration among MDAs and other organisations. On the same note, SEATINI also engages relevant authorities to have a look and consider enacting or supporting efforts towards harmonisation and initiating standards for key value chain crops in Uganda and beyond. SEATIN in this initiative has the buy in from UNBS and MTIC as shown by the MOU they have signed. In so doing SEATINI will not only see its outputs come out faster but also ensure that they are owned by for instance the standards body, and the upcoming standards join a list of standards being enforced by the government bodies.

The project however has not secured funding of the project beyond its current funding, yet there is a likelihood of further work to be completed to have strong sustainability of results.

Several activities are included to address sustainability and are mostly clear and relevant. Monitoring of the sustainability of some of the outcomes is planned or undertaken. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated. The strategy includes a broad description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Most ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad and realistic plan of how to fund these.

IMPACT	Achieving long-term outcomes	Through organised training for farmers and groups, there has been observed increase in number of traders buying from supported groups in Masindi and Nakaseke districts of Uganda. Before intervention farmers used to sell maize without grading but with the project intervention, maize has been sorted and averagely attracts UGX 700 from 400 UGX it used to attract at project set up. Much as this increment might not be entirely contributed by TMEA, even a small increment is remarkable. This shows how beneficiaries are moving to increased compliance to EAC standards for maize, and by implementation, this effect could have effected both females and males since they have been actively engaged in implementation. It is however still very early assess the extent to which these results do contribute to increasing business competitiveness.	There has been some intended or unintended or unintended progress (25-50%) towards long-term outcomes (i.e., Increasing physical access to markets; Enhancing trade environment and improving business competitiveness), or this is moderately likely to occur in future. Some measurement of the project's contribution to these outcomes has been completed, and the results chain articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts (whether convincing or not). Limited consideration has been taken of differential impacts for men and women.

# **Uganda Country Programme**

GOOD	Needs improvement	Moderately good	Good	Very good
	Clear evidence of unsatisfactory functioning; serious weaknesses across the board on crucial aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Adequate performance overall; some serious, but non- fatal weaknesses on a few aspects. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Good performance overall; might have a few slight weaknesses but nothing serious. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree	Very good or excellent performance on virtually all aspects; strong overall; no weaknesses of any real consequence. About 80%-100% of findings fit with description to a considerable or high degree
RELEVANCE Project clarity and logic	Country programme retending less-relevant efficompetitive advantage we find that the program well with the programme that the long term outcoprojects. The theory of clear. All programme pathe programme hangs to the overarching logic.  We further find that the TMEA's overall EAC stratuganda with respect to donors and to the intensinternally consistent (the projects supported by Tarue of the URA, SCT, Ounder the revised result impact is total trade grown impact is total trade	After the 2014 finalization of the revised theory of change, the Uganda Country programme refined and refocused its programme. This included ending less-relevant efforts and refocusing on projects core to TMEA's competitive advantage and in line with its overall objectives. As a result, we find that the programme logic is clear. All projects assessed lined up well with the programmatic goals and reinforce each other in such a way that the long term outcomes are likely to exceed the sum of individual projects. The theory of change itself makes the internal assumptions clear. All programme participants were able to contextualize both how the programme hangs together and the role of individual projects within the overarching logic.  We further find that the UCP's expected outcomes are highly relevant to TMEA's overall EAC strategy, to the strategies of the Government of Uganda with respect to Regional Integration, to other partners and donors and to the intended beneficiaries. The projects within the UCP are internally consistent (they support each other) and complementary to projects supported by TMEA in other EAC countries. This is particularly true of the URA, SCT, OSBP, NTB and standards efforts.  Under the revised results framework of 2014, the long term expected impact is total trade growth. include:  • Increased trade  • Imports and exports within EAC  • Exports outside of EAC (rest of the world)  • Competitiveness index		The project has a strong logic, which is a clear and easy to understand relationship between 1) the expected outcomes from short term through to longer term; 2) between outputs and outcomes. Outcomes appear very realistic. Assumptions are explicit and relevant. The outputs appear necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes, taking into account the assumptions. All project implementers have an excellent understanding of the programme logic, the problem that is being addressed and the relationship between the parts and can convincingly explain the logic to others.

Contribution to TMEA and partner	
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- To and from the Port of Mombasa
- Volume to and from the Port of Mombasa
- Time savings against a baseline at select border posts
- Dwell time at the Ports of Mombasa and Dar
- Reduction in transit time through Uganda
- Proportion of border crossing incorporating gender sensitive activities in IBM implementation
- User satisfaction rating with targeted border crossing infrastructure

These outcomes are support by a number of UCP projects, including:

- OSBPs
- Ntungamo-Mirama Hills roadway

# SO-2 Increased ease of trade as indicated by TAB ranking

- Common market protocol and customs union commitments implemented
- Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures
  - Reduction in customs clearance times
  - Key trade information available on electronic information portals
  - Reduction in physical escort of transit vehicles
  - Growth of percentage of women who use key trade portals
- High priority NTBs eliminated
- Effective framework for managing trading standards across EAC
  - Increase in regionally harmonized standards
  - Growth in tests provided by UNBS
  - Reduction in time to test and certify intra-regional export products
  - Enhanced capacity to certify products for export under private standards schemes

These outcomes are support by a number of UCP projects, including:

- MEACA
- MTIC, UNBS
- MTIC, NMC and NTB Reporting
- URA, ASYCUDA World, ECTS, AEO, eSwift
- SCT

 SO3 - Enhanced business environment for trade as indicated by the number of new or revised policies The expected outcomes are highly relevant to the strategies of TMEA, the partner organisations, the EAC, the target government and target beneficiaries, as applicable. It is clear how they contribute to aggregate strategic outcomes and contribute to a coherent TMEA strategy. Interventions are fully consistent and complementary with activities supported by projects in TMEA and/or by other donor organizations.

# adopted and newly adopted policies that address gender-specific issues

- Number of PSO/CSO recommendations adopted and number specific to women adopted
- Improved processes for traders, and particularly women traders
  - Reduction in certification and testing costs for goods traded by women
  - Reduction in border crossing times for traders and particularly women traders
  - Women increase their understanding of EAC trade key trade procedures, benefits and opportunities

These outcomes are support by a number of UCP projects, including:

- OSBP/IBM
- Uganda Grain Council
- SEATINI
- Uganda Shippers Council
- PSF Uganda
- Uganda Women in Trade

Overall, expected project results map up to programme results. We note very limited programme outputs with no corresponding project outputs, of which some may be covered by regional programme efforts not in scope for this evaluation:

- Kagitumba bridge construction
- Regional MRAs agreed to and implemented
- Progress towards drafting and implementing the EAC Strategy for Negotiating the Tripartite FTA and the draft EAC Tripartite Work Plan
- Progress towards development of Mutual Recognition Agreements of Key Product standards identified/reccommended by the EASC
- Reduction of time spent crossing the border for small traders, women traders etc.
- No and type of tools/law/policy to support the domestication of EAC gender policy on cross border trade developed
- Number of mutual recognition mechanisms operational (MRAs and similar mutual facilitative agreements operational; single visas issued) on TMEA supported interventions
- Number of SMEs(traders, buyers, coops, adopting agreed testing practices
- No of farmer groups trained on EAGAP disaggregated by gender
- Truck driver training materials and trainings produced

Of these, the most significant gap is outputs for small trader and women trader border crossing time reductions, which may well be facilitated by overall efforts to reduce crossing times, facilitate and ease procedures for

		small volume traders, product specific initiatives, and ePortal information dissemination.	
EFFICIENCY	Adaptive management of plans and budgets	TMEA has gone through a number of changes during the course of the programme in its M&E structure which, while improving the overall M&E approach, has led to some problems for partners trying to keep up. The UCP has generally made good use of the monitoring and evaluation system. Uganda has regularly received good rankings on use of the MIS. Most projects are on track for reporting the M&E system and UCP has regularly received high marks in the annual reviews for its use of the system. But it is largely used as a repository for information and not a system for active management. Further reporting has been somewhat ad hoc, in that TMEA has pushed for results reporting from project inception, prior to their being results to report on. TMEA has been a bit schizophrenic in that it seeks both results and activity reporting to fill its own various management and reporting needs, though officially it should be focused on results reporting only.	The project team identifies and understands some of the strategic and most of the operational issues concerning the project. Actions taken or recommended actions to overcome implementation issues are usually well founded and provide some insights. The project manager and team are normally proactive at monitoring implementation and progress towards results (mostly outputs and sometimes outcomes) and usually implements actions to avert or overcome them. The funder is mostly alerted to potential issues or issues in a timely manner; and the project team usually follows funder management (financial and otherwise) guidelines. The project implementation context and problem to be addressed is periodically analysed

adjusted as necessary to ensure activities, outputs and outcomes are relevant and realistic. Monitoring occurs on a regular basis and is mostly based on updated and complete MPs.There is moderate evidence that innovations or best practices have been used during project management.

and the project plan

# Relationship management and communication

The UCP has exhibited very strong relationship management, communication and reporting approaches. The UCP was challenged during the revision to the corporate theory of change and the resulting reorientation of priorities and increased focus on areas of competitive advantage. In particular, certain relationships with potential partners and PSOs/CSOs were put on uncertain footing and the UCP had to make a particular effort to re-establish trusting relationships. Further as the donor pool extended beyond DfID, effort was made to maintain reporting and management structures that satisfied multiple new partners. The UCP managed both of these challenges in exemplary fashion. All partners reported good working relationships, satisfaction with the frequency and quality of formalized meetings, informal and ad-hoc meetings and generally satisfaction with reporting documents.

There is some concern with meeting the reporting needs of a variety of donors and partners, including lack of clarity regarding activity vs. output reporting and clear presentation of financial information. However, partner dialogue with TMEA on these issues has been constructive and well-received. Donors do have some current concerns regarding the formulation of TMEA's strategy 2 and have drafted a letter to TMEA outlining these concerns.

The project team manages relationships with key stakeholders and funders proactively and faceto-face communication occurs on a regular basis (e.g. monthly). Stakeholders and the project team have a good and common understanding of theirs, and each other's, roles and responsibilities. All parties put in considerable effort to build and maintain effective working relations. Communication is open, trusting and constructive. Verbal and written communications systematically provide useful implementation

			insights, lessons learned, recommendations and actions to address any issues raised. Regular project monitoring reports are always received on time, are accurate, informative and results orientated in that they provide a clear picture of performance and achievements against monitoring plans.
	Translating inputs into outputs	Project monitoring documents indicate that on balance most projects are generating planned outputs in a timely manner and those outputs are largely relevant to hoped-for outcomes. Not all projects are on schedule, but those that are on schedule or complete are delivering results that indicate a likelihood of meeting programmatic targets. Of greatest schedule and/or outcome concern are:  • Ntugamo-Mirama Hills Road • Elegu OSBP • SEATINI	The planned (original or agreed readjusted outputs) are produced in a mostly timely manner, are of a good quality and mostly remain relevant to the desired outcome. The targets achieved are almost the same as planned (originally or agreed adjustments to the monitoring plan). The project is completed or expected to be completed between 1 and 3 months of the original planned date.
EFFECTIVENESS	Translating outputs to outcomes, including gender Transitioning Outputs	TMEA has not yet determined whether or not it has met its targets for 2014/15 trade levels, its top line outcome, which is problematic. Likewise its expected result in SO1 are not yet measured. SO2 outcome is currently exceeding target and SO3 is meeting targets on one measure and is not yet expected to meet targets on the other. Further, several key project measurements indicate good progress toward goals. In particular:  • Time to import/export goods through Mombasa is exceeding target  • OSBP completion is exceeding target  • Common market protocols and customs union commitments implemented to date exceed target	A majority (50 to 75%) of outcomes/targets are achieved (at project-level and/or in TMEA's results framework and theory of change). Achievement predominantly focuses on short and medium term outcomes. Where

	<ul> <li>Customs clearance time reduction is exceeding targets</li> <li>Elimination of physical escort of transit trucks is meeting target</li> </ul>	implementation is on- going, there is good
	MTB elimination is exceeding target (as counted in the results)	evidence that short
	framework) <sup>56</sup>	term outcomes are
	<ul> <li>UNBS testing capacity is exceeding target</li> </ul>	being achieved.
	<ul> <li>UNBS certification capacity is exceeding target</li> </ul>	Moderate
	<ul> <li>UNBS testing and certification time is exceeding target</li> </ul>	consideration has
	<ul> <li>The number of PSO/CSO women-focused policies adopted are exceeding target</li> </ul>	been taken of gender issues; if
	Women's awareness of EAC standards is exceeding target	implementation is advanced some
		gender-positive
	In addition to formal intermediate outcome targets, projects are reporting	changes have been
	other outcomes that are likely to contribute to the SO objectives and	observed.
	ultimately the programmatic indicator. For example:	
	<ul> <li>ASYCUDA world is reducing processing time for customs submittals</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>SCT and URA/KRA integration is increasing preclearance usage and reducing delays in port</li> </ul>	
	Standards compliance growth is increasing agricultural export	
	demand within EAC	
	<ul> <li>Standards compliance is being successfully integrated with local ordinances at the District level</li> </ul>	
	MEACA has become an acknowledged focal point and clearing	
	house for Regional Integration activities and reporting within the Ugandan Government	
	Gender has been better mainstreamed within the past year than it had	
	been in the programme previously. However, gender targets are	
	somewhat limited within the results framework. What targets that do	
	exist are being met with the same, if not better, level of success as other, non-gendered, targets.	
	The general level of consensus, among all stakeholders for all projects	
_	assessed for this evaluation is that TMEA involvement sped up implementation of interventions by 4 to 8 years. We do not find it a flaw,	There is evidence that
ality	however, that most considered projects would eventually have happened	the project or initiative would not
Additionality	without TMEA, as the very design of the programme – integrating TMEA	have occurred without
Add	with government priorities through a consultative process - is what	TMEA funding.
	grounded the programme, made it effective, and met stakeholder needs.	5

 $^{56}$  We note, however, that the framework counts an NTB as "eliminated" if a single instance is resolved – this approach does not address the durability of the resolution.

SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability addressed; sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved	Our most significant concern about the UCP is the limited consideration of sustainability built into the various projects assessed. While UCP is better positioned than the RCP in terms of sustainability, there is clearly more that can be done. Sustainability is considered in project design and ownership of systems and is typically pre-defined. However, capacity building programmes often focused on staff-training at partners resulting in trained up staff that had the skills to leave partners for better jobs (a reoccurring theme). Further, where system or facility maintenance is required, it would be best practice to get a commitment, where possible in the MOU for maintenance. This is largely lacking, though it has not yet resulted in abandoned or un-maintained systems or facilities.	A few activities are included to address sustainability although they are not always clear. Only a few outcomes are being monitored for sustainability. A relatively clear exit strategy exists and is periodically updated and includes a description of how some project activities or the benefits thereof will be sustained on completion. Some responsibilities are outlined. Several ongoing maintenance or operational costs have been estimated and the organisation has a broad plan of how to fund these, although plans may not always be realistic.
IMPACT	Achieving long-term outcomes	As discussed above, the UCP has made fair progress toward several of its long-term outcomes. However, a number are yet to be measured. Many, but not all projects are measuring their contributions to long term outcomes. For example:  • Mirama Hills OSBP is not yet measuring crossing time (not yet complete)  • Busia OSBP is not yet measuring crossing time  • MEACA is meeting or exceeding all targets other than resource center visitor numbers  • MTIC is meeting or exceeding all NTB removal targets, other than bilateral MOUs signed  • UNBS is meeting or exceeding all targets other than harmonized standard numbers  • URA is meeting or exceeding all targets other than DPC commissioning and pre-arrival clearance rates. Of particular note:  • AEO inspection rate reductions are exceeding target (now 0)  • AEO customs clearance time reductions are meeting target  • Customs clearance time reductions are exceeding target  • Customs clearance time reductions are exceeding target  • Clearing and forwarding agency integration with ASYCUDA World is exceeding target	There has been strong intended or unintended progress towards impacts (50-75%) on long-term outcomes (i.e., Increasing physical access to markets; Enhancing trade environment and improving business competitiveness), or this is likely to occur in future. Measurement of the project's contribution to these outcomes has been completed, and the results chain convincingly articulates the linkage to these ultimate impacts. Moderate consideration has been taken of

- Physical inspection rate reductions are exceeding target
- Transit time reductions for transit goods is exceeding target (now 2 days from entry to exit)

The UCP has a clear vision of how each of these projects will contribute to overall outcomes and this is articulated in each results chain. There is some consideration of the impact of some of the projects within the programme on women and some projects have features specifically designed to address these differences. These include:

- Design of OSBPs to accommodate the specific needs of women and children
- Design of IBM process to meet the needs of small traders (many of whom are women
- Outreach to SMEs (many of which are women-owned) to sensitize on standards and grow capacity to export
- Outreach to women traders via the Women in Trade Project
- Outreach and training geared toward women farmers in the SEATINI project

Other projects have been less successful at considering the specific needs of women and incorporating those needs in project design and implementation. These include:

- NTB reporting system
- MEACA
- URA AEO, ECTS and ASYCUDA World
- Mirama Hills Road

differential impacts for men and women.

## **Annex 5: Case Studies**

Case studies accompany the report.

# **Annex 6: Photographs**

Photographs accompany the report.

# **Annex 7: Quality Control Guide**

Guide accompanies this report in a separate document.

# **Annex 8: UCP Projects and their link with Strategic Objectives**

UCP's overall objective is increased trade, defined as

- o Increase in imports and exports within EAC
- o Increase in exports outside of EAC (rest of the world)
- o Increase in the competitiveness index

This target is supported via three long-term strategic objectives:

#### SO1 - Reduced transport time and transport volume growth

- o To and from the Port of Mombasa
- Volume to and from the Port of Mombasa
- o Time savings against a baseline at select border posts
- o Dwell time at the Ports of Mombasa and Dar
- o Reduction in transit time through Uganda
- Proportion of border crossing incorporating gender sensitive activities in IBM implementation
- o User satisfaction rating with targeted border crossing infrastructure

These SO1 outcomes are support by a number of UCP projects, including:

- o OSBPs
- o Ntungamo-Mirama Hills roadway

#### SO-2 – Increased ease of trade as indicated by TAB ranking

- Common market protocol and customs union commitments implemented
- o Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures
  - Reduction in customs clearance times
  - Key trade information available on electronic information portals
  - Reduction in physical escort of transit vehicles
  - Growth of percentage of women who use key trade portals
- o High priority NTBs eliminated
  - Effective framework for managing trading standards across EAC
  - Increase in regionally harmonized standards
  - Growth in tests provided by UNBS
  - Reduction in time to test and certify intra-regional export products
  - Enhanced capacity to certify products for export under private standards schemes

These SO2 outcomes are support by a number of UCP projects, including:

- MEACA
- o MTIC, UNBS
- MTIC, NMC and NTB Reporting
- o URA, ASYCUDA World, ECTS, AEO, eSwift
- o SCT

SO3 - Enhanced business environment for trade as indicated by the number of new or revised policies adopted and newly adopted policies that address gender-specific issues

- Number of PSO/CSO recommendations adopted and number specific to women adopted
- o Improved processes for traders, and particularly women traders
  - Reduction in certification and testing costs for goods traded by women
  - Reduction in border crossing times for traders and particularly women traders
  - Women increase their understanding of EAC trade key trade procedures, benefits and opportunities

These SO3 outcomes are support by a number of UCP projects, including:

- o OSBP/IBM
- o Uganda Grain Council
- o SEATINI
- O Uganda Shippers Council
- o PSF Uganda
- O Uganda Women in Trade

# Annex 9: Assumptions and Limitations of the TRADE CBA Tool

TRADE was originally developed based on a need to develop a Value for Money (VfM) assessment in order to fulfill DfID reporting requirements. As such, the framework was prepared within the context of two sets of DfID guidance:

- 1. Guide to Investment Appraisal for DFID Economists, April 2005, and
- 2. How To Note: A Strengthened Approach to Economic Appraisals, February 2009

In specific, TRADE is designed to generate Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) outputs for TMEA programmes.

#### **CBA CONCEPT OVERVIEW**

CBA is a conceptual framework that quantifies in monetary terms as many of the costs and benefits of an intervention (e.g., a policy, project, measure) as possible. Benefits are broadly defined. They represent the extent to which people impacted by the intervention are made better-off, as measured – whenever possible – by their own willingness-to-pay. In other words, central to CBA is the idea that people are best able to judge what is "good" for them, what improves their well-being or welfare.

CBA also adopts the view that a net increase in welfare (as measured by the summation of individual welfare changes) is a good thing, even if some groups within society are made worse-off. Thus, an intervention would be rated positively if the benefits to some are large enough to compensate the losses to others.

Within a CBA framework, the timing of benefits and costs is also important because CBA is typically a forward-looking exercise, seeking to anticipate the welfare impacts of an intervention over its entire life cycle. Future welfare changes are weighted against today's changes through "discounting", which is meant to reflect society's general preference for the present, as well as broader intergenerational concerns.

Discounting is a method used to convert future costs and benefits into a common year. The procedure expresses future outcomes in their present value and permits the level-playing field comparison of options whose costs and benefits occur at different rates over time. The conversion involves the use of a discount rate, the annual percentage change in the present value of a future dollar (or other unit of account).

In general, with higher discount rates, less value is assigned to future costs and benefits. And because benefits tend to arise later then costs, higher discount rates will typically reduce an intervention's apparent value proposition.

The outcomes of any BCA rely on a large number of measurements, projections, and assumptions all of which are subject to considerable uncertainty. To account for that uncertainty, a variety of analytical techniques are available, including sensitivity analysis.

The primary purpose of a sensitivity analysis is to help identify the variables and model parameters whose variations have the greatest impact on the BCA outcomes, the so-called "critical variables." The sensitivity analysis may also be used to:

- Evaluate the impact of changes in individual critical variables how much the final results
  would vary with reasonable departures from the "preferred" or most likely value for the
  variable; and
- Assess the robustness of the BCA and evaluate, in particular, whether the conclusions
  reached under the "preferred" set of input values are significantly altered by "reasonable"
  departures from those values.

CBA is different in purpose and in scope from Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis.

Effectiveness Analysis is an effort to determine whether the impacts of an intervention are "as expected" (i.e., whether the intervention produces an improvement), and statistically significant.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, in contrast, compares the outcomes associated with using a given amount of resources in different situations. It has also been described, perhaps confusingly, as an effort to determine the "least costly way of achieving a given level of benefits" or service. Cost-effectiveness analysis does not require that benefits or outcomes be expressed in monetary units. The term "cost effectiveness," itself, is often used to represent the unit cost of achieving a stated objective. Thus, in transportation safety, interventions may be compared in terms of cost per accident avoided or per life saved. In transportation planning, estimates of the "cost per new user" are often used for new transport facilities. One important limitation of cost-effectiveness analysis, however, is that it does not help define the "optimal" (socially or otherwise) level of service provision, because total benefits are not compared to total costs.

CBA is also different from a Financial Analysis or Business Case Assessment. Where a *financial analysis* focuses on the costs and benefits accruing to a specific entity, and considers payments received by that entity (from other members of society) as a "benefit", CBA generally ignores transfers and considers a cost to be a cost, regardless of who is paying for it. In other words, the primary purpose of a CBA is to assess the total, societal costs and benefits of an intervention and to help identify the option - or mix of options - that maximizes "social welfare" per dollar invested.

CBA results in a number summary metrics that can be used for interpreting the economic analysis findings. These include:

- Present discounted value of direct and societal benefits;
- Present discounted value of direct and societal costs;
- Net Present Value: the present value of total benefits minus the present value of total costs;
- Benefit/Cost Ratio: the present value of total benefits divided by the present value of total costs:
- Internal Rate of Return: the discount rate that would give a countermeasure a net present value of zero; and

 Payback Period: the number of years until program implementation costs are recouped through the accumulation of annual benefits;

#### **VALUING TIME SAVINGS AND TRADE GROWTH IN EAST AFRICA**

A key input into the Cost Benefit Analysis is the value of saving time in transport. Delay cost savings drive about 43% of benefits in the project level approach. Given the scale of time savings expected, the value of that time greatly influences the predicted programme returns. In this analysis, we base the time savings value on work done by CPCS Transcom for the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Authority (NCTTCA) in 2010.57 CPCS estimates the direct and indirect costs of delay along the Northern Corridor based on available data, interviews, surveys and field observation. Their estimates of cost of delay are based on direct costs, inclusive of container freight station storage charges and demurrage charges, and indirect costs based on estimated opportunity cost for delay of delivery of items in transit as well as the opportunity costs of excess inventory necessary to account for uncertainty in stock delivery time. We take CPCS's country-specific estimates of costs and weight them, for those countries for which CPCS provides an estimate, by the total annual volume of goods shipped, to generate a region-wide per day cost of delay estimate of \$450.81. Of this \$301.44 is the direct cost of delay and \$149.38 is the indirect cost. Error! Reference source not found. describes the CPCS data on delay costs and the calculation of the weighted average.

Another key input, broadly applied across project analyses, is the annual rate of traffic growth. The CDS includes some data regarding national import and export volumes over time.<sup>58</sup> TMEA has historically applied a 5% average annual growth rate assumption to its economic analyses. Based on the CDS data, this assumption is reduced to 4.91% for this study. This assumption is applied to all pre-defined project analyses that impact commercial traffic except for the Rwanda Bureau of Standards intervention.

In most cases, it is difficult to obtain an estimate of current delay, much less a data series that might make it possible to extrapolate a delay growth estimate. For this reason, the analysis assumes that delays grow in direct proportion to the growth in over-all traffic.<sup>59</sup>

A major benefit resulting from infrastructure enhancement projects is the incremental increase in trade volume resulting from the reduction in transport cost. Induced trade benefit is evaluated based on the percent change in transport time and the effect of transport costs on trade. The elasticity of trade with respected to transport cost used in TRADE is based on Limão and Venable's (2001) model<sup>60</sup>. Their analysis is based on 4,516 bilateral trade flows focusing in the most part on sub-Saharan African economies. They estimate an elasticity of trade flows to transport cost factor in the range of -2 to -3.5. The analysis applies an elasticity of -2.5 to transport cost reductions. Within

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> CPCS, Analytical Comparative Transport Cost Study Along the Northern Corridor Region, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Nathan Associates, Corridor Diagnostic Study, see for example, Trade and Traffic Forecast page 17, Trends in Landlocked Countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> For further discussion see Section 5.1.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup>Limão N and Venables A J (2001) 'Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage, Transport Costs, and Trade', *The* World Bank Economic Review, 15, 451-479.

TRADE, all projects that reduce transport time apply this assumption to estimate the benefits of trade growth. The trade growth benefit is estimated based on the time improvement generated by the intervention relative to the average total shipping time and the estimated profitability of the additional trade induced. The analysis assumes a very conservative profitability of 2.5% based on prior TMEA economic analyses.

## Value of Delay Reduction per Day Calculations

Costs way Day of Dalay in USC	Duranda	Kanya	Haanda	Domondi	Southern	Weighted
Costs per Day of Delay in US\$	Rwanda	Kenya	Uganda	Burundi	Sudan	Avg.
Transported goods per truck (V)	55000	40000	50,000	60000	65000	
Capital opportunity cost (C)	30%	25%	30%	30%	45%	
Fixed vehicle operating costs per						
day (T)	318	220	372.67	225.69	220.32	
Total direct costs per day ((V*C)+T)	363.21	247.40	413.77	275.01	300.46	301.44
Cost of unreliability per day						
3 months inventory value	600000	600,000	600000	600000	600000	
1 month extra stock	200000	200,000	200000	200000	200000	
Capital opportunity cost	30%	25%	30%	30%	45%	
One month extra stock opportunity						
cost	60000	50,000	60000	60000	90000	
Extra stock opportunity cost per						
day	164.38	136.99	164.38	164.38	246.58	149.38
Total hidden costs per day	527.59	384.38	578.15	439.39	547.03	450.81
Share of total tonnage, 2008	4.3%	62.3%	28.2%	2.7%	2.5%	

The value of delay reduction is applied to all pre-defined projects except the Rwanda Bureau of Standards (RBS), Burundi Office of Revenue (OBR) and ASSET interventions. The ASSET and OBR projects do not rely on a time savings valuations, though such time savings may exist. The RBS project does rely on a time savings valuation, but is based on a Rwanda-specific value of \$209.59, which excludes vehicle operation cost savings which are not relevant to that intervention.

#### **VALUING REVENUE GENERATION**

Strictly speaking, revenues gains cannot be referred to as an economic benefit as the collection of taxes represent a transfer payment within the economy. However, increased revenues do give some indication of the efficiency gains expected to result from a more equitable and efficient taxation system. Better revenue administration is likely to both reduce economic distortions within the economy and to improve income distribution. For the purposes of this TRADE analysis, however, revenue gains were not factored into the estimation of benefits.

#### APPLICATION OF DISCOUNTING

All economics analyses of investments require discounting. This is true of the more simplified Performance Evaluation Matrix approach and of the CBA approach. Discounting reflects a "time value of money" concept. That is, a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. Why is money worth more today than tomorrow? DfID's economic assessment guidance provides two main reasons for applying discounting.

The first of these reasons is the *time preference of money*:

"A given sum has a lower subjective value to a person or society, the later it arises. A person offered the same sum now or in the future will normally choose to have it now, and will subjectively discount the value of getting the same sum in future. This is true even if there is complete certainty about receiving the sum in future, and results from myopia, an urgent need for gratification (e.g. because of poverty or greed) or the belief that future consumption will be greater (hence the marginal utility of a given amount of consumption will be less). Governments, acting on behalf of their citizens, reflect these collective concerns through social time preference, for example where they expect future average incomes to be higher than now. However, governments can, and should, take a longer view than that commonly held by individual citizens, since society will continue, whereas individual mortals will not."

The second reason for discounting future flows of value is the opportunity cost of capital:

The second reason for discounting is the opportunity cost of capital. A sum of money is worth more now than in the future because it can be invested profitably or lent for interest right away. In this case the discount rate is the inverse of the rate of interest. Capital committed to a project earning a return in future could have been earning interest or profits now. The discount rate reminds us of what is being forfeited, and sets a threshold rate of return for the project to achieve.

In a cost benefit analysis, because the costs are typically separated in time from the flow of benefits – that is, the costs are usually upfront and the benefits accrue over time – discounting is very useful for orienting our thinking around the true difference in value between the two categories.

The *discount* rate, then, indicates how much more one values present consumption (utility) versus future consumption (utility). The higher the discount rate the more one values present consumption relative to future consumption. The lower the discount rate the more one values future consumption relative to present consumption.

When a time flow of values – either costs or benefits – is discounted using the correct discount rate and summed together, the product is a *present value* (PV). The formula for the PV of a flow of expenditures (costs) is represented as follows:

$$PVC = \sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{C_t}{(1+r)^t}$$

Where, PVC is the present value of costs

Ct is the cost at a given time, t, and

r is the discount rate

These are summed for all time points to generate the present value. Where the PVC is deducted from the PV of benefits (PVB) you generate the *net present value*.


The DfID guidance suggests that the best discount rate to use in a given analysis is that estimated by the client of the proposed intervention as their social discount rate. However, the guidance is also realistic that most DfID clients are unlikely to have conducted such analysis. The model is predefined with a 10% discount rate, the rate used in the 2012 CBA update. However, the model also allows for the user to adjust the rate.

#### APPROACH TO PROJECTS SPANNING MULTIPLE PROGRAMMES

A number of the projects pre-defined within TRADE are funded out of multiple programme budgets. To avoid double-counting, falsely claiming the full benefit of an improvement multiple times within the overall analysis, TRADE applies a method of allocating benefits across programmes. To accomplish this, TRADE includes the capability to allocate a given benefit stream to multiple programmes. Where an intervention is represented in multiple programmes we divide and allocate its benefit. Though it is conceivable that one programme may have a greater per dollar impact on the project than another (because, for example, they are funding different aspects of the improvement, or different phases), TRADE allocates benefit based on the proportion of the undiscounted budget contribution to the overall cost. For example, both the Tanzania and Burundi programmes are funding processing improvements at the Kabenga/Kobero border crossing. Of the almost \$11 million budget for improvements, the Tanzania programme is funding 57.4%. As such, whatever benefit is estimated from those improvements will be allocated 57.4% to the Tanzania programme and 42.6% to the Burundi programme.

The diagram below illustrates how the allocation of project effects between contributing programmes will flow through the economic analysis:

# Illustration of Project Benefit Allocation in the Economic Analysis



#### PRE-DEFINED DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS

TRADE includes baseline assumptions for all programmes that can be adjusted or overwritten by the user. This section discusses the types and sources of such data and assumptions.

#### **DEFINITION OF TMEA'S PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS**

For the purposes of TRADE, TMEA's projects have been organized into seven programmes. These are:

#### Kenya

The Kenya Programme includes projects coded 901 through 999 and includes the Kenya Mombasa Port project.

#### • Uganda

The Uganda Programme includes projects coded 1001 through 1099.

#### Tanzania

The Tanzania Programme includes projects coded 1101 through 1199

#### Rwanda

The Rwanda Programme includes projects coded 1201 through 1299

#### Burundi

The Burundi Programme includes projects coded 1301 through 1399

#### South Sudan

The South Sudan Programme includes projects coded 1401 through 1499

#### • All Regional Programmes combined

The Regional Programme includes Economic Corridor and Transport (projects 101 to 199), EAC (201 to 299), Regional Integration (301 to 399), PSO/CSO (401 to 499), EATIP (1501 to 1599), and TCIP (1601 to 1699)

Certain programmes have overlapping projects. For example, the Regional programme may fund a port improvement that is also being funded by the Ugandan programme. Separate budgetary contributions from separate programmes to the same improvement effort have unique coded projects within each contributing programme.

#### PRE-DEFINED PROJECTS AND PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS

TRADE includes pre-defined data and assumptions relating to the set of TMEA projects that were included in the 2013 CBA update, as well as an expanded Kagitumba border crossing inclusive of the Gatuna road. While these projects are pre-defined within TRADE, users may adjust these pre-defined data and assumptions or exclude specific projects from their analyses, if desired. The table below describes the projects pre-defined in TRADE and the basis of the estimated impact of each project currently included in TRADE.

## **Summary of Pre-Defined Projects Included in TRADE**

	B 1 (1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project	Basis of Impact Estimate
Authorities responsible for Mombasa port and port	
users improve efficiency and effectiveness of port	
operations	TMEA Subject Matter Expert
Border agencies improve the efficiency and	TMEA Subject Matter Experts;
effectiveness of border processing at Taveta/Holili	Logframe
Border agencies improve the efficiency and	TMEA Subject Matter Experts;
effectiveness of border processing at Busia	Logframe
Border agencies improve the efficiency and	
effectiveness of border processing at Nimule	Logframe
Uganda Revenue Authority improves efficiency of	TMEA Subject Matter Experts;
customs processing	Logframe
Border agencies improve the efficiency and	TMEA Subject Matter Experts;
effectiveness of border processing at Mutukula	Logframe
Border agencies improve the efficiency and	TMEA Subject Matter Experts;
effectiveness of border processing at Tunduma	Logframe
Border agencies improve the efficiency and	TMEA Subject Matter Experts;
effectiveness of border processing at Kobero/Kabanga	Logframe
Tanzania Port Authority improves its efficiency whilst	
providing for growth	Logframe
Border agencies improve the efficiency and	
effectiveness of border processing at	
Kagitumba/Mirama Hills and support construction of	TMEA Subject Matter Experts;
an improved Gatuna Road.	Logframe
RRA and other agencies reduce time to process & clear	
goods.	TMEA – RW RRA Study
RBS improves quality infrastructure for implementing	
standards, testing and certifying products	From RBS in TMEA RBS CBA
ASSET operational on the economic corridors	ASSET Business Case

In addition to these, TRADE includes certain pre-defined projects for which, as of the 2012 CBA update, TMEA had either no impact estimate, or for which there was no counterfactual data available, or for which it was uncertain that funding would be requested. These projects are pre-defined project categories within TRDE but TRADE includes no data or assumptions for these projects, though the user may input them as desired. These are listed in **Error! Reference source not found.** 

# Other Pre-Defined Projects with No Impact or Cost Estimates

Project	
Bujumbura airport improves customs management	
Bujumbura port improves efficiency of goods processing	
Burundi Office of Revenue: Enhancement of taxpayers's compliance level	

#### Project

South Sudan Customs Service improves the efficiency of import and export processing by 2014

SSCS improves efficiency of cross-border processing at selected borders

Reducing Freight Logistics Costs through a strong regional clearing and forwarding agents Federation Advocacy Implementation

TRADE includes assumptions about these projects that represent the most recent information available at the time of initiation.

TRADE evaluates the impact of TMEA interventions at the individual investment level. Generally this means evaluating the traffic impacts at a specific border crossing or port. Project benefits are quantified in three categories:

- Time Savings a direct benefit of the majority of interventions included in the analysis
- Induced Trade additional profitability for EAC firms based on time savings for export goods and reduced prices for import consumption. The induced trade does not feedback into the traffic forecast or time savings and may result in over-estimation of time savings benefits
- Improved Capital Availability This is specific to the ASSET Project and results from reduced borrowing requirements to fund transit bonds

In each case the benefits are calculated based on a forecasted counterfactual condition and an estimated impact of intervention. The estimated impacts of intervention at the project level are based on indicators described in TMEA logframes and monitoring and evaluation plans. TMEA has generated these impact estimates by analyzing available baseline information, synthesizing where possible differing information and using in-house subject matter experts who understand the projects as well as the context for implementation.

#### ESTABLISHING THE COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITION AND SOURCES OF DATA

There is no region-wide source for traffic and delay estimates at the network segment level in East Africa. TRADE's project level analysis method is forced to rely on data widely differing in collection technique, timing, quality and certainty by location. For locations where a border audit had been conducted, this data is considered and generally included. Where the relevant port authority or customs agency had performed a time release study in the recent past, this data is included in the current version of TRADE. For port and border post improvement projects a baseline traffic level is first defined, inclusive of expected diverted traffic, where relevant. A baseline dwell or processing time, depending on the investment type, is also defined. Both of these baseline conditions are then forecasted over the analysis period based on an assumed rate of average annual traffic growth regionally and a direct relationship between traffic growth and wait time growth.<sup>61</sup> For non-

Beyond the BPR Curve: Updating Speed-Flow and Speed-Capacity Relationships in Traffic Assignment.) It is not

<sup>61</sup> The assumed relationship between traffic growth and queue time growth is based on accepted forecasting models for traffic delay in conditions where facilities grow from at capacity to 10% over capacity. (See Singh, R.

infrastructure projects – ASSET, OBR and the RBS capacity enhancement project, for example – the baselines are defined in the project studies and logframes and are relied upon in the economic model. The ASSET counterfactual is assumed to grow at the same rate as all traffic. The RBS counterfactual testing growth is pre-defined as growing at 6.5% annually, as forecasted by RBS.

The intervention cases are generally based on the TMEA programme indicators as specified in the TMEA programme logframes and/or Outcome Monitoring Plans. They are specific to the interventions included in the analysis. In most cases these are specified as improvement factors or percentages relative to the baseline condition. In one case, the Port of Mombasa, no TMEA indicator has been developed yet and improvement values estimated by TMEA subject matter experts are relied upon. For ASSET, a first year dollar value of benefit is estimated for Kenya traffic only in the ASSET study. This figure is relied upon in the economic model and is assumed to grow with the general growth of total traffic. For certain projects, as identified by TMEA, incremental O&M costs are also estimated based on an assumed factor of 5% of total investment costs required for operations and maintenance annually which is based on straight line funded depreciation over a 20-year useful asset life, with no variable costs -- typical of a road. The true incremental O&M cost will, of course, vary greatly with the type of asset. These are specified in the economic model as costs, not disbenefits, and are therefore added to the denominator in the benefit/cost ratio.

Each intervention has a specified lifecycle and start date. TRADE calculates benefits over this lifecycle by project. However the CBA metrics are based on the portion of each project's costs and benefits that fall between 2010, the first year of TMEA expenditure, and 2025, ten years after implementation.

Costs and benefits are discounted based on a base year of 2012 and a discount rate of 10%. <sup>62</sup>DfID's Guide to Investment Appraisal recommends using the Treasury Green Book rate when the country of expenditure does not have a domestically estimated discount rate. While EAC as a whole does not have a recommended rate, it was generally agreed that 3.5% would be too low and that a rate between 8 and 12% would be more reasonable, given the costs of capital in the region. <sup>63</sup> NPV and B/C ratio metrics are computed based on these discounted values. The IRR metric, often described as the rate of return, calculates the discount rate necessary to bring the flow of costs and benefits back to a present value of zero. Estimated IRR should therefore be compared to a "hurdle rate," a rate that indicates the minimum necessary return to make a project worthwhile.

#### **Incremental O&M Costs**

clear that delay at border posts necessarily result from capacity limitations, and this assumption therefore represents a limit to the analysis. However, testing of the effect of the forecasted delay time growth indicates that it drives less than 1% of the total benefits and therefore this assumption does not represent a significant limit to the robustness of the model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> As the analysis relies on a base year of 2012, TMEA expenditures in 2010 and 2011 are subjected to an inverse discounting to generate a present value for costs in those years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> It should be noted that the prior analysis of the Uganda programme, the most recently completed CBA that this project is intended to update, utilized a discount rate of 12%.

The analysis of those projects that are implementing significant new infrastructure assumes that the operating entities will be faced with net new operating and maintenance costs. Though those costs will not be borne by TMEA, they are included in the analysis of the net project effects as an addition to the investment costs. O&M costs are broadly estimated to be 5% of total investment costs in each year of operation. The 5% is based on straight line funded depreciation over a 20-year useful asset life, with no variable costs -- typical of a road. The true incremental O&M cost will of course vary greatly with the type of asset.

#### Other Project-Specific Data and Assumptions

The above data and assumptions apply to most or all project level analyses. There are other projectspecific estimates utilized in the analyses. These typically relate to location-specific traffic volumes and delays.

#### **Limitations of the Analysis**

The economic analysis was undertaken with the greatest care and due diligence possible given the limited timeframe for the CBA production and given the limited scope of the ToR.<sup>64</sup> Readers should note, however, the following limitations which affect the analysis outputs:

- 1. The analyses rely on TMEA's own estimates of programme and project effectiveness, no external validation of these estimates was undertaken for this exercise:
- 2. The analyses rely on limited and uncertain information about traffic flows and delay conditions. Considerable effort was made by the consulting team and by TMEA to validate these estimates based on multiple, and often conflicting, sources of information;
- 3. Only a subset of TMEAs interventions are easily or reliably quantifiable. As such, this study only captures a sub-set of the benefits likely to result from TMEA interventions but captures all the planned investment costs. The results therefore likely understate the returns on the TMEA investment; and
- 4. Lastly, the CBA represents our best assessment of the likely impact of TMEA programmes given our understanding of the programmes and conditions at a given point in time. The analyses presented here rely on several assumptions and uncertain data. As assumptions are adjusted over time and improved data is collected the outputs of the CBA analyses will change. Possible improvements that may occur in the future include:
  - Programme cost estimate updates
  - Improved traffic forecast data
  - Improved intervention impact estimates
  - Inclusion of additional projects in the analysis
  - Improved estimates of delay growth

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> The TOR specifies this exercise as an update of existing analyses based on changes in programme investment levels and plans and as such does not provide the capacity for a greatly extended analysis.

- Improved estimates of the responsiveness of trade growth to delay reductions
- Improved estimates of the cost of delay
- Improved and more geographically-specific estimates of the average shipment value
- Improved understanding of interdependencies among variables